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ABSTRACT: 
This thesis concerns the tension that exists between the principles of certainty and freedom 
of contract (which includes the notion of contractual discretionary powers) and how this 
tension impacts on the requirement that agreement must be reached on the price and 
rental in contracts of sale and lease, respectively. 
The matter at issue is whether South African law should recognise the validity of contracts 
of sale at a reasonable price and lease and rental respectively, and/or at a unilaterally 
determined price or rental as suggested in an obiter dictum of the Supreme Court of Appeal 
in NBS Boland Bank v One Berg River Drive and Others; Deeb and Another v ABSA Bank Ltd; 
Friedman v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA) and in an obiter dictum 
of the then Appellate Division in Genac Properties JHB (Pty) Ltd v NBC Administrators CC 
1992 (1) SA 566 (AD). Currently, the law requires that the price (in the case of sale) or the 
rental (in the case of lease) must be certain, in the sense that it is either ascertained or 
objectively ascertainable. The price is ascertainable if there is agreement between the 
contractants on an external standard in light of which the price may be ascertained 
objectively without further reference to the contractants: Westinghouse Brake & Equipment 
(Pty) Ltd v Bilger Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1986 (2) SA 555 (A). 
The obiter dicta in the One Berg River and Genac cases suggest that an agreement to a 
reasonable price or rental or to unilaterally determined price or rental meets this 
requirement.  
The basis for both obiter dicta can be found in the principles of freedom and sanctity of 
contract that form the cornerstones of the South African law of contract. The conceptual 
framework of public policy forms the outer limits of both freedom and sanctity of contract. 
The thesis considers whether a development in South African law that recognises the 
validity of a contract of sale or lease at a price or rental determined unilaterally by a 
contractant or at a reasonable price or rental, respectively, is contrary to public policy as 
informed by the values embodied in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 
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and whether it would promote consensus and certainty, which are foundational principles 
of South African law of contract. Consideration is also be given to the question whether such 
a development is defensible in law, and desirable as a matter of policy and practice.  
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Chapter 1  
Overview and summary 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The question dealt with in this thesis concerns the tension that exists between the principles of 
certainty1, and freedom of contract2 (which includes the notion of contractual discretionary 
powers), and how this impacts on the requirement that agreement must be reached on the 
price and rental in contracts of sale and lease respectively.3 
At issue, is whether South African law should recognise the granting of a discretionary power to 
one of the contracting parties to unilaterally determine the price, or the rental, as suggested in 
an obiter dictum of the Supreme Court of Appeal.4 Currently, the law requires that the price and 
                                                            
1    Certainty is one of the general requirements for the validity of contracts in general. Van der Merwe, van 
Huyssteen, Reinecke and Lubbe Contract: General Principles (2012) 192, hereafter Van der Merwe et al 
Contract; Hutchison, Pretorius, Du Plessis, Eiselen, Floyd, Hawthorne, Kuschke, Maxwell, Naudé and De Stadler 
The Law of Contract in South Africa (2012) 210-216, hereafter Hutchison et al Contract. See further paras 1.3.2 
and 1.3.3 below and in chapter 2 paras 2.2 and 2.7.  
2    Freedom of contract is discussed in paras 1.3.1 and 1.3.3 below and in chapter 2 paras 2.2-2.4 and 2.7. 
Freedom of contract and certainty underpin the South African law of contract: Hutchison et al Contract 21-24. 
Certainty and freedom are also principal attributes of the law in general: Hund & Van der Merwe Legal Ideology 
and Politics in South Africa: a social science approach (1986). Hence, the two concepts form the basis of the 
discussion throughout the thesis. 
3     The price and rental are essentialia (essential terms) in contracts of sale and lease respectively. Essentialia are 
terms required by law and typify a contract as being, for example, a contract of sale or lease or exchange etc. 
4  NBS Boland Bank v One Berg River Drive and others Deeb and another v ABSA Bank Ltd Friedman v Standard 
Bank of South Africa Ltd 1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA) para [32], hereafter NBS Boland Bank 1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA). The 
case dealt with a discretionary power granted to financial institutions to change, unilaterally, the interest rates 
on housing loans extended by them. The obiter flies in the face of a wealth of authority going back to Gaius that 
advocate against granting a contractant the power to unilaterally settle the price. See further para 1.2 below. In 
Westinghouse Brake & Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Bilger Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1986 (2) SA 555 (A), hereafter 
Westinghouse 1986 (2) SA 555 (A), the Appellate Division said that “[t]here can be no valid contract of sale if 
the parties have agreed that the price is to be fixed by one of them” (547C-D). See also Murray & Roberts 
Construction Ltd v Finat Properties (Pty) Ltd 1991 (1) SA 508 (A) 514G-H hereafter Murray & Roberts 1991 (1) SA 
508 (A); Lambons (Edms) Bpk v BMW (Suid-Afrika) (Edms) Bpk 1997 (4) SA 141 (SCA) 158F-H, hereafter 
Lambons 1997 (4) SA 141 (SCA). The position was left unchanged in the recent decision of the Constitutional 
Court in Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC), hereafter 
Everfresh 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC), without the court expressing an opinion on the matter. In casu, the court 
expressed the opinion that a duty of good faith exists in respect of pre-contractual negotiations. The case 
concerned a clause in a lease agreement that gave the Appellants the option to renew the lease on expiry on 
the same terms and conditions, subject to agreement being reached on the rental. The Respondents rejected 
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rental must be certain in the sense that it is either ascertained5 or objectively ascertainable. The 
price is ascertainable if there is agreement between the contractants on an external standard6 
in light whereof the price may be ascertained objectively without further reference to the 
contractants.7 
The obiter dictum in NBS Boland Bank v One Berg River suggests that a discretionary power to 
unilaterally settle the price and rental meets this requirement. Linked to the proposition 
contained in that obiter dictum is the question whether contracts of sale and lease at a 
reasonable price or rental, respectively, should be regarded as valid8 as suggested in an obiter 
dictum of the then Appellate Division.9 The basis for the obiter dicta may be found in the 
principles of freedom and sanctity of contract that form the cornerstones of the South African 
law of contract.10 The conceptual framework of public policy forms the outer limits of both 
freedom and sanctity of contract.11 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
the offer of renewal and argued that the renewal clause did not constitute a legally binding and enforceable 
right and that it was hence not obliged to negotiate. The question before the Court was whether the common 
law should be developed in terms of section 39(2) so as to place a duty on the parties to negotiate in good 
faith.  The minority judgment held that the issue had merit and that it should be referred back to the High 
Court for determination. Whilst the majority acknowledged the importance of infusing the common law with 
constitutional values, it left the question open by deciding that it was not in the interests of justice to entertain 
the appeal, the Appellants having raised the constitutional issues for the first time in the Constitutional Court. 
5  The price will be ascertained if an amount is fixed in the contract: Kerr The Law of Sale and Lease (2004) 33, 
hereafter Kerr The Law of Sale and Lease. 
6  For example, a formula. Currently, the following, inter alia, are regarded as valid formulae: usual price, implied 
price, market price, matching clauses (lowest price of a competitor). See further para 1.4.2 below. 
7  Westinghouse 1986 (2) SA 555 (A), 547 C-D. This will, hereafter be referred to as the Westinghouse principle; 
Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille Corporation of South Africa (Pty) Ltd 1964 1 SA 669 (W) 670C-D, hereafter 
Burroughs Machines1964 1 SA 669 (W). The impact of the obiter dicta in Everfresh 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC) on the 
current legal position is dealt with in chapter 4 para 4.2.4.4. 
8   Currently, such contracts are void: Adcorp Spares P.E. (Pty) Ltd v Hydromulch (Pty) Ltd 1972 (3) SA 663 (T) 668, 
hereafter Adcorp1972 (3) SA 663 (T). 
9   In Genac Properties JHB (Pty) Ltd v NBC Administrators CC 1992 (1) SA 566 (AD) 578 B-C, hereafter Genac 
Properties 1992 (1) SA 566 (AD). The case concerns a contract of lease and is briefly dealt with below in paras 
1.2 and 1.4.2 below and also chapter 4. Currently, the Appellate Division is known as the Supreme Court of 
Appeal. 
10  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) paras [57] and [87], hereafter Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC).  The 
case is discussed in para 1.3.3 below and in chapters 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.  
11  Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) paras [29] and [30]. 
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The thesis intends to determine whether a development in our law that recognises the validity 
of a contract of sale and lease at a price determined unilaterally by a contractant or at a 
reasonable price or rental, respectively, is contrary to public policy12 as informed by the values 
embodied in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 199613 and whether it promotes 
consensus and certainty of the law which are foundational principles of South African law of 
contract. In the process, consideration will be given to the question whether such a 
development is defensible in law, and desirable as a matter of policy and practice. The 
following main themes will be explored: 
1. The tension that exists in the law of contract between certainty and contractual 
freedom and the role and function of public policy. 
2. The recognition of a duty of good faith and its role and function in relation to the 
essentiale of price. 
3. A discussion of the policy considerations and relevant provisions of consumer-
orientated legislation14 and how these relate to the principles of freedom and certainty 
of contract. The aim is to determine the validity and desirability of a development as 
proposed in the obiter dicta15 in the context of these policy considerations. 
4. The constitutionality of a clause that leaves the determination of the price and rental to 
the sole discretion of one of the contractants as well the constitutionality of an 
agreement to pay a reasonable price or rental. The question will be considered whether 
the views expressed in the obiter dicta give expression to the constitutional values of 
dignity, equality and freedom. 
                                                            
12   As defined in Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) para [30]. See further para 1.3.3 below. 
13  Hereafter the Constitution.  
14  For example, the National Credit Act 34 of 2005, the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999, and the Consumer 
Protection Act 68 of 2008. See the discussion in chapter 3. 
15  The obiter dicta propose the recognition of contracts of sale and lease at a reasonable price and rental 
respectively, or a unilaterally determined price or rental.  
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5. The role and function of essentialia will be investigated with a view to establishing the 
critical function and value of essentialia, and, hence, the importance for both parties to 
be involved in the formulation of the content of the obligations that will bind them.16  
6. The desirability of courts of law functioning as contract-creating mechanisms which may 
be the ultimate, albeit unintended, consequence if the obiter dicta are accepted as law.  
7. The approaches in other jurisdictions17 that allow the price and rental to be determined 
unilaterally or by the standard of reasonableness. International instruments18 will also 
be examined with a view to ascertaining the legal position in an international law 
context. The aim will be to determine what lessons may be learnt from the international 
experience.  
 
1.2 Current legal position regarding the question of law 
This part sets out, briefly, the current legal position regarding the question of law19 as well as 
the views expressed in support of a reform of the law in this regard. 
In Westinghouse Brake & Equipment v Bilger Engineering,20 the Appellate Division explained 
that the price must either be ascertained or objectively ascertainable.21 The price will be 
                                                            
16   See further para 1.4.2 below and chapter 4 and in particular para 4.2.4. 
17  The United States of America, England, Scotland, Germany, the Netherlands. The jurisdictions to be 
investigated are those referred to by the court in NBS Boland Bank 1999 (4) SA 928(SCA) case as examples of 
modern legal systems with which our own legal system is “sadly” out of touch (para [16]). See the discussion in 
chapter 5. 
18  The United Nations Conventions on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980) (CISG); UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts (2004) (UNIDROIT Principles (2004)); Principles of European 
Contract Law (2003) (PECL).See further chapter 5. 
19  The question of law being whether South African law should sanction a contract that allows the unilateral 
determination of a price or a rental, and whether contracts of sale and lease at a reasonable price or rental 
should be regarded as valid. See para 1.1 above. 
20  1986 (2) SA 555 (A). See also Murray & Roberts 1991 (1) SA 508 (A) 514G-H; Lambons 1997 (4) SA 141 (SCA) 
158F-H.  
21  There is a marked similarity between contracts of sale and contracts of lease. Cooper Landlord and Tenant 
(1994) 6-7, hereafter  Cooper Landlord and Tenant, makes the following observation:  
“Paradoxically, the fundamental difference between lease and sale emphasizes their affinity, for, as Pothier 
says: 
‘…[L]ease, when analysed, is seen to be a species of sale for lease connotes, in a measure, not the 
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ascertainable if there is a formula in the contract in light whereof the price may be ascertained 
objectively without further reference to the contractants. Thus, it should be possible for an 
outsider to determine the price by employing the formula.22 The court also held that “[t]here 
can be no valid contract of sale if the parties have agreed that the price is to be fixed by one of 
them.”23 Further light was cast on the requirement that the price must be ascertainable in 
Adcorp Spares P.E. (Pty) Ltd v Hydromulch (Pty) Ltd24 where the Court held that an agreement 
to pay a reasonable price is not valid  because there is no objective standard in light of which it 
may be ascertained. 
A similar position prevails in the law of lease. In Letaba Sawmills (Edms) Bpk v Majovi (Edms) 
Bpk,25 the Appellate Division acknowledged that a valid contract of lease exists where the 
contractants agreed to a formula whereby the rental could be determined. In Benlou Properties 
(Pty) Ltd v Vector Graphics (Pty) Ltd26 the Appellate Division accepted that an agreement that 
one of the contractants has an unfettered discretion to settle the price is not permissible. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
sale of a thing itself which has been let, but the sale of the use and enjoyment of the thing for the 
period of the lease, and the amount fixed as rent is the price of the use and enjoyment.’ 
Since lease is akin to sale it is governed by similar rules. Hence the principles applicable to sale and lease are 
alike in matters relating to the formation of the contract, e.g. the fixing of the price or rent…If there is doubt 
regarding the law of lease, we may go to the law of sale for an analogy.” 
Because of the similarity between the law relating to price and rental, I will henceforth, for the sake of 
convenience and brevity, refer mainly to the law relating to the price in contracts of sale. Differences between 
the two will be highlighted. For the law of sale see Westinghouse 1986 (2) SA 555 (A), 547 C-D; Kerr The Law of 
Sale and Lease 33 et seq.; Bradfield, Lehmann, Khan, Havenga, Havenga & Lotz Principles of the Law of Sale and 
Lease (2010), 18 et seq, hereafter Bradfield et al Principles. For the law of lease see Proud Investments (Pty) Ltd 
v Lanchem International (Pty) Ltd 1991 (3) SA 738 (A) 746 G-H, hereafter Proud Investments 1991 (3) SA 738 (A); 
Letaba Sawmills (Edms) Bpk v Majovi (Edms) Bpk 1993 (1) SA 768 (A), hereafter Letaba 1993 (1) SA 768 (A); Kerr 
The Law of Sale and Lease 257 et seq.; Bradfield et al Principles 74 et seq.; Cooper Landlord and Tenant 54-55. 
The requirement that the price must be ascertained or objectively ascertainable is dealt with in chapter 4.  
22  Examples of what are currently are regarded as valid formula are: usual price, implied price, market price, 
matching clauses (lowest price of a competitor).See further para 1.4.2.2(C)(ii) below. 
23  At 547C-D.See also Murray & Roberts 1991 (1) SA 508 (A) 514G-H; Lambons 1997 (4) SA 141 (SCA) 158F-H; 
Burroughs Machines 1964 1 SA 669 (W) 670C-D. 
24  1972 (1) SA 663 (TPD) 668. 
25  1993 (1) SA 768 (A) 775 B-G. 
26  1993 (1) SA 179 (A) 184 I- 186D. 
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In light of, inter alia, the Westinghouse and Adcorp Spares cases27 the current legal position 
may be summarised as follows: 
(i) An agreement to pay a reasonable price is not valid because one of the 
essentialia, the price, is lacking in the sense that it is neither ascertained nor 
objectively ascertainable; and 
(ii) The recognition of contractual discretionary power does not extend to 
agreements enabling a contractant to unilaterally settle the price. 
Before discussing the case law that has called the current legal position into question, it is 
apposite to briefly summarise the history of the current state of law. 
The Institutes of Justinian required that the contractants had to agree to a definite price to 
conclude a valid contract of sale.28 The price had to be ascertainable from the contract and it 
was permissible for the price to be set by a third party.29 The same rules applied in respect of 
rental in contracts of lease.30 The concept of a reasonable price was not known to Roman law.31 
The rule against unilateral determination of the price may be traced to Gaius32 who was of the 
view that the determination may not be made by the buyer.33 The Codex extended this rule to 
                                                            
27  Westinghouse 1986 (2) SA 555 (A). Adcorp 1972 (3) SA 663 (T) 668. 
28   Institutes 3.23.1 in Moyle Imperatoris Justiniani Institutiones (1923) 433, hereafter Moyle Imperatoris. See also 
Sandaris The Institutes of Justinian (1934) 363, hereafter Sandaris The Institutes.  
29   Institutes 3.23.1 in Moyle Imperatoris 433. See also Sandaris The Institutes 363. Van der Bergh explains that 
Roman jurists argued in favour of third party determination because it brought objectivity and was indicative of 
the contractants’ trust and belief that the price would be fair and just: Van der Bergh “The Roman tradition in 
the South African contract of sale” (2012) 1 TSAR 53, 60-67, hereafter Van der Bergh (2012) 1 TSAR.   
30  Kerr & Glover ‘May Essential Provisions of a Contract be Determined by One of the Parties Alone’ (2000) 117 
SALJ 201, 203, hereafter Kerr & Glover (2000) 117 SALJ. 
31  Van der Bergh (2012) 1 TSAR 62. 
32  Mommsen, Krueger & Watson The Digest of Justinian 18.1.35.1 Volume 2 (1985) 518, hereafter Mommsen et al 
The Digest of Justinian. 
33  Mommsen et al The Digest of Justinian 18.1.35.1 Volume 2 (1985) 518. See also Digest 18.1.35.1 in Moyle 
Imperatoris 433. Du Plessis ‘The Unilateral Determination of Price in Roman Law’ (2012) 18 (1) 15-31 
Fundamina provides an in-depth and insightful exposition of the debate surrounding the validity of unilateral 
price determination in Roman Law.  
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prohibit the unilateral determination of the price by either contractant.34 The same holds true 
for rental in lease agreements.35  
The Roman statements of law are not accompanied by any explanation and were stated as a 
self-evident rule.36 The probable reason for the rule that the price must be ascertained or 
objectively ascertainable is that because contracts are based on consensus, there has to be 
agreement on the essentials.37 Zimmermann postulates that the Romans regarded the rule as 
promoting certainty. The main reason against unilateral determination, according to 
Zimmermann, was the possibility of exploitation in that “the institutional check against gross 
and unreasonable contractual imbalance (namely negotiation about the price) had been 
removed.”38 Kerr also postulates that the Roman texts on the topic suggest that the basis of the 
rule is the promotion of certainty.39  
The Roman-Dutch writers accepted the Roman law principles in respect of price and rental with 
little comment.40 There is also very little evidence of the concept of a reasonable price in 
Roman-Dutch law.41 The Roman and Roman-Dutch texts have formed the basis for court 
decisions in South Africa to the effect that that the price or rental must be certain in that it is 
ascertained or objectively ascertainable.42 The current state of law that does not recognise 
sales or leases at a reasonable price or rental or at a unilaterally determined price or rental was 
                                                            
34    Codex 4.38.13 in Moyle Imperatoris 433. 
35  Institutes 3.24.1 in Moyle Imperatoris 438. 
36  Kerr Sale and Lease 65; Kerr and Glover ‘May Essential Provisions of a Contract be Determined by One of the 
Parties Alone’ (2000) 117 SALJ 201 203. 
37  Kerr Sale and Lease 65.  
38  Zimmermann The Law of Obligations Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990) 254, hereafter 
Zimmermann The Law of Obligations. 
39  Kerr Sale and Lease 58. 
40  Van der Bergh (2012) 1 TSAR  62. The following Roman-Dutch writers are recorded as supporting this rule:  
Grotius, Voet, and Van Der Keesel: Kerr Sale and Lease 55 & 59; Kerr & Glover (2000) 117 SALJ 203. Van der 
Linden refers only to sale whilst Huber referred only the inability of the buyer to settle the price unilaterally. 
Pothier also opined against unilateral price determination: Kerr & Glover (2000) 117 SALJ 203. See also Van der 
Merwe Contract 201-202. 
41  Van der Bergh (2012) 1 TSAR  62–63. 
42  Kerr Sale and Lease 66. Van der Bergh gives an insightful analysis of the historical development of the objective 
ascertainability rule from Roman times through to the present: Van der Bergh (2012) 1 TSAR 60-67. See also 
Van der Merwe Contract 202; Kerr & Glover (2000) 117 SALJ 202-205. 
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called into question by the obiter dicta in the Genac Properties43 and in NBS Boland Bank 
cases.44  
In 1992, in Genac Properties, a case that dealt with the terms of a contract of lease, the Court 
expressed the opinion that it was difficult to see on what principle a sale for a reasonable price 
or even a lease at a reasonable rental should be regarded as invalid. The court referred to the 
position in England and the United States of America in support.45 
In 1999, in NBS Boland Bank, the Supreme Court of Appeal, after reviewing the position in 
England, Scotland, Germany, the Netherlands and the United States of America, expressed the 
view that our law of sale is “sadly out of step with modern legal systems”46 in that it regards as 
invalid a contract of sale that gives to one of the contractants the power to unilaterally settle 
the price. The court summarised the reasons advanced for the current state of the law which 
resulted in the invalidity as follows: 
(i) One of the requirements for the validity of contract of sale is that the price must be 
certain. If the price is left to be settled by one of the parties then the price would be 
uncertain and the contract would consequently be invalid. The contract would be void 
for vagueness.47 
(ii) Such an agreement would lead to an unfettered exercise of discretion.48 
In criticising the present position in respect of the first reason above, the Court noted that our 
law regards as valid a contract where the contractants agree that a third party may settle the 
price or rental on their behalf. The court reasoned that in such a case the price is as “uncertain” 
                                                            
43  1992 (1) SA 566 (AD).  
44  1999 (4) SA 928 (A).  
45  At 578B-C. The court also echoed the view of Zeffert ‘Sales at a Reasonable Price’ (1973) 90(2)SALJ 113, 113. 
Zeffert argued that a fair and reasonable price is not void for vagueness because “...that which can be reduced 
to certainty is certain and an agreement to pay a reasonable price may be capable of being reduced to certainty 
if the court is able to determine what is reasonable and fair in the circumstances of a particular agreement” 
(113). 
46  Para [16]. 
47  Para [9]. 
48  Para [21]. 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
as it is when it is left to the discretion of one of the parties.49 Regarding the second reason, the 
Court said that at common law any discretion given to a contractant is not unfettered; it has to 
be exercised arbitrio bono [sc: boni] viri.50 Accordingly, the court was of the opinion that there 
is no reason why a contract that leaves the determination of the price or rental to the 
discretion of one of the contractants should be void for vagueness.51 
Van der Merwe et al52 agree with the criticism of the NBS Boland Bank court that the common 
law position in respect of contracts of sale was, as described by the court, “illogical” and “sadly 
out of step with modern legal systems.”53. The authors argue against the blanket prohibition of 
a discretionary power54 and state that the recognition of a discretionary power to settle the 
price does not mean that the exercise of power is unassailable. In this regard, they propose 
“that the risk of exploitation”55 should be addressed by subjecting the exercise of such power 
“to judicial control with reference to considerations of objective reasonableness.”56 In light of 
developments regarding public policy, they suggest that courts will be “sensitive to the need to 
protect a party against the possibility of exploitation” and that one approach might be “to 
regard a so-called unfettered discretion as valid unless shown to be unreasonable and against 
public policy” – each case to be decided on its own merits. The other approach, and one 
apparently not favoured by the authors, would be “to hold that, because an objective limitation 
on the exercise of contractual power is in itself a reflection of public policy, it is to that extent 
                                                            
49  Para [9]. 
50  Para [25].The term “arbitrio bono [sc: boni] viri” is explained as the decision of a reasonable person or simply a 
reasonable decision: Claassen Dictionary of Legal Words and Phrases vol. 1 (2011) 146-147. See also Erasmus 
and Others v Senwes Ltd and Others 2006 (3) SA 529 (T) 538. See further chapter 4 para 4.3. 
51  Para [32]. 
52  Contract 209.  
53  Para [16]. 
54  At 234–237. 
55  The risk of exploitation may be regarded as a major concern in this regard. See further chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
56  At 238 and 234–243. 
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not a matter of dispositive law and that a stipulation to the effect that a power is unlimited is 
ineffective.”57 
In the development of the thesis, the views formulated by the authors will, inter alia, be 
considered and explored as part of determining whether or not the approaches the obiter dicta 
suggest should be adopted.58 
 
1.3 The tension that exists in the law of contract between contractual freedom and the 
requirement of certainty, and the role and function of public policy 
Brief expositions of freedom of contract, certainty, and public policy are given to establish the 
foundation for later chapters as well to found a basis for the thesis and hence for a 
determination of whether not the obiter dicta should be adopted in our law.59 It is necessary to 
deal with the position in the law of contract in general because the general principles of the law 
of contract pervade and inform the requirements of all specific contracts, of which the 
contracts of sale and lease are but two.  
 
1.3.1 Freedom of contract 
In general, private law functions to facilitate arrangements by legal subjects in their personal 
and commercial relations with each other. It provides a forum and a framework whereby legal 
subjects may, for example, enter into a marriage, or acquire property, or conclude contracts, if 
                                                            
57  At 242. 
58  The content of the issues raised by the authors are discussed in chapters 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. 
59  Each of these fundamental principles of South African contract law has a bearing on the question of law, 
namely whether validity should be bestowed on contracts of sale at a reasonable price or at a unilaterally 
determined price as proposed in the obiter dicta. Freedom of contract theorists would support the obiter dicta 
on the basis that individual autonomy that forms an integral part of freedom of contract should be given effect 
to. See further on freedom of contract chapter 2 and in particular para 2.2.2 and chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6. 
Adherents of certainty may argue against the recognition of the obiter dicta on the basis that the standard of 
reasonableness in relation to price introduces uncertainty in a fundamental area of contract creation. See 
further on certainty chapter 2 para 2.6 and generally in chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6. It will be argued that public 
policy considerations as informed by the Constitution will ultimately be definitive in the determination of the 
question of law. See further chapter 4. 
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they so desire.60 In particular, the law of contract provides an enabling framework within which 
parties can choose to establish and exchange rights and obligation.61 A contract is an 
agreement that is recognised by the law and that gives rise to enforceable rights and duties.62 
The law of contract deals, therefore, mainly with the two questions of agreement and 
enforceability.63 The Digest64 specifies that the essence of an obligation is “that it binds another 
person to give, do, or perform something for us.”65 
Contractual obligations, unlike other legally enforceable obligations,66 arise because of a 
conscious and voluntary act on the part of each of the contractants.67 It follows that the 
contractants must have the requisite intention to reach an agreement and thereby to create 
obligations.68 Implicit in this is the principle of freedom of contract, meaning that an individual 
is free to decide whether to contract, with whom and on what terms.69 This principle goes hand 
in hand with sanctity of contract70 as expressed in the maxim pacta sunt servanda.71 The two 
principles form cornerstones of the South African law of contract.72 Hereunder follows a brief 
discussion of how freedom of contract may be limited. 
                                                            
60  Cranston Legal Foundations of the Welfare State (1985) 51, hereafter Cranston Legal Foundations.   
61  Bowles Law and the Economy (1982) 128, hereafter Bowles Law; Pretorius ‘The basis of contractual liability (1) 
Ideologies and approaches’ (2005) 68 THRHR 253, 259, hereafter Pretorius (2005) 68 THRHR; Kessler ‘Contracts 
of Adhesion – Some Thoughts About Freedom Of Contract’ (1943) 43 Columbia Law Review 629, 629. 
62  Van der Merwe et al Contract 7-8; Pretorius (2005) 68 THRHR 259. 
63  Cranston Legal Foundations 91; Bowles Law 128. 
64   Mommsen et al The Digest of Justinian 44(7)3 Volume 4 641.   
65   For an introduction to the historical development of the South African law of contract see Christie & Bradfield 
Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa 6ed (2011) 1-12, hereafter Christie & Bradfield Christie’s The Law 
of Contract.  
66  For example, in delict the obligation arises ex lege as a result of, inter alia, a wrongful act, and in unjustified 
enrichment the obligation arises ex lege because an enrichment and a corresponding impoverishment occurred 
without a valid legal cause. See also Hutchison et al Contract 8-9. 
67  Van der Merwe et al Contract 5; Vorster ‘The bases for the implication of contractual terms’1988 2 TSAR 161, 
163. 
68  Conradie v Roussouw 1919 AD 279, 288 and 320. 
69  Van der Merwe et al Contract  9. 
70  Hutchison et al Contract 22. 
71  Agreements freely entered into must be honoured and enforced. Van der Merwe et al Contract gives a succinct 
and informative overview of the development of the principle 17-18. 
72  The jurisprudential value of these principles and limitations thereof are dealt with in chapter 2 and particularly 
in paras 2.2 and 2.4. 
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1.3.1.1 Limitations on freedom of contract 
The freedom to enter into contracts is subject to various limitations, in terms of the common 
law, statute law, and, importantly, in terms of the Constitution and contractants may find that 
their agreement to create obligations has no legal effect or that it does not have the intended 
legal effect.73 What follows is a brief exposition of some of the ways in which contractual 
freedom may be limited.  
 
1.3.1.2 Common law 
(A) Contra bonos mores and public policy 
Contracts may be void for illegality if the subject matter of the contract, its object, or its 
conclusion is contra bonos mores or against public policy.74 In Sasfin v Beukes75 the court said 
that though the distinction between contra bonos mores and public policy may not be of 
importance in principle, in that there may be an overlap between the two, it is, nevertheless, 
convenient to make the distinction. The Court explained that “[a]greements which are clearly 
inimical to the interests of the community, whether they are contrary to law or morality, or run 
counter to social or economic expediency, will...on the grounds of public policy not be 
enforced.”76    
 
 
                                                            
73  Van der Merwe et al Contract 9-16. A brief discussion of some of the reasons for a limitation on freedom of 
contract is given in Hutchison et al Contract 24-26 and a comprehensive discussion is given in Aronstam 
Consumer Protection, Freedom of Contract and the Law Juta (1979), hereafter Aronstam Consumer Protection.   
74  Hosten Introduction to South African Law and Legal Theory (1995) 715, hereafter Hosten Introduction; Eiselen 
& Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment: A Casebook (1999) 89–91.  
75  1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 8. 
76  Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 8, hereafter Sasfin 1989 (1) SA 1 (A). See further on illegality Kerr The 
Principles of the Law of Contract (2002), 187-204; Van der Merwe et al Contract 165-191; Lubbe & Murray 
Farlam & Hathaway Contract Cases, Materials and Commentary (1988) 236–296, hereafter Lubbe & Murray 
Contract; Hutchison et al Contract 174-177; Du Bois, Bradfield, Himonga, Hutchison, Lehmann, le Roux, Paleker, 
Pope, van der Merwe & Visser Wille’s Principles of South African Law  (2007) 763-772, hereafter Du Bois et al 
Wille’s Principles. See further chapter 2 para 2.3. 
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(B) Requirements 
The requirements for contracts in general and specific contracts also have a bearing on 
contractual validity.  An example of a general requirement is that a person must have 
contractual capacity.77 An example of specific requirements is in contracts of sale where the 
requirements are that there must be an intention to buy and sell; there must be a merx (res 
vendita) and a price.78 These requirements limit contractual freedom since they prescribe the 
circumstances under which the exercise of such freedom will be effective. 
 
(C) Rules of interpretation 
Rules of interpretation also play a role in restricting the freedom to contract. It is a trite law 
that courts give effect to the real intention of the parties whatever the expressed intention may 
be.79 
 
(D) Implied terms  
Implied terms80 also have a bearing on the agreement between the contractants. In contracts of 
sale, the ex lege incorporation of naturalia such as the implied warranty against eviction and 
the implied warranty against latent defects, the existence whereof contractants are, in general, 
                                                            
77  Hutchison et al Contract: for example, a person must be major and of sound mind to conclude a valid contract. 
has comprehensive discussion of contractual capacity (chapter 5). 
78  Kerr Sale and Lease 8-75. 
79  In Vasco Dry Cleaners v Twycross 1979 (1) SA 603 (A), the respondent in an attempt to recover machinery from 
the appellants relied on a simulated contract of sale and resale between himself and the person who sold the 
machinery to the appellant. The court held that the true intention of the parties (the respondent and the seller) 
was to create a contract of pledge and not one of sale and resale. See also Maize Board v Jackson 2005 (6) SA 
592 (SCA) 596 A-F. See further chapter 2 para 2.4.5. 
80  The distinction between implied and tacit terms has been described as “trite” by the Supreme Court of Appeal 
in Seven Eleven Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd v Cancun Trading No 150 CC 2005 (5) SA 186 (SCA) para [33]. An 
implied term is one that is not expressly agreed upon between the contractants but which is imposed by 
operation of law (ex lege) and hence forms part of the contract unless validly excluded by the contractants. 
Tacit terms refer to the unarticulated intention of the contractants and are inferred from the express terms and 
the surrounding circumstances of the contract. Van der Merwe et al Contract 242; Hutchison et al Contract 
244-245 and 247-248; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 798-800; Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal 
Provincial Administration 1974 (3) SA 506 (A) 531-533. See also the discussion of tacit terms in chapter 4 para 
4.3.4.2(C)(viii). 
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unaware, impose obligations which significantly affect the legal relationship between the 
parties.81 
 
1.3.1.3 Self imposed limitations 
The contractants may by agreement impose restrictions on their own freedom to contract by, 
for example, providing that a contract or any amendments to an existing contract will have the 
cloak of validity only if it is reduced to writing.82 
 
1.3.1.4 Statute law 
Statutory attempts at balancing the bargaining power of contractants have also had the effect 
of curtailing the freedom to contract. Recent examples of legislation are the Prevention of 
Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act,83 Consumer Protection Act,84 the 
National Credit Act,85 and the Rental Housing Act.86 These statutes have a definite consumer-
friendly orientation which is evidenced in their respective preambles and in their provisions 
generally.87 
 
 
                                                            
81  Scott, Baqwa, Eiselin, Humby, Kelly-Louw, Konyn, Kopel, Mukheiber, Schoeman, Smit, Sutherland and Van der 
Bijl The Law of Commerce in South Africa: commercial law (2009) 158-164, hereafter Scott et al The Law of 
Commerce.  
82  Van der Merwe et al Contract General Principles 129 et seq. See also chapter 2 para 2.3.2.2(A) below.  
83  Act 19 of 1998. 
84  Act 68 of 2008. 
85  Act 34 of 2005. 
86  Act 50 of 1999. 
87  For example, the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 have the 
effect of nullifying a clause in a lease agreement entitling the lessor to forthwith evict a tenant on failure to pay 
rental (sections 4, 5, 6 and 8). The National Credit Act prohibits any agreement in a credit agreement that has 
the effect of excluding any common law rights that would otherwise be applicable (section 90(1)&(2)(c)). The 
Rental Housing Act, in criminalizing conduct such as locking out a tenant and disconnecting utilities (S16hA), 
effectively excludes terms in lease agreements giving discretionary powers to a lessor to do so. In imposing an 
implied warranty of quality, the Consumer Protection Act has effectively rendered meaningless a voetstoots 
clause in a contract of sale (section 56 read with section 55). See further chapter 3. 
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1.3.1.5 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 
All laws or forms of conduct which are inconsistent with the Constitution, as the supreme law 
of the land, are invalid.88 Courts are required to declare invalid any law or conduct that is 
inconsistent with the Constitution89 and every court, tribunal or forum is required to promote 
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights when interpreting legislation, developing the 
common law or customary law.90 It follows that contractual relations as regulated by common 
law or statute law are subject to Constitutional control and scrutiny.91 
 
1.3.1.6 Conclusion 
The considerations mentioned above illustrate that the notion that contractual obligations are 
reflective of the agreement of the parties, is subject to qualification. Qualifications are 
necessary and expedient in that they serve to regulate and promote legal intervention in a key 
area of the law by allowing for a balancing of principles and policies “so as to satisfy prevailing 
perceptions of justice and fairness, as well as economic, commercial, and social expediency”92 
                                                            
88  Section 2. 
89  Section 172 (1)(a). 
90  Section 39(2). 
91  Barkhuizen2007 (5) SA 323 (CC), para. [15]. In Du Plessis v De Klerk and Another 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) the 
Constitutional Court decided that the interim Constitution does not, as a general rule, have direct horizontal 
application. Whilst the matter of horizontal application is not in dispute under the final Constitution, the 
debate is whether the application should be direct or indirect: Van der Merwe et al Contract 10-15; Brisley v 
Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 SCA, hereafter Brisley 2002 (4) SA 1 SCA discussed in chapter 2; Woolman ‘The Amazing 
Vanishing Bill of Rights’ (2007) 124 SALJ762, hereafter Woolman (2007) 124 SALJ762. Direct application in 
terms of section 8 of the Constitution means that a contractant contests the validity of a contract or its term(s) 
on the basis that it is inconsistent with a particular right expressed in the Constitution. In terms of this 
approach, the courts utilise the “rights and freedoms, and the general rules derived from them” as a “point of 
departure for determining whether the law or conduct is invalid.” Woolman (2007) 124 SALJ 769. Drawing on 
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938 CC para 54, and S v Thebus 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC), 
Woolman (2007) 124 SALJ argues that indirect application in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution does not 
require of a court to pronounce on the validity of a right but rather “to bring all laws into line with the ‘spirit, 
purport and objects’ of the Bill of rights and the ‘objective, normative value system’ made manifest in the text 
of the Constitution as a whole (769 fn12). See also Currie & de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2008) 32 and 
the discussion in para 1.3.3 below. In Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC), the Constitutional Court preferred the 
indirect approach (paras [23]–[30]). 
92   Van der Merwe et al Contract 10. 
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as well as to reflect the values that underlie the Constitution.93 Inasmuch as qualifications place 
limitations on contractual freedom, the limitations are necessary and desirable in that, inter 
alia, they promote legal certainty.94 
 
1.3.2 Certainty 
The principle of certainty is not limited to the law of contract. A few examples of the 
manifestation of certainty in the legal system in general will be discussed and thereafter 
certainty in the context of the law of contract will be dealt with briefly. 
 
1.3.2.1 Stare decisis (judicial precedent) 
Certainty of the law is a characteristic of most legal systems and, in the South African context, 
finds expression, inter alia, in the stare decisis95doctrine which forms the foundation of the 
South African system of binding judicial precedent.96 The practical effect of the doctrine is that 
the ratio decidendi of a superior court must be followed by all courts that are obliged to follow 
the decision of that court;97 thereby certainty of the law is created and promoted.98 
                                                            
93  Barkhuizen2007 (5) SA 323 (CC), para [30]. 
94  The conclusion is supported by the conclusions reached in respect of the consumer protection legislation 
discussed in chapter 3 and in the discussion of public policy and the constitutional values of dignity, equality 
and freedom in chapters 4. 
95  The Latin maxim stare decisis non quieta movere means to let decisions stand and do not disturb settled law. 
Whilst the doctrine does not have much currency in France and other laws of the Romano-Germanic legal 
tradition, in England “the rules set by decided cases must be followed or else the certainty of the Common Law 
will be destroyed and its very existence compromised”: David & Brierley Major Legal Systems in the World 
Today: An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law (1985) 376-378. 
96  Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles give brief exposition of the operation of doctrine in South African law (86-92). 
See also Havenga & Havenga General Principles of Commercial Law (2010) 11-12. 
97  Camps Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association and Another v Harrison and Another 2011 (4) SA 42 (CC) 
para 28, hereafter Camps Bay Ratepayers 2011 (4) SA 42 (CC); Hosten Introduction 386-388. 
98  Hahlo & Kahn The South African Legal System and its Background (1968), hereafter Hahlo & Kahn The South 
African Legal System, summarises the nature and function of the stare decisis principle as follows: “The 
advantages of a principle of stare decisis are many. It enables the citizen, if necessary with the aid of practising 
lawyers to plan his private and professional activities with some degree of assurance as to their legal effects; it 
prevents the dislocation of rights, particularly contractual and proprietary ones, created in the belief of an 
existing rule of law; it cuts down the prospect of litigation; it keeps the weaker judge along the right and 
rational paths, drastically limiting the play allowed to partiality, caprice or prejudice, thereby not only securing 
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In Daniels v Campbell NO and Others,99 the Constitutional Court described the doctrine of 
judicial precedent as an incident of the rule of law that is designed to promote legal certainty 
and in Camps Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association and Another v Harrison and 
Another100 the Constitutional Court elaborated that “[i]t is a manifestation of the rule of law 
itself, which in turn is a founding value of our Constitution [s1(c)].” The Constitutional Court in 
Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security, In re S v Walters101 confirmed the validity of the 
doctrine in respect of post-constitutional decisions. 
The interrelationship between the stare decisis doctrine and the section 39(2)102 of the 
Constitution was explained in Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom.103 Whilst confirming the sanctity 
of the stare decisis doctrine, the court held that the reach of section 39(2) to override pre-
constitutional decisions of the court, be limited to two instances. The first would be where the 
High Court is convinced that the rule in question is inimical with a constitutional provision. This 
applies even if the rule in question had been laid down by the Supreme Court of Appeal.104 The 
second would be where the High Court, with due regard for the values of the Constitution, was 
of the view that a pre-constitutional decision, based on considerations such as boni mores or 
public interest, no longer reflected the boni mores or public interest. In both these instances 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
justice in the instance but also retaining public confidence in the judicial machine through like being dealt with 
alike .... Certainty, predictability, reliability, equality, uniformity, convenience: these are the principle 
advantages to be gained by a legal system from the principle of stare decisis” (214-215). The views expressed 
by the authors were quoted with approval in Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) para [30], 
hereafter Afrox Healthcare 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) and in Camps Bay Ratepayers 2011 (4) SA 42 (CC) para [28]. 
The authors explain that “[t]he maintenance of the certainty of the law and equality before it, the satisfaction 
of legitimate legal expectations, entails a general duty of judges to follow the legal rulings in previous judicial 
decisions” and that litigants would feel “unjustly treated if a past ruling to his applicable case were not 
followed where the material facts were the same” (214). 
99  2004 (5) SA 331 (CC) para [94]. 
100  2011 (4) SA 42 (CC) para 28.  
101  2002 (4) SA 613 (CC) paras [57]-[61]. See also Camps Bay Ratepayers 2011 (4) SA 42 (CC) para [29] quoting with 
approval from Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In re S v Walters and Another 2002 (4) SA 
613 (CC) at paras [60]-[61].  
102  Section 39(2) enjoins all courts to promote the “spirit, purpose and objects” of the Bill of Rights when 
developing the common law or customary law. 
103  2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) paras [25]–[30]. 
104  The reason being that the Constitution is the highest law of the law and thus supersedes the common law (para 
[27]). 
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the High Court would be obliged to depart from such pre-constitutional decision and such 
departure would not be viewed as being in conflict with the stare decisis doctrine.105 
 
1.3.2.2 The law of succession 
The devolution of a deceased estate is regulated by the provisions of the common law and the 
Wills Act106 in the event of testate succession.107 Though freedom of testation is the 
cornerstone of our law of succession, it is subject to limitations imposed by the common law108 
and by statute.109 In addition, the Wills Act prescribes formalities that must be complied 
with.110 These requirements and formalities are necessary because of the significant legal effect 
of a will which is to confer rights on the beneficiaries named therein. This necessitates certainty 
regarding the form and content of a will and this is provided by the law of succession. 
 
1.3.2.3 The law of marriage 
In addition to the common law requirements which the parties must comply with, the Marriage 
Act111 imposes certain formalities112 for a marriage to be valid. A valid marriage holds important 
                                                            
105  Paras [27]–[28]. 
106  Act 7 of 1953 
107  The Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 applies where the deceased did not leave behind a valid will. 
108  A condition in a will that purports to cause the break-up of a marriage by divorce or separation is invalid as 
being contrary to public policy and will be treated as pro non scripto. See further Corbett, Hofmeyr & Kahn The 
Law of Succession in South Africa (2001) 129-138, hereafter Corbett et al The Law of Succession.  
109  For example, the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970 restricts a testator’s power to subdivide 
agricultural land. See further Corbett et al The Law of Succession 40. 
110  For example, sections 1 and 2 require that the will must be in writing and signed by the testator and at least 
two witnesses, all in the presence of one another.  
111  Act 25 of 1961. This Act regulates civil marriages. Customary marriages are regulated by the Recognition of 
Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 and marriages between same-sex partners are regulated by the Civil 
Union Act 17 of 2006. See further Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 236-253.  
112  For example, the marriage ceremony must be performed by a duly appointed marriage officer and the marriage 
must be solemnized in the presence of the parties to the marriage and at least two competent witnesses. The 
marriage officer, both parties to the marriage and at least two witnesses must sign the marriage register and 
two copies of the register. The original register and one of the copies must be sent by the Marriage Officer to 
the Director-General of Home Affairs: Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 250-252. 
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(invariable) consequences 113 for the parties to the marriage; hence, there must be certainty as 
to its conclusion and its existence. The requirements and the formalities promote such 
certainty.  
 
1.3.2.4 The law of contract 
“It is a general requirement for a contract that the agreement must bring about certainty 
regarding its legal consequences.”114 A contract would be void for vagueness where it is 
incomplete because an essential or material aspect has not been agreed upon.115 Though it may 
be possible for the parties to supplement their agreement to facilitate its implementation, this 
may not always be possible because the parties may no longer be available to provide the 
requisite explanation or the rights under the contract may have been ceded. Since it is not the 
function of the court to create obligations,116 the notion of certainty of contract assumes critical 
importance.117 The law of contract promotes certainty, inter alia, by providing general118 and 
specific requirements119 and in some instances formalities120 that that must be met in order for 
a contract to be valid. 
 
                                                            
113  For example, the status of the parties change in that a relationship by affinity is created between each spouse 
and the blood relatives of the other; a spouse who was a minor prior to the marriage attains majority status on 
marriage. See further Hahlo The South African Law of Husband and Wife (1985) 127-130; Cronje and Heaton 
South African Family Law (2010) 43-63; Cronje and Heaton Casebook on South African Family Law (2010) 67-98; 
Visser and Potgieter Introduction to Family Law (1998) 72-81. 
114  Van der Merwe et al Contract 192. 
115  Van der Merwe et al Contract 194. 
116  Hurwitz and Others NNO v Table Bay Engineering (Pty) Ltd & Another 1994 (3) SA 449 (C) 453I-455G, hereafter 
Hurwitz 1994 (3) SA 449 (C).  
117  Hutchison et al Contract 210. 
118  For example, only major persons who are of sound mind may conclude a valid contract; a contract must not 
promote illegality. 
119  For example, in contracts of sale it is required that (i) the contractants must agree to buy and sell, (ii) there is 
agreement on the property sold, and (iii) there is agreement on the price. 
120  Section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 requires that contracts for the alienation of land must be 
reduced to writing and signed by the parties thereto or their representatives. The purpose “is to promote legal 
certainty regarding the authenticity and contents of contracts, thereby limiting litigation and preventing 
malpractice and fraud”: Hutchison et al Contract 161-162. 
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1.3.2.5 Conclusion 
Certainty as a feature of the law is important in that, in the words of Hahlo and Kahn, “[i]t 
enables the citizen ...  to plan his private and professional activities with some degree of 
assurance as to their legal effect” and “it prevents the dislocation of rights, particularly 
contractual and proprietary ones, created in the belief of an existing rule.”121 
 
1.3.3 The role of public policy in the tension between contractual freedom and certainty   
Having discussed the requirement of certainty and the notion of freedom of contract, it is 
necessary to explore the role played by public policy in attempting to attain a balance between 
the two. 
Whilst it is trite law that, at common law, agreements which are contrary to public policy are 
void for illegality,122  the definition of what constitutes public policy has always been considered 
to be fraught with difficulty.123 The Appellate Division has cautioned that there cannot be a 
closed list of agreements that may be regarded as contrary to public policy because of the 
difficulty in reaching consensus about what constitutes public policy or what effect it should 
                                                            
121  Hahlo & Kahn The South African Legal System 215. Though the authors expressed these views with reference to 
the stare decisis doctrine, it aptly also encapsulates the role of certainty as a characteristic of our legal system. 
See also Carter & Hartland Contract Law in Australia (2002) para [113].  
122  Sasfin 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 7I and 18F-G; Magna Alloys and Research SA (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 874 (A) 891G, 
hereafter Magna Alloys 1984 (4) SA 874 (A). In the Sasfin case, the Appellate Division recognised the interests 
of the community as a paramount consideration in determining, not only, the content of public policy, but also, 
in deciding whether an agreement is contrary to public policy. Accordingly, the Court explained that 
agreements which are contrary to public policy are those “which are clearly inimical to the interests of the 
community, whether they are contrary to law or morality, or run counter to social or economic expedience, 
[such agreements] will ... on the grounds of public policy, not be enforced” (8C-D). Though the Court, at 9B-F, 
was wary of declaring a contract contrary to public policy “merely because its terms (or some of them) offend 
one’s individual sense of propriety or fairness,” Van der Merwe et al Contract offer a qualification. The authors 
explain that public interest is not limited to the wider interests of society in general “but may include the 
individual interests of the parties to a particular agreement” (168). As an example, they cite that a restraint of 
trade agreement “may seem acceptable when only the general interest of society is considered, but may be so 
unreasonable when the relative interests of the contractants are taken into account that it is against the public 
interests after all” (168). See further the discussion of public policy in chapters 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. 
123  In Law Union and Rock Insurance Co Ltd v Carmichele’s Executor 1917 AD 593, the Appellate Division described 
public policy as an expression of “vague import” (598).   
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have.124 Views about its content are not always the same and may change from time to time.125 
Compounding the problem of public policy being, in the words of Glover,126 a “slippery and 
vexed concept,”127 is the reality that in the South African context, the concept of public policy 
has to be understood and enforced within the reality of a heterogeneous society as opposed to 
a homogeneous one. Van der Merwe et al propose that the guiding principle should be that 
sectional interests must be evaluated within the context of the wider interests of society as a 
whole. The mutually beneficial result would be that sections of society would have an interest 
in upholding the general interests of society whilst the society at large would have an interest in 
maintaining sectional interests.128 
The perception that public policy is a “slippery and vexed concept” underwent a seismic change 
in Barkhuizen v Napier.129 The Constitutional Court, on the one hand, reflected, with approval, 
on the interrelationship between sanctity of contract and the core constitutional values of 
freedom and dignity,130 but, on the other hand, cautioned that sanctity of contract must be 
tempered by considerations of morality and public policy as discerned from the values 
                                                            
124  Magna Alloys 1984 (4) SA 874 (A). Examples of agreements regarded as being against public policy are those 
that offends or injures the state, such as agreements which defeat, obstruct or pervert the administration of 
justice (Lekeur v SANTAM Insurance Co Ltd 1969 (3) SA (C)), and agreements which unduly restrict a person’s 
liberty or freedom to act (Filmer and Another v Van Straaten 1965 2 SA 575 (W)). For example, an agreement 
that the parties should never contract with one another in the future would be not be binding in that it would 
be contrary to public policy because it amounts to a substantial limitation of contractual freedom: Shifren & 
Others v SA Sentrale Ko-op Grannatmaatskappy Bpk 1964 (2) SA 343 (O). 
125  Magna Alloys 1984 (4) SA 874 (A), 891H; Van der Merwe et al Contract 165-170; Lubbe & Murray Contract 238-
269. 
126  Glover (2007) 124 SALJ 449, 455. 
127  In Sasfin 1989 (1) SA 1 (A), the Appellate Division described public policy as being “an expression of ‘vague 
import’” and said that the requirements of public policy are “must needs often be a difficult and contentious 
matter” (71). 
128  Van der Merwe et al Contract 168.  
129  2007 (5) SA 323 (CC). The Court upheld the validity of a clause that required an insured to institute legal 
proceedings within 90 days of the rejection by the insurer of a claim. In arriving at its conclusion, the court 
considered the question whether the time-limitation clause was contrary to public policy.  
130  Paras [57] and [87]. 
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embodied in the Constitution, and especially the Bill of Rights.131 The judgment, may therefore, 
be said to confirm that: 
(i) the basic values of dignity, equality and freedom132 and the rule of law133 that 
underpin the Constitution and the Bill of Rights134 find expression in the 
principles of freedom and sanctity of contract that form the bedrock of the law 
of contract; and 
(ii) the common law checks and balances, public policy included, used to attempt to 
attain a balance between certainty and flexibility are constitutionally sound. 
The Constitutional Court explained that the test to determine the constitutionality of a 
contractual clause is whether it is contrary to public policy and that the content of public policy 
is to be found in “the values that underlie our constitutional democracy as given expression by 
the provisions of the Bill of Rights.”135  The court concluded that a term that is inimical to the 
values enshrined in the Constitution is contrary to public policy and hence unenforceable.136 
The judgment, in acknowledging the moral profundity of pacta sunt servanda as a legal 
principle that has attained universal legal recognition, cautions that the rule cannot apply to 
immoral agreements which violate public policy.137 The court makes it clear that constitutional 
provisions and values inform and underpin the content of public policy.138 Public policy is also 
no longer viewed as being difficult to define as it is deeply rooted in the Constitution and its 
foundational values.139 Public policy is defined as being informed by the concept of ubuntu140 
                                                            
131  Para [30]. 
132  Section 1(a). 
133  Section 1(c). 
134  Chapter 2 of the Constitution. 
135  Paras [29] and [30]. 
136  Para [29]. 
137  Para [87]. 
138  This theme forms the basis of the discussion in chapter 4 below. 
139  Para [28]. However, Glover (2007) 124 SALJ disagrees with the court, saying that public policy will continue to 
be “a slippery and vexed concept” (455). 
140  Para [51]. 
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and as being a repository of “those values that the society hold most dear”141 and of “the 
general sense of justice of the community, the boni mores, manifested in public opinion”142 and 
incorporates: 
(i) the notions of fairness, justice and equity, and reasonableness;143 and 
(ii) the necessity to do simple justice between individuals.144 
The definition includes the competing values which are used, at common law, to evaluate the 
enforceability of agreements reached pursuant to the twin145 notions of freedom of contract 
and sanctity of contract, but importantly, it heralds the incorporation of ubuntu in the 
definition. 
In S v Makwanyane,146 the court, in dealing with the constitutionality of the death penalty, 
commented that an outstanding feature of ubuntu in a community sense is the value it places 
on life and human dignity. The dominant theme of the culture of ubuntu is that the life of 
another person is at least as valuable as one’s own. Respect for the dignity of every person is 
integral to this concept.147 It emphasis the communal nature of society and “carries in it the 
idea of humanness, social justice and fairness.”148 Mokgoro J described ubuntu as humaneness. 
“In its most fundamental sense, it translates as personhood and morality.”149 It refers to an 
interconnectedness between the individual and society and society and the individual. 
                                                            
141  Para [28]. 
142  Para [73]. 
143  Paras [51] and [73]. The Court added that unequal bargaining power is another factor that plays a role in the 
consideration of public policy (para [59]). 
144  Para [51]. 
145  I regard the notions as twins because the one reinforces the other: because people are free to contract, 
therefore they are bound by their contract, the contract being an expression of their free will. See also 
Hutchison et al Contract 23; Hutchison ‘Non-variation Clauses in Contract: Any Escape from the Shifren 
Straitjacket?’ (2001) 118 SALJ 720, 743; Van der Merwe et al Contract 11. 
146  1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
147  Para [225]. See further chapter 4 and in particular para 4.2.4.2(A)(i). 
148  Para [237]. 
149  Para [308]. The learned judge explains that it envelopes “the key values of group solidarity, compassion, 
respect, human dignity, conformity to basic norms and collective unity” (para [308]).   
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Roederer and Moellendorf describe ubuntu as simultaneously individual and universal.150 The 
philosophical notion of ubuntu is deeply rooted in the individual psyche but with a concomitant 
expectation that all conduct, whether by an individual or by society should promote the welfare 
of both the individual and of society.151 From the foregoing, it may be concluded that the 
content of ubuntu is fluid in that it is based in all that is good and healthy and which promotes 
the goodwill of the individual and society – the individual and society being mirror images of 
one another. 
Hutchison et al152 observe that the Barkhuizen decision moderates and tempers the approach 
adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Brisley v Drotsky.153 The Brisley court, in reasoning 
that giving judges a discretion to disregard contractual provisions that offended their personal 
sense of what is fair and reasonable would give rise to legal and commercial uncertainty,154 
held155 that good faith does not constitute an independent or “free floating” basis for the 
setting aside or non-enforcement of contractual terms.156 The recognition of ubuntu as an 
expression of public policy will favour a further moderation of the approach of the Brisley court. 
The concept has both objective and subjective features, and since it does not lend itself to 
accurate definition as is evident from the different formulations of the content of ubuntu in the 
Makwanyane case,157 it is conceivable that subjective features may, on occasion, come more 
strongly to the fore in relation to contracts.158 A development in that direction has already 
                                                            
150  Jurisprudence (2002) 445, hereafter Roederer & Moellendorf Jurisprudence. 
151  S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), paras [224]–[225]. 
152  Contract 29-32. 
153  2002 (4) SA 202 1 (SCA). In this case, the tenant wished to preclude the enforcement of a non-variation clause 
because to do so would be “onredelik, onbillik en in stryd met beginsels van bona fides” (para [12]). 
154  Para [24]. 
155  Para [22]. 
156  To paraphrase Hutchison et al Contract 29, good faith, reasonableness and fairness were said (by the court) to 
be merely abstract values rather than independent substantive rules of intervention in contractual 
relationships, and that the notions of boni mores and the legal convictions of the community were too vague to 
be used to judge the enforceability of contractual obligations. 
157  See also Roederer & Moellendorf Jurisprudence 445-446. 
158  See chapter 4. 
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occurred. In Everfresh Market Virginia v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd,159 the Constitutional Court 
expressed itself in favour of the importance of good faith in contract law160 and of infusing 
contract law with constitutional values, including ubuntu.161 Glover162 and Kerr163 are of the 
view that the Barkhuizen court has in a sense restored the exceptio doli generalis164 which had 
been dealt a death blow by the Appellate Division in Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De 
Ornelas.165 Woolman166 is critical of the Constitutional Court’s “persistent refusal to engage in 
the direct application of the Bill of Rights,” and its preference of an indirect approach in terms 
of 39(2) of the Constitution. The writer accuses the court of “[f]laccid analysis in terms of three 
vaguely defined values – dignity, equality and freedom...” In doing so, he postulates that the 
Constitutional Court “may assert constitutional jurisdiction ... whenever it believes that the 
common law ... does not conform to its understanding of our basic constitutional norms ... its 
authority [being] unconstrained by determinative standards.” Woolman characterizes this 
approach as “the linguistic trick that causes the specific substantive provisions of the Bill of 
Rights – ss 9-35 of the Constitution – to disappear, and then to reappear in the rather 
amorphous form of an ‘objective normative value system.”167 
                                                            
159  2012 (1) SA 256 (CC). 
160  See, for example, para [22] (minority judgment) and para [72] (majority judgment). 
161  See, for example, para [23] (minority judgment) and para [72] (majority judgment). 
162  Glover ‘Lazarus in the Constitutional Court: An exhumation of the exception doli generalis?’ (2007) 124 SALJ 
449, 455-456, hereafter Glover (2007) 124 SALJ. 
163  Kerr (2008) 125 SALJ 241. The writer concludes  that “those who thought that the Bank of Lisbon … was correct 
are now obliged to note that it cannot any longer be so considered” (246). 
164  In Roman law, the exceptio doli generalis gave the judge an equitable discretion to make a decision on what 
appeared to be fair and reasonable. In the absence of fraud, an unconscionable claim would not be entertained 
even though the claim might be sound in law. Its reception into Roman-Dutch Law and hence into our common 
law was always uncertain with our courts at times prepared to recognise it: Hutchison et al Contract 26-29; 
Glover (2007) 124 SALJ 449-450. See also chapter 2 para 2.8. 
165  1988 (3) SA 580 (A).   
166  Woolman (2007) 124 SALJ 763. 
167  At 769-770, fn12. The result of this is that “the court obviates the need to give the specific substantive rights in 
chapter 2 the content to determine the actual validity of the rule being challenged in the instant matter and of 
similar rules challenged in subsequent matters” ... in the process producing “the unintended consequence of 
undermining the rule of law” (763). 
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Regardless of the validity of Woolman’s criticism, the considerations raised above, individually 
and cumulatively, suggest that a trend has emerged where, under the influence of the 
Constitution and the values of dignity, equality and freedom, equitable considerations of good 
faith,168 fairness and reasonableness are beginning to play a more prominent role in decisions 
on the validity of contractual terms.169 
As indicated before, tentative signs of the acceptance of a general principle of good faith as a 
constitutional value may be seen in the Everfresh case where the Constitutional Court 
pronounced that the question whether the Constitution requires good faith in contractual 
relations is one that should be determined sooner rather than later.170 Further evidence of this 
trend may be found in cases such as Breedenkamp and Others v Standard Bank of South Africa 
Ltd171 and in Hoffmann v South African Airways.172  
In the Breedenkamp case,173 the Court, per Jajbhay J, intervened to curtail the exercise of 
contractual power by granting an urgent interim interdict restraining the respondent from 
doing so. In answering the question whether it is fair in the circumstances to allow the 
                                                            
168  Notwithstanding the Barkhuizen court’s acceptance in para [82], that good faith is not an independent rule of 
law determinative of the validity of a contractual term. The duty of good faith is discussed in chapter 2 para 2.8 
and in chapter 4 para 4.2.4.4. 
169  In this regard, Woolman (2007) 124 SALJ 763 makes the observation that the Barkhuizen court speaks to a 
jurisprudence of restorative justice. “Such jurisprudence demonstrates far less concern with coherence and far 
more with compassion. It is unencumbered by rules and doctrine” (788).   
170  2012 (1) SA 256 (CC) para [22] (minority judgment). The court continued to say that every contract has the 
potential of not being performed in good faith. See also para [71] (majority judgment) to same effect.  
171  2009 (5) SA 304 (GSJ). The case concerned an application before Jajbhay J for an urgent interim interdict in 
respect of a clause that conferred a discretionary power on the bank to terminate the contract between the 
bank and the applicant for any reason. On the return date the matter was heard by Lamont J and the case was 
reported as Breedenkamp v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2009 (6) SA 277 (GSJ). An appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Appeal was reported as Bredenkamp and others v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA). It should be 
noted that the first syllable of the applicant’s name in the citations of the courts a quo is spelt with a double “e” 
whereas in the Supreme Court of Appeal citation it is spelt with one “e”. The respective spellings will be 
retained and to avoid any confusion between the cases, the cases will hereafter be referred to as follows: 
Breedenkamp (interim interdict) 2009 (5) SA 304 (GSJ); Breedenkamp (return date) 2009 (6) SA 277 (GSJ); and 
Bredenkamp (appeal) 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA).     
172  2001 (1) SA 1 (CC), hereafter Hoffmann 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC). 
173  Breedenkamp (interim interdict) 2009 (5) SA 304 (GSJ) 
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respondent to terminate the contract,174 the Court said that a clause that purports to give a 
powerful bank the right to close a bank account (and in the process destroy the party’s 
prospects of participating in the modern commercial world) without either showing that there 
is good cause for doing so, or giving the party a hearing, might operate in a way that is unfair, 
unjust and oppressive.175 However, in rejecting Bredenkamp’s appeal against the setting aside 
of the interim order,176 the Supreme Court of Appeal,177 opined that the Barkhuizen court178 did 
not propose that fairness is a “core value of the Bill of Rights and that it is, therefore, a broad 
requirement of our law generally” and that, accordingly, any unfair conduct is void because it 
conflicts with the Constitution. The Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed as “novel” any 
suggestion that the Constitutional Court implied that there is a general underlying, all pervasive 
requirement of fairness, which if found to be breached, would render an impugned term 
unconstitutional, and, hence void.179 The court re-affirmed its earlier decisions180 and 
concluded that “fairness is not a free-standing requirement for the exercise of a contractual 
right...”181 This interpretation of the Barkhuizen judgment was recently confirmed by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Potgieter and Another v Potgieter NO and Others.182 
                                                            
174  Para [59]. 
175  Para [68]. 
176  The interim interdict granted by Jajbhay J was set aside on the return date by Lamont J. See Breedenkamp 
(return date) 2009 (6) SA 277 (GSJ).  
177  Bredenkamp (appeal) 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA) paras [27]–[28]. 
178  Barkhuizen2007 (5) SA 323 (CC). 
179  At para [27]. 
180  For example, Brisley 2002 (4) SA 202 1 (SCA). See further chapter 2 paras 2.3 and 2.8.  
181  Para [53]. The merits of the dicta are considered in chapter 2. In this context it is apposite to acknowledge that 
the gloss that the Supreme Court of Appeal put on the Constitutional Court’s decision in Barkhuizen2007 (5) SA 
323 (CC) constitutes a reality check on the belief, as expressed by Glover and Kerr (earlier in this paragraph) 
that the exceptio doli generalis has in a sense been restored by Barkhuizen decision, and puts a damper on the 
hope that the Barkhuizen decision may lead to a resurrection thereof. See further chapter 2. 
182  2012 (1) SA 651 paras [32]-[34] and [36]. The Court upheld the Appellants’ challenge to the variation of a trust 
deed by the founder and trustees of the trust, likening the deed to a stipulatio alteri which may be altered only 
with the consent of the beneficiaries. 
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In the Hoffmann case, the applicant challenged the respondent’s refusal to employ him as a 
cabin attendant because of his HIV-positive status,183 on the basis that the refusal constituted 
unfair discrimination, and violated his constitutional right to equality, human dignity, and fair 
labour practices.184 The Constitutional Court, in ordering the respondent to offer Hoffmann a 
contract of employment as a cabin attendant, decided that the respondent’s refusal impaired 
the applicant’s dignity and amounted to unfair discrimination.185 The court concluded that the 
refusal to employ Hoffmann because he was HIV impaired violated his right to equality, 
guaranteed in Section 9 of the Constitution.186 
Though the Supreme Court of Appeal dicta in the Bredenkamp case187 mirror the reasoning in 
Brisley v Drotsky,188 the High Court decision in the Breedenkamp case189 per Jajbhay J, the 
decision in the Hoffmann case,190 and, especially the decision in the Barkhuizen case,191 are 
indicative of the ascendency of the considerations of reasonableness and fairness in 
determining the validity of clauses that grant discretionary powers and the exercise of such 
powers. Hence, it would not be inapposite to conclude that the above discussion, “illustrates a 
willingness [by the courts] to intervene if a party exercises a contractual power in a manner that 
fails to respect the constitutional rights of another party and may even, in appropriate 
circumstances, be prepared to compel one party to contract with another on constitutional 
grounds.”192 The regulatory role of constitutional values in the contract law arena received 
                                                            
183  The respondent sought to justify its decision on the basis of, inter alia, the inherent operational requirements 
of the work. The court rejected this argument on the basis of the respondent’s own medical evidence and 
policy that only persons with a CD+ count of less than 350 were regarded as being unfit for who employment as 
a cabin attendant. The applicant did not fall into that category at the time when the respondent made its 
decision. 
184  Para [6]. 
185  Para [40]. 
186  Para [41]. 
187  Bredenkamp (appeal) 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA). 
188  Brisley2002 (4) SA 202 1 (SCA). 
189  Breedenkamp (interim interdict) 2009 (5) SA 304 (GSJ). 
190  Hoffmann 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC). 
191  Barkhuizen2007 (5) SA 323 (CC). 
192  Hutchison et al Contract 41. 
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express recognition in Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd193 where 
the Constitutional Court pronounced that it is “necessary to infuse the contract law with 
constitutional values, including values of ubuntu.”194 
 
1.3.4 Conclusion 
The law of contract provides a legal framework that aims: (i) to ensure that agreements are 
kept by providing mechanisms for their enforcement and remedies for non-compliance; and (ii) 
to promote legal and commercial certainty and to promote good faith, fairness, and 
reasonableness in contractual relations.195 In doing so, the law of contract has to balance the 
tension that exists between certainty and flexibility.196 Rigid adherence to rules would 
compromise individual and judicial discretion, with good faith, fairness, and reasonableness 
amongst the casualties, whilst (excessive) flexibility would dilute certainty,197 with the rule of 
law and respect of the law as possible casualties. Public policy, as informed by the provisions 
and values of the Constitution, appears to be the mechanism favoured by the Constitutional 
Court to achieve this balance.198 
Having sketched the role of certainty and flexibility in relation to contracts in general, it is now 
apposite to briefly explore the position in the contract of sale. 
 
 
 
                                                            
193  2012 (1) SA 256 (CC) para [71]. 
194  The regulatory role of the constitutional values such as dignity, equality and freedom is explored in chapter 4.    
195  Hutchison et al Contract 22-23. The considerations of good faith, fairness and reasonableness are dealt with in 
chapters 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. 
196  Van der Merwe et al Contract 10; Hutchison et al Contract 23. 
197  Hutchison et al Contract 23. 
198  See Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) paras [87] and [28]. Chapter 4 deals with the role of public policy in 
answering the question of law, viz., whether our law should recognise the validity of contracts of sale and lease 
a reasonable price or rental or at a unilaterally determined price.  
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1.4. Contracts of sale 
1.4.1 Introduction 
Contracts of sale are “the most common and typical of contracts”199 and are entered into, 
consciously and unconsciously, on a daily basis.  By entering into a contract, each contractant 
voluntarily200 assumes one or more obligations. The contractant often does so oblivious of the 
consequences or blindly accepting consequences without appreciating the implications 
thereof.201 Litigation or the threat or fear thereof also exacts its toll on many different levels. 
For example, litigation could possibly have an adverse effect on the structure and activities 
(legal, economic, educational, social etc) of the family.  In order to regulate this daily activity 
and to clothe the parties to the contract with the protection of the law, our legal system has 
over the centuries, from Roman times,202 developed a sophisticated set of legal principles which 
today comprise our common law principles of the law of sale. The discussion that follows deals 
briefly with the common law principles.  
 
1.4.2 The protection afforded to contractants at common law 
It is imperative for contractants to know what they are contracting for and what rights and 
obligations flow from their actions. Such understanding is promoted, and the contractants 
protected, by the law of sale requiring that the contract contains certain essentialia.203 
                                                            
199  Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 740. 
200  The voluntariness of the assumption of the obligation is debatable when viewed in the light of, for example, 
standard form contracts, discussed chapter 2 para 2.4.2. See further Aronstam Consumer Protection 14 et seq. 
201  Aronstam Consumer Protection quotes the following from the speech of the Minister of Economic Affairs to the 
House of Assembly on 29 March 1971: “In many cases the purchaser does not read the contents of the contract 
and, even if he does read them, he does not for the most part understand the implications of certain clauses 
appearing in the contract. If in fact the purchases does have objections to any term or condition included in the 
contract, he will often be swayed by the assurance of the seller that the danger he envisages is not a real one” 
(23).  
202  For more on the historical development see Kerr Sale and Lease 3–7. 
203  Zulman & Kairinos Norman’s Law of Purchase and Sale in South Africa (2005) 1-3, hereafter Zulman & Kairinos 
Norman’s Law of Purchase and Sale for a list of definitions of a contract of sale going back to Gaius 
(Institutionem) 3.1.39. At this juncture, it is appropriate to repeat that naturalia are imposed, ex lege, in 
contracts, mainly for the protection of the buyer and may, if the law so allows, be excluded by agreement 
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1.4.2.1 Essentialia 
The common law identifies specific contracts by means of their essentialia.204 The essentialia, 
aside from serving as a tool for identifying a contract as belonging to a specific class or 
category,205 also serve to identify for the parties the most important obligations that flow from 
that contract.206 Christie207 interprets Pothier as describing essentialia as the essence of a 
contract in the absence whereof there is either no contract or a contract of a different kind.208 
 
1.4.2.2 The price as an essentiale of a contract of sale 
(A) Introduction 
It is an essentiale of contract of sale that there must be agreement on the price. The 
requirement that the contractants must have stipulated a price, and the notion that it be 
certain, in the sense that it must be agreed upon between the parties,209 appear consistently in 
definitions of the contract of sale from the time of Gaius to the present.210 This requirement, 
therefore, constitutes one of the protective mechanisms devised and refined by our common 
law and serves, inter alia, to prevent disputes regarding the counter-performance expected of 
the buyer.211 The price must be ascertained or objectively ascertainable in that the contract 
contains some objective standard by the application whereof it will be possible to determine 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
between the contractants. In this regard, it is important to note that the Cape Provincial Division has extended 
the protection of the implied warranty against latent defects (one of the naturalia) to the seller as well. See 
Wastie v Security Motors (Pty) Ltd 1972 (2) SA 129 (C) and Janse Van Rensburg v Grieve Trust CC 2000 (1) SA 
315 (C).  The Durban and Coast Local Division and the Orange Free State Provincial Division rejected the 
reasoning of the Cape Provincial Division. See Mountbatten Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mahomed 1989 (1) SA 172 
(D) and Bloemfontein Market Garage (Edms) Bpk v Pieterse 1991 (2) SA 208 (O). 
204  The role and function of essentialia are dealt with in chapter 4.  
205  See Hosten Introduction 720. 
206  Van der Merwe et al Contract 245; Hosten Introduction 770. 
207  Christie & Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract 164-165. 
208  The theme of essentialia as the essence of the contract is developed in chapter 4 para 4.3.3.3(D). 
209  At common law, the parties may agree on any price. There is no rule of law that states that the price agreed 
upon must be the market price or that it must be close to that price. Kerr Sale and Lease 30; Bradfield et al 
Principles 21–22.  
210  Kerr Sale and Lease 3–5 and 30–31. The history of the law in this regard is briefly set out in para 1.2 above. 
211  Kerr Sale and Lease 66; Zimmermann The Law of Obligations 254-255. 
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the price without reference to contractants.”212 This seemingly simple requirement that there 
must be agreement on the price is beset with problems of definition - what are and what ought 
to be the accepted routes of arriving at such agreement?213 
As a starting point, it may be said that the requirement that the parties must have agreed on a 
price is to show that there must be a serious intention to pay. More relevant to the matter at 
hand is the further requirement that the price must be certain in the sense that it is either 
ascertained or objectively ascertainable. 
 
(B) Price must be ascertained 
The requirement that the price must be ascertained presents no problem. It is ascertained in 
the sense that it is fixed in the contract or it is arrived at, for example, by virtue of a simple 
arithmetical calculation. For example, X buys a motor vehicle for 50 000 ZAR (fixed price) or X 
buys a 10 000 loaves of bread at 10 ZAR (simple arithmetical calculation).214 In these examples, 
the price is clear. It is known. It is certain. There is no doubt about what the price is. The 
problem lies with the interpretation to be given to the requirement that the price must be 
ascertainable. 
 
(C) Price must be ascertainable 
In the Westinghouse case,215 the court required the contractants to either fix the amount of 
that price in their contract or to agree upon some external standard by the application whereof 
                                                            
212  Westinghouse 1986 (2) SA 555 (A) 547C-D; Burroughs 1964 (1) SA 669 (W) 670C-D; Murray & Roberts 1991 (1) 
SA 508 (A) 14G-H; Lambons 1997 (4) SA 141 (SCA) 1997 (4) SA 158F-H. Payment must take the form of money. 
Kerr Sale and Lease 30; Van den Bergh ‘The Roman tradition in the South African contract of sale’ (2012) 1 TSAR 
2012 53, 55, hereafter Van den Bergh (2012) 1 TSAR 2012. The rental requirement in contracts of lease is 
similarly formulated in Proud Investments 1991 (3) SA 738 (A) 746G-H. The essentialia of price and rental is 
explored more fully in chapter 4.  
213  This theme is explored in chapters 4 and 5.  
214  Kerr Sale and Lease at 33; Zulman & Kairinos Norman’s Law of Purchase and Sale 43. 
215  1986 (2) SA 555 (A) 574 C-D. 
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it would be possible to determine the price without reference to them.216 The Westinghouse 
principle means that it should be possible for even a total stranger to ascertain the price by 
employing the external standard, the contractants then playing no role in this process, other 
than to pay and to receive the price. From this, it is clear that the price must be objectively 
capable of ascertainment. Our law recognises that this may happen in one of two ways, either 
by nomination or by a formula. 
 
(i) Nomination 
Nomination217 is the process whereby the seller and the buyer jointly designate an identified or 
identifiable third party to settle the price on their behalf.218 A valid contract comes into 
existence as soon as the contractants have agreed on a nominee provided, of course, that the 
other essentialia have been met.  
 
 
                                                            
216  This is henceforth referred to as the Westinghouse principle. 
217  Kerr Sale and Lease 36-55; Bradfield et al Principles 19–20. Gillig v Sonnenberg 1953 4 SA 675 (T), hereafter 
Gillig 1953 4 SA 675 (T) and Dublin v Diner 1964 1 SA 799 (D), discussed in chapter 4 para 4.4.2 illustrate this 
method. Both contractants must be in agreement as to the identity of the nominee and it cannot be left to one 
of the contractants to unilaterally appoint the nominee. It appears to be possible for the parties to agree that 
the price would be settled by one of the contractants and a nominee. In an obiter dictum in Murray & Roberts 
1991 (1) SA 508 (A) the court reasoned that the validity of such an agreement would depend on the facts of the 
case, in particular the relationship between the contractants, and the independence and competence of the 
nominee (515B-E). It is submitted that such an agreement does not compromise the Westinghouse principle 
provided that the independence and competence of the nominee is beyond reproach. Conceivably such an 
arrangement would be apposite in situations such as where only one of the contractants is of the view that 
he/she does not have the necessary skill and/or expertise to negotiate a price of a particular commodity. The 
nominee would then, in a manner of speaking, stand in for the contractant in a manner that approximates that 
of an agent. Kerr’s suggestion that a deadlock-breaking clause be included in such an agreement is, with 
respect, a sound one: Sale and Lease 37. In the absence of the recognition of a duty to negotiate in good faith, 
a situation could very well arise where the contractant (the one with whom the nominee must settle the price) 
frustrates the agreement by ensuring that no agreement is reached with the nominee. A deadlock-breaking 
clause could provide, for example, that in the event of no agreement being reached, the price is to be settled 
by third party. The role of a deadlock-breaking mechanism is discussed again in chapter 4 para 4.2.4.4.  
218  Examples: “We appoint Joan Smith to settle the price on our behalf.” The nominee’s identity is ascertained. It is 
ascertainable: “We appoint the current Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of the Western Cape to fix 
the price on our behalf”. 
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(ii) Formula 
The contractants may agree on a formula, the employment of which would settle the price to 
be paid and received.219 Whilst there is no closed list of formulae, the sine qua non is that the 
formula must, in terms of the Westinghouse principle, be sufficiently clear so as to enable an 
outsider to calculate the price without further involvement of the contractants.220 The objective 
method of price determination may be contained in the contract itself, or it may arise from 
commercial practice or other custom or usage.  Some of the formulae are briefly discussed 
below. 
 
(a) Usual or current price  
The contractants may agree to a sale at the usual or current price.221 Such an agreement is valid 
only in respect of commodities in free supply (“over-the-counter” goods), for example, milk, 
coal, and bricks. The price would then be the usual price of the particular seller.222 A sale at the 
usual price will not be valid in the case of expensive, rare, or unique commodities, for example, 
gold jewellery or jewellery made of precious stones, a painting etc.223 These commodities are 
expensive, rare or unique, consequently there is no usual price for them and one would expect 
of the parties to agree expressly on the price or to appoint a nominee to settle the price for 
them.224 
 
                                                            
219  Kerr Sale and Lease (2004) 33-55; Bradfield et al Principles 17-22; Scott et al The Law of Commerce 141. 
220  Westinghouse 1986 (2) SA 555 (A); Van den Bergh (2012) 1 TSAR63-67; Lücke ‘Illusory, Vague and Uncertain 
Contractual Terms’ (1977-1978) 6 Adel LR 1, 14. 
221  Shell SA (Pty) Ltd v Corbitt and Another 1984 4 SA 523 (C) 526F-527E, hereafter Shell SA 1984 4 SA 523 (C); 
Lombard v Pongola Sugar Milling Co. Ltd 1963 (4) SA 119 (D) 128 A-H, hereafter Lombard 1963 (4) SA 119 (D).   
222  In such instances, and unlike a reasonable price, judicial intervention is minimal because the price is easily 
ascertainable. 
223  Contrast this with the position in the Netherlands where a reasonable price is permissible. See chapter 5 para 
5.2.6.2(B).   
224  Kerr Sale and Lease 33-34; Van den Bergh (2012) 1 TSAR 64-65; Shell SA 1984 4 SA 523 (C) 526F-527E; Lombard 
1963 (4) SA 119 (D) 128 A-H. 
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(b) Market price  
With reference to the meaning of the market value225 in the context of contractual damages, 
the Appellate Division in Katzenellenbogen Ltd v Mullin226 expressed the view that market does 
not necessarily refer to an organised entity like a municipal produce market. In Desmond Isaacs 
Agencies (Pty) Ltd v Contemporary Displays,227 the court said a market refers “to any source to 
which the purchaser might reasonably have gone, in the circumstances, in order to replace the 
goods which ought to have been delivered to him.” Market price would be the price charged at 
such a source.228 
 
(c) Price is implied 
If the price is implied,229 in other words, if no mention is made of the price in the contract, then 
the sale will be for the usual price of the seller.230 
 
(d) Competitor’s price list 
Here the parties agree, for example, that the seller will match the lowest price on the price list 
of a competitor.231 
 
                                                            
225  “Markwaarde van eiendom is na my mening iets wat objektief vasstelbaar is”: Stead v Conradie en Andere 
1995(2) SA 111 (A) 123B-C; Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd v Breedt 1997 (2) SA 337 (A) 349B-C and 351B-D. 
See also Van der Bergh (2012) 1 TSAR 65. 
226  1997 (4) SA 855 (A) 878E-F. 
227  1971 (3) SA 286 (T) 288. 
228  Erasmus v Arcade Electric 1962 (3) SA 428 (T). See also Letaba 1993 (1) SA 768 (A) 775B-D which dealt with a 
dispute regarding the determination of rental in a lease agreement. See also Desmond Isaacs Agencies (Pty) 
Ltd, t/a Decorative Pieces v Contemporary Displays 1971 (3) SA 286 (T) 287H; Zulman & Kairinos Norman’s Law 
of Purchase and Sale in South Africa 44. 
229  Kerr Sale and Lease 34. 
230  For example, where a person buys a newspaper from a vendor on the street or at a shop, or a person buys a 
loaf of bread or tin of fish or at a shop without agreeing on a price with the seller, then the price will be the 
usual price of the seller even if the price is higher than that of the shop next door. There need not be an 
existing legal relationship between the contractants. The discussion under Usual/Current price in (ii)(a) above 
applies here as well. See also Rex v Kramer 1948 (3) SA 48 (N). 
231  Shell SA 1984 4 SA 523 (C), 526F-527E. The contractants may identify a competitor or the contract may be 
open-ended in this regard. 
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(e) Sales ad mensuram 
In the case of a sale ad mensuram,232 the parties agree to a price per unit. Counting, weighing 
or measuring must then occur to finalise the price but the contract will have come into 
existence as soon as the price per unit was agreed upon.  
 
(f) Course of dealing 
The average price of previous dealings between the contractants may also be used to settle the 
price where the contract is silent on the price.233 
In all of the above instances, the price is determined by making use of a specific formula. The 
price is ascertainable because an external objective standard, for example, the price list of the 
competitor or a price per unit, has been agreed upon as the basis, as per the Westinghouse 
principle, on which the price may be ascertained without further reference to the contractants. 
The contract of sale comes into existence as soon as a valid formula has been agreed upon 
provided, of course, that the other two requirements234 have been complied with. 
 
1.4.2.3 The rental as an essentiale of a contract of lease 
As in the case of sale, the contractants are, in principle,235 at liberty to agree to any rental. As 
previously indicated,236 there is a marked similarity in the fixing of the price and rental in 
                                                            
232  Kerr Sale and Lease at 72 – 75. 
233  In Singh v Sir JL Hulett & Sons Ltd 1924 117 NPD, the contract for the sale of sugar did not contain a price. 
During the period 1917-1921 the price had been calculated using the seasonal as opposed to the monthly 
average price of sugar. The court based its decision that the price should be based on the seasonal average 
price on the history of the transactions from 1917-1921 between the contractants. The course of dealing is also 
recognised as a method of arriving at a price in international jurisdictions. See chapter 5. 
234  Agreement to buy and sell and agreement on the subject matter of the sale.  It must be noted that agreement 
on essentialia is not a validity requirement for all contracts but is merely required for a valid contract to be 
identified as a specific nominate contract: Van der Merwe et al 245. See further chapter 4 para 4.2.4.1. 
235  In this regard, it must be noted that section 13 (4) and (5) of the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 empowers 
rental housing tribunals to replace a rental with one that is “just an equitable” to the lessor and lessee and with 
due regard to the provisions of section 13 (5) and (6).  
236  See paras 1.1-1.2 above. 
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contracts of sale and lease respectively. In both cases, the contractants may not agree to a 
reasonable amount as a price or rental; neither may they agree that the price or rental be 
unilaterally determined by one of them. In both lease and sale, the amount to be paid may 
either be a fixed sum or one that is ascertainable by virtue of a formula or method agreed upon 
between the contractants. So for example, an agreement that the rental will be what was paid 
by a previous tenant was accepted as valid.237 The usual or customary rental will be implied 
where nothing is said about the rent.238 The usual rent is the rent charged for that kind of 
property in the area where the leased property is situated.239 As in the case of sale, it is also 
permissible for the contractants to agree to leave the rental to be determined by an 
ascertained or objectively ascertainable third party. 
 
1.4.2.4 Conclusion 
Our law requires certainty, not only regarding the price and rental, but also, regarding the 
manner in which it is arrived at. In light of the fact that contracts of sale are based on consensus 
where, as a general proposition, the contractant voluntarily assumes obligations, there should 
be certainty about these obligations, especially the one relating to the price and rental. The 
importance of agreement on the price and rental is underscored by the fact that, generally 
speaking, payment of the price and rental is the most important obligation which the buyer and 
tenant undertake to discharge, and receipt of payment is, arguably, the most important right 
the seller and lessor have.  
 
 
 
                                                            
237  Kerr Sale and Lease 258. 
238  Kerr Sale and Lease 258; Lobo Properties (Pty) Ltd v Express Lift Co SA (Pty) Ltd 1961 (1) SA 704 (C). See further 
the discussion in chapter 4 para 4.3.4.3(D). 
239  Kerr Sale and Lease 259. See also chapter 4 para 4.3.4.3(D). 
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1.5 The issues 
It is in the context of the above that the obiter dicta of the Supreme Court of Appeal and the 
then Appellate Division that recommended the validity of contracts of sale and lease at a 
reasonable price and rental, respectively, or at a unilaterally determined price and rental240 will 
be examined.  
The aim is to determine their validity as principles and rules of law, and the effect of their 
application from a constitutional perspective as well as from the perspective of policy and 
practice. This will be done by focussing on whether: 
(i) they are constitutionally sound, as being in consonance with the Constitutional 
Court’s decision that the content of public policy is to be found in “the values 
that underlie our constitutional democracy as given expression by the provisions 
of the Bill of Rights.”241 
(ii) they run counter to the trend where, under the influence of the Constitution, 
equitable considerations of good faith, fairness, and reasonableness play a more 
prominent role in decisions on the validity of contractual terms.242 
(iii) they promote the requirement of consensus in its broad, general sense,243  
between the contractants as required by the authorities.244 
(iv) they promote the requirement of certainty.245 
 
                                                            
240  See para 1.1 above. 
241  Barkhuizen2007 (5) SA 323 (CC), paras [29] and [30]. See para 1.3.3 above.The issue is addressed in chapter 4. 
242  See, for example, Breedenkamp (interim interdict) 2009 (5) SA 304 (GSJ) and Hoffmann 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) 
discussed in para 1.3.3 above. See also chapter 4 para 4.2.4.2(A) and generally chapter 2. 
243  In its broad, general sense, consensus means that the there must be a meeting of minds between the parties. 
In other words, the parties must be in agreement about the terms of the contract. An offer coupled with an 
acceptance thereof usually results in consensus between the contractants. Van der Merwe et al Contract 17-45 
and Hutchison et al Contract 13-19. See also the discussion of consensus in chapter 2 para 2.2.2 and in chapters 
3, 4, 5 and 6.  
244  See Kerr Sale and Lease 3–5; Hosten Introduction 702–713; MacKeurtan & Hackwil MacKeurten’s The Law of 
Sale of Goods in South Africa (1984). 
245  See chapter 2 and in particular para 2.6. See also chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6. 
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(v) they impact on the interests of the buyer and particularly: 
(a) the common law protections, such as the implied warranties, that have 
historically developed to protect the buyer. 
(b)  the legislative interventions such as the Consumer Protection Act,246 
National Credit Act,247 and the Rental Housing Act248 which as a matter of 
law and policy, seek to benefit and protect the consumer. 
The questions that will be examined in determining the legal and policy implications of 
adopting the obiter dicta include the following: 
(i) Will adoption of the obiter dicta result in an increase in litigation? A case may be 
made that litigation would be avoided if, at the outset, the contractants manifest 
their respective positions regarding the price that should be paid, thereby giving 
each an opportunity to walk away from the deal because the proposed price is 
unacceptable as being either too high or too low as the case may be.249 
(ii) Is it the court’s function to settle disputes or to create contracts by, for example, 
imposing a price on the contractants?250 The role and function of the court will 
be brought into focus where it is determined that a discretion has not been 
exercised arbitrio bono viri, this being the controlling mechanism suggested in 
the NBS Boland Bank case. 
(iii) Is there an economic or social need for a sale to be at a reasonable price?251 
 
                                                            
246  Act 68 of 2008. 
247  Act 34 of 2005. 
248  Act 50 of 1999. 
249  See generally in this regard the discussion in chapters 4 and 5.  
250  The wisdom of a court participating in the contract-creating process, in addition to its role as a dispute-settling 
mechanism, is questionable: Hurwitz 1994 (3) SA 449 (C) 453I–455G. See also Kerr Contract 408 n204; Gillig 
1953 (4) SA 675 (T). Lubbe & Murray Contract  argue that “judges are, in general, not entitled to supply terms 
and make contracts where the parties have not indicated their intention clearly” (307). See further chapter 4 
para 4.4. 
251  See chapter 4 paras 4.2.4.4 and 4.3.4.3(E). 
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The desirability of adopting the obiter dicta will also be considered in light of the following: 
(i) The possible uncertainty they may produce surrounding the method of 
calculating the price even if it is to be done arbitrio bono viri252 as suggested by 
the court in the NBS Boland Bank v One Berg River case.253 
(ii) The possibility that the recognition thereof may exacerbate the current unequal 
bargaining power254 that exists between many buyers and sellers.255 The 
possibility exists that clauses to the effect advocated in the two obiter dicta may 
be included in standard form contracts256 thereby further compromising the 
buyer’s ability to bargain and in the process inhibiting the buyer’s freedom to 
contract.257 Another possible adverse consequence is that it could undo the 
policy advances secured under consumer protection legislation.258 
(iii) A seller259 may abuse its discretionary power and fix a purchase price that 
exceeds the real value of the commodity secure in the knowledge that the buyer 
may not have the means and/or ability to engage in costly and/or lengthy 
litigation260. 
The issues raised above will be dealt in the context of the question whether the status quo, 
namely, the refusal to recognise the validity of contracts of sale and rental at a reasonable price 
                                                            
252  See chapter 4 para 4.3. 
253  From the perspective of the seller, the price, if left to be settled by the buyer, may be too low necessitating 
litigation to establish that the buyer did not exercise its discretion arbitrio bono viri. The same applies if the 
buyer is of the opinion that the seller did not exercise its discretion arbitrio bono viri. 
254  In the Barkhuizen2007 (5) SA 323 (CC), the Constitutional Court confirmed that many people who have no 
bargaining power or who do not understand contracts, nevertheless, conclude contracts (para [65]). The Court  
also confirmed the principle recognised in Afrox Healthcare 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) that unequal bargaining power 
is indeed one of the factors that play a role in the consideration of public policy (para [59]). See also chapter 2 
para 2.4.4 and generally chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6.   
255  Hutchison et al Contract 24–25. 
256  Hutchison et al Contract notes that it has been estimated that 95% of all transactions are included in this 
manner (25). See further chapter 2 para 2.4.2. 
257  Hutchison et al Contract 25 and Kerr Sale and Lease 72. 
258  See the discussion in chapter 4 and in particular in 4.3.4.3(E). 
259  Sellers are usually in the better bargaining position. 
260  Kerr The Law of Sale and Lease 72. The notions of abuse of discretionary power and costs of litigation are 
examined in chapters 3 and 4. 
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and rental respectively, or at a unilateral determined price and rental should be retained. This 
will be done in the chapters as follows: 
 
1.6 Chapter outline 
Chapter Two:  Contractual freedom and certainty: the role and function of public policy 
and good faith 
This chapter examines the current status and development of the principles of certainty and 
freedom of contract with reference to contractual discretionary powers, in the law of contract 
in general. This will include a discussion of the constitutional developments in regard to these 
notions. 
The aim is to provide the basis for the discussion whether the recognition of contracts of sale 
and lease at a reasonable price and rental respectively, or at a unilaterally determined price or 
rental is warranted, and specifically to determine whether the recognition thereof would be 
contrary to public policy and hence unconstitutional. 
 
Chapter Three: Overview of consumer protection legislation: its impact on certainty and 
freedom of contract.  
This chapter will highlight some of the significant aspects of the protection given to consumers 
by the Consumer Protection Act,261  the National Credit Act,262 and the Rental Housing Act263 
and the policy considerations underlying these statutes with a view to determining (i) whether 
public policy considerations can operate in harmony with the principles of freedom, sanctity 
and certainty of contract and (ii) whether the recognition of the obiter dicta would conflict with 
                                                            
261  Act 68 of 2008. 
262  Act 34 of 2005. 
263  Act 50 of 1999. 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
the public policy considerations that underpin public interest legislation such as the three 
statutes.  
 
Chapter Four: The constitutional, jurisprudential and policy imperatives informing the 
role and function of the essentialia of price and rental – contractual 
freedom and certainty  
This chapter considers the question whether it can be argued that a reasonable price, or 
unilaterally determined price264 can be said (i) to be the result of a voluntary choice; (ii) to 
promote certainty;265 (iii) to be reflective of the constitutional, jurisprudential and policy 
imperatives that inform the notion of essentialia266 and (iv) to be in line with the policy 
direction of recent consumer protection legislation.267 
In answering these questions, the chapter discusses the constitutional, jurisprudential and 
policy imperatives that inform the requirement of essentialia with a view to laying the 
foundations for a conclusion regarding the role and function of the essentialia of price and 
rental in the promotion of the principles of contractual freedom and certainty. The chapter also 
deals with the court’s function in the determination of the essentialia of price and rental and 
how such role affects the principles of contractual freedom and certainty. 
The aim in this chapter is to provide a basis for a conclusion about (i) the impact that 
recognition of the obiter dicta would have on the principles of freedom and sanctity of contract, 
informed consent and certainty that form the basis of the South African law of contract and (ii) 
whether public policy, as informed by constitutional values, that underpin the essentialia of 
price and rental support such a development.  
                                                            
264  As per the obiter dicta in NBS Boland Bank 1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA) and in Genac Properties 1992 (1) SA 566 (A) 
discussed in para 1.1 above. 
265  See chapters 2 and 4. 
266  See chapter 4 para 4.2.4. 
267  See chapter 3. 
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Chapter Five:  Discretionary powers in respect of price and rental in international and 
comparative perspective 
This chapter deals with the concept of discretionary powers in respect of price and rental in 
international and comparative perspective. It examines the approaches in international 
instruments268 as well as in other jurisdictions that recognise the notion of a reasonable price or 
rental and/or that allows the unilateral determination of the price or rental. The object will be 
to contrast the position in those jurisdictions with our common law approach with a view to 
ascertaining what lessons, if any, may be learnt from the international experience in respect of 
the question of law, namely, whether validity should be bestowed on contracts of sale and 
lease at a reasonable price or rental respectively, or at a unilaterally determined price or rental. 
 
Chapter Six:   Conclusion and recommendations 
This chapter outlines and justifies my conclusions with reference to the preceding chapters. It 
will determine whether our law should, in light of public policy as informed by constitutional 
imperatives, recognise as valid a contract of sale and lease at a reasonable price or rental 
respectively, or at a price or rental determined unilaterally by one of the contractants. In the 
process, it will determine whether the current legal position that the price and rental must be 
ascertained or objectively ascertainable should be retained, and whether it is sufficiently 
refined and developed to give expression, not only, to the principles of freedom, sanctity and 
certainty of contract that underpin contract law, but also, to the democratic values of human 
dignity,269 equality270 and freedom (including freedom of contract)271 that underpin the 
Constitution. 
                                                            
268  These are the United Nations Conventions on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980), UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts (2004), and the Principles of European Contract Law (2003).  
269  Section 10. 
270  Section 9. 
271  Section 7(1). 
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Chapter 2 
Contractual freedom and certainty:  the role and function of public policy and good faith 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the current status and development in South African common law of 
the principles of certainty and freedom of contract with specific reference to discretionary 
powers within the law of contract in general. This includes a discussion of the constitutional 
developments concerning these principles.272 
The aim is to provide a basis for determining whether the recognition of a unilateral 
discretionary power to settle the price and the rental as well as the recognition of a sale at a 
reasonable price or rental is warranted,273 and whether such developments would be contrary 
to public policy and hence unconstitutional.274 
 
2. 2 Freedom of contract 
2.2.1 Historical development of freedom of contract 
The classical theory of the law of contract with the twin notions of freedom and sanctity of 
contract as its cornerstone and which is central to a capitalist, free-market economy,275 has its 
                                                            
272  In Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC), hereafter Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC), public policy was 
redefined as being informed by the concept of ubuntu, and as being a repository of (i) those values that the 
society hold most dear; (ii) the general sense of justice of the community (iii) the boni mores manifested in 
public opinion and incorporates the notions of fairness, justice and equity, and reasonableness and the 
necessity to do simple justice between individuals. See chapter 1 para 1.3.3. 
273  It will be recalled that in a footnote in chapter 1 para 1.2 it was explained that there is a marked similarity 
between contracts of sale and contracts of lease: Cooper Landlord and Tenant (1994) 6-7. Hence, the practice 
of referring mainly to the law relating to the price in contracts of sale will be continued in the interest of brevity 
and avoiding repetition. Differences between the two will be highlighted. 
274  The possibility exists that such developments may be contrary to public policy and hence unconstitutional 
when measured against the Constitutional Court’s findings in Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) as to the 
constituent elements of public policy. This aspect is also explored in the remaining chapters.  
275  Lubbe & Murray Farlam & Hathaway Contract Cases, Materials and Commentary (1988) 2, hereafter Lubbe & 
Murray Contract; Kessler ‘Contracts of Adhesion – Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract’ (1943) 43 
Columbia LR 629, 629-630, hereafter Kessler (1943) 43 Columbia LR 629.  
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roots in the social, economic and political philosophies of sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries,276 during which period “[t]he growing belief in the self-sufficiency of human reason 
highlighted individual freedom and autonomy vis-à-vis the state and other individuals…”277 
Grotius (1583-1645), a natural law theorist, was a leading proponent of that view. He 
considered the right to contract a basic human right.278 The explanation in his Inleidinge279 
makes it clear that the notions of freedom, equality and autonomy underpin this right.280 The 
English philosopher, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) believed that, subject to the dictates of 
natural law, fundamental rights were absolute and could be surrendered only by the individual 
himself. Contract was the vehicle for such surrender, hence his support for the proposition that 
freedom of contract was a basic human right.281 John Locke (1632-1704) emphasized 
individualism and, in a manner similar to Hobbes, promoted the rights of the individual to self-
determination. He perceived the social contract as a means of securing the individual’s rights 
                                                            
276  Aronstam Consumer Protection 1. Aronstam argues that the principle of freedom of contract was extensively 
used by various theorists and commentators to give expression and content to the doctrine of freedom and 
liberty that characterized the libertarian philosophies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (v). It “was 
used by philosophers to formulate a new political order; by sociologists as a means of freeing men from the 
toils of social status; by economists who advocated the creation of a laissez-faire economic system; and by legal 
philosophers as a means of formulating a legal order in which the individual could exercise his legal rights 
without vexatious constraint, a legal order in which the sanctity of his bargains would be rigidly upheld.” There 
is a brief discussion of the position prior to, and leading up to this period in the discussion on the related notion 
of consensuality in Van der Merwe, van Huyssteen, Reinecke & Lubbe Contract: General Principles (2012) 17-
18, hereafter Van der Merwe et al Contract. 
277  Van der Merwe et al Contract 18. 
278  Aronstam Consumer Protection 1. 
279  Hugo & Lee The Jurisprudence of Holland: The Text Translated with Brief Notes and a Commentary by R.W. Lee 
Volume 2 (1936) 295.  
280  This development in the legal arena mirrored the development in the political arena where natural law 
theorists such as John Locke proposed total freedom of choice within the limits of the law of nature. Johnson, 
Pete & Du Plessis Jurisprudence: A South African Perspective (2001) 40, hereafter Johnson et al Jurisprudence; 
Aronstam Consumer Protection 3. 
281  Aronstam Consumer Protection 3. Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract (2005) 10, hereafter 
Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract. Smith traces the origin of the modern principles of 
contract law, including freedom of contract to the eighteenth century. He gives a very insightful discussion of 
the development of freedom of contract from that period till today: Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law 
of Contract 9-19. 
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whilst conceding that political and social security necessitated a limitation of that right.282 Adam 
Smith (1723-1790) believed that individualism led to social order and progress, and was critical 
of state interference in the contractual arena.283 Likewise, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) 
reasoned that human beings have free will and act in accordance with their particular idea of 
laws.284 
Building on these constructs, John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), leader of the utilitarian movement, 
wrote that freedom of contract as a basic human right meant that state interference with the 
exercise of contractual power should be kept to a minimum and that an individual had absolute 
freedom to pursue any contract, and on any terms.285  
The theory of individual freedom was also adopted by eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century proponents of the laissez-faire economy, most notably Adam Smith, who is 
widely regarded as the founder of modern economics. The laissez-faire economists 
argued trenchantly against any state interference in matters of contract because freedom 
of contract was essential for the continuance of trade and industry.286 The market was 
regarded as the driver of the nation, with the function of government relegated to 
preserving the public order.287 These thought processes were mirrored in the legal, 
                                                            
282  Feinman (1982-1983) 30 UCLA LR 829, 839; Johnson et al Jurisprudence 40; Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to 
the Law of Contract 10; Hosten Introduction to South African Law and Legal Theory (1995) 65-69, hereafter 
Hosten Introduction. The theme of the social contract theory is developed in chapter 4 paras 4.2.1-4.2.3 in the 
context of the nature, characteristics and function of the essentiale of price. 
283  Hawthorne ‘The principle of equality in the law of contract’ (1995) 58 THRHR 157, 163, hereafter Hawthorne 
(1995) 58 THRHR; Hawthorne ‘Closing of the open norms in the law of contract’ (2004) 67 THRHRH 294, 295. 
284  Hosten Introduction 69-73.   
285  Current South African law still views freedom of contract as the freedom to decide whether to contract, with 
whom and on what terms: Van der Merwe et al Contract 9; Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) para [57]. 
286  Hawthorne (1995) 58 THRHR 163; Aronstam Consumer Protection 5. Aronstam explains that the principle of 
freedom of contract was also used by socio-political commentators to “explain or advocate the social 
development of various societies” (5 et seq.). Sir Henry Maine used it to explain the development of society 
“from a static condition into an advanced, progressive society.” The “static society” was one where obligations 
and functions were determined by one’s status and the “progressive society” was one where obligations were 
freely acquired. See also Barkhuizen2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) para [151]; Furmston Law of Contract 13, hereafter 
Furmston Law of Contract; Grace, McLane & Giesel Corbin on Contracts (2003) 21. 
287  This includes administration of justice, preservation of law and order, defence.   
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political and socio-economic discourse on both sides of the Atlantic and are still prevalent 
generally in the law of contract.288 
In summary, the classical theory of freedom of contract is founded on the following key 
concepts: (i) an adversarial ethic in which contractants were expected to protect their own 
interests; (ii) the primacy of intention arising from individual self-will (autonomy) that resulted 
in consensus. 
Hereafter follows a brief discussion of contractual autonomy and consensus. 
 
2.2.2 Contractual autonomy and consensus 
The fundamental value that underlies contractual freedom is autonomy,289 meaning an 
individual’s ability to independently engage in a legal act, free from manipulation, input, or the 
dictates of others including the state.290 The belief in the self-sufficiency of human reason291 
means that human beings are viewed as rational human beings who have the right and 
responsibility to make their own choices. Thus, contractual obligations are, in principle, the 
result of a deliberate and voluntary act on the part of the contractants:292 the individual is free 
to decide whether to contract, with whom and on what terms.293 This gave rise to the 
                                                            
288  See para 2.2.5 below for authorities in support of this conclusion.  
289  Autonomy was a central value in the theories of the philosophers dealt with in the paragraph above and all of 
these still profoundly shape today’s legal thinking. In, for example, African Dawn Property Finance 2 (Pty) Ltd v 
Dreams Travel and Tours CC 2011 (3) SA 511 (SCA) paras [27]-[28], hereafter African Dawn 2011 (3) SA 511 
(SCA), the Court cautioned against over-zealous judicial intrusion in the sphere of contractual autonomy, it 
being a real and meaningful incidence of freedom. See also Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of 
Contract 9-10. 
290  Hawthorne (1995) 58 THRHR 163; Pretorius ‘The basis of contractual liability (1) Ideologies and approaches’ 
(2005) 68 THRHR 253, 259, hereafter Pretorius (2005) 68 THRHR 253. In Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 (4) SA 1 
(SCA), hereafter Napier 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA) the Supreme Court of Appeal based its decision in the values of 
dignity and autonomy which “find expression in the liberty to regulate one’s life by freely engage[ing] [in] 
contractual arrangements” (para [12]). See also para 2.2.4 below. 
291  Van der Merwe et al Contract 18. See para 2.2.1 above. 
292  Van der Merwe et al Contract 5-6. Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract 1. 
293  Van der Merwe et al Contract 9. Pretorius (2005) 68 THRHR 266; Friedman Law in a Changing Society (1972) 
121, hereafter Friedman Law in a Changing Society; Hawthorne (1995) 58 THRHR 163. 
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assumption that contracts were based on mutual consent.294 Accordingly, individuals are bound 
by the choices so exercised, hence the principle of sanctity of contract.295 
The choice so exercised may be vitiated only on formal grounds in terms of the strictly defined 
rules of mistake296 and where consensus is obtained by improper means.297 This is in accord 
with the classical theory of contract law. The “rigid application of long-standing rules” may, 
however, result in consent being present in form but not in substance, exposing contract law to 
stagnation and inequity.298 The uncritical employment of contractual autonomy could result in 
the constitutional, social, and economic context in which the law of contract operates being 
overlooked or at best undervalued299 as is illustrated in the discussion further below.300 
                                                            
294  Olivier Legal Fictions: An Analysis and Evaluation Proefschrift ter verkryging van de graad van doctor in de 
rechtsgeleerdheid aan de Rijksuniversiteit te Leiden (1973) 136, hereafter Olivier Legal Fictions. 
295  It is on the basis of this theory that freedom and sanctity of contracts are regarded as twin principles. 
296  Van der Merwe et al Contract 22-26. 
297  Van der Merwe et al Contract chapter 4; Pretorius (2005) 68 THRHR 258. 
298  Bhana & Pieterse ‘Towards a Reconciliation of Contract Law and Constitutional Values: Brisley and Afrox 
Revisited’ (2005) 122 SALJ 865, 884, hereafter Bhana & Pieterse (2005) 122 SALJ. See also Friedman Law in a 
Changing Society 130-132. 
299  See Sachs J in Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) para [145].For example, the preference for sanctity of contract 
in restraint of trade cases, ignores the reality of the socio-economic situation in South Africa where poverty is 
rife and unemployment is endemic. It is submitted that this approach undermines the constitutional values of 
dignity and freedom are undermined. The role of the constitution and the constitutional values of dignity, 
equality and freedom in the context of contractual freedom are elaborated on in the chapters that follow. In 
Advtech Resourcing (Pty) Ltd t/a Communicate Personnel Group v Kuhn 2008 (2) SA 375 (C), hereafter Advtech 
Resourcing 2008 (2) SA 375 (C), the Cape High Court decried the “uncritical use of the concept of ‘contractual 
autonomy as part of freedom in forming the constitutional value of dignity’ holding that it “may be incongruent 
with the principles contained in the development clauses in the Constitution... The use of ‘contractual 
autonomy’ wrenched from any examination of the concept of existing power relationships is, in my view, 
reflective of a libertarian view of the world, clearly evident in Magna Alloys ... and which is in conflict with the 
spirit of the Constitution read as a whole which promotes an entirely different vision of our society” (para [30]). 
The case dealt with the enforcement of a restraint of trade clause. See also Miller & Another NNO v Dannecker 
2001 (1) SA 928 (C) 938-9, hereafter Miller 2001 (1) SA 928 (C), discussed in para 2.8 below; and Mozart Ice 
Cream Franchises (Pty) Ltd v Davidoff 2009 (3) SA 78 (C), hereafter Mozart 2009 (3) SA 78 (C), where the Cape 
High Court defended this view when it replied to the criticism in Den Braven SA (Pty) Ltd v Pillay and Another 
2008 (6) SA 229 (D), hereafter Den Braven2008 (6) SA 229 (D). See further the discussion in para 2.3.2.2(C) 
below. See also Bhana & Pieterse (2005) 122 SALJ 865, 884. This debate concerning autonomy and the 
presumption of consensus was foreshadowed by Van der Merwe, Lubbe & Van Huyssteen ‘The Exceptio Doli 
Generalis: Requiescat in Pace – Vivat Aequitas’ (1989) 106 SALJ 235, 240, hereafter Van der Merwe et al (1989) 
106 SALJ 235. With reference to the decision of the Bank of Lisbon 1988 (3) SA 580 (A) court to strike down the 
exceptio doli generalis, the writers were critical of the majority judgment for expressing no “explicit belief” in 
the “fundamental ... responsibility of a court to ensure justice” and suggesting that adherence to the rules of a 
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Some other fundamental principles of contract law include public policy and good faith.301 
Hereafter follows an exposition of the role and function of these notions, namely, freedom of 
contract, certainty, public policy, and good faith. These principles are discussed with a view to 
establishing the effect of the accommodation in the law of contract302 of the obiter dicta that 
would bestow validity on contracts of sale and lease at a reasonable price or rental respectively, 
or at a unilaterally determined price or rental. 
 
2.2.3 The jurisprudential basis of freedom of contract 
The principle of freedom of contract may be viewed as being a consequence of the reality that 
in a free enterprise system the law cannot possibly anticipate the content of an infinite number 
of atypical transactions that legal subjects may wish to enter into.303 In order to accommodate 
this reality, the principle of freedom of contract keeps to a bare minimum “the ceremony 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
system based, inter alia, on individual autonomy and consensuality, coupled with protection against improperly 
obtained consent, in itself guarantees inequity. The Bank of Lisbon case is discussed in para 2.3.2.1 below. 
300  The edifice of contractual autonomy is increasingly being chipped away by public interest legislation and/or, as 
is the case in South Africa, by legislation aimed at giving effect to the constitutional imperative to foster socio-
economic reforms for the creation of a just and egalitarian society based on the values of dignity, equality and 
freedom. See the Preamble of the Constitution read with sections 1 and 7. Examples of such legislation are: the 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 0f 1997 relating, inter alia, to wages and working hours, and the Broad-
Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 relating to government tenders. Such legislation, whilst 
recognising contractual autonomy, require that it be exercised with restraint to promote a political or social 
objective. Contractual autonomy then becomes the backdrop against which some political or social principles 
of justice have to operate. The latter involves the principle of paternalism in terms whereof there is 
interference by the state (or an individual) with the autonomy of another person. Such interference is justified 
by a claim that the interference is for the protection of the person interfered with or is in the public interest. 
Typical examples of such paternalistic legislation are the consumer protection legislation discussed in chapter 
3. See also Ferreira v Levin NO and Others 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) paras [180]-[181], hereafter Ferreira 1996 (1) SA 
984 (CC).    
301  Du Bois, Bradfield, Himonga, Hutchison, Lehmann, le Roux, Paleker, Pope, van der Merwe & Visser Wille’s 
Principles of South African Law  (2007) 737, hereafter Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles. 
302  For example, how would the current approach to contractual autonomy, freedom of contract and certainty 
impact on an aggrieved contractant who objects to a price or rental determined by the other contractant as 
being unfair or unreasonable.    
303  Kessler (1943) 43 Columbia LR 629. 
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necessary to vouch for the deliberate nature of a transaction …”304 The objective of the law of 
contract is to facilitate and support the contractants’ freedom of contract whilst the function of 
the courts is to enforce contracts.305 
The classical theoretical framework is that a legal subject should be free to decide whether to 
contract, with whom and on what terms with the contractants making their own rules.306  The 
“proud spirit of individualism and of a laissez faire”307 is reflected in the notions of freedom and 
autonomy that lie at the root of this theory; the assumption being that equality exists in the 
contractual arena.308 In terms of this theory, the law, in general, does not concern itself with 
the fairness of a bargain.309 The relative bargaining power of the contractants is generally 
regarded as irrelevant and the law does not entertain a defence to a claim of breach of contract 
on the basis that the defendant negotiated from a position of weakness.310 As a theoretical 
                                                            
304  Kessler (1943) 43 Columbia LR 629. Kessler concludes that consequently freedom of contract is to be 
commended, not only, for moral reasons, but also because it is an eminently practical principle (630). In 
Barkhuizen2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) the Constitutional Court acknowledged the moral content of principle of pacta 
sunt servanda which is the logical extension of the notion of freedom of contract (para [87]). See also Barnett 
‘Contract is Not a Promise; Contract is Consent’ Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 
11-29 (2011) Georgetown Law The Scholarly Commons, 1, 4-5 
<http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/615>, hereafter Barnett ‘Contract is Not a Promise; Contract is 
Consent.’ Although Atiyah Law and Modern Society (1995) describes the economic goals of the law, his 
observation mirrors that of Kessler when he says that “[p]rivate enterprise economics, from the days of Adam 
Smith onward, has tended to take it for granted that the individual pursuit of individual satisfaction within a 
minimal framework of the laws will produce the maximum economic advantage for everyone” (130-131).    
305  Olivier Legal Fictions (1973) 135. See also Furmston Law of Contract 21; Pretorius (2005) 68 THRHR 259. On this 
analysis, the court’s primary concern is not with the substantive fairness of the contract. See the discussion in 
the text following this footnote reference. Instead, the function of the court is limited to determining whether 
the “minimum requirements demanded by society for the creation of liability have been met”: Lubbe & Murray 
Contract 21. See further the discussion in chapter 4 para 4.4. 
306  Beale Chitty On Contract Volume 1 para [1-010]; Hondius & Grigolet Unexpected Circumstances in European 
Contract Law (2011) 4; Barnett ‘Contract is Not a Promise; Contract is Consent’ 4; Brownsword Contract Law 
Themes for the Twenty-First Century (2000) para [2.6], hereafter Brownsword Contract Law Themes. 
307  Kessler (1943) 43 Columbia LR 630; Carter & Hartland Contract Law in Australia para [113]. 
308  Furmston Law of Contract 21; Carter & Hartland Contract Law in Australia para [108]; Cockrell ‘Second-guessing 
the exercise of contractual power on rationality grounds’ (1997) Acta Juridica 26, 30-32. The notion of absolute 
equality between contractants is illusory at best. See the discussion in para 2.4.4 below and Hawthorne (1995) 
58THRHR 163. 
309  Pretorius ‘The basis of contractual liability (3) Theories of Contract (consideration, reliance and fairness)’ (2005) 
68 THRHR575, 575-576 & 590-591; Hawthorne (1995) 58THRHR 164. 
310  Beale Chitty On Contract Volume 1 paras [1-011]-[1-012]; Hawthorne ‘Distribution of wealth, the dependency 
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construct, the soundness of the principle is not questioned because the principle is applied 
equally to both parties,311 hence the notion of equality.312 The supposition is that each 
contractant will protect his/her interests and that by careful shopping around, oppressive 
bargains may be avoided.313 The foregoing is predicated on the fact that legal and commercial 
certainty are essential ingredients of a flourishing free-market economy and that legal and 
commercial certainty is promoted by the recognition and practical implementation of the twin 
notions of freedom and sanctity of contract.314 
 
2.2.4 The South African context 
In one of the earliest South African cases on freedom of contract, Osry v Hirsch, Loubser & 
Co Ltd,315 the Court said that “[t]he spirit of modern Jurisprudence is in favour of the 
liberty of contract...” and, quoting De Villiers CJ in Henderson v Hanekom20 SC at 519, 
explained that “[a]ll modern commercial dealings proceed upon the assumption that 
binding contracts will be enforced by law.” The classical theory outlined above, finds 
resonance in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Appeal.316 In Napier v 
Barkhuizen317 the Court in stating that a cautionary approach should be adopted when 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
theory and the law of contract’ (2006) 69THRHR 48, 51-52, hereafter Hawthorne (2006) 69THRHR 48; Hahlo 
(1981) 98 SALJ 70. The discussion in para 2.4.4 illustrates the continued application of this approach in South 
African law. 
311  Lubbe & Murray Contract 2. 
312  Friedman Law in a Changing Society 124; Cockrell ‘Substance and Form in the South African Law of Contract’ 
(1992) 109 SALJ 40, hereafter Cockrell (1992) 109 SALJ 40. 
313  Kessler (1943) 43 Columbia LR 630. 
314  See the explanation in chapter 1 para 1.3.3 and in para 2.2.2 above. See also Hutchison, Pretorius, Du Plessis, 
Eiselen, Floyd, Hawthorne, Kuschke, Maxwell, Naudé and De Stadler The Law of Contract in South Africa (2012) 
22, hereafter Hutchison et al Contract. This approach to legal and commercial certainty still prevails in the 
decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeal: see Potgieter and Another v Potgieter NO and Others 2012 (1) SA 
637 (SCA) paras [32] and [34], hereafter Potgieter 2012 (1) SA 637 (SCA). 
315  1922 CPD 531, 546. The case concerned the validity of an agreement for the sale of movables by means of 
parate executie.  
316  For example, in Brisley v Drotsky2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA), hereafter Brisley2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA), and Bredenkamp v 
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA), hereafter Bredenkamp (appeal) 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA). 
317  2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA) para [13]. 
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“intruding on apparently voluntarily concluded arrangements,” confirms the principle that 
public policy demands that agreements should be honoured. 
This has consistently been the approach of our courts318 and was granted constitutional 
legitimacy when the Constitutional Court319 confirmed that “[s]elf-autonomy, or the 
ability to regulate one’s own affairs, even to one’s own detriment, is the very essence of 
freedom and a vital part of dignity.” However, the Constitutional Court also cautioned 
that the principle of pacta sunt servanda is not a sacred cow and that it is subject to 
constitutional scrutiny.320 Despite this, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Bredenkamp v 
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd321 re-affirmed its earlier decisions322 and concluded 
that fairness is not a free-standing requirement for the exercise of a contractual right.323 
In doing so, the Supreme Court of Appeal re-established the hegemony of freedom and 
sanctity of contract.324 
                                                            
318  See for example, Brisley2002 (4) SA 1 SCA; Bredenkamp (appeal) 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA). 
319  Barkhuizen2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) para [57]. 
320  Para [15]. The issue is discussed in chapter 1 para 1.3.3. See also Hawthorne (1995)58THRHR 167. 
321  (Appeal) 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA) para [27]. See also the discussion in chapter 1 para 1.3.3. It will be recalled that 
in chapter 1 para 1.3.3 it was explained that there are three cases involving the Applicant and that the 
Applicant’s name was spelt differently in two of the three cases. The precautionary measures described in 
chapter 1 para 1.3.3 to avoid confusion between the cases are also followed in this chapter and are repeated 
here for the sake of clarity. The spellings of the Applicant’s name as per the case citations will be retained and 
to avoid any confusion between the cases, the cases will hereafter be referred to as follows: Breedenkamp 
(interim interdict) 2009 (5) SA 304 (GSJ); Breedenkamp (return date) 2009 (6) SA 277 (GSJ); and Bredenkamp 
(appeal) 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA). 
322  For example, in Brisley2002 (4) SA 202 1 (SCA).  
323  Para [53]. See also Potgieter 2012 (1) SA 637 (SCA) para [34] which affirmed the Bredenkamp (appeal) 2010 (4) 
SA 468 (SCA) viewpoint. The conclusions have their origin in the classical theory principal of individual 
autonomy in terms whereof individuals have the freedom to decide on the terms of their contract. When once 
they have exercised this right, they are bound by their choices. Hence, the theory, in general, operates on a 
presumption of consensus and ignores any unfairness that may adhere to the contract as a result of unfair 
business practices such as standard form contracts (para  2.4.2 below) and subjective considerations  such as 
unequal bargaining power or personal attributes of the contractant such as literacy levels and need: see para 
2.4.4 below). The provisions of the consumer protection legislation such as those relating to information and 
disclosure address such considerations. See the discussion in chapter 3.  
324  In English law, during the period 1870-1980, there was a retreat from the dogmatism of the classical notions of 
freedom of contract and an embrace of a more paternalistic and regulatory approach to the law of contract. 
The post-1980 period has seen a duality in approach. On the one hand, there has been a tendency to revive the 
classical principles of contract law, whilst on the other hand there has been a strengthening of the movement 
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By way of summary, “[i]t may be stated with a measure of impunity that the dominant social 
and economic values reflected in the formal dogma, and rules of South African law of contract 
are those of individualism (autonomy) and self-interest.”325 
 
2.2.5 Conclusion 
The principle of freedom of contract, central to the classical theory, is the most powerful 
symbol of individualism. As a theoretical construct, freedom of contract means that the 
decision whether to contract, with whom, and on what terms falls within the sole province of 
those who have the requisite contractual capacity. Inherent in the theory is the assumption 
that contractants operate on the basis of complete equality.326 
Freedom of contract is viewed, not only, as being fundamental to the prevailing legal, political, 
and socio-economic discourse, but also, as the generator of growth and modernisation. The 
ideal is a system in which state interference is kept to a bare minimum, private rights being 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
for regulation. The rationale for the latter has changed from one of protecting the weak to one of facilitating 
contracting. The argument is that consumers would more readily conclude a contract if they are confident that 
the contract does not contain unwelcome surprises: Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract 16-
20. See also Furmston and Bradgate The Law of Contract (2010) para [1.52], hereafter Furmston and Bradgate 
The Law of Contract; Beale Chitty On Contract  Volume 1 para [7-126]. The discussion of the consumer 
protection legislation in chapter 3 shows that such legislation may promote contracting. Whilst the principles of 
freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda constitute salient features of both the NBW and the Principles of 
European Contract Law (PECL), the existence of an unequal bargaining relationship as well the application of 
the principles of good faith and fair dealing act to temper the application thereof: Schelhaas (General Editor) 
The Principles of European Contract Law and Dutch Law A Commentary (2002) 7 and 33. Similar considerations 
apply in German law: Mak Performance-Orientated Remedies in European Sale of Goods (2009) 7-11 and 48-50. 
325  Van Huyssteen, Van der Merwe & Maxwell Contract Law in South Africa (2012) para [16], hereafter cited as Van 
Huyssteen et al Contract Law.  
326  The assumption is evident in the following quotation from the early (1875) English case of Printing Registering 
Co. v Sampson LR 19 Eq at 465 as quoted in Wells v South African Alumenite 1927 AD 69, 73, hereafter Wells 
1927 AD 69: “[I]f there is one thing which more than another public policy requires it is that men of full age and 
competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts when entered 
into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of Justice. Therefore you have 
this paramount public policy to consider – that you are not lightly to interfere with the freedom of contract.” 
Inequality in bargaining power is discussed in para 2.4.4 below. 
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regarded as superior to public rights.327 The hallmarks of the classical model of the law of 
contract328 still dominates the modern law of contract329 subject to varying degrees of 
                                                            
327  That the adherence to this line of thinking is undergoing a change in South Africa is evident from the decisions 
of the Constitutional Court in Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC), hereafter Hoffmann 2001 
(1) SA 1 (CC); Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) and Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) 
Ltd 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC), hereafter Everfresh 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC). 
328  Hutchison et al Contract summarizes these as consisting of freedom and autonomy of the parties; minimal 
state intervention; a preference for clear and certain rules, rather than open-ended standards; self- interested 
individualism; assumed fairness of the exchange; a discrete event; parties enjoy equal bargaining power; 
perfect or near-perfect competition in the market; and parties actually negotiate the terms of their contract 
(23).  
329  In England, the high-water mark of the classical theory of contract was reached during the 18th and 
19thcenturies whereafter judicial action and legislative intervention, in the pursuit of fairness and justice, 
sought to temper some of the harsh consequences: Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract 9-16. 
An example of the resonance of the classical theory in the decisions of the English courts is the dictum in 
Printing Registering Co. v Sampson LR 19 Eq 465 quoted the footnote above. Furmston Law of Contract 13 
traces this aspect of the judgment in the Printing case back to Adam Smith’s line of thinking. See also Atiyah 
Essays on Contract (1986) 11 et seq, hereafter Atiyah Essays; Beale Chitty On Contract Volume 1 (2008) para [1-
011]-[1-014], hereafter Beale Chitty on Contract Volume 1; Selected Readings on the Law of Contracts From 
American and English Legal Journals (1931) 100-103. The role of good faith in England and in other common 
law jurisdictions is not as clear-cut as in the United States of America: Beale Chitty On Contract Volume 1 para 
[7-126]. 
Though the principle of freedom of contract underpinned the law of contract in Scotland, the concept did not 
reach the same zenith that it did in England: Woolman & Lake Contract (2001) para [1.8], hereafter Woolman & 
Lake Contract. 
In the United States of America, freedom of contract is still the guiding principle of the UCC. See, for example, 
UCC 1-102(3). See also Kessler (1943) 43 Columbia LR 629-630. However, it is subject to limitation. Freedom of 
contract is qualified by the UCC requirements that the parties must act reasonably and in good faith and that 
the agreement must not be unconscionable: Warkentine ‘Article 2 Revisions: An Opportunity to Protect 
Consumers and Merchant Consumers through Default Provisions’ (1996-1997) 30 J. Marshall LR 39, 44, 
hereafter Warkentine (1996-1997) 30 J. Marshall LR 39; See also UCC 2-302:6 read with UCC 2-302:8 in 
Lawrence Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code Volume 2A (2008). 
Freedom of contract also forms the foundation of the Australian law of contract: Carter & Hartland Contract 
Law in Australia paras [108] and [113]. 
Article 1.1 of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (2004), (UNIDROIT Principles 
(2004)), also guarantees freedom of contract but it is subject to a mandatory duty of good faith in Article 1.7. 
Freedom of contract is implicit in Article 6 of the United Nations Conventions on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods, (1980) (CISG): Kröll, Mistelis & Viscasill The United Nations Conventions on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods: Article by Article Commentary (2011) 99-100, hereafter Kröll et al The United 
Nations Convention. Article 1:102 of the Principles of European Contract Law (2003) (PECL) also guarantees 
freedom of contract but the notion is subject to the requirement of good faith and fair dealing and any 
mandatory rules established by the PECL. The duty of good faith may not be excluded or limited: Bonell & 
Peleggi ‘UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and Principles of European Contract Law: A 
Synoptical Table’ (2004) 9 Uniform LR 315, 334, hereafter Bonell & Peleggi (2004) 9 Uniform LR 315. The 
European Court of Justice has recognized freedom of contract as a “general principle of civil law.” The notion of 
freedom of contract enjoys protection in Article 16 (to conduct business) of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and has been set as “the basic point of reference for the future development of European contract law”: 
Beale Chitty On Contract Volume 1 para [1-013]. The duty of good faith in international jurisdictions is 
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constraints and limitations depending on the prevailing social, political and economic climate in 
a particular country.330 
The roots of the classical theory grow very deep in the South African contract law environment 
as is evident in decisions that ignore considerations such as illiteracy, bargaining power and 
need.331 
 
2.3 Public policy and its influence on freedom of contract  
2.3.1 Introduction 
The discussion in the preceding paragraphs is illustrative of the conclusion that it is trite law 
that the twin notions of freedom and sanctity of contract stand at the vanguard of the South 
African law of contract.332 In general, South African courts have proved to be reluctant to 
pursue distributive justice333 by second-guessing contracts freely entered into.334 There is a 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
discussed in chapter 5.   
330  The social, political, and economic climate prevailing in a country dictates the degree of social and state control 
exercised over commercial transactions. In South Africa, for example, a combination of social, economic and 
political factors have led to the enactment of consumer-orientated legislation such as the Consumer Protection 
Act 68 of 2008, the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 and the National Credit Act 34 of 2005. These statutes are 
representative of an increasing willingness on the part of the legislature to intervene in private contracts with 
the goal of placing contractants on a more equitable and level playing field. The courts have also a played a role 
in this regard. For example, the ambit of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of 
Land Act 19 of 1998 has been extended by the courts so that the common law right of a lessor to summarily 
evict a tenant and any contractual provision regarding the eviction of a tenant, are subjugated to the provisions 
of the Act: see Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker v Jika [2002] 4 All SA 384 (SCA). The decision has been criticized on the 
basis that the Act was not intended to regulate those cases where the occupation was initially lawful, for 
example, in terms of a lease agreement, but became unlawful on termination of the lawful title. Though the 
legislature has taken note of this criticism, steps to “rectify” the law in this regard have yet to come to pass.  
Public policy, as embodied in the foundational values that underlie the Constitution, has also been used by the 
courts, as exemplified in Barkhuizen2007 (5) SA 323 (CC), as a basis for testing the validity of contractual terms. 
See the discussion in chapter 1 para 1.3.3 but see the discussion paras 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 below. See also Carter & 
Hartland Contract Law in Australia para 117. 
331  See for example, Mathole v Mothle 1951 (1) SA 256 (T), hereafter Mathole 1951 (1) SA 256 (T); Khan v Naidoo 
1989 (3) SA 724 (NPD); Brisley 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) and Bredenkamp (appeal) 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA); the 
discussion in paras 2.3.1, 2.4.2-2.4.4 and 2.8 below. 
332  The constitutionality thereof was recognised in Barkhuizen2007 (5) SA 323 (CC): see chapter 1 para 1.3.3. See 
also Lubbe & Murray Contract 21. 
333  Distributive justice has to do with the equal treatment of people before the law and relates to the distribution 
of goods whilst commutative justice is concerned with rectifying disturbances in the distribution of goods, for 
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reluctance to meddle with contractual arrangements out of deference to the will of the 
contractants and a refusal to impose their own conceptions of fairness and justice on parties’ 
individual arrangements.335 
This individualistic approach to the law of contract is one-dimensional and somewhat 
anachronistic.336 That such an approach does not place a premium on substantive fairness (and 
hence distributive justice),337 as opposed to procedural fairness,338 is evident in that it, at best, 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
example, where one person acquires goods meant for another: Johnson et al Jurisprudence 15; Hosten 
Introduction 24-25; Speidel ‘The Borderland of Contract’ (1983) 10(2) Northern Kentucky LR 163. See also Du 
Bois et al Wille’s Principles 15-16. 
334  Cockrell (1992) 109 SALJ 59. Brownsword Contract Law Themes para [2.8]. 
335  See Napier 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA) para [13]. A duality in approach in the English courts has led to a compromise 
between those who believe that the flexibility of the doctrine leads to uncertainty and who have adopted the 
public-policy-is-an-unruly-horse adage and those who acknowledge the creative role of public policy such as 
Lord Denning M.R. who held that with a good rider in the saddle the unruly horse can be kept in control – it can 
jump over obstacles: Treitel An Outline of the Law of Contract (2004) 189, hereafter Treitel An Outline. See also 
McBryde The Law of Contract in Scotland (2007) para [19-02], hereafter McBryde The Law of Contract in 
Scotland. The South African Constitutional Court is evidently aligned with the view expressed by Lord Denning 
M.R: see Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC). See also Friedman Law in a Changing Society 124. 
336  The approach, not only, spawns a reliance by contractants that the law will enforce contracts freely and 
voluntarily entered into, but also, generates an enthusiasm by the law to do so: see the cases dealt with in the 
paragraphs below. See also Cockrell (1992) 109 SALJ 63. 
337  By way of example, the following statements are instructive of the individualistic approach of the Supreme 
Court of Appeal. In Brisley2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) the court sought justification in the Constitution and its values for 
the view that the courts did not have a “general jurisdiction to invalidate contracts on the basis of judicially 
perceived notions of unjustness or to determine their enforceability on the basis of imprecise notions of good 
faith” (para [93]). This theme is addressed in para 2.8 below. Similar sentiments are expressed in Bredenkamp 
(appeal) 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA) where the Court held that it was not the duty of the court “to assess whether or 
not a bona fide business decision, which is on the face of it reasonable and rational, was objectively ‘wrong’ 
where in the circumstances no public policy considerations are involved” (para [65]). In this regard, and with 
reference to the rejection of the notion that the exceptio doli generalis forms part of our law by the court in 
Bank of Lisbon 1988 (3) SA 580 (A), Van der Merwe et al Contract comment that the need for “substantive 
justice” between contractants “remains extant” (276).   
338  Where improperly obtained consensus in forms such as misrepresentation, duress and undue influence play a 
role in procedural fairness: Van der Merwe et al Contract 86 et seq. American law follows a similar approach 
regarding the sanctity of contracts but with the important qualification that in order to protect freedom of 
contract, courts will “favour a conscionable interpretation of a contract”: UCC 2-302:90 in Lawrence Anderson 
on the Uniform Commercial Code Volume 2A (2008). 
English law, unlike American and Australian law does not have a general defence of unconscionability: Smith 
Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract 15; Furmston Law of Contract 385; Beale Chitty On Contract 
Volume 1  paras [7-014]–[7-018] and [7-126]; Beaton Anson’s Law of Contract (2002) 299. However, 
considerations of fairness and justice saw the relaxation of procedural defenses to include the recognition of 
“economic duress” and “mistake at equity” as defences. The threat of economic duress is directed at the 
contractant’s economic interests. The minimum requirement is the “but for” test, meaning that the contract 
would not have been concluded at all or on the term(s) it was made had it not been for the particular “event” 
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only grudgingly acknowledges that the law does limit the power of a contractant to utilize the 
legal infrastructure to enforce contracts.339 
Against the background of individualism, public policy340 fulfills a dual function in that it may 
operate as a sword or as a shield: it may on the one hand, be used to strike down a contract 
and, in the process achieve a measure of substantive fairness, whilst on the other hand, it may 
be used as a rationale for the enforcement of a contract.341 Public policy operates as a sword in 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
complained of: Beale Chitty On Contract Volume 1 para [7-022]; Peel Treitel The Law of Contract (2011) paras 
[10-003] and [10-005], hereafter Peel Treitel The Law of Contract. The test is a subjective one: whether 
economic duress exists depends of the coercive effect of the threat in each case. As opposed to economic 
duress, duress of person will exist if the threat was simply one reason why the contract was concluded: Peel 
Treitel The Law of Contract para [10-003].  
Scottish law also recognizes the notion of economic duress and follows the path of English law: MacQueen & 
Thomson MacQueen and Thomson: Contract Law in Scotland (2000) para [4.26], hereafter MacQueen & 
Thomson Contract Law in Scotland; Woolman & Lake Contract para [6.5].  
The defence of economic duress is also recognized in American common law. Economic duress requires 
conduct that precludes the exercise of free will on the part of a contractant. So for example, the exclusion of 
liability by a monopolistic entity was held to constitute economic duress. A subjective test is used in that the 
threat need only to have deprived the contractant of free will and absence of choice may be said to occur even 
in those cases where the subject-matter of the sale is a necessity and not readily available elsewhere, or where 
the weaker contractant is unaware of its availability: Hillman, McDonnell, & Nickles Common Law and Equity 
under the Uniform Commercial Code (1985) 4-24 to 4-28 and 6-6 to 6-7, hereafter Hillman et al Common Law 
and Equity under the Uniform Commercial Code. However, the test has become more objective in that the 
threat must have left the contractant with “no reasonable alternative”: Farnsworth Farnsworth on Contracts 
(2004) 261, hereafter Farnsworth Contracts.  
It is unlikely that South Africa will, in the near future, see a development along the lines set out above as a 
result of the pronouncement in Medscheme Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Bhamjee 2005 (5) SA 339 (SCA) where the 
Court said it is, in general, neither unlawful not unconscionable to cause economic harm or even economic ruin 
in a competitive economy. Hard bargaining does not constitute duress not even where there is an imbalance in 
bargaining power (para [18]). The jurisdictions mentioned above also subscribe to a similar philosophy 
regarding hard bargains in a competitive economy but make allowances for unconscionable conduct as 
explained above. The obiter in the Medscheme case to the effect that there is no reason in principle why a 
threat of economic ruin may not, in appropriate cases, amount to duress provides scant relief because of the 
Court’s vague explanation that “[s]omething more – which is absent in this case – would need to exist for 
economic bargaining to be illegitimate or unconscionable and thus to constitute duress” (para [18]). Emphasis 
added. The Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 discussed in chapter 3 does, however, address issues of this 
nature. 
339  Cockrell (1992) 109 SALJ 61. In Brisley2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) the court explained that a court’s function is to weigh 
up fundamental values, such as good faith, fairness and the boni mores, which sometimes conflict with each 
other, against each other, and “om by geleentheid wanneer dit nodig blyk te wees, geleidelik en met verdrag 
aanpassings te maak” (para [24]). Emphasis added.  
340  The problem of what constitutes the content of public policy was dealt with in chapter 1 para 1.3.3.  
341  Hutchison ‘Non-variation Clauses in Contract: Any Escape from the Shifren Straitjacket?’ (2001) 118 SALJ 720, 
hereafter Hutchison (2001) 118 SALJ 720. 
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terms of the public harm principle:342 the law comes to the assistance of contractants in striking 
down contracts or terms thereof when the interests of society at large343 are at stake or when it 
is necessary to prevent impairment of public institutions.344 The law may also, in terms of the 
principle of paternalism,345 come to the assistance of contractants in order to protect them by 
preventing them from acting against their own best interests.346 Public policy acts as a shield 
when it is used to enforce contractual arrangements.  
The role of public policy as a rationale for the enforcement of contracts is dealt with in the next 
paragraph. Its role as a sword is discussed thereafter.347 
 
 
 
                                                            
342  Cockrell (1992) 109 SALJ 61 referring to Joel Feinberg Social Philosophy (1973) 25. 
343  See Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A), hereafter Sasfin 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) where the court said that the 
interests of the community or public are “of paramount importance in relation to the concept of public policy” 
(71). 
344  Cockrell (1992) 109 SALJ 61. In Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC), the Constitutional Court, 
in ordering the respondent to offer Hoffmann a contract of employment as a cabin attendant, decided that the 
respondent’s refusal impaired the applicant’s dignity and amounted to unfair discrimination. The court 
concluded that the refusal to employ Hoffmann because he was HIV impaired violated his right to equality, 
guaranteed in Section 9 of the Constitution. The Constitution (a public institution) and the public at large are 
protected in this instance. See also chapter 1 para 1.3.3. 
345  The principle is descriptive of (philanthropic) interference by the state or an individual in the autonomy of 
another latter. The interference is rationalised by a claim that the interference is for the protection of the 
person interfered with or is in the public interest. See further footnote explanations in paras 2.2.2 above and 
2.3.1 below. See also Cockrell (1992) 109 SALJ 61; Kronman (1983) 92 Yale LJ 763.    
346  See Breedenkamp and Others v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd (interim interdict) 2009 (5) SA 304 (GSJ) para 
[68] discussed in chapter 1 para 1.3.3. The judgment reflects the practical application of the “principle of 
paternalism” and reflects a line of thinking that differs significantly from that of the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
Further evidence of the application of the public harm principle and the principle of paternalism are to be 
found in public interest legislation such as the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008, the National Credit Act 34 
of 2005, and the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999. Relevant aspects of these pieces of legislation are dealt with in 
chapter 3. As will become evident in the discussion in chapter 3, the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act 
as well as the National Credit Act and the Rental Housing Act are designed to give effect and to promote the 
constitutional values of dignity, equality and freedom (these values were touched upon in chapter 1 and are 
discussed in more detail in chapter 4) and in the process they provide the context for effecting “critical social 
and economic reforms required by the Constitution” for the “transformation [of the South African society] to a 
more just and egalitarian society,” as concluded by Chaskalson P: Devenish The South African Constitution 
(2005) 63. 
347  The role of public policy in answering the question of law is discussed in chapter 4. 
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2.3.2 Public policy as rationale for the enforcement of contracts 
The general approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal348 is outlined first and thereafter specific 
instances are discussed in illustration of this approach. 
 
2.3.2.1 General approach  
Public policy favours the utmost freedom of contract.349 It demands that a contractant must, in 
the absence of fraud, be held to a contract even if it contains harsh conditions.350 Coming to the 
rescue of such a contractant is regarded as tantamount to changing the contract instead of 
interpreting it.351 The subjective expectation of the contents of a contract is disregarded and no 
legal obligation rests on a contractant to draw the other contractant’s attention to a clause that 
can be reasonably expected in a contract.352 
                                                            
348  The Supreme Court of Appeal, as the apex court on non-constitutional matters, has been responsible for 
shaping the contract law in South Africa. This is evidenced by landmark cases which have seen the erosion of 
equitable principles in the determination of contractual validity. This thesis highlights some of these cases. 
Representing pre-constitutional jurisprudence see, for example, Bank of Lisbon 1988 (3) SA 580 (A) (discussed 
in chapter 1 para 1.3.3 and para 2.3.2.1 of this chapter); Magna Alloys and Research SA (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) 
SA 874 (A), hereafter Magna Alloys 1984 (4) SA 874 (A) (discussed chapter 1 para 1.3.3 and in para 2.3.2.2(C)) 
of this chapter) and representing post-constitutional jurisprudence, see, for example, Brisley2002 (4) SA 202 1 
(SCA) (discussed in chapter 1 para 1.3.3 and paras  2.3.2.2(A) and 2.8 of this chapter); Bredenkamp (appeal) 
2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA) (discussed in para chapter 1 para1.3.3 and in paras 2.2.4 and 2.8 of this chapter). The 
apex status of the Supreme Court of Appeal when the Constitution 17th Amendment Bill was adopted by the 
National Assembly on 20 November 2012 becomes law. The Bill still has to be signed by the State President and 
published in the Government Gazette. Currently there are two apex courts: the Constitutional Court in 
constitutional matters and the Supreme Court of Appeal in non-constitutional matters. The Bill extends the 
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court to hear any matter it deems to raise an arguable point of law in the 
public interest. This effectively confirms the status of the Constitutional Court as the highest court in the land. 
349  Osry v Hirsch, Loubser & Co Ltd 1922 CPD 531; Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) where the 
Court quoted with approval from Sasfin 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 9B-F that “public policy generally favours the utmost 
freedom of contract, and requires that commercial transactions should not be unduly trammelled by 
restrictions on that freedom”: (para 8). 
350  Wells 1927 AD 69, 73. The case concerned the validity of an acknowledgment by the Appellant that it had 
concluded the contract regardless of any representations by the Respondent or its representatives. The dictum 
of the court was recently quoted with approval in Bredenkamp (appeal) 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA) para [33]. 
351  Natal Motor Industries Ltd v Crickmay 1962 (2) SA 93 (N) 98; Lubbe & Murray Contract 21. 
352  In other words, a legal obligation would exist only where a clause, objectively speaking, is unexpected: Afrox 
2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) paras [36] & [9]. In casu, the Respondent challenged the validity of a clause in a contract 
that he signed that indemnified the Appellant from negligence of its nursing staff. One of the grounds of the 
challenge was that the admitting clerk had a legal duty to bring the indemnity clause to the Respondent’s 
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Equitable considerations do not play a role in the court’s decisions.353 In Bank of Lisbon v De 
Ornelas the Court found that there was no evidence of a “general substantive defence based on 
equity.”354 Roman-Dutch law was viewed as an inherently equitable legal system and equity 
was deemed to be subject to the principles of law and, unable to override “a clear rule of 
law.”355 The Appellate Division struck the death-blow to the doctrine of laesio enormis356 in 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
attention on his admission to the hospital. In arriving at its conclusion, the Court said that exemption clauses 
have become the rule rather than the exception in standard form contracts and that there is no reason why 
private hospitals should as a matter of principle be distinguished from other service providers.  
In Germany, BGB 307 provides for a presumption of unreasonable disadvantage where a clause limits “essential 
rights or duties inherent in the nature of the contract to such an extent that attainment of the purpose of the 
contract is jeopardized.” BGB 307 further provides that a clause is ineffective if, contrary to the requirement of 
good faith, it unreasonable disadvantages the other contractant. The impugned clause in the Afrox case would 
have triggered BGB 307. In Constantia Insurance Co Ltd v Compusource (Pty) Ltd 2005 (4) SA 345 (SCA) the 
court held that a contractant cannot be bound by a clause that it did not or could not reasonably have been 
thought to have agreed to (355B-D). 
353  In the words of Hosten Introduction this approach is a refusal by the courts “to consider the needs of individual 
justice ... coupled with an unbending adherence to Roman Dutch principle” (530). Lubbe & Murray Contract 
comment that “the limited number of grounds on which a party may escape liability under an agreement 
satisfying the general requirements for the validity of contracts is indicative of our courts’ adherence to the 
notion that public policy demands recognition of the principle of pacta sunt servanda” (387). 
354  1988 (3) SA 580 (A) 605I-J, hereafter Bank of Lisbon 1988 (3) SA 580 (A). In rejecting and burying once and for 
all the exceptio doli generalis as a “superfluous, defunct anachronism,” the Appellate Division (607B) fortified 
the hegemony of the individualistic approach by remaining, in the words of Lubbe & Murray Contract 
“unpersuaded by Jansen JA’s attempt to demonstrate ... that pacta sunt servanda, freedom of contract and 
legal certainty were not absolute values in our law of contract” (391). The case concerned securities and 
mortgage bonds furnished by the Respondents as security to the Appellants for overdraft facilities. On 
satisfaction of its principal indebtedness, the Respondents requested the cancellation of the securities and the 
mortgage bonds. The Appellants declined to do so and retained the securities pending the outcome of court 
proceedings it intended to institute against the Respondents, an eventuality that was not within the 
contemplation of the contractants at the time when the contracts concerning the securities and mortgage 
bonds were drafted. The Respondent relied on the exceptio doli generalis for relief.  The court, after rejecting 
the contention that the exceptio had become part of our law, and after finding  that there is no “evidence of 
the existence of a general substantive defence based on equity” concluded that the ambit of the contracts was 
wide enough for the securities to also function as collateral for the contemplated court action (at 605I). Jansen 
JA (611 et seq.), in a minority judgment, disagreed with the majority that the exceptio doli was a “defunct 
anachronism” (607A-B)). The ambit of the exceptio was explained in chapter 1 para 1.3.3. 
355  At 606A-B. In English law, equitable considerations that were administered in separate courts are now 
administered in the same courts as the common law: Treital An Outline of the Law of Contract 6. Equity also 
plays a role in the United States of America: Hillman et al Common Law and Equity under the Uniform 
Commercial Code 6-20 to 6-21. 
356  The doctrine allowed the rescission of a contract, or an adjustment in the contract price, in the absence of 
fraud, duress or excusable mistake, where the contract price was more than twice or less than half the value of 
the subject matter of the sale. The doctrine served to correct abuses of bargaining power and addressed the 
issue of unconscionable contracts: Lubbe & Murray Contract 378-381. See also Van der Merwe et al Contract 
112; Gillig v Sonnenberg 1953 (4) SA 675 (TPD) 682H.  
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Tjollo Ateljees (Eins) Bpk v Small357 when it refused to come to the assistance of a contractant 
who had been overextended by the contract. A court, before it will grant relief, must be 
convinced that the contractant was misled when concluding the contract.358 The interests of 
certainty and the court’s concern of its arbitrary use dictate that the power to declare a 
contract contrary to public policy must be used “sparingly and only in the clearest of cases.”359 
In an earlier case, the Appellate Division in Preller and Others v Jordaan360 warned that if judges 
are allowed to decide cases on what they regarded as being reasonable and fair, the criterion 
will no longer be the law but the judge.    
The cases discussed above are representative of the approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal 
to uphold a contract even though it produces an inequitable result. The approach was recently 
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Napier case.361 More recently, the Supreme 
                                                            
357  1949 (1) SA 856 (A). The respondent sued for the rescission of sale on the basis that the promissory note issued 
in favour of the appellant was in the amount of £27 16s 6d whilst the value of the item sold was less than £13 
8s 3d. The Court concluded that the doctrine allowed the contractant “to seek relief not against a wrong, but 
against his own lack of judgment, ineptitude, or folly” (873). The court viewed the principle of freedom of 
contract, which informed its decision to strike down the application of the laesio enormis, to be absolute and 
inviolate. However, the notion of its inviolability was qualified by the Constitutional Court in Barkhuizen2007 
(5) SA 323 (CC) discussed in chapter 1 para 1.3.3. The Tjollo Ateljees decision probably resulted in the abolition 
of the doctrine in the then Transvaal and Natal by section 25 of the General Law Amendment Act 32 of 1952: 
Lubbe & Murray Contract 387; Aronstam Consumer Protection 45. At the time when the case was heard, the 
doctrine had already been abolished by legislation in the Cape Colony in 1879 and in the Orange Free State in 
1902: Aronstam Consumer Protection 44. More recently justification for the approach was sought in the 
Constitution. In Knox D’Arcy Ltd and Another v Shaw and Another 1996 (2) SA 651 (W), hereafter Knox D’Arcy 
1996 (2) SA 651 (W), the Court said that ‘[t]he Constitution does not take such a meddlesome interest in the 
private affairs of individuals that it would seek as a matter of policy to protect them against their own 
foolhardy or rash decisions” (660 D-E). The case dealt with restraint of trade agreements within the context of 
section 26 of the the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993, hereafter the Interim Constitution, that 
guaranteed the right to freely engage in economic activity. 
358  See George v Fairmead (Pty) Ltd 1958 (2) SA 465 (A) 471, hereafter George 1958 (2) SA 465 (A). The Court, in 
rejecting the Appellant’s appeal for relief where he had signed a document without reading the contents 
thereof, said that a party who seeks relief “must convince the Court that he was misled as to the words to 
which he was thus signifying his assent.” 
359  Afrox 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) para [8]. See also Sasfin 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 9B-F. 
360  1956 (1) SA 483 (A) 500. 
361  2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA). Basing its approach in the values of dignity and autonomy which “find expression in the 
liberty to regulate one’s life by freely engage[ing] [in] contractual arrangements”, the Court cautioned that the 
fact that a term in a contract is “unfair or may operate harshly [does not] by itself, lead to the conclusion that it 
offends the values of the Constitution” (para [12]). See also para 2.2.4 above. 
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Court of Appeal in the Potgieter case362 again warned that the introduction of reasonable and 
fairness as a basis for deciding cases would lead to “intolerable” legal uncertainty.  
 
2.3.2.2 Specific examples 
Having sketched in broad terms the approach of the courts to public policy as a sword, the 
discussion will highlight a few specific examples of the use of public policy as a shield. The 
examples discussed below reflect some of the more common encounters that individuals have 
with legal and commercial practice. The examples also illustrate that the obligations that arise 
from these encounters often have a profound legal consequences for those involved.  
 
(A) Non-variation clauses 
In terms of the Shifren principle, a non-variation clause does, not only, not constitute a 
limitation of freedom of contract, but also, does not offend public policy;363 rather public policy 
requires that it be enforced.364 The courts have held that recognition and enforcement of non-
variation clauses do not serve to favour the economically powerful but rather serve as 
protection for both contractants365 from the factual and evidentiary uncertainties that may 
                                                            
362  2012 (1) SA 637 (SCA) para [34].  
363  Shifren & Others v SA Sentrale Ko-op Graanmaatskappy Bpk 1964 (2) SA 343 (O) 346. See also the decision on 
appeal in SA Sentrale Ko-op Graanmaatskappy Bpk v Shifren en Andere 1964 (4) SA 760 (A) 766, hereafter SA 
Sentrale 1964 (4) SA 760 (A). In this case, a tenant relied on an oral variation to a signed contract of lease that 
provided that variations thereto must be in writing. The problems arising from the Shifren principle and the 
approaches of the courts to deal with these are discussed in Hutchison et al (2001) 118 SALJ 720. 
364  SA Sentrale 1964 (4) SA 760 AD. The Appellate Division warned that the refusal to recognise the validity of the 
clause would be an “opvallende afwyking [van die] elementere en grondliggende algemene beginsel dat 
kontrakte wat vrylik en in alle erns deur bevoegde partye aangegaan is, in die openbare belang afgedwing 
word” (766-7). The Court’s reasoning mirrors the rationale that underlies the caveat subscriptor rule that is 
discussed in the next paragraph.  
365  Brisley 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) paras [7]&[90]. The case cemented the Shifren principle’s place in the South African 
legal landscape. In affirming the soundness of the Appellate Division judgment, the Court remarked that the 
decision “represented a doctrinal and policy choice” that was sound and that “[c]onstitutional considerations of 
equality did not detract from it” but rather “enhanced it” (para [90]). The case that concerned the validity of a 
non-variation clause in a lease agreement entailed the Supreme Court of Appeal revisiting its earlier decision in 
the Shifren case. The Court outlined the historical context of the of the Shifren principle finding support for the 
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arise with oral contracts or oral variations of contracts.366 Accordingly, the notion of potential 
inequality in bargaining power or disparity in financial means and protection of weaker 
contractants are not an issue.367 The resultant commercial consequences, legal uncertainty, and 
evidentiary problems do not justify a departure from the Shifren principle.368 
 
(B) The caveat subscriptor rule   
A contractant who has signed a written contract, albeit unwisely, is deemed to be bound by the 
terms of such contract.369 Illiteracy, ignorance of,370 or mistake regarding the content of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
principle in the Appellate Division’s decision to strike down Parliament’s attempt to sidestep an entrenched 
statutory provision through a simple majority vote in the first Harris and Another v Minister of Interior and 
Another 1952 (2) SA 428 (A) of the three Harris cases concerning the sovereignty of Parliament (para [6]).   
366  Para [8]. 
367  Para [26]. Unequal bargaining power is discussed in para 2.4.4 in this chapter. 
368  Para [8]. In a scathing denunciation of the attack on the Shifren principle, the Court poetically states: “Waar die 
kontraktereg die beginsel van regsekerheid nastreef, blyk dit nou dat dit op sand gebou is” (para [10])). 
Indicative of the frustration with untouchable status of the Shifren principle is the case of Nyandeni Local 
Municipality v Hlazo 2010 (4) SA 261 (ECM) where the Court bemoaned the fact that attempts, particularly 
since 1994, to develop the common law by mitigating the sometimes “harsh and inequitable consequences” 
that may result from its application have been rebuffed. The Court wryly observes that the Shirfren principle 
has been “knocked back into place by definitive judgments from the Supreme Court of Appeal reaffirming its 
status and its scope and ambit of operation. This, the Court said, is coupled with “reminders to the lower courts 
to observe the stare decisis rule” (para [1]). However, interestingly and indicative of a way out of the Shifren 
stranglehold, the Court, on the facts of the case, justified the departure from the Shifren principle on the basis 
that it was invoked for purposes other than the vindication of legitimate rights. The Court reasoned that such 
use of the principle constituted an abuse of the process of law which offended public policy as expressed by 
constitutional norms and values (paras [124-126]).  
369  In George 1958 (2) SA 465 (A),  the Appellate Division ruled “[t]hat when a man is asked to put his signature to 
a document he cannot fail to realize that he is called upon to signify, by doing so, his assent to whatever words 
appear above his signature” (472-473). The rule is based on the doctrine of quasi-mutual consent in that a 
contractant may as a general rule reasonably conclude that by signing the document, the other contractant had 
signified his/her assent to the terms as contained in that document: Brink v Humphries & Jewell (Pty) Ltd 2005 
(2) SA 419 (SCA) 421C-D, hereafter Brink2005 (2) SA 419 (SCA). 
370  In Mathole 1951 (1) SA 256 (T), the Court applied the rule where an illiterate contractant did not express a 
desire that the contract be read to him/her (258-259). The Court’s decision related to a clause in the contract 
that contained Latin phrases and in respect of which no evidence was led that the defendant sought 
clarification thereof. See also Khan v Naidoo 1989 (3) SA 724 (NPD) where an illiterate contractant was also 
held bound to the contract. The Consumer Protection Act provisions, discussed in chapter 3 para 3.6.3, have 
radically changed this position.  
In American and English law, a substantially unfair contract may be set aside where the contractant is “‘poor 
and ignorant’ (e.g. illiterate)”: Beale Chitty On Contract Volume 1 paras [7-128] and [7-136]. See also Smith 
Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract 7; Peel Treitel The Law of Contract para [10-044].   
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written document, or the fact that the contractant did not read it will, in general, be of little or 
no avail.371 The subjective intention of the contractants when signing a contract is irrelevant372 
and their intention must be gathered from the language in the contract.373 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
In Australia, the notion of unconscionability underpins a number of established equitable principles. Taking 
advantage of a contractant’s weakness or vulnerability is deemed to be unconscionable: Davis, Seddon, and 
Masel The Laws of Australia Contract (2003) para 7.1[8], hereafter Davis et al The Laws of Australia Contract; 
Carter & Hartland Contract Law in Australia paras [1504]&[1514].  
In Germany, the BGB provides for the invalidity of any legal transaction that is contrary to public policy (BGB 
138). In particular, grounds of invalidity may be exploitation of a predicament, inexperience, or infirmity of will 
or judgment (BGB 138(2)).  
In the Netherlands, the NBW 3.44(4) provides for the invalidity of a juristic act induced by special circumstances 
such as a state of necessity, dependency, wantonness, abnormal mental condition or inexperience. 
371  In Burger v Central South African Railways 1903 TS 571, one of the earliest cases on the topic, the Court, whilst 
acknowledging that there are grounds upon which a signed contract may be repudiated, confirmed that “[i]t is 
a sound principle of law that a man, when he signs a contract, is taken to be bound by the ordinary meaning 
and effect of the words which appear over his signature” (576). The case concerned incorporation by reference 
of a set of railway regulations. The court said that a signed contract may be repudiated, inter alia, on the 
grounds of fraud, undue influence, duress, misrepresentation, and, in certain instances, mistake (578). See also 
Wells 1927 AD 69, 73. These statements of law were confirmed in Blue Chip Consultants (Pty) Ltd v Shamrock 
2002 (3) SA 231 (W) where the court said that “[o]ne is expected to read what one signs. The law goes no 
further than to recognize that the other party by words, by conduct or by the form the document takes may 
mislead or lull the signatory into believing that he need not go through every clause or he may ensure that the 
signatory does not go through the document carefully but only skims through it before signing, whether by 
induced time constraints or by other devices. The furthest Courts will go on a principle approach is to identify 
the issue as one of iustus error” (239). In Brink 2005 (2) SA 419 (SCA), the Appellant was granted relief on the 
grounds of iustus error from a suretyship obligation arising from a document that he had signed on behalf of 
the debtor. The relevant clause formed part of a document entitled “Credit Application Form” leading to the 
conclusion that “the form was a trap for the unwary and [that] the appellant was justifiably misled by it.” It is 
pertinent to note, in the context of this chapter, that in the dissenting judgment it was reasoned that the form 
of the contract, seen as a whole, could not be described as a trap or a misrepresentation. It was said that even 
on the assumption that it constituted a trap of a misrepresentation, the Appellant’s error was not iustus 
because a reasonable person in the Appellant’s position would not have been misled by it. Failure to hold the 
Appellant bound by his bargain would be “to open the door to abuse and possible uncertainty” (paras [35]-
[37]). See also Afrox 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) para [30]. The Afrox court was prepared to concede that there may be 
a duty to notify a consumer in those instances where the term was one that, objectively speaking, was 
unexpected (para [36]). Note in this regard the duty of notification imposed by section 49(3)-(5) of the 
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 which will be discussed in chapter 3 below. 
372  Freddy Hirsch Group (Pty) Ltd v Chickenland (Pty) Ltd 2011 (4) SA 276 (SCA) paras [15]-[17], hereafter Freddy 
Hirsch 2011 (4) SA 276 (SCA). The Appellant and the Respondent had concluded a contract in terms whereof 
the Appellant supplied the Respondent with spices. The case was precipitated by the presence of the Sudan 1 
red dye which had been banned by the World Health Organisation and was banned for use in food products in 
terms of GNR1008/1996 promulgated under the Foodstuff, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act 54 of 1972. The 
issue in this case was whether a non-liability clause contained in the standard terms and conditions of the 
signed contract could be relied on by the Appellants. The court ruled that the fact that the Respondent’s 
representative did not read the terms and conditions did not detract from its validity even though the 
representative had written the words “standard conditions not checked” immediately above her signature as 
well as below the relevant warranty in terms whereof she warranted that she had read the conditions. 
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(C) Agreements in restraint of trade 
A restraint of trade agreement is concluded usually to protect a particular trade, business, or 
professional activity.374 The result is that two contractual principles come into consideration, 
namely, freedom of contract and freedom of trade, occupation, and profession.375 In Magna 
Alloys and Research (SA) Pty Ltd v Ellis the Appellate Division,376 in finding restraint of trade 
agreements to be prima facie valid and enforceable with the onus being on the contractant 
wishing to escape the restraint to prove that the restraint is against public policy,377 gave free 
reign to the notion of freedom of contract.378 
Since restraints of trade effectively amount to a limitation of the freedom of the contractant to 
engage in commercial activity, the question arises whether the common law as evidenced in 
Magna Alloys is at odds with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of trade occupation and 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
373  See para 2.4.5 in this chapter for a discussion of interpretation of contracts. 
374  Van der Merwe et al Contract 183. 
375  In Afrox 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA), the Court confirmed that the constitutional value of freedom of contract includes 
the principle of sanctity of contracts (para [23]). See also Reddy v Siemens Telecommunications (Pty) Ltd 2007 
(2) SA 486 (SCA), hereafter Reddy 2007 (2) SA 486 (SCA), where the court also stated that these values inform 
the section 22 constitutional right to, inter alia choose a trade, profession or occupation (para [15]). 
376  1984 (4) SA 874 (A) 897-898. This case concerned a clause that prevented the Respondent, for a period of two 
years after termination of his contract of employment and for a radius of 10 km of a defined area, from acting 
in competition to the business of the Appellant. See further the case discussions below. Initially, in the absence 
of common law authority, our provincial courts followed the English law approach which determined that the 
contract was prima facie void and unenforceable. The onus was on the contractant wishing to enforce the term 
to prove that the restraint was reasonable. The Magna Alloys court rejected the approach that followed the 
English law position as being “onlogies en onvanpas” (892). The English approach is predicated on 
accommodating the unequal bargaining power of employees. A similar position prevails in the United States of 
America: Calitz ‘Restraint of Trade Agreements in Employment Contracts: Time for Pacta sunt servanda to Bow 
Out? (2011) 22 Stellenbosch LR 50, 52, 63 & 64-65.  
377  The Magna Alloys approach ignores the weak bargaining power that employees generally have and further 
weakens the position of the employee by placing the burden of proof on the employee who may as a result of 
the high transaction costs of litigation (for example, costs, time, energy, uncertainty about prospects of 
success) be disinclined to litigate.   
378  The Court confirmed the common law position that the principle of freedom of contract permeates our law of 
contract; that any unreasonable limitation of this freedom or any limitation that harms public policy should not 
be tolerated; and that any agreement that is contrary to public policy will not be countenanced (890 & 892). 
The Court concluded that, as is the case with all other contractual terms, the enquiry should be whether such 
restraint should, in light of public policy, not be enforced. An agreement found to be contrary to public policy 
does not render it void, just unenforceable (892 & 897-8). 
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profession.379 In the pre-constitutional dispensation, the courts clearly placed freedom of 
contract and hence the validity of a restraint of trade before freedom of trade.380 In the post-
constitutional dispensation, the question involves two competing constitutional principles, 
namely, the constitutionally recognised principle of freedom of contract coupled with sanctity 
of contract,381 and the constitutional protection of the freedom of trade occupation or 
profession.382 The weight of opinion thus far has been in favour of the former.383 
The soundness of this approach is debatable given the Constitutional Court ruling in Barkhuizen 
v Napier384 that the principle of sanctity of contract must be tempered by considerations of 
morality and public policy as informed by the notion of ubuntu and as discerned from the 
values embodied in the Constitution, and especially the Bill of Rights. An equally compelling 
consideration that may yet prove decisive is the current socio-economic situation with 
widespread poverty and rampant unemployment and its deleterious effect on constitutional 
values of dignity, equality and freedom.385 
                                                            
379  Section 22 of the Constitution. 
380  Magna Alloys 1984 (4) SA 874 (A). See also Roffey v Catterall, Edwards & Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 
(one of the cases that precipitated the Magna Alloys decision), where the court unequivocally stated that South 
African laws prefer sanctity of contract over freedom to engage in commercial activity because “[f]reedom of 
trade does not vibrate nearly as strongly [as sanctity of contract] through our jurisprudence” (505F)  
381  Discussed in chapter 1 paras 1.3.1 and 1.3.3 and in para 2.4.4 above. 
382  Section 22 of the Constitution. 
383  The decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeal after the final Constitution show its aversion to a return to the 
pre-Magna Alloys position and confirm its preference for freedom of contract. For example, in Reddy 2007 (2) 
SA 486 (SCA), the Court unequivocally said that the question of onus is a matter of substantive law and that the 
substantive law has been settled in the Magna Alloys case (paras [10] & [14]). In considering the impact of 
section 26 of the Interim Constitution that guarantees the right to economic activity, the courts in, for example, 
Waltons Stationery Co (Edms) Bpk v Fourie en ‘n ander [1994] 2 All SA 398 (O) 399, and Knox D’Arcy 1996 (2) SA 
651 (W) 661 confirmed the position in our law as determined in the Magna Alloys case.  
384  2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) paras [30] & [51] discussed in chapter 1 para 1.3.3. 
385  In Affordable Medicines Trust and others v Minister of Health and Others 2006 (3) SA 247 (CC), hereafter 
Affordable Medicines 2006 (3) SA 247 (CC), the Court held, with reference to section 22 of the Constitution, 
that “[w]hat is at stake is more than one’s right to earn a living, important though that is. Freedom to choose a 
vocation is intrinsic to the nature of a society based on human dignity as contemplated by the Constitution. 
One’s work is part of one’s identity and is constitutive of one’s dignity ... it is the foundation of a person’s 
existence” (para [59]). Emphasis added. The decision suggests that it may not sit uncomfortably with the Court 
to find that public policy dictates that the constitutional value of dignity associated with employment takes 
precedence over the constitutional value of dignity associated with freedom and sanctity of contract. The case 
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The Constitutional Court’s confirmation in Barkhuizen v Napier386 of the common law position 
that the onus is on a contractant alleging that the enforcement of contractual term is unfair and 
unreasonable and hence contrary to public policy to prove it, does not settle the debate in this 
regard;387 the reason being that the case did not concern the conflict between the 
constitutionally recognised principle of freedom of contract and constitutional protection of the 
freedom of trade occupation or profession in section 22 of the Constitution. In addition, the 
current approach that places the onus on the employee to prove the unfairness of the restraint 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
dealt with a constitutional challenge, based, inter alia, on section 22 of the Constitution that medical 
practitioners and dentists, amongst others, require a licence issued by the Director-General of the Department 
of Health to dispense medicines. In Advtech Resourcing 2008 (2) SA 375 (C), the Court, after referring to the 
Affordable Medicines 2006 (3) SA 247 (CC) case and other cases, said that “[t]hese cases support the view that 
an employer must justify a limitation upon the right to work, given the importance placed on the dignity of 
work and of the concomitant limitation or eradication of that right when a restraint operates” (para [28]). 
These cases suggest that the onus should be on the contractant wishing to enforce the restraint to prove that 
the restraint meets the requirements of section 36 of the Constitution, in that it constitutes a reasonable 
limitation of the section 22 right to freedom of trade, occupation, and profession. An acceptance of this line of 
reasoning would see the restoration of the pre-Magna Alloys approach. Although the court in Advtech 
Resourcing 2008 (2) SA 375 (C) characterised this as simply a reversion to the law which operated prior to 1984 
and cast the burden on the employer to justify the reasonableness of the restraint, and one that does not entail 
a radical departure from our legal tradition, the decision, as well as the others on which it draws, may be 
viewed as showing a preference for the section 22 freedoms (para [28]). Equally significantly, such a 
development would give effect to the public harm principle and the principle of paternalism. Note, however, 
the counter-argument in Den Braven 2008 (6) SA 229 (D). The Court pointed out that placing the onus on the 
one seeking to enforce the restraint imposes a burden that is impossible to discharge because if a restraint of 
trade is regarded as prima facie invalid in that it infringes the right choose a trade, occupation of profession as 
promised in the first sentence of section 22 of the Constitution, “then I fail to see on what basis the party 
seeking to enforce the restraint of trade agreement can overcome the problem that it is seeking to enforce a 
contractual terms that breaches a constitutional right” (para [30]). The Court justified this conclusion on the 
basis that “[n]either the entitlement in terms of the second sentence [of section 22] to regulate the practice of 
a trade, occupation or profession by law nor the ability under section 36(1) to limit the rights in the Bill of 
Rights ... are available to be invoked by a private citizen as Ngcobo J [in Barkhuizen2007 (5) SA 323 (CC)] has 
emphasised private citizens do not make law.” The Court concluded by affirming that it does not know of any 
“developed system of jurisprudence that does not recognise the need, subject to some exceptions such as 
fraud, misrepresentation, public policy or the like, to enforce contractual obligations” (para [33]). In a poetic 
response, Davis J in Mozart 2009 (3) SA 78 (C) remarks that “[c]ontract law cannot be reduced to a museum of 
a past jurisprudence” (85F). The constitutional value of dignity (and its sister values, equality and freedom) as a 
constituent element of the essentialia of price and rental is explored in chapter 4. 
386  2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) para [69]. 
387  Van Huyssteen et al Contract Law contend that the constitutional influence on the issue of onus is “unclear, 
since the relation between the weight that is attached to freedom of trade, freedom of contract, and freedom 
of personal choice, in general, [has been] left undefined” in cases where the constitutionality of this approach 
was in issue (para 262). 
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is questionable in that it saddles the employee, who in most cases has the weaker bargaining 
power and fewer resources to conduct litigation, with the transaction costs388 of litigation. 
It is submitted that the final determination of the question regarding the burden of proof in 
restraint of trade cases will be based on a consideration of public policy as redefined by the 
Constitutional Court in Barkhuizen v Napier.389 A generation of cases that reflect the redefined 
concept of public policy include the Affordable Medicines, the Mozart Ice Cream and the 
Advtech Resourcing cases.390 The emphasis that the Affordable Medicines case placed on the 
right to work as an integral component of dignity and the importance placed on socio-economic 
rights that filters through in the judgment,391 suggest that the balance of probabilities are 
stacked strongly in favour of the Constitutional Court, when apprised of the matter, deciding to 
revert the legal position prior to the Magna Alloys case, viz., that restraints of trade are prima 
facie invalid and unenforceable. The jurisprudence in the Affordable Medicines case is strongly 
supported in the decisions in cases such as Mozart Ice Cream and Advtech Resourcing. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
388  This involves a decision whether or not to litigate which would be dependent on various considerations, not 
least of which is the cognitive ability of the contractant and whether he/she has the resources (inter alia, 
means, time, energy, capacity, inclination) to prosecute his/her claim. 
389  2007 (5) SA 323 (CC). The Court held that public policy is informed by ubuntu and is the repository of the values 
most dear to society, the general sense of justice of the community, the boni mores, manifested in public 
opinion and incorporates the notions of fairness, justice and equity, and reasonableness and the necessity to 
do simple justice between individuals. See chapter 1 para 1.3.3. In a minority judgment Sachs J commented 
that “[t]he jurisprudential pedestal on which it [freedom of and sanctity of contract] once imperiously stood 
has been singularly narrowed in the great majority of democratic societies. Our new constitutional order, I 
believe, further attenuates its one-time implacable application” (para [141]). 
390  Discussed earlier in this sub-paragraph. 
391  The Court held, with reference to section 22 of the Constitution, that “[w]hat is at stake is more than one’s 
right to earn a living, important though that is. Freedom to choose a vocation is intrinsic to the nature of a 
society based on human dignity as contemplated by the Constitution. One’s work is part of one’s identity and is 
constitutive of one’s dignity ... it is the foundation of a person’s existence” (para [59]) 
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2.3.3 Public policy as a rationale for not enforcing contracts 
The law as a normative paradigm will not recognise any contract that is contrary to public 
policy.392 The principle received constitutional approval in Barkhuizen v Napier393 where the 
Constitutional Court reasoned that contractual terms which are inimical to the values enshrined 
in the Constitution are contrary to public policy and unenforceable.  
However, the role played by the elusive concept of public policy, as a qualification of the pacta 
sunt servanda principle,394 in the pursuit of substantive justice, receives scant recognition in our 
courts.395 It is even more telling that public policy has not been accepted as a tool of 
distributive justice for ensuring substantive fairness,396 and what evidence there was of this has 
been eroded.397 Conflict with constitutional values has been found to be not sufficient to 
invalidate a contract or terms thereof.398 The Supreme Court of Appeal has instead sought 
justification in the Constitution for its reluctance to strike down contracts as being contrary to 
public policy.399 The reliance of the Supreme Court of Appeal on the values of dignity, equality, 
                                                            
392  One of the earliest cases expressing this is Morrison v Angelo Deep Gold Mines Ltd 1905 TS 775 at 779. See also 
the cases in para 2.3.2 in this chapter. Public policy is also discussed in chapter 1 para 1.3.3. 
393  2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) para [29] discussed in chapter 1 para 1.3.3. It is instructive to note that the philosophy of 
the Barkhuizen court regarding the role (and content) of public policy was foreshadowed by the minority (pre-
constitutional) judgment of Jansen JA in Bank of Lisbon 1988 (3) SA 580 (A) when the Judge of Appeal  stated 
that the notions of freedom of contract, pacta sunt servanda, and legal certainty are not “absolute values” and 
the status of freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda as contractual values is interlinked with other socio-
economic considerations such as inflation, monopolies, unequal bargaining power and standard form contracts 
(613). 
394  See Barkhuizen2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) at para [87].  
395  The Supreme Court of Appeal has consistently stressed that it must be sparingly used in this context. See, for 
example, Afrox 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) para [8] and the cases referred to therein. 
396  See paras 2.3.2 & 2.3.3 in this chapter. 
397  The rejection in Bank of Lisbon 1988 (3) SA 580 (A) of exceptio doli generalis serves as an example of the latter. 
Likewise, the Appellate Division’s recommendation in Tjollo Ateljees (Eins) Bpk v Small 1949 (1) SA 856 (AD) to 
the legislature for the abolition of the doctrine of laesio enormis. 
398  “[C]onstitutional values of dignity, equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms” do not 
provide a “general all-embracing touchstone for invalidating a contractual term”: Napier 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA) 
para [11].  
399  In African Dawn 2011 (3) SA 511 (SCA), the Court, with reference to similar pronouncements in Napier 2006 (4) 
SA 1 (SCA) para [7] and in Bredenkamp (appeal) 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA) para [39], confirmed the view of its 
predecessors that making rules of law discretionary or subject to value judgments may be destructive of the 
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and freedom that pervade the constitutional provisions to support its preference for the notion 
of freedom of contract and its corollary pacta sunt servanda400 is, however, misplaced.  
Freedom of person401 does not have unlimited application neither is it immune from limitation. 
A wide interpretation of freedom might impede the acceptance of regulation and redistribution 
in the public interest, an issue which, being political in nature, falls within the province of the 
Legislature. The function of the courts is not to approve or disprove of such policies but rather 
to ensure compliance with the constitutional principles.402 The same holds for contractual 
freedom.403 Dignity and equality also serve as a brake on freedom404 especially in the context of 
substantive, as opposed to formal equality, as in the Constitution: that much was recognised by 
the Constitutional Court in the Barkhuizen case.405 
The Supreme Court of Appeal’s preference for freedom and sanctity of contract and its 
insistence on using public policy sparingly as a sword406 is at odds with the view of the 
Constitutional Court as expressed in Barkhuizen v Napier. The validity of this submission is 
borne out by the gloss that the Supreme Court of Appeal in Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of 
South Africa Ltd407 placed on the Barkhuizen judgment.408 It is also at odds with the 
Constitutional Court’s approach409 of determining the validity of contractual terms with regard 
to section 39 of the Constitution which requires courts of law to “promote the values that 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
law and would “run counter to the spirit, purport and objects of our Constitution” (para [27]). See also 
Potgieter 2012 (1) SA 637 (SCA) para [34] to the same effect. 
400  See para 2.1.3 in this chapter. 
401  Section 12(1) of the Constitution. 
402  Ferreira 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) paras [180]-[185]. 
403  Bhana & Pieterse (2005) 122 SALJ 879. 
404  Bhana & Pieterse (2005) 122 SALJ 879-880. 
405  Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) discussed in chapter 1 para 1.3.3. See further chapter 4 paras 4.2.1-4.2.3. 
406  A narrow interpretation of public policy is adhered to in terms whereof it is used to justify the enforcement of 
contracts and contractual terms. In, for example, Reddy 2007 ((2) SA 486 (SCA) the Court said that public policy 
requires contracts to be enforced (para [21]). See also para 2.3.3 read with para 2.3.2 in this chapter. 
407  (Appeal) 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA). See chapter 1 para 1.3.3. The Potgieter 2012 (1) SA 637 (SCA) places a similar 
interpretation on the Barkhuizen decision (paras [31]&[32]). 
408  Discussed in chapter 1 para 1.3.3. 
409  Barkhuizen2007 (5) SA 323 (CC), for example, at para [28]. 
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underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom” when 
interpreting the Bill of Rights410 and to “promote the values the spirit, purport and objects of 
the Bill of Rights” when developing the common law or customary law.411 This duty is 
particularly present where a court deals with “value laden concepts such as public policy...”412 
 
2.3.4 Conclusion 
Although social, political, and economic conditions and value systems have changed, the 
classical theory of freedom and sanctity of contract, with individual autonomy at its core, is still 
very prominent in the South African law of contract.413 The idea that public policy requires the 
enforcement of contracts freely entered into has been “virtually elevated into a constitutional 
value.”414 This is so despite the “statutory erosion”415 of the common law of contract.  
This approach, elevated to the status of a dogma, is succinctly encapsulated in the words of 
Hahlo416 when the writer says: 
“[P]rovided a man is not a minor or a lunatic and his consent is not vitiated by fraud, mistake or 
duress, his contractual undertakings will be enforced to the letter. If, through inexperience, 
carelessness, or weakness of character, he has allowed himself to be overreached, it is just too bad 
for him, and it can only be hoped that he will learn from his experience. The courts will not release 
                                                            
410  Section 39 (1)(a). 
411  Section 39(2). 
412  Advtech Resourcing 2008 (2) SA 375 (C) para [25]. Emphasis added.   
413  The examples cited of the practical implementation of the notion of freedom of contract above, are illustrative 
of the reluctance of our courts to consider the harshness or oppressiveness of contractual terms freely entered 
into as a factor in assessing the validity of the disputed contract or contractual term. The Supreme Court of 
Appeal has repeatedly confirmed that notions such as bona fides do not independently play a role in a 
determination of the validity of a contract or a contractual provision. For example, in Brisley2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) 
the Court confirmed that “goeie trou nie ‘n onafhanklike, oftewel ‘n “free-floating,” basis vir die tersydestelling 
of die nie-toepassing van kontraktuele bepalings bied nie” (para [22]). In Bredenkamp (appeal) 2010 (4) SA 468 
(SCA) the Court went to lengths to explain thatthe Barkhuizen case should not interpreted to mean that good 
faith plays a role, thereby steadfastly adhering to its viewpoint so aptly expressed in its earlier decision in the 
Brisley case (para [27]). See also Lubbe & Murray Contract 20.  
414  Naudé & Lubbe ‘Exemption Clauses – A Rethink Occasioned by Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom’ (2005) 122 SALJ 
441, 443, hereafter Naudé & Lubbe (2005) 122 SALJ 441. Emphasis added. 
415  The term borrowed from Lubbe & Murray Contract 26 is descriptive of recent legislative developments 
discussed in chapter 3. 
416  Hahlo (1981) 98 SALJ 70. 
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him from the contract or make a better bargain for him. Darwinian survival of the fittest, the law of 
nature is also the law of the market-place.”    
Whether the sacrosanct status of freedom and sanctity of contract, with its philosophical 
assumption of equality, is justified, is open to question bearing in mind that the free enterprise 
system is in decline due to “the innate trend of competitive capitalism towards monopoly;”417 
the inroads made by standard form contracts;418 consumer protection legislation;419 public 
policy as redefined in the Barkhuizen case420 and the decisions in cases such as Breedenkamp,421 
Hoffmann,422 Nyandeni Local Municipality423  and Everfresh.424 The Constitutional Court’s 
redefinition of public policy in the Barkhuizen case as embracing constitutional values is 
confirmation of the notion that “[t]he safeguarding of the public interest often involves the 
courts in a survey of not only the legal aspects of a contract but also of its moral, social and 
economic implications.”425 However, the latter is an arena into which the Supreme Court of 
Appeal has been extremely reluctant to enter.426 Be that as it may, the discussion in chapter 4 
will argue that public policy, as redefined by the Constitutional Court, has a definitive role in the 
determination of the nature and function of the essentialia of price and rental which role will 
ultimately prove to be decisive in the resolution of the question of law, namely, whether South 
African contract law should confer validity on contracts of sale and lease at a reasonable price 
and rental respectively or at a unilaterally determined price or rental. 
                                                            
417  Lubbe & Murray Contract 25. 
418  Discussed in para 2.4.2 in this chapter. 
419  See chapter 3. 
420  2007 (5) SA 323 (CC). The Court held that public policy is informed by ubuntu and is the repository of the values 
most dear to society, the general sense of justice of the community, the boni mores, manifested in public 
opinion and incorporates the notions of fairness, justice and equity, and reasonableness and the necessity to 
do simple justice between individuals. See chapter 1 para 1.3.3.  
421  (Interim interdict) 2009 (5) SA 304 (GSJ). 
422  2001 (1) SA 1 (CC).  
423  Nyandeni Local Municipality v Hlazo 2010 (4) SA 261 (ECM). See para 2.3.2.2(A) above. 
424  2012 (1) SA 256 (CC). The cases reveal a trend for the acceptance in contract law, of a general principle of good 
faith as a constitutional value. See also chapter 1 para 1.3.3. 
425  Aronstam Consumer Protection 43. See further chapter 4.  
426  See the decisions discussed in this chapter, and especially the decisions by the then Appellate Division in the 
Tjollo Ateljees and Bank of Lisbon cases. See also the discussion of the decisions in Brisley 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA); 
Bredenkamp (appeal) 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA) and Potgieter 2012 (1) SA 637 (SCA). 
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In summary, the reluctance, in general, of the courts’ to employ a broader definition of public 
policy that incorporates constitutional values as a standard for determining contractual 
validity,427 coupled with the presumption of equality and free will428 leads to the conclusion 
that our law should not recognize as valid contracts of sale at a reasonable price or at a 
unilaterally determined price.  
Having explained the principle of freedom of contract and its revered status in South African 
law, it is necessary to consider the question (indirectly dealt with in the preceding section) 
regarding the extent to which the principle is subject to limitation. 
 
2.4 Limitations on freedom of contract 
2.4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 explained that freedom to enter into contracts is subject to various limitations429 in 
terms of the common law, statute law, and, importantly, the Constitution. This section 
discusses additional areas of limitation in order to determine the extent to which freedom of 
contract and contractual autonomy is subject to limitation and the consequences of such 
limitations. 
 
2.4.2 Standard form contracts 
The rules of law proposed in the obiter dicta430 would, in all probability, if adopted, find their 
way into standard form contracts431 which it is estimated is used in ninety-five percent of all 
                                                            
427  See paras 2.3 and 2.8 in this chapter. 
428  See paras 2.2.2 above and 2.4.2 below. 
429  See chapter 1 para 1.3.1.1 
430  The proposal is to validate contracts of sale and lease at a reasonable price or rental respectively and at a price 
or rental determined unilaterally by one of the contractants. 
431  The advent of standard form contracts may be traced to the age of industrialization in the nineteenth century 
when mass production revolutionized, not only, the economy, but also, society as a whole. The dawn of the 
industrial age that resulted in mass production was accompanied by a proliferation of standard terms in order 
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transactions.432 The following discussion concerns standard form contracts and how such 
contracts affect the principles of autonomy and freedom of contract, consensus and certainty. 
Standard form contracts play a Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde role within the law of contracts.433 
Standard form contracts are generally employed by large corporations, public utilities,434 
monopolies and cartels.435 In addition to achieving uniform trading practices,436 such contracts 
are time- and cost-effective in that the same contract is used over and over, obviating the need 
to engage in fresh negotiations for each new contact.437 Such contracts also lead to greater 
legal certainty in that once a court has interpreted a term or terms thereof, the expectation is 
that a similar interpretation will be given in the future.438 
Standard form contracts, the abovementioned benefits aside, may give rise to a predisposition 
by their users to abuse their economic power and/or the economic need of the consumer by 
imposing oppressive standard contracts.439 Such contracts are risk-averse for the drafters in 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
to ensure mass distribution of goods and services: Zerres ‘Principles of the German Law on Standard Terms of 
Contract’ 1, 1 
<http://www.jurawelt.com/sunrise/media/mediafiles/14586/German_Standard_Terms_of_Contract_Thomas_
Zerres.pdf>, hereafter Zerres ‘Principles of the German Law’  
432  Hutchison et al Contract 25; Harker ‘Imposed Terms in Standard-Form Contracts’ (1981) 98 SALJ 15, 16, 
hereafter Harker (1981) 98 SALJ 15. 
433  For a concise summary of some of the more important advantages and disadvantages, see the minority 
judgment of Sachs J in Barkhuizen2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) para [135] et seq. See also Schroeder Music Publishing 
Co Ltd v Macaulay [1974] 3 All ER 616 at 623-624. 
434  Hutchison et al Contract 239. 
435  In general, the legal skills and experience are concentrated on the side of the drafter. The disadvantage of this 
is that contract is rendered “seller-protective” at the expense of the buyer. Llewellyn ‘What Price Contract? – 
An Essay in Perspective’ (1931) 40 Yale LJ704, 734, hereafter Llewellyn (1931) 40 Yale LJ 704. Consumer 
protection legislation discussed in chapter 3 seeks to regulate this consequence. The advantage is that “[t]hey 
materially ease and cheapen selling and distribution ... and they make the experience and planning power of 
the high executive available” to others. Llewellyn (1931) 40 Yale LJ731; Zerres ‘Principles of the German Law’ 1. 
436  Van der Merwe et al Contract 269-270. 
437  Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) para [139]; Llewellyn (1931) 40 Yale LJ 731. 
438  Sachs J in Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) para [137]. See also Harker (1981) 98 SALJ 16. See also Zerres 
Principles of the German’ 1-2. 
439  In most cases, potential disputes issues are pre-determined in favour of the drafter. The result is that risks are 
slanted against the buyer and in favour of the seller in that the contract is rendered “seller-protective.” 
Llewellyn (1931) 40 Yale LJ 731 and 734. See also Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) para [135]. Aronstam 
observes that standard form contracts have often been singled out as “the most undesirable device used for 
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that they burden the non-drafter with all the risks.440 Whereas, in the case of individually 
negotiated contracts, it could usually be assumed that contractants understood the terms 
thereof, such an assumption cannot be made in the case of standard form contracts where 
negotiation seldom occurs.441 Contractants often also lack the requisite knowledge and skill to 
negotiate effectively with suppliers of goods and services who by and large are better equipped 
in these areas of business.442 The problem is aggravated by the use of jargon or obscure 
legalese.443 Hence, they erode the consensual element of contract law. Contractants may feel 
dragooned into concluding contracts444 that contain oppressive or unreasonable terms445 
because of limited options available in that the market is dominated by a few large 
corporations or entities or because of necessity.446 Hence, the contractant’s autonomy and 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
oppression”: Consumer Protection 23. See also Bhana & Pieterse (2005) 122 SALJ 885. Consumer protection 
legislation, discussed in chapter 3, seeks to regulate this consequence. 
440  This is typically done through exemption clauses such the one in Afrox 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA).  
441  Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) paras [135], [137] and [138]. The inherent danger is that they eliminate the 
opportunity for arm’s length negotiations and may contain terms that are presented to consumers on a “take-
it-or-leave-it” basis: Barkhuizen para [135]; Van der Merwe et al Contract 270; Hutchison et al Contract 24-25 
and 239.  
442  Zerres ‘Principles of the German Law’ 1-2. 
443  Sachs J in Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) para [135]. 
444  InBarkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC), Sachs J observed that “[t]he consumer’s will does not enter the picture at 
all” (para [155]). 
445  Sachs J in Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) complained that the terms “tend to be weighted heavily in favour of 
the supplier” in that it limits or excludes “the consumer’s normal contractual rights and the supplier’s normal 
contractual obligations and liabilities” (para [135]). The implications are even more dire in the case of lay 
contractants who are most at risk because they have very little or no choice but to submit to the terms of the 
standardised contract, resigning themselves to accept whatever fate may dish out. Van Huyssteen 
Onbehoorlike Beïnvloeding en Misbruik van Omstandighede in die Suid-Afrikaanse Verbintenisreg (1980) 131 
comments that a great portion of the population lacks, from a business perspective, knowledge and 
experience. 
446  Because of circumstances, for example, as prevailed in the Afrox case, such terms often go unnoticed. Even in 
those instances where the contractant does read the contract the contractual terms or the implications thereof 
may be incomprehensible to, or not fully understood by the contractant, especially a lay-contractant, because 
of their complexity. This much was recognized by the Constitutional Court in Barkhuizen2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) 
when it observed that “many people…conclude contracts without understanding what they are agreeing to…” 
(paras [65], [135] and [136]). The Court commented that the terms are often couched in legalese and hidden in 
fine print (para [135]). See also Lewis ‘Fairness in South African Contract Law’ (2003) 120 SALJ 330, 346, 
hereafter Lewis (2003) 120 SALJ 330.  
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freedom of choice is limited because, generally, his/her encounter with the dealer next door 
will be an equally invidious one.447 
The possibility and danger of exploitation and of unconscionable448 contractual terms is 
exacerbated by the advent of the electronic age which makes it possible to conclude contracts 
via electronic media such as the internet and cell phone text messages.449 
In summary, “[a standard form contract] is a form of contract which, in the measure of 
importance of the particular deal in the other party’s life, amounts to the exercise of unofficial 
                                                            
447  Any attempt at variation of contractual terms will, in all probability, be met by the proverbial “blank stare.” 
“The only freedom left for the customer is the fictitious alternative to accepting the terms presented to him: 
not contracting at all”: Harker (1981) 98 SALJ 17. 
448  Unconscionability does not have a fixed meaning. In contract law, it is used to describe situations where, in the 
absence of fraud or duress, it is believed that one contractant took advantage of or exploited another. It 
consists of a procedural as well as a substantive enquiry. The procedural enquiry aims at determining whether 
an element of vulnerability existed. For example, impaired intellectual ability or absence of choice (in the case 
of monopolies, for example). The substantive element requires proof that the contract or term itself was 
substantively unfair: Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract 300. 
449  Hutchison et al Contract 245. That great care must be exercised when engaging in this medium of 
communication is illustrated by the English case of Immingham Storage Company Limited v Clear [2011] EWCA 
Civ 89 where the respondent had signed and returned a quotation containing substantial terms agreed on, sent 
to it by the appellant which included the words “a formal contract will follow in due course.” The Court of 
Appeal concluded that in the absence of an express indication that the quotation was subject to a contract, 
there was an intention to conclude a valid contract. The reference to a formal contract was deemed not 
specific enough to exclude an intention to contract (paras [25]-[26]). A similar conclusion was reached in 
Golden Ocean Group Limited v Salgaocar Mining Industries PVT Limited [2011] EWHC 56 (Comm) (paras [60]-
[65]). In that case, the electronically signed e-mails related, inter alia, to a guarantee in a charter party of a 
vessel. The guarantee was contained in the first e-mail from the defendants and the following e-mails 
concerned other terms and conditions. The last e-mail which did not refer to the guarantee purported to 
contain a final agreement and contained a request for a “recap” of the terms. A charter party that included the 
guarantee was never signed. Despite this expectation that the agreement would be recorded in the future, the 
court held that the e-mails and other documents sent between the contractants were sufficient to establish a 
guarantee. The South African courts in MV Navigator (No. 1): Wellness International Network Limited v MV 
Navigator and Another 2004 (5) SA 10(C) adopted a different approach. In this case the buyer, when it made its 
offer, provided that “a formal agreement is to be drawn up between the seller and the buyer within 30 days” 
and the seller on accepting the renegotiated (increased) offer confirmed that the buyer would receive 
communication from the owners’ brokers who would “put together all the contracts etc.” The Court decided 
that a reasonable person in the position of the buyer’s managing director would not have concluded that the 
seller intended to sell without a formal written contract setting out the terms of the contract. The English cases 
confirm that parties who communicate electronically are at risk and establish that it is important for parties to 
protect themselves by explicitly stating that the agreement is subject to the conclusion of a formal written 
agreement. The use of the term “formal” does not offer any protection because it may even be interpreted as 
indicating that the further written agreement is a mere formality in that the substance of the contract has 
already been agreed upon. See also chapter 3 paras 3.6.2, 3.6.6 and 3.9.  
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government of some by others, via private law.”450 Consequently, such contracts weaken the 
autonomy of the contractants, reduce their freedom and practically negate (substantive) 
consensus, thereby impairing the foundations of contract law. At this juncture, it is apposite to 
note that the legislature, responding to the challenges of standard form contracts and to the 
unwillingness of our courts of law to respond to the challenges presented by modern 
commercial practices, is increasingly called upon to intervene.451 
 
2.4.3 Exemption clauses 
Exemption clauses have become the norm.452 An exemption clause is one that excludes a 
remedy that the contracting party would otherwise have had under the common law.453 A 
contractant is obliged to point out an exemption clause only if it is unexpected in the kind of 
contract signed by the contractant454 or where the clause undermines the essence of the 
contract.455 Where the meaning of the language used in excluding liability is “express and 
unambiguous” then effect must be given to that meaning456 even if the consequences are 
harsh. The combined effect of this and the caveat subscriptor rule which binds contractants 
even though they cannot read or understand the contract, place consumers in an invidious 
position. The acceptance that the exclusion of gross negligence is contrary to public policy does 
                                                            
450  Llewellyn (1931) 40 Yale LJ 731. 
451  See chapter 3 for the discussion of consumer protection legislation as a corrective mechanism.  
452  Afrox 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) para [36]. 
453  Cockrell (1992) 109 SALJ 62. Van der Merwe et al Contract cite the following examples of acceptable exemption 
clauses: a clause that excludes liability for gross negligence has been held not be against public policy; a clause 
that excludes liability for breach (even serious breach) of contract (259). See further 258-260. 
454  Afrox 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) para [36]. BGB305(c) also provides for the disqualification of unexpected terms. 
These could, in the context of the contract, relate to the content of the term or to the position of the term (for 
example, the heading under which the term appears) or due to the graphical layout of the term. In the case of 
doubt, a presumption arises against the issuer. Zerres ‘Principles of the German Law’ 11. 
455  Mercurius Motors v Lopez 2008 (3) SA 572 (SCA) para [33]. The notion of the essence of the contract in relation 
to the essentialia of price and rental and unilateral price and rental determination is discussed in chapter para 
4.3.3.3(D). Shari’a (Islamic law) prescribes that a contractual term that runs counter to the essence of the 
contract is deemed to be null and void. El-Hassan ‘Freedom of Contract, the Doctrine of Frustration, and 
Sanctity of Contracts in Sudan Law and Islamic Law’ (1985-1986) 1(1) Arab Law Quarterly 51, 57. 
456  Durban’s Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha and Another 1999 (1) SA 982 (SCA) 989H. 
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not automatically invalidate an exemption clause that excludes negligence.457 
Exemption clauses are not contrary to public policy because of the elementary and 
fundamental general principle that contracts freely and voluntarily entered into must be 
enforced in the public interest.458 Whilst it is accepted that the courts will not enforce 
exemption clauses which are contrary to public policy, “[t]his have very rarely been shown to 
the courts’ satisfaction.”459 Clauses which have been held to be against public policy are those 
that exclude liability for fraud460 or for an intentional breach of contract.461 However, the 
common-law does not provide adequate or effective mechanisms for the control of exemption 
clauses.462 
                                                            
457 Afrox 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) para [13]. The Court, with reference to the right to have access to health care 
services in section 27(1)(a) of the Constitution, said that the fact that a right enjoys constitutional protection is 
not, in itself, a decisive consideration. The Court reasoned that freedom of contract (which includes the notion 
of pacta sunt servanda) is also a constitutional value (paras [22]-[23]). 
458  Afrox 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) para [24]. In England, both the courts (by way of interpretation) and the legislature 
by way of legislation (such as the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977), have displayed a marked hostility to 
exemption clauses: Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract 149 et seq. A combination of the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (which deals only with exemption clauses - see Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction 
to the Law of Contract 314) and the Misrepresentation Act 1967 has the effect of precluding attempts to 
exclude or limit liability even by consenting consumers. In terms of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, judges 
have the general authority to strike down unreasonable exemption clauses. The Unfair Contract Terms Act 
1977 is described as the “most conspicuous” success of the movement to modify the general rules of contract 
to reflect the “new” view of freedom of contract: Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract 15. See 
chapter 3 for a discussion of grey and black lists in the Consumer Protection Act in relation to exemption 
clauses.  
459  Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 811.  
460  Wells 1927 AD 69. 
461  Van der Merwe et al Contract 259. 
462  Naudé & Lubbe (2005) 122 SALJ 442. The writers are of the view that an exemption clause that undermines the 
fundamental character of a contract should, in principle, be regarded as invalid. They argue that the exemption 
clause in the Afrox case was unexpected in that it allowed the hospital to provide a service that is at variance 
with what one would normally expect, namely the provision of professionally acceptable medical care. The 
writers fortify their view by concluding that the fact that there are hospitals and that “apparently all” medical 
practitioners do not contract out of this duty, show that the provision of such care is regarded as an “ethical” 
duty in those sectors. Accordingly, the hospital’s representative had a legal duty to bring the exemption clause 
to the Respondent’s attention (459). The writers are critical of the court’s conflation of medical service 
contracts with the “wider categories of commercial transactions” (460). In the process, the Court confirmed a 
uniformity of approach based on the mantra that public policy favours freedom and sanctity of contract. In this 
regard, it must be noted that the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 contains provisions aimed regulating 
unfair and unreasonable terms in commercial contracts. Relevant provisions of the Act are dealt with in chapter 
3. 
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The fact that exemption clauses have become the rule rather than the exception in standard 
form contracts,463 and the fact that standard form contracts may leave a contractant in an 
invidious position, as summarized above, necessitates a brief discussion of the reality of 
inequality in bargaining power and the approach of the courts to it. 
 
2.4.4 Unequal bargaining power 
Unequal bargaining power may, and often does, result in the “weaker” contractant playing very 
little or no role in the contract-creating process, the terms of the contract being dictated by the 
“stronger” contractant on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.464 As a result, it has a debilitating effect, 
not only on the prized principle of freedom of contract, but also on the requirement of 
consensus that underlies the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda.465 
The Supreme Court of Appeal, in giving expression to both the spirit and letter of the principle 
that courts do not have a discretion to set aside contracts freely and voluntarily entered into,466 
have had scant regard for the role and impact that unequal bargaining power has on contract 
formation.467 Unequal bargaining power, per se, does not justify a conclusion that the 
                                                            
463  Afrox 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) paras [9]&[36]. The discussion in South African legal circles about standard form 
contracts and exemption clauses is mirrored in common law jurisdictions with consumer protection legislation 
also being used to attain an element of fairness. For English law see, Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law 
of Contract 12 and 16-17; for Scottish law, MacQueen and Thomson Contract Law in Scotland para [7.27]; for 
Australian law, Davis et al The Laws of Australia Contract para [82]. 
464  Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) para [65]; Van der Merwe et al Contract 258 and 269-270. The discussion and 
authority referred to in paras 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 in this chapter apply mutatis mutandis to the discussion in this 
paragraph. 
465  Bhana & Pieterse (2005) 122 SALJ 884. 
466 For example, in Tjollo Ateljees (Eins) Bpk v Small 1949 (1) SA 856 (A), the Court reasoned that to allow a 
contractant to escape obligations “freely and solemnly” undertaken would not be “in harmony either with 
immanent reason or public policy” (873). In Magna Alloys 1984 (4) SA 874 (A), the Court said that it is in the 
public interest that contractants must abide by their agreements (893I-894A). In Brisley 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) the 
Court described the Magna Alloys dictum as a value that underlies the law of contract (para [23]). The Brisley 
court said that it, in principle, did not have any discretion to refuse to enforce a valid contractual term (para 
[12]). 
467  Brisley 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) para [7] where the court denied that non-variation clauses serve to protect the 
interests of only the powerful. In doing so, the Court lost sight of the fact that standard form contracts are 
normally imposed at the behest of the more powerful contractant and that the variations which the non-
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variation clause seeks to guard against are more likely to benefit the more powerful - in casu, the lessor: Bhana 
& Pieterse (2005) 122 SALJ 885. The writers point out that in standard form lease agreements the obligations of 
the lessee are usually more onerous than those of the lessor. For example, in the “Central News Agency lease 
agreement” at issue in the Brisley case, the lessor is exempted from liability for damage suffered by the lessee 
from any cause whatsoever, whilst the lessee is expected to compensate the lessor for damage, intentionally or 
negligently caused to the property by the lessee or those connected to him. More pertinently, the non-waiver 
is expressly worded in favour of the lessor (885-886).  
The English courts recognise that private autonomy, as a characteristic of freedom of contract, can be abused 
by a contractant with superior bargaining power and have sought to contain the abuse: Atiyah Essays 11. 
However, an attempt by Lord Denning in Lloyds Bank v Bundy [1975] 1 QB 236 to recognise unequal bargaining 
power as a defence to “very” unfair terms where the bargaining power of the contractant was impaired by his 
“needs or desires” or by his “ignorance or infirmity” was rejected by the House of Lords in National 
Westminster Bank plc v Morgan [1985] AC 686: Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract 15 n13, 
and 7 and 19; Furmston Law of Contract 23-24. Thus as in South African law, English law has not recognized, as 
a general principle, the invalidity of contracts secured through exploitative or unconscionable conduct. The 
English position is justified on the basis that the acceptance of a general doctrine would swallow up the general 
rule of enforcement of contracts and result in a “collapse of the institution of contract itself: Furmston and 
Bradgate The Law of Contract para [1.70]. This is also the approach of the South African Supreme Court of 
Appeal. However, the English legislature has sought to address structural inequality in the consumer market by 
black-listing those provisions which “a well-advised consumer would almost always refuse to accept in an equal 
bargaining situation.” These are absolutely prohibited based purely on their substantive features, disregarding 
totally the transparency of such terms: Willett ‘The functions of transparency in regulating contract terms: UK 
and Australian approaches’ (2011) 60(2) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 355, 359, hereafter Willett 
(2011) 60(2) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 355. It has also grey-listed terms that “a well-advised 
position contractor (consumer or commercial) would normally prefer not to accept. The criterion with the 
latter is not equality of bargaining power but rather whether there was some semblance of negotiation. These 
are presumptively prohibited. Lastly, it has adopted the notion of economic duress in cases of both consumer 
and commercial contracts: Furmston and Bradgate The Law of Contract para [1.70].  
South Africa addresses the problems raised by unequal bargaining power only in the context of consumer 
contracts especially in the grey- and black-list provisions. Grey- and black-listing lead to greater predictability. 
Grey lists enable regulatory bodies to deal from a position of strength when negotiating with recalcitrant 
business. They facilitate judicial decision-making by providing a list of suspect terms. The benefits of grey- and 
black-lists are discussed more fully by Naude ‘The Use of Black and Grey Lists in Unfair Contract Terms 
Legislation in Comparative Perspective’ (2007) 124 SALJ 128, 131 et seq. Grey- and black-listing in the South 
African consumer context is discussed in chapter 3 para 3.6.3. 
In Scotland, unequal bargaining power does not exist as a general principle of law and contractants are held to 
their bargains no matter how harsh. The function of the courts is to enforce the contract as agreed to by the 
contractants. As in South Africa, the contention is that setting aside a contract on the ground of fairness alone 
would open the way for a “flood of claims”: Woolman & Lake Contract para [6.10]-[613]; MacQueen & 
Thomson Contract Law in Scotland para [7.2].  
The concept of unconscionability has gained statutory recognition in the United States of America. UCC 2-302 
requires contracts to be treated differently where there is unequal bargaining power: Farnsworth Contracts 
298 et seq. The unconscionability or otherwise is determined at date of contract. With reference to the general 
commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the test is whether clause(s) 
are so one-sided as to be unconscionable: Lawrence Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code Volume 2A 
(2008) UCC 2-302:1. It is aimed at oppression and unfair surprise by protecting a buyer in a weak bargaining 
position from being taken advantage of: Lawrence Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code Volume 2A 
(2008) UCC 2-302:6. Unconscionability may be either procedural (wrongdoing during the conclusion of the 
contract, for example, taking advantage of age, illiteracy, lack of knowledge of language) as well as substantive 
unconscionability (relating to the actual substance of the contract such as excessively wide exemption clauses, 
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grossly exorbitant or excessive prices): Beale Chitty On Contract Volume 1 para [7-136]. In Kugler v Romain 279 
A.2d 640 (N.J. 1971) referred to by Warkentine (1996-1997) 30 J. Marshall LR 51 n56, the Court explained that 
drafters of the Code expected the notion of unconscionability, which is not defined in the Code, to be 
interpreted liberally. Very instructive in the South African context is the Court’s view that the intent of the 
clause is not to erase the doctrine of freedom of contract “but to make realistic the assumption of the law that 
the agreement has resulted from real bargaining between parties who had freedom of choice and 
understanding and ability to negotiate in a meaningful fashion.” This point is made below in chapter 3 (the 
effect of consumer protection legislation) and in chapter para 4.2.4.2(B) (the role of the duty imposing aspect 
of essentialia). See also Lawrence Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code Volume 2A (2008) UCC 2-302:8; 
Maurer ‘Consumer Protection and Social Models of Continental and Anglo-American Contract Law and the 
Transnational Outlook’ (2007) 14 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 353, 359 and 369. Johnson v Mobil Oil 
Corp., 415 F.Supp. 264, 268 (ED Mich. 1976) lists the following as some of the factors that may have a bearing 
on unconscionability: age, status, intelligence, business sophistication, bargaining power, explanation of terms, 
fairness of the seller’s position (the take-it-or-leave-it approach), and the availability of alternative sources of 
supply. The court may arrive at a conclusion by merely listing these factors without having to illustrate “which 
factors are essential, which are sufficient, and which are superfluous”: Hillman et al Common Law and Equity 
under the Uniform Commercial Code 6-2 to 6-4. In addition to the above factors, Warkentine (1996-1997) 30 J. 
Marshall LR lists the following: poverty, lack of education, poor English language skills, one-sided terms (55-56). 
The advantage of a defence of unconscionability is that it enables courts to decide cases directly on the basis of 
fairness without having to resort to the “manipulation of existing legal rules” (such as mistake, duress) as is the 
case in English law: Hillman et al Common Law and Equity under the Uniform Commercial Code 6-13; 
Warkentine (1996-1997) 30 J. Marshall LR 50 et seq. In the 1969 case of Williams v Walker Thomas Furniture 
Company, the Court set aside a credit agreement on the ground that the Ms Williams lacked bargaining power 
because of her lack of education: Maurer (2007) 14 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 359 and 369. As is 
evident from the discussion in this chapter, the South African Supreme Court of Appeal has denied relief on 
most of the grounds listed in the Johnson case and those listed by Warkentine.  
In Australia, though the philosophical underpinnings of freedom and certainty of contract in a free enterprise 
system and the concern for drawn-out and costly trials as well evidentiary problems has engendered a cautious 
approach, equity principles imposed a duty to bargain fairly and prohibit unconscionable conduct, the emphasis 
being on procedural rather than substantive unconscionability: Davis et al The Laws of Australia Contract paras 
7.1[6] and 7.1[11]. In the past 15 years the notion of unconscionability became a significant theme in the 
Australian law of contract. It increasingly became the basis for court challenges of contracts or contractual 
terms, inter alia, on the basis that the unconscionable conduct induced the conclusion of the contract or that 
the terms of the contract are unconscionable in the sense of their being unfair to one of the contractants or 
that the enforcement of the contract may be unconscionable: Carter & Hartland Contract Law in Australia 
paras [1501]–[1503]; Beale Chitty On Contract Volume 1 para [7-136]. Unequal bargaining power plays a role in 
determining what is unconscionable conduct. Examples are a contractant’s lack of sophistication or knowledge, 
or insensitivity to a contractant’s difficulties such as imperfect understanding of language, which deficiency 
ought to have been known to the other contractant: Davis et al The Laws of Australia Contract paras [7.1], [13] 
and [15]. Carter & Harland Contract Law in Australia paras [1506] - [1508], [1513] cite the following examples: 
poverty, age, youth, inexperience, illiteracy, ill health, lack of education, eccentricity and isolation. Today 
unconscionable conduct is regulated by sections 20, 21 and 22 of the Australian Consumer Law as contained in 
Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). Section 20 in essence codifies the position as 
understood in equity. Section 21 regulates unconscionable conduct between business and consumers whilst 
section 22 regulates the position between business consumers and business suppliers: Corones The Australian 
Consumer Law (2011) paras [1.05] and [5.05-5.30], hereafter Corones The Australian Consumer Law. The 
provisions are concerned with oppressive conduct, regardless of whether the victim was misled. It involves 
taking advantage of the weakness or vulnerability of the other party in a manner that offends good conscience: 
Corones The Australian Consumer Law para [125]. Illiteracy, lack of experience and education are some of the 
factors that play a role in determining unconscionability in the South African Consumer Protection Act. See 
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impugned term is contrary to public policy even if the term was weighted in favour of the 
stronger contractant.468 A more probable basis for non-enforcement would be “where a 
contracting partying, strong or weak, seeks to invoke the writing-only requirement in deceit or 
to attain fraud”469 or where the agreement is contrary to public policy.470 
Such an approach is unmindful of the practical reality confronting a contractant who, in the 
event of, for example, an emergency, is placed in an invidious position of deciding whether or 
not to sign a contract containing an exemption clause.471 Socio-economic inequalities 
exacerbated by the ravages of patriarchy472 and lingering legacy of apartheid473 have a further 
compounding effect on contractual inequality.474 The assumption of formal equality of 
bargaining power “in ignorance of these realities serve to further entrench and reinforce them, 
and as such undermines the constitutional aspiration to create a substantively equal society.”475 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
further chapter 3 below. 
468  Afrox 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) para [12]. 
469  Cameron JA in a separate concurring judgment in Brisley 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) para [90]. 
470  Cameron JA para [91]. See, however, the discussion of public policy in para 2.3 in this chapter. 
471  For example, in the Afrox 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) where the need for medical attention coupled with anxiety and 
fear would significantly reduce a patient’s bargaining power. In the Afrox case these fears were compounded 
by the patient’s reasonable and realistic concern that treatment may be refused and that other health-care 
facilities may have similar contracts. 
472  Though equality is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, the effects of the pre-Constitution unequal treatment of 
women at common law will, like the effects of apartheid probably take some time to dissipate. At common law, 
for example, women married in community of property, which was and still is the default matrimonial property 
regime, were subject to the marital power of the husband and were in the position of minors. Hahlo The South 
African Law of Husband and Wife (1975) 106-107. The Matrimonial Property Act of 1984 abolished the 
matrimonial power in respect of all marriages concluded after 1 November 1984. Section 29 of the General Law 
Amendment Act 132 of 1993 finally abolished the marital power in respect of all marriages irrespective of when 
the marriage was concluded. See also the founding provisions, the Preamble and section 3(1)(b)(iv) of the 
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 that recognise these legacies from the past.  
473  Du Plessis and others v De Klerk and another 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) para [163]. 
474  Bhana & Pieterse (2005) 122 SALJ 865, 887. One of the premises for equal bargaining power is perfect 
knowledge. Since perfect knowledge cannot be assumed, there cannot a harmony of interests and hence equal 
bargaining power: Atiyah Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1985) 703. 
475  Bhana & Pieterse (2005) 122 SALJ 887. The reality of apartheid and its associated discriminatory laws that 
resulted in intolerably high levels of poverty, illiteracy, and other forms of social and economic inequality has 
been recognised on a policy level and has been incorporated in the founding provisions of the Consumer 
Protection Act 68 of 2008. See the Preamble and see also section 3(1)(b)(iv) of the Act.    
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The element of “need” as a major factor affecting bargaining power is either side-stepped or 
confused with “means.” An overwhelming need for a particular product or service at a critical 
point in time may place a contractant at a distinct disadvantage even though the contractant is 
possessed of means and/or access to (legal) resources. Poverty and/or lack of access to (legal) 
resources do not necessarily equate to need. The converse is also true.476 The personal 
attributes of an applicant should matter little because “identical stipulations could be good or 
bad in a manner that renders whimsical the reasonableness standard of public policy.”477 
                                                            
476  In Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC), Sachs J reasoned that “the fact that consumer protection is especially 
important for the poor does not imply that it is irrelevant for the rich. The rich too have rights. They have the 
same entitlement as everybody else to fair treatment in their capacity as consumers. If, in our new 
constitutional order, the quality of public policy, like the quality of mercy and justice, is not strained, then the 
wealthy must be as entitled to their day in court as the poor” (para [149]).  
477  Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) para [98]. Lord Denning in Lloyds Bank v Bundy [1975] 1 QB 236 recognised 
that the bargaining power of a contractant could be impaired by its “needs or desires” and that this could serve 
a defence to “very unfair terms. As in South Africa, this proposition was rejected by the House of Lords in 
National Westminster Bank plc v Morgan [1985] AC 686: Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract 
15 n13, 7 and 19.  
In African Dawn 2011 (3) SA 511 (SCA) the Supreme Court of Appeal placed undue weight on the fact that the 
Respondents were persons of means, were conversant with business and had legal advice. The Respondent’s 
need, which was ignored, was clearly evidenced by the fact that the Respondent turned to the Appellant for 
bridging finance after being refused by Gateway Capital Ltd to whom the Respondent had turned after its 
application had been declined by a number of registered banks. Sight must not be lost of the fact that these 
banks declined the application, in all probability, having had access to the same information on which the Court 
concluded that the Respondent was possessed of means. Even an “eccentric” consumer who chooses to haggle 
is unlikely to find better alternatives or a different mindset to the normal “take-it-or-leave-it” elsewhere: 
Naude ‘Unfair Contract Terms Legislation: The Implications of Why We Need it for its Formulation and 
Application’ (2006) 17 Stell LR 361, 368, hereafter Naude (2006) 17 Stell LR 361. See also Willett (2011) 60(2) 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 377. A provision in United Kingdom’s Unfair Contract Terms Bill of 
2005 (proposed by the Law Commissions of England, Wales and Scotland) stipulates that one of the factors for 
determining the relative bargaining powers of contractants is whether the complaining party had a realistic 
opportunity to enter into a similar contract with other parties, but without the impugned term: Naude (2006) 
17 Stell LR 373. In casu, the Respondent having already exhausted its options elsewhere, and having been met 
with rejections was clearly faced with a take-it-or-leave-it scenario. In Germany, a “very strong” presumption 
arises that interest rates are against good morals where the interest rate is more than twice the relevant 
market rate: Howells et al Handbook of Research on International Consumer Law 298. In the African Dawn case 
interest was charged at a rate of 5% per month. Though the Respondent had legal advice and negotiated in 
respect of the securities, it is clear that the Respondent’s hands were tied on the crucial aspect of the interest 
rate. Even (lengthy) negotiations is no guarantee that a term will be fair. Persons in a superior bargaining 
position can use negotiations as an opportunity to gauge the need of the other side and, hence, to press their 
advantage: Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract 319.The Respondent’s failure to negotiate in 
this regard was surely a result of its need for the money which was exacerbated by the rejections it had 
encountered. The Respondent’s “desperation” is further illustrated by the fact that the Respondent urgently 
required the money, and had prevailed on the Appellant to furnish the money before the securities were 
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2.4.5 Principles of construction that impact on the limitations 
The following principles of construction may serve to minimize some of the harsh consequences 
of legal principles and business practices that limit freedom and sanctity of contract. 
The golden rule of interpretation is that the court must ascertain the intention of the parties. 
South African courts have, in the interests of certainty,478 adopted a linguistic approach to 
interpretation479 that involves a literal interpretation of the language in the document 
recording the agreement.480 The real intention of the contractants is ignored where wording in 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
registered (para [34]). To suggest, in these circumstances, that the Respondent had a choice to walk away or to 
turn to another lender is unrealistic. In the words of Harker (1981) 98 SALJ 17, “[t]he only freedom left for the 
customer is the fictitious alternative to accepting the terms presented to him: not contracting at all.” The 
unsoundness of the courts’ approach is evident in the express acknowledgement by the Constitutional Court 
that “many people in this country conclude contracts without any bargaining power and without understanding 
what they are agreeing to”: Barkhuizen2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) para [65]. (Emphasis added). The decision sought 
to accommodate the interests of vulnerable or weak contractants by incorporating the notion of ubuntu and 
fairness within the context of the twin principles of freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda. However, the 
Constitutional Court’s judgment as a harbinger of reform of contract law to give expression to constitutional 
values was undone by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Bredenkamp (appeal) 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA). The 
Supreme Court of Appeal reaffirmed this approach to the Barkhuizen decision in Potgieter 2012 (1) SA 637 
(SCA) paras [31]-[36]. See also the discussion in chapter 1 para 3.3 and elsewhere in this chapter. 
478  The courts are apprehensive that the notion of good faith is subject to interpretation and hence justice would 
be at the mercy of the idiosyncrasies of individual judges, thereby impairing the valued attribute of certainty of 
the law. In, for example, Bredenkamp (appeal) 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA), the Court said that “[m]aking rules of law 
discretionary or subject to value judgments may be destructive of the rule of law” (para [39]). See also 
Potgieter 2012 (1) SA 637 (SCA) paras [32] and [34]; Joubert v Enslin 1910 AD 6, 37; Lubbe& Murray Contract 
446 et seq. The approach averts the possibility of fraud and perjury and protects judges from “intractable 
disputes of fact regarding subjective states of mind”: Lubbe & Murray 463. 
479  Lewis ‘The Demise of the Exceptio Doli: Is There Another Route to Contractual Equity? (1990) 107 SALJ 26, 35-
36, hereafter Lewis (1990) 107 SALJ 26.  
480  Freddy Hirsch 2011 (4) SA 276 (SCA) at paras [15] and [16] quoting with approval from Worman v Hughes & 
Others 1948 (3) SA 495 (A). In the latter case, the Appellate Division held that “the rule of interpretation is to 
ascertain, not what the parties’ intention was, but what the language used in the contract means, i.e., what 
their intention was as expressed in the contract (505A). As was said by Solomon J in Van Pletsen v Henning 
1913 AD 82 “The intention of the parties must be gathered from their language, not from what either of them 
had in mind” (99). Both judgments were mentioned in the High Court of Swaziland in the matter between 
Kenneth Bhekizwe Ngcamphalala v Swaziland Development and Savings Bank, Case Number 2412/2011 where 
the court also applied the ordinary meaning “test.”  
One of the issues before the Freddy Hirsch court was whether the standard conditions of sale and credit on the 
reverse of the credit application form, formed part of the agreement. The question was whether an inscription 
by the Respondent’s representative that the standard conditions had not been checked (“standard conditions 
not checked”) excluded the operation of these standard conditions. The court held that the representative’s 
subjective intention as to the meaning of the inscription was irrelevant; so also was the subjective 
understanding of the inscription by the Appellant’s representatives (para [16]). The court accorded to the 
words its plain meaning and concluded that the Respondent’s representative had “merely recorded that she 
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the document is clear or unambiguous.481 The approach is contradictory and self-defeating and 
leads to practical absurdities.482 Evidence of a less literal approach may be detected in a recent 
cases where the Supreme Court of Appeal held that “consideration must be given to the 
language used in the light of ordinary rules of grammar and syntax; the context in which the 
provisions occur; the apparent purpose to which it is directed and the material known to those 
responsible for its production.”483 
By way of contrast, the English courts have moved away from an inflexible literal approach in 
favour of a more liberal historical-psychological approach, an approach in which the legitimate 
expectations of the parties are fulfilled.484 The English approach is instructive and insightful 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
had not checked the standard conditions. That was simply a statement of fact.” The inscription “does not 
amount to an intimation from her that she did not agree to be bound by those standard conditions” (para [17]). 
481  Lewis (1990) 107 SALJ 36; Van Huyssteen et al Contract Law 264-266. See, for example, the interpretation in 
Freddy Hirsch 2011 (4) SA 276 (SCA). 
482  Whilst it places a premium on the ascertaining the intention of the contractants, it at the same time limits the 
means by which such intention may be proved. In doing so, it compels courts to speculate as to the intention of 
the parties although evidence is available of their intention: Olivier Legal Fictions 137-139. See also Kerr 
Principles of the Law of Contract 219-223. 
483  Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) para [18]. See along similar 
lines: Hydrop Investments Ltd & Another v Shoprite Checkers Ltd [2011] JOL 27144 (SCA) para 12. 
484  Lewis (1990) 107 SALJ 38-43. In British Movietonews Ltd v London and District Cinemas Ltd [1951] 1 KB 190 
(CA), hereafter British Movietonews [1951] 1 KB 190 (CA), Denning LJ said that “[t]his does not mean that the 
courts no longer insist on the binding force of contracts deliberately made. It only means that they will not 
allow the words, in which they happen to be phrased, to become tyrannical masters ... The day is done when 
we can excuse an unforeseen injustice by saying to the sufferer “It is your own folly. You ought not to have 
passed that form of words. You ought to have put in a clause to protect yourself.” We no longer credit a party 
with the foresight of a prophet or his lawyer with the draftmanship of a Chalmers.” In Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 
3 All ER 237 (HL) Lord Wilberforce said that “[t]he time has long passed when agreements, even those under 
seal, were isolated from the matrix of facts in which they were set and interpreted purely on internal linguistic 
considerations. ... We must ... enquire beyond the language and see what the circumstances were with 
reference to which the words were used, and the object, appearing from those circumstances, which the 
person using them had in view.” See also Beale Chitty On Contract Volume 1 para [12-118] and paras [12-043]-
[12-045]. Judicial interpretation was used to ameliorate the harsh consequences of standard form contracts 
and its associate, exemption clauses: Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract 15-16; Treital An 
Outline of the Law of Contract 85-86 and 116. It is assumed that provisions in consumer protection legislation 
are based on the law’s view of what is appropriate, as opposed to merely giving effect to the contractants’ 
intention: Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract 19. Such an approach leads to some of the 
legal results that in other systems are attained by a general requirement of good faith: Zimmermann & 
Whittaker Good Faith in European Contract Law (2000) 45-46 and 679-680, hereafter Zimmermann & 
Whittaker Good Faith.  
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particularly when viewed in the context of the recognition in Cinema City (Pty) Ltd v 
Morgenstern Family Estates (Pty) Ltd485 that “evidence of surrounding circumstances ... as an 
aid to interpretation would be consistent with modern thinking on language and its meaning.” 
Such an approach is prudent in a pluralistic society with a multiplicity of cultures and languages 
where nuances in cultural practices and language, and where problems in language skills and 
proficiency are manifest. Ignoring such nuances and problems may lead to contractual 
consequences somewhat removed from those contemplated by the contractant(s). A more 
figurative analysis would go some way towards addressing such situations. 
The harshness of the literal approach to interpretation is lessened to some extent by the quod 
minimum rule that provides that words of doubtful meaning must be construed so as to place 
the least possible burden on the debtor.486 In similar vein, the contra preferentem rule 
stipulates that in cases of doubt a contract or its terms must be construed against the party 
who formulated it.487 
Contractants also enjoy a measure of protection from the caveat subscriptor rule488 in that 
consumers are bound only if the document signed is a contract and if it reflects the true and 
real intention of the contractants. Contractants are, in some instances, not bound where the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
The development in Scottish law is similar to that in English law: MacQueen & Thomson Contract Law in 
Scotland para [3.42]; Woolman & Lake Contract para [8.3].  
In Germany, contracts must be interpreted according to the requirements of good faith with customary 
practice taken into consideration: BGB 157.  
The American courts also do not have a literal approach to interpretation. The good faith performance principle 
requires courts to take into account, not only, the contractual language, but also, surrounding circumstances, 
including an estimation of how reasonable contractants, bargaining fairly, would allocate risks: Hillman et al 
Common Law and Equity under the Uniform Commercial Code 6-26.  
In Australia, the function of interpretation is “to give effect to the bargain, [and] not to deny its efficacy by a 
restrictive technical analysis.” Courts are reluctant to accept an interpretation that yields an unreasonable 
result, and adopt a common-sense approach in which the role of context is acknowledged: Carter & Hartland 
Contract Law in Australia para [704]. 
485  1980 (1) SA 796 (A) 805-806. 
486  Van der Merwe et al Contract 267. 
487  The reason being that the contractant who formulated it should have used the opportunity to express 
himself/herself clearly. Van der Merwe et al Contract 267. This rule of interpretation would usually benefit the 
consumer, who in most instances, has to accept a contract drafted by the seller. See para 2.4.2 above. 
488  Aronstam Consumer Protection 36 et seq. 
 
 
 
 
87 
 
terms are inconsistent with an explanation of the document given to him by the other 
contractant489 and mistake is a defence or a basis for rectification. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
The individualistic approach, favoured by South African courts, with its general assumption that 
choices have been made voluntarily derogates from contractual autonomy and hence the 
consensual aspect of contract law, attributes which are at the core of the South African 
approach to contract law. The approach that binds contractants regardless of considerations of 
reasonableness and fairness does not bode well for a contractant who, in the belief that the 
price or rental would be within his/her contemplation or expectation,490 agrees to a reasonable 
price or rental or one that is unilaterally determined. Hence, contracts of sale at a reasonable 
price or a price that is unilaterally determined should remain invalid. 
The predilection for standard form contracts coupled with the enforcement of the caveat 
subscriptor, rule in conjunction with the current approach to the golden rule of interpretation 
would exacerbate the legal position of the hapless contractant who in the words of Lord 
Denning did not have “the foresight of a prophet” or whose lawyer did not possess “the 
draftmanship of a Chalmers.”491 Hence, a combination of standard form contracts, exemption 
clauses, the caveat subscriptor rule,492 coupled with the courts’ approach to unequal bargaining 
                                                            
489  This exception is, in effect, nothing other than a remedy based on a misrepresentation as explained by 
Aronstam Consumer Protection 38.  
490  Explained in chapter 4 para 4.3.4.3(E).  
491  British Movietonews [1951] 1 KB 190 (CA) quoted by Lewis (1990) 107 SALJ 39. 
492 The approach of our courts was highlighted above in paras 2.4.2, 2.4.2 and 2.4.5 respectively. For example, our 
courts have, in the absence of fraud refused to come to the assistance of a contractant who signed a contract 
without reading the contents thereof (George 1958 (2) 465 (A) discussed in paras 2.3.2.1 and 2.4.5 above); or 
who made a subjective assumption of what the contract contains (the Afrox case, discussed in paras 2.3.2.1 and 
2.4.4 above). 
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power493 constitute significant impediments to the attainment of the principle of contractual 
fairness.494 This combination of factors also impacts on the essence of the Constitution, namely, 
the values of an open and democratic society that promotes human dignity, equality and 
freedom495 which the Constitutional Court has indicated infuses contract law.496 
Whilst it is true that standard form contracts do have benefits for both contractants,497 and that 
there are provisions that could ameliorate harsh consequences, the possibility and mechanisms 
of exploitation loom large, and cannot be discounted. The inescapable and unpalatable 
conclusion is that the modern commercial environment with its prevalence of, and preference 
for, standard form contracts places a limitation, not only, on the power of a contractant to 
negotiate the terms of a contract which will bind him/her, but also, on the choice as to who to 
contract with. Against this background, the notion of “agreement” does not “carry any 
connotation of real willingness.”498 
The result is a constant and insidious erosion of the notion of consensus, and consequently of 
the valued principle of contractual freedom that stands at the vanguard of the modern law of 
contract. Equality of bargaining power is amongst its casualties and, by implication, the equality 
                                                            
493  The courts’ approach to the existence and relevance of unequal bargaining ignored considerations of good 
faith, fairness and equality. In doing so, “[i]t effectively vindicated pacta sunt servanda (based on a limited 
notion of formal consensus) in circumstances where this did not accord with the social and economic reality.” 
See Bhana & Pieterse (2005) 122 SALJ 887; Naudé & Lubbe (2005) 122 SALJ 461-462. 
494  Aronstam, cites the case of Linstrom v Venter 1957 (1) SA 125 (SWA) 127 where the Court using the example of 
the purchase of a motor vehicle, lamented the fact that a purchaser’s freedom of contract is often limited 
because “so many trading firms have adopted standard forms of contract which the purchaser has to sign or 
remain without the article”: Consumer Protection 24. The purchaser’s experience and the court’s disapproval 
are not confined to South Africa. Aronstam cites English case law, Suisse Atlantique Société D’Armement 
Maritime SA v NV Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [1967] 1 AC 361 (HL) to the same effect: Consumer Protection 
24. 
495  Sachs J is skeptical about the use of standard form contracts, holding that “[a] strong case can be made out for 
the proposition that clauses in a standard form contract that are unreasonable, oppressive or unconscionable 
are in general inconsistent with the values of an open and democratic society that promotes human dignity, 
equality and freedom:” Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) para [140], 
496  See chapter 1 para 1.3.3. 
497  See para 2.4.2 in this chapter. 
498  Llewellyn (1931) 40 Yale LJ 728 n49. The reality of consent is impacted by pressures and/or stimuli, such as 
standard form contracts and exemption clauses that are out of kilter with the general understanding of fair 
dealing.  
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principle and the constitutional values of freedom, equality and dignity would be further 
casualties.  
The foregoing observations justify the conclusion that validity should not be bestowed on 
contracts of sale at a reasonable price or at a price that is unilaterally determined by one of the 
contractants.   
 
2.6 Certainty 
2.6.1 Introduction 
The annals of history have proven that uncertainty is a fact of life, a fact which the law, as a 
discipline, has recognised499 in a number of ways.500 The Twelve Tables (approximately 450BC) 
is probably the earliest testimony of such recognition in Roman law. The Twelve Tables served, 
not only, to codify the customary law, but also, to publicise the law and to make it accessible to 
the people. It generated certainty of the law and served to eliminate exploitation.501 Today, the 
philosophy finds expression in policy considerations underlying, for example, statute law and 
the doctrine of stare decisis.502 In Public Law, for example, the doctrine of the Rule of Law, 
serves to protect basic individual rights by requiring the State to act “in accordance with pre-
announced, clear and general rules that are enforced by impartial courts in accordance with fair 
procedures.”503 The pronouncement of the Constitutional court in President of the Republic of 
                                                            
499  Seita ‘Uncertainty and Contract Law’ (1984) 46 University of Pittsburgh LR 75, 77, hereafter Seita (1984) 46 
University of Pittsburgh LR 75. 
500  Currie & de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 10, hereafter Currie & de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 
10.  
501  Hosten Introduction explains that the law was codified and publicised at the insistence of the plebeians who 
objected to the concentration of the knowledge of the law in the hands of priests who belonged to the 
patricians, the privileged class. The publication of the law led to the gradual breakdown of the monopoly of the 
law by the priests (276-277). 
502  See chapter 1 para 1.3.2.1 
503  Currie & de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 10. 
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South Africa and Another v Hugo504 that “[a] person should be able to know the law, and be 
able to conform his or her conduct to the law” serves to illustrate the importance of certainty in 
modern jurisprudence. Hence, certainty promotes transparency accountability, predictability 
and acceptability of the law as well as of the decision-making process.505 In effect, it is an 
underlying principle of the law in general and the same principles underlie the role of certainty 
in contract law which is discussed below.506 
 
2.6.2 Certainty as the jurisprudential basis for the enforcement of contracts 
Certainty requires that the rights and obligations set out in the contract must be sufficiently 
clear so that the contractants have sufficient information about their rights and obligations and 
it provides the judiciary with a basis for determining whether a contract was concluded, and 
consequently whether a breach of that contract has occurred as well as an appropriate remedy 
for such breach.507 Certainty is attained if there is explicit agreement in the contract or when 
the contract identifies an external standard by which the performances may be determined by 
any third party without further reference to the contractants.508 An agreement that is not 
sufficiently clear is incapable of establishing a legal relationship between the parties.509 
Hence, certainty may be said to serve two functions, the one, internal, and the other, 
external.510 As an internal regulatory mechanism, it fulfills an important function in determining 
                                                            
504  1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) para [102]. 
505  See also Brownsword Contract Law Themes para [9.11].  
506  Chapter 1 explained the role of certainty, in general, as a controlling mechanism for contractual validity with 
reference to examples drawn from the various branches of the law. In this part of the chapter, the role of 
certainty within the contract law, and its application by the courts, as well as the philosophical underpinnings 
of the notion of certainty, will be examined with reference to some examples. 
507  Patel v Adam 1977 (2) SA 653 (A), 666; Seita (1984) 46 University of Pittsburgh LR 78. 
508  Westinghouse v Bilger 1986 (2) SA 555 (A) 574D-E; Shell SA (Pty) Ltd v Corbitt and Another 1984 4 SA 523 (CPD) 
526C-D; Genac Properties v NBC Administrators 1992 1 SA 566 (AD) 576H-J. 
509  Wessels & Roberts The Law of Contract in South Africa Vol 1 (1951) paras [77]-[80]. 
510  These two roles of certainty also inform the discussion on the nature, content, context and role of the 
essentialia of price and rental in chapter 4 paras 4.2.4.2(B) and 4.2.4.3. 
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whether the contractants are in agreement.511 As an external mechanism, it fulfills a controlling 
function for the validity of the contract as a whole in that it regulates the validity of the terms 
of the contract individually and collectively. It also ensures that a court of law has sufficient 
information to determine that the contractants intended to contract, the terms of the contract 
and whether a breach has occurred. The obligations to be created must be certain or 
objectively ascertainable,512 failing which the whole contract may be rendered void unless the 
impugned term can be severed from the rest.513 The test to determine whether a contract or 
one or more of its terms is sufficiently certain so as to render the obligations enforceable by the 
courts, is an objective one to be determined with reference to the prevailing circumstances at 
date of contract.514 
Certainty also serves a third function, namely, that of justification for, on the one hand, the 
enforcement of contracts in terms of the pacta sunt servanda doctrine, and, on the other hand, 
for the rejection of a regulatory function for good faith,515 and for the reluctance to engage in 
non-literal approach to the interpretation of contracts in order to discover the true intention of 
the contractants.516 
                                                            
511  The requirement of certainty, though a separate requirement for the validity of contracts in general, also finds 
expression in the requirement that the offer must be certain. Offer and acceptance constitute agreement 
(consensus) which is the first requirement for a valid contract. Van Huyssteen et al Contract Law para [135]; 
Lubbe & Murray Contract 307. 
512  Lambons (Edms) Bpk v BMW (Suid-Afrika) Edms Bpk 1997 (4) SA 141 (SCA) 158E-G, hereafter Lambons 1997 (4) 
SA 141 (SCA). In this case, the issue was whether a valid oral contract had been concluded appointing the 
Appellant as a non-exclusive BMW dealer in Bloemfontein.  
513  Lambons 1997 (4) SA 141 (SCA) 154G-I; Van der Merwe et al Contract 192-193. In ascertaining the 
performances, the courts have reference to the express terms of the contract, tacit terms and terms implied by 
law. Tacit terms are terms not specifically agreed upon but are unarticulated terms which have the same legal 
effect as an express term. Implied terms are imposed by operation of law into contracts. Hutchison et al 
Contract 242-248. 
514  Van der Merwe et al Contract 193. 
515  See para 2.8 below. 
516  See para 2.4.5 above. 
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In the last context, Van der Merwe et al,517 in commenting on the decision in the Bank of Lisbon 
v De Ornelas,518 express surprise at “the absence of an in-depth discussion [by the court] of 
general policy considerations raised by the issue” and wonder “whether their ultimate 
conclusion actually rests on some unexpected premise such as the desirability of the utmost 
degree of certainty of the law.” It is not far-fetched to conclude that in not engaging in an in-
depth discussion, and in refusing to interfere, the Court was committed to upholding the 
doctrine of sanctity of contracts, thereby, promoting certainty of the law.519 The conclusion is 
reinforced by the fact that the Court enforced the contract despite finding that the impugned 
condition gave the plaintiff an “extraordinary degree of protection.”520 
Constitutional principles provide little, if any, relief.521 Recently, the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Napier v Barkhuizen confirmed the need for certainty by emphasising that public policy 
demands that agreements should be honoured.522 Although the Constitutional Court in the 
Barkhuizen case cautioned that the principle of pacta sunt servanda is not a sacred cow and 
that it is subject to constitutional scrutiny,523 the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Bredenkamp 
                                                            
517  Van der Merwe et al (1989) 106 SALJ 240. The writers further commented that “[t]he recognition of equitable 
discretion inherent in the courts immediately involves notions such as freedom of contract, pacta sunt 
servanda and legal certainty...” and were disappointed that “[t]he majority of the court did not consider the 
scope of these notions” (240-241). 
518  1988 (3) SA 580 (A) 605I-J discussed in para 2.3.2.1 above. 
519  The decisions discussed in para 2.3.2 in this chapter to illustrate the proposition that public policy has been 
used as an instrument of the notion of freedom of contract, may equally serve as examples of certainty of 
contract being used to justify the enforcement of contracts. The insistence of the court in the Brisley case, as 
evidenced in, for example, paras [21], [24] and [58] is exemplary of the Supreme Court of Appeal’s attitude. 
520  At 98. The decision is expressive of the Appellate Division’s reluctance, justified on the basis of promoting 
certainty, to use public policy to strike down contracts. See also Sasfin 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 9B-F. 
521  In Brisley 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) the Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed the constitutional argument by 
proclaiming that “’n [h]of kan nie skuiling soek in die skaduwee van die Grondwet om vandaar beginsels aan te 
val en om ver te werp nie ... In hierdie konteks is vaagweg na konstitutionele waardes verwys sonder om 
spesifiek te wees. ’n Vrye regterlike diskresie is nie so ’n waarde nie” (para [24]). See also Bredenkamp (appeal) 
2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA) para [39]. 
522  2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA) paras [13] and [7].The Court held that “intruding in apparently voluntarily concluded 
arrangements is a step that Judges should countenance with care, particularly when it requires them to impose 
their individual conception of fairness and justice on parties’ individual arrangements.” 
523  Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) para [15]. 
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case524 dismissed any suggestion that the Barkhuizen court intended a renewed role for good 
faith in contractual validity.525 Subsequent to the Bredenkamp case, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal expressed similar sentiments in the Potgieter case.526 In doing so, the Court confirmed 
its earlier philosophical view regarding the supremacy of the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda. 
The Court went further and admonished527 that “[a] constitutional principle that tends to be 
overlooked, when generalised resort to constitutional values is made, is the principle of legality. 
Making rules of law discretionary or subject to value judgments may be destructive of the rule 
of law.”528 “[W]eighty considerations of commercial and social certainty” required judges to 
exercise restraint when “intruding upon the domain of private citizens.”529 
 
 
 
                                                            
524  Bredenkamp (appeal) 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA). 
525  In doing so it confirmed the decision in Brisley 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) where the Supreme Court of Appeal warned 
that granting judges a discretion to determine the reasonableness and fairness of contractual principles would 
result in the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda being overlooked with consequent legal and commercial 
uncertainty (para [24]). See further the discussion on good faith in para 2.8 in this below. 
526  Potgieter 2012 (1) SA 637 (SCA) paras [31]-[36]. 
527  At para [39]. 
528  In doing so, the Court may be seen as cocking a snook at the decision in Advtech Resourcing 2008 (2) SA 375 (C) 
where the Cape High Court sought a revision of the doctrinaire approach to restraint of trade clauses by 
encouraging an approach that is more cognisant of constitutional values. See the discussion in a footnote in 
para 2.2.2 in this chapter. 
529  African Dawn 2011 (3) SA 511 (SCA) paras [27]-[28]. In adhering to the strict common law requirements for 
usury, the Court not only persists in its reluctance to use public policy informed by broader standards of 
fairness, but also places the notions of freedom and sanctity of contract in the forefront in the interests of 
preserving commercial and legal certainty. Pretorius (2005) 68 THRHR characterises this as the formalist 
approach which values predictability and certainty in contract law. As opposed to this, is the contextualist 
approach which prefers flexible and adaptable standards that allow the courts to take into account the 
circumstances and equities of individual cases (268-269). The root of this may be traced to the predominance 
of the will theory of contract as opposed to the reliance theory which is predominant in the United States of 
America: Pretorius ‘The basis of contractual liability (2): Theories of Contract (will and declaration)’ (2005) 
68THRHR 441, 442-457; Pretorius (2005) 68 THRHR 581-590 and Pretorius ‘The basis of contractual liability (4) 
Towards a composite theory of contract’ (2006) 69 THRHR 102-106. The will theory, in essence, requires 
consensus on the terms and consequences of the agreement, an intention to be legally bound, as well as an 
awareness of the agreement. The reliance theory suggests that the binding element in contract law is a 
reasonable reliance by one party of the existence of a contract. 
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2.6.3 Conclusion 
Certainty of the law has been used as a blunt instrument for the enforcement of contracts, 
ignoring subjective considerations such as the relative bargaining powers of the contractants, 
or the fact that a contractant was innumerate or illiterate. In doing so, it has been deployed in a 
role similar to the role that public policy plays as an instrument for the enforcement of 
contracts530 thus leaving the hapless contractant doubly exposed to the vicissitudes of classical 
contract law. 
Our courts, in deference to the principle of contractual autonomy, are reluctant to declare a 
contract a nullity because of the possibility of creating uncertainty in the law. This reluctance 
may exacerbate the invidious position in which contrantants find themselves,531 a position 
which has necessitated a raft of statutory interventions.532 Viewed in this light, and bearing in 
mind that contractual obligations are often based on a presumption of consensus,533 the 
recognition of a sale at a reasonable price or at a unilaterally determined price may leave a 
contractant, who has been tempted by the idea of paying a “reasonable” price, without any 
recourse.534 Hence, the call to confer validity on contracts of sale at a reasonable price or at a 
price that is unilaterally determined should not be acceded to. 
Certainty is a cardinal principle in law in general and in contract law in particular. Its primary 
function is to guard against arbitrariness and to promote predictability and reliability. In doing 
so, it ensures equality, thereby securing dignity.535 Certainty, as represented by these valued 
attributes, forms the basis of the theory that the right to determine the price or rental 
                                                            
530  Both overlook subjective considerations in the determination of contractual validity. Bank of Lisbon v De 
Ornelas 1988 (3) SA 580 (A) (public policy); Bredenkamp (appeal) 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA) (certainty). Public policy 
is dealt with in para 2.3.2 in this chapter.   
531  For example, as a result of standard form contracts. 
532  Relevant legislation is dealt with in chapter 3. 
533  See para 2.4.2 in this chapter. 
534  See chapter 3 and chapter 4 para 4.3.4.3(E). 
535  Hahlo and Kahn The South African Legal System and its Background (1968), 214-215 in his explaining of the 
virtues of the stare decisis doctrine that contributes to certainty. 
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constitutes the essence of a contract of sale and lease that cannot be surrendered by trading it 
for a standards-driven approach to the essentialia of price and rental that is based on 
reasonableness.536   
 
2.7 The role of certainty in relation to freedom of contract 
The foregoing discussion related to the misuse of certain principles of contract law537 and 
practices in the name of freedom of contract. The misuse was justified on the grounds of the 
classical contract law assumption of consensus. Individuals were assumed to have free will and 
could, hence, under the guise of contractual autonomy contract as they pleased.538 The validity 
of this argument was proven to be suspect with reference to, for example, the abuse of 
standard form contracts and exemption clauses.539 It was also illustrated how the principle of 
certainty was used to enforce contractual terms, including those that unfairly burdened 
contractants. 
The discussion that follows will focus on the role of the principle of certainty in counter-
balancing the excesses of contractual freedom. 
Unlike the law of property that operates on the basis of a closed system of rights,540 the law of 
contract, in principle, works with an open system of rights that has its basis in the notion of 
freedom of contract.541 An open system advances legal development and adaptation to modern 
conditions whereas a closed system advances legal certainty.542 A danger inherent in a closed 
                                                            
536  This theory is developed in chapter 4. 
537  Autonomy, freedom of contract, consensus, public policy and certainty.  
538  See in particular para 2.2.2 above. 
539  See para 2.4 above. 
540  In the Law of Property, for example, there is a closed number of original ways of acquiring ownership and 
virtually a closed number of constructive ways in which ownership may be acquired. See further Badenhorst, 
Pienaar and Mostert Silberberg Schoeman’s The Law of Property (2006) 137-174 & 180-200; Van der Merwe 
Sakereg (1989) 11-12. 
541  Pretorius (2005) 68 THRHR 258-261. 
542  Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 410. 
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system is that it may inhibit legal development and adaptation to modern conditions.543 
Conversely, the danger of an open system is that the advances it promotes may occur at the 
expense of legal certainty.544 The law of contract has elements of both systems in that whilst 
freedom of contract is the cornerstone of the law of contract, the law of contract is also 
concerned with the formulation of limits within which persons may bind themselves.545 
A contract may be defined as an agreement that is recognised by the law and that gives rise to 
enforceable rights and obligations.546 The two aspects that come to the fore are those of 
agreement and enforceability. In principle, agreement “paradoxically” signifies freedom, on the 
one hand, and conformity as well as consistency, on the other hand, and is, in principle, a 
prerequisite for enforceability.547 
The paradoxical relationship between the notions of freedom, on the one hand, and conformity 
and consistency, on the other hand, is more apparent than real. Conformity and consistency in 
the guise of certainty are core and fundamental features of a healthy legal system. Agreement 
(which derives from freedom), and certainty (conformity and consistency) are, in essence, 
mirror images of one another. Agreement is, in principle, possible only if there is certainty 
relating to the contents and consequences of that which is being agreed upon and certainty is, 
in principle, possible only if agreement is reached about contents and consequences. 
Information and disclosure are essential in attaining agreement and maximising certainty.548 
The very notion of freedom itself is founded on certain minimum requirements, namely, an 
                                                            
543  Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 410. 
544  Both systems, however, have the promotion of justice as their objective. 
545  For example, by setting out essentialia for the creation of a valid contract. See further Van der Merwe et al 
Contract 17 et seq.  See also chapter 1 para 1.4.2. 
546  Van der Merwe et al Contract 7-8. 
547  The latter notion is self-explanatory. 
548  That this conclusion is axiomatic is demonstrated in the discussion of the information and disclosure provisions 
of the consumer protection legislation in chapter 3.  
 
 
 
 
97 
 
awareness of choices and the ability to make choices.549 However, the provision of such an 
environment is not possible in an imperfect world order550 hence the need for limitations. The 
maximisation of freedom can best be attained by balancing freedoms and restrictions. For 
example, the right to free speech is balanced by the corresponding obligation not to slander or 
defame. Obligations impose a necessary limitation on freedoms, the main objective of 
balancing limitations with freedoms being the safeguarding of the social and legal order and the 
protection of rights. Absolute freedom, meaning freedom without any limitation, could result in 
anarchy. Consequently, the maintenance of a healthy equilibrium between freedom and 
certainty becomes the hallmark of a functional legal order. In the South African context, the 
provisions of the Constitution and the constitutional values of dignity, equality and freedom 
would provide the outer boundaries of such a legal order.551 
The apparent paradoxical relationship between freedom and conformity is also found in the law 
of contract. Agreement is, in principle, attainable only if contractants are free to decide on the 
nature, contents, and consequences of their actions. Such agreement must, in the interest of 
justice and good order, take place within a regulatory framework. The regulatory framework, as 
summarised in chapter 1,552 especially the role played by essentialia553 secures the role of 
certainty as a fundamental and core value of the law of contract.554 This role of the essentialia 
is explored in chapter 4 in relation to the question of law, viz., whether contracts of sale and 
lease at a reasonable price and rental respectively or at unilaterally determined price or rental 
should be recognised as valid. 
                                                            
549  The discussion in chapter 3 illustrates the importance of information and disclosure in reaching an agreement 
and in attaining certainty about contractual obligations. 
550  As illustrated with reference to the text in paras 2.4.2-2.4.4 in this chapter. 
551  See further the discussion in chapter 4.  
552  The limitations placed on freedom of contract by the common law, legislation, and the Constitution. See 
chapter 1 para 1.3.1. 
553  The role and function of essentialia in promoting certainty is the focus of the discussion in chapter 4. 
554  This role is explored in more detail in para 2.6 above. See also para 4.2.3 of chapter 4 and in chapter 4 generally 
where the theme of freedom and conformity is developed. 
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2.8 The role of good faith in relation to freedom and certainty of contract 
The concept of good faith has been proclaimed as “the Magna Carta of international 
commercial law.”555 However, the extent to which the duty of good faith should operate in 
determining the validity and enforceability of contracts is a matter of controversy throughout 
the common law world.556 
Bearing in mind that “[a] specific content has as yet not been given to bona fides,”557 good faith 
may be described “[a]s an ethical value or controlling principle founded upon community 
standards of fairness or decency, [that] underlies and informs the entire law of contract, 
shaping its content and finding expression in its technical rules and doctrines.”558 The discussion 
that follows will be confined to role of good faith as a mechanism for determining the validity or 
enforceability of a contract or a term(s) thereof.  
Good faith as a tool of substantive fairness in the law of contract was discarded in Bank of 
Lisbon v De Ornelas559 when the Court disposed of the exceptio doli as a “superfluous defunct 
anachronism … Requiescat in pace”560 and concluded that there was no evidence of the 
“existence of a general substantive defence based on equity” in Roman-Dutch law.561 
Accordingly, “[e]quity could not override a clear rule of law.”562 Any hope of a revival of a 
                                                            
555  Gabriel Contracts for the Sale of Goods: A Comparison of US and International Law (2009) 22, hereafter Gabriel 
Contracts for the Sale of Goods.  
556  As per by Lord Brown-Wilkinson in Dymocks Franchise Systems (NWS) Pty Ltd v Todd [2002] All E.R. (Comm) 849 
(PC) para [54] quoted by Beale Chitty On Contract Volume 1 para [1-024]. 
557  Van der Merwe et al (1989) 106 SALJ 241; Van der Merwe et al Contract 276-279. 
558  Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 737-738. Van der Merwe et al Contract 277-278 says that in practical terms the 
notion of good faith entails that a contractant may not over-protect its interests at the unreasonable expense 
of the other. In the United State of America, the common law characterises the duty of good-faith performance 
as “resulting in an implied term … requiring cooperation on the part of one party to the contract so that 
another party will not be deprived of his reasonable expectations.” The definition requires that considerations 
of fairness and equity be taken into account: Hillman et al Common Law and Equity under the Uniform 
Commercial Code 6-25 to 6-26.  
559  1988 (3) SA 580 (A). See also Lewis (2003) 120 SALJ 332. 
560  At 607. 
561  At 605. 
562  At 606. The following response by Van der Merwe et al (1989) 106 SALJ 235 to the judgment appropriately 
characterises, as it will be shown, the current state of the court’s approach to equity today. “The majority 
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substantive role for good faith563 was dashed in the Brisley case which ended what can only be 
described as a brief flirtation with the notion of fairness.564  The Court held that good faith does 
not constitute an independent basis for assessing the validity of a contract or term thereof.565 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
decision follows what can be described as a positivist-historical approach” and “the court approaches the 
sources in such a formalistic and clinical manner” with the result that “the historical method appears 
insensitive to the particular problems of the present” (238 and 239).    
563  See Hutchison (2001) 118 SALJ 741-743 who sought to find evidence of a renewed concern for substantive 
fairness in Sasfin 1989 (1) SA 1 (AD). The Appellate Division confirmed that whilst public policy favoured the 
utmost freedom of contract, it should also take into account the doing of simple justice between “man and 
man” (9G). The writer traces a line between this and a number of subsequent cases starting with the 
concurring minority judgment in Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman NO 1997 (4) SA 302 
(SCA) where good faith formed the basis for refusing to enforce a suretyship agreement. The next case is Mort 
NO v Henry Shields-Chiat 2001 (1) SA 464 (C) where the Court interpreted the reference, at para [28], by the 
NBS Boland Bank case to Olivier’s judgment as meaning “that our highest Court has given the green light in the 
direction of the development of a concept of good faith in our law of contract which would render the body of 
contract law congruent with the values of our constitutional community” (475 and see also 475C-D). The last 
case is that of Miller 2001 (1) SA 928 (C) where the Court, relying on Olivier’s minority judgment, refused to 
enforce a non-variation clause because “[t]he good faith basis of a contract imposes an obligation on 
contractors not to exercise powers in ways which run counter to the concept of bona fides” (938-9). Bhana & 
Pieterse (2005) 122 SALJ 865 discusses the Sasfin, Saayman, Mort and Miller cases along similar lines (891-892). 
See also Lewis (2003) 120 SALJ 336. The remarks in the Mort case noted above and the general tenor of the 
case were referred to with approval by Sachs J in the minority judgment in Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) 
para [140]. By way of illumination Sachs J warned that the “legal convictions of the community should not be 
equated with the convictions of the legal community” (para [141]). This warning has not been heeded by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal (for example, Bredenkamp (appeal) 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA) and Potgieter 2012 (1) SA 
637 (SCA) as pointed out in the footnote below.   
564  The court rejected the implication in Mort case (475C-D) that the enforceability of a contract is dependent on 
the public interest (gemeenskapsgevoel) (para [21]). The Brisley court was also dismissive of the Miller court’s 
reliance on the Olivier judgment, characterising the Olivier judgment as a minority judgment of a single judge 
on a factual finding with which the other four judges did not agree (para [16]). The NBS Boland Bank court’s 
reference to the Olivier judgment is similarly dismissed as having been made in passing (by the NBS Boland 
Bank court) and without any analysis thereof (the Olivier judgment) (para [16]). Adding more nails to the coffin, 
the Brisley court went on to stress that the NBS Boland Bank court’s remark did not form part of the court’s 
ratio decidendi. The court then rendered sterile the significance of the Olivier’s judgment by dismissing it in the 
following terms: “Die sienings in die uitspraak van Olivier AR verteenwoordig dus nog steeds net dié van ‘n 
enkel regter” (para [16]). Emphasis added. See also Van Huyssteen et al Contract Law para 97. In another 
context, one that related to the implication of terms into a contract, the Supreme Court of Appeal in South 
African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) para [29] held that the fact that terms can be 
implied if dictated by fairness and good faith “does not mean that these abstract values themselves will be 
imposed as terms of the contract.”  
565  Paras [15] & [22]. See also the Afrox decision where the Court confirmed the Brisley approach by holding that 
“[w]anneer dit by die afdwinging van kontraksbepalings kom, het die hof geen diskresie en handel hy nie op die 
basis van abstakte idees nie, maar juis op die basis van uitgekritaliseerde en neergelegte regsreëls” (para [32]). 
The recent case of African Dawn 2011 (3) SA 511 (SCA) pronounces itself along similar lines (para [28].)  
Of the common law jurisdictions, the duty of good faith is most extensively utilized in the United States of 
America where it has been described as the cornerstone of American law: Dixon ‘Good Faith in Contractual 
Performance and Enforcement – Australian Doctrinal Hurdles’ (2011) 39 Australian Business LR 227, 228, 
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hereafter Dixon (2011) 39 ABLR 227 who did a comparative review of the role of good faith in various 
jurisdictions. It has been said that there is no obligation in all of the UCC and in general contract law that is of 
more overall importance than the general obligation of good faith: Summers ‘Good Faith Revisited: Some Brief 
Remarks Dedicated to the Late Richard E. Speidel – Friend, Co-Author, and U.C.C. Specialist’ (2009) 46 San 
Diego LR723, 726, hereafter Summers (2009) 46 San Diego LR723. The duty is to be found in the two principal 
treatises on contracts, namely the UCC and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, hereafter referred to as 
Restatement (Second). The repealed UCC 1-203 imposed a duty of good faith in the performance and 
enforcement of every contract. The contents of this duty are now embodied in the revised UCC 1-304. In 
addition, many other provisions of the UCC impose or define specific duties of good faith. For example, a 
contractant empowered to unilaterally determine the price is under an obligation to act in good faith when 
doing so: UCC2-305(2). UCC 1-201(19) defines good faith as “honesty in fact in the conduct of the transaction 
concerned” whilst UCC 1-201(b)(20)[Rev] now defines good faith more broadly as “honesty in fact and the 
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.” The new definition retains the subjective 
element (honesty in fact) and, importantly, an objective standard (the element of commercial reasonableness), 
incorporating fairness: Summers (2009) 46 San Diego LR 728. The UCC directs that the Code must be liberally 
construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies. Hence, the notions of good faith and 
reasonableness are integral to the legal landscape. In addition, section 205 of the Restatement (Second) 
imposes, ex lege, a duty, not only, of good faith, but also, of fair dealing in the performance and enforcement 
of a contract. Section 205 represents a major advance because it, inter alia, symbolizes the requirements of 
“’contractual morality’ such as the unconscionability doctrine and various general equitable principles. As “an 
explicit general requirement” it offers “a direct and overt tool” without which judges in the past had “to leave 
bad faith unaddressed or resort to indirect and covert means, thereby fictionalizing the law or otherwise 
begetting unclarity, unpredictability, or inequity”. The Restatement (Second) has its basis in judicial decisions, 
academic literature and in various provisions of the UCC that contained many provisions that imposed specific 
duties of good faith: (811-813). Of note is UCC 1-304 that states that “[e]very contract or duty within this Act 
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.” Note that the duty does not apply in 
respect of the pre-contract/negotiation stage but only in respect of the performance and enforcement of the 
contract. The same applies in respect the duty of good faith in Section 205 of the Restatement (Second). 
Though the Restatement (Second), as adopted by the American Law Institute, does not have statutory force, it 
is usually viewed as authoritative by the courts: Summers ‘The General Duty of Good Faith – Its Recognition 
and Conceptualization’ (1981-82) 67 Cornell LR 810, 810-813, hereafter Summers (1981-82) 67 Cornell LR; 
Dixon (2011) 39 ABLR 227, 228-229. See also Knapp, Crystal & Prince Problems in Contract Law Cases and 
Materials (2003) 441-482; Zimmermann & Whittaker Good Faith chapter 4. See further on good faith in chapter 
5 para 5.5.5.2(D)(ii)(h). 
Treitel An Outline records that the House of Lords in Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc 
[2002] 1 AC 481 at [17] explained that fairness means that a seller must not “take advantage of a consumer’s 
necessity, indigence, lack of experience, unfamiliarity with the subject-matter of the contract, [or] weak 
bargaining position.” Fairness, therefore, relates to matters of substance (113). A duty to act in good faith is not 
implied in all contracts, as is the case in the civilian law systems. English law also does not recognise that a 
general duty to act in good faith exists unlike the position in civil law jurisdictions: Smith Atiyah’s An 
Introduction to the Law of Contract 7 and 15. See also Furmston Law of Contract 32. Instead, it has “developed 
piecemeal solutions to demonstrated problems of unfairness:” Per Bingham L.J in Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v 
Stilletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1989]1 Q.B. 433 at 439 quoted in Beale Chitty On Contract  Volume 1 para [1-
022]. The English courts have expressed their reluctance to apply a good faith standard in terms similar to 
those expressed by the South African courts, namely, business considerations, contractual certainty and 
conferring an undefined judicial discretion: Beale Chitty On Contract Volume 1 para [1-023]. Sight must also not 
be lost of the considerations of equity which takes a less rigid or literal approach to contract problems than the 
common law: Treitel An Outline 6. See also Furmston Law of Contract 32. Adams & Brownsword Key Issues in 
Contract (1995) 253-254 summarises the state of English law in this regard in the following terms: “…English 
contract law urgently needs an explicit doctrine of good faith to deal more openly, more rationally, with the 
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many manifestations of bad faith encountered in commercial contracting. Of course, the availability of a good 
faith provision does not guarantee utilization, nor the development of an articulate jurisprudence of good faith. 
Nevertheless, in the absence of such an explicit doctrine, we can be sure the law of contract will muddle 
through in an unnecessarily irrational way.” However, Smith forecasts a growing role for good faith under the 
influence of regulatory legislation originating in the European Union. An example of this is the European Union 
Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts implemented by the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract 
Regulations 1999 which gives the courts wide-ranging powers to strike down unfair terms in consumer 
contracts: Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract 20 and 25. See also Beale Chitty On Contract 
Volume 1 para [7-137]. The notion of fairness and good faith underpin legislation such as the Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contract Regulations 1999 which provides for the invalidity of certain unfair terms. The United 
Kingdom Law Commissions have proposed a “unified regime” to replace the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations Act 1999 and the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977: Willett (2011) 60(2) International &  
Comparative Law Quarterly 356. See also chapter 5 para 5.2.3.1. 
Though Scottish law does not recognize a general duty of good faith, it like English law, has ways of dealing 
with many of the situations dealt with by other legal systems under the rubric of good faith: Zimmermann & 
Whittaker Good Faith 687-688; McBryde The Law of Contract in Scotland para [1-30].  
Though the duty to bargain in good faith has not, unlike the position in the United States, been explicitly 
recognized in Australian law (Davis et al The Laws of Australia Contract para 7.1[6]), it has been held that it has 
become the norm to apply “standards of fairness which are wholly consistent with the existence in all contracts 
of a duty upon parties of good faith and fair dealing in its performance … anything less is contrary to prevailing 
community perceptions”: Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister of Public Works (1992) 33 Con LR 72 at 
112-113, quoted in Furmston Law of Contract 33. See also Carter & Hartland Contract Law in Australia para 
[113]; Dixon (2011) 39 ABLR227, 233 et seq. Dixon explains that the implied contractual term is used as the 
vehicle for the development of a good faith obligation. Consistent with the prescriptions of classical contract 
law the existence of the duty could be regarded as a question of fact, the duty being implied on an ad hoc basis 
if the presumed intention of the contractants so indicated. The existence of the duty could also be a question 
of law, an intention being imputed to the contractants. The courts have not settled the question whether the 
duty is to be implied as a matter of law or as one of fact though according to Dixon recent developments point 
in the direction of the latter. The law in regard to the place of good faith in the law of contract is still “evolving” 
(233 et seq).   
“With its roots in classical Roman law, good faith is well recognized in civil jurisdictions”: Dixon (2011) 39 ABLR 
227. See also Beale Chitty On Contract Volume 1 para [1-025] and the quotation of Bingham L.J. quoted in Beale 
Chitty On Contract Volume 1 para [1-022]. Lord Bingham characterizes the duty of good faith as a principle of 
“fair open dealing” or, in colloquial terms, a duty to play fair or to come clean or to put one’s cards facing up on 
the table.  
In Germany, there is a general duty to perform in good faith with customary practice taken into consideration 
(BGB 242). In addition, as noted above, contracts must be interpreted according to the requirements of good 
faith with customary practice taken into consideration (BGB 157). BGB 242 may be relied upon without it being 
specifically pleaded: Dixon (2011) 39 ABLR 227. See further chapter 5 para 5.2.5.3(B).  
In the Netherlands, good faith exists where a contractant knew or ought to have known of the facts or the law 
(NBW 3.11). NBW 6.2 imposes an obligation to act in accordance with the requirements of reasonableness and 
fairness whilst NBW 3.12 states that in determining the standard of reasonableness and fairness, generally 
accepted principles of law, current judicial views in the Netherlands and societal and private interests must be 
taken into account. See further chapter 5 para 5.2.6.2(B) 
Good faith provisions are also to be found in the French Civil Code, the Italian Civil Code, the Greek Civil Code, 
Quebec’s Civil Code, the Swiss Civil Code, the Russian Civil Code, the Japanese Civil Code as well as the code 
adopted in 1999 in the People’s Republic of China entitled Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China: 
Dixon (2011) 39 ABLR227, 228. 
Good faith requirements are also to be found in international instruments. The CISG requires, inter alia, the 
observance of good faith in international relations in the interpretation of the convention 7(1). This rule of 
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Any other approach would be to replace the standard of the law with the standard of the judge 
resulting in disregard for the pacta sunt servanda principle because the enforceability of a 
contractual term would then be dependent what a particular judge would regard as 
unreasonable or unfair in the circumstances.566 In warning that a court “kan nie skuiling soek in 
die skaduwee van die Grondwet om vandaar beginsels aan te val en omver te werp nie…”567 the 
Court rejected the notion that constitutional values gave it the jurisdiction to utilize equitable 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
interpretation was formulated as a substitute for a “substantive good-faith provision as some drafters of the 
CISG feared that a rule that required “good faith conduct might lead to “uncertainty”: Lookofsky Understanding 
the CISG: A Compact Guide to the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for International Sale of Goods 
(2008) 37 n187, hereafter Lookofsky Understanding the CISG. It must be noted, however, that since the CISG 
does not generally deal with questions of validity, most questions which fall under the heading of validity such 
as fraud, duress, mistake or unreasonableness or unconscionability of contract terms fall to be resolved 
according to domestic or non-CISG (1980) rules:  Lookofsky Understanding the CISG 22.The CISG has been 
adopted “by no less than seventy States from all five continents including the major trading nations.” The 
exceptions are Japan, the United Kingdom and India: Bonell ‘The CISG, European Contract Law and the 
Development of a World Contract Law’ (2008) 56 Am. J. Comp. Law1, 4, hereafter Bonell (2008) 56 Am. J. 
Comp. Law 1. See further chapter 5 para 5.2.7.2(G).  
Article 1.7 UNIDROIT Principles (2004) refers to “good faith and fair dealing in international trade.” This 
mandatory obligation applies to every aspect of the contract, including the negotiation thereof: Gabriel 
Contracts for the Sale of Goods 22. See further chapter 5 para 5.2.7.3(C)&(D). Although UNIDROIT Principles has 
persuasive value, it has been well received in academic circles. It has also served as a model for civil codes, for 
example, the Civil Codes of the Russian Federation, Hungary, China, Pakistan and Turkey. Mention is also made 
in the UCC of provisions of UNIDROIT Principles. The UNIDROIT Principles (2004) is also increasingly used in the 
conclusion of international commercial contracts, and the resolution of international and domestic commercial 
contract disputes: Bonell ‘UNIDROIT Principles 2004 – The New Edition of the Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts adopted by the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law’(2004) 9 Unif. LR 
5n.s. 6-17, hereafter Bonell (2004) 9 Unif. LR 5. 
Article 1.201 of the PECL imposes a general duty to act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing: Bonell 
(2004) 9 Unif. LR 34. See also Dixon (2011) 39 ABLR 230. Article 1:201 of the PECL also provides for a mandatory 
duty of good faith and fair dealing; Bonell & Peleggi (2004) 9 Unif. LR 335. The Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contract Regulations 1999 also explicitly incorporates a principle of good faith in the European Union: Smith 
Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract 20.  
566  Para [24]. Early evidence of this view is to be found in Tjollo Ateljees (Eins) Bpk v Small 1949 (1) SA 856 (A) 
where the Appellate Division rejected the laesio enormis doctrine, inter alia, on the basis that “despite all the 
learning relating to the rescission of contracts on the ground of laesio enormis nothing has evolved out of it 
which could be dignified by the name of a rule of positive law” (875). In the United States of America, a similar 
concern that “altruism, Good Samaritanism, general benevolence, moral idealism, or the like” may cause courts 
to “overextend” a general requirement of good faith resulting in a “parade of the horrible” was curtly rejected. 
“[E]xtensive case law to date” did not support any tendency in that direction: Summers (1981-82) 67 Cornell LR 
834.  
567  Para [24]. In the same vein, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Napier 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA) said that “the 
Constitution and its value system does not confer on judges a general discretion to declare contracts invalid on 
the basis of their subjective perceptions of fairness or on the grounds of imprecise notions of good faith” (para 
[7]). The sanctity placed on principles cannot be left unchallenged. The approach is reminiscent of apartheid 
ideology that formulated policy in the form of principles which were immune from judicial scrutiny. 
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considerations to disregard contractual provisions freely entered into.  The decision “closes off 
what is most arguably one of the most viable avenues through which to align the common law 
of contract with the values underlying the Constitution.”568  The Brisley court’s approach was 
recently fortified by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Bredenkamp569 and Potgieter570 cases.  
The view of the Bredenkamp court stands in stark contrast to the Constitutional Court’s very 
clear pronouncements on the role of fairness in the Barkhuizen judgment which is peppered 
with the word “fair” and variations thereof (unfair, fairness, unfairness).571 The use of the words 
as well as the context in which they are used are indicative of an intention that fairness should 
play a more extensive role than the hitherto restrictive role ascribed to it by the Supreme Court 
of Appeal. Moseneke DCJ went much further by holding572 “[t]rite as it is that our constitutional 
values allow individuals the dignity and freedom to regulate their affairs, they also require that 
                                                            
568  Bhana & Pieterse (2005) 122 SALJ 889. See also Naudé & Lubbe (2005) 122 SALJ 455 who express themselves 
along similar lines. 
569  (Appeal) 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA) discussed in chapter 1 para 3.3 and elsewhere in this chapter. The Bredenkamp 
court effectively put an end to any belief, as expressed by Kerr ‘The Defence of Unfair Conduct on the Part of 
the Plaintiff at the Time Action is Brought: The Exceptio doli generalis and the Replicatio Doli in Modern Law’ 
(2008) 125 SALJ 246 and Glover ‘Lazarus in the Constitutional Court: An exhumation of the exceptio doli 
generalis?’ (2007) 124 SALJ 449, 454-456, hereafter Glover (2007) 124 SALJ 449, that the exceptio doli generalis 
has in a sense been restored by the Barkhuizen decision, and puts a damper on any hope that the decision may 
lead to a resurrection thereof. This much was predicted by Glover (2007) 124 SALJ449 when he concluded that 
the chances of a resurrection of the exceptio doli generalis were “in all honesty, slim” (458).  
570  Potgieter 2012 (1) SA 637 (SCA) paras [31]-[36]. 
571  By way of example, the following may be highlighted:  the Court says that “[o]ur democratic order requires an 
orderly and fair resolution of disputes (para [31]); “... the requirement of an adequate and fair opportunity to 
seek judicial redress is consistent with the notions of fairness and justice ...” (para [52]); “I can conceive of no 
reason either in logic or in principle why public policy would not tolerate time limitation clauses in contracts 
subject to the considerations of reasonableness and fairness” (para [48]); “That [the fact that many people 
conclude contracts without having any bargaining power and without understanding what they are agreeing to] 
will often be a relevant consideration in determining fairness” para [65]; “public policy imports the notions of 
fairness, justice and reasonableness ...” para [73]; “In these circumstances, I am unable to conclude that the 
90-day period allowed to the applicant to sue is so unreasonable that its unfairness is manifest and that 
therefore its enforcement would be contrary to public policy” para [67]; “In my view, what contractual fairness 
in light of the Constitution requires is a special examination of the provenance of the time-bar ...” para [124]. 
The comment in para [70] is probably the most suggestive of a renewed role for fairness. It advises that 
“[w]hile it is necessary to recognise the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, courts should be able to decline the 
enforcement of a ... clause if it would result in unfairness or would be unreasonable. The approach requires a 
person  ... to demonstrate that in particular circumstances it would be unfair to insist on compliance with the 
clause.” (Emphasis added.) 
572  Para [104]. 
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bargains, even if freely struck, may not steer a course inimical to public notions of equity and 
fairness, which are now constitutional values.” Further impetus for the recognition of a general 
duty of good faith may be detected in the obiter dicta of the Constitutional Court in Everfresh 
Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd573 that recognizes a duty to conduct 
negotiations in good faith and the need for contractants to relate to one another in good faith. 
The decisions in Breedenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd574 and in Hoffmann v South 
African Airways575 constitute further evidence of this trend.576 
The above analysis leads to the conclusion that the development in the common law of 
contract has reached the judicial equivalent of a fork in the road: the one path represents a 
continuation of the supremacy of the principles of freedom and sanctity of contract and one 
that seeks to insulate itself from subjective considerations even those that have a constitutional 
basis; the other path recognises freedom and sanctity of contract as constitutional values577 
that stand on equal footing with other constitutional values such as dignity, equality, freedom 
and ubuntu: public policy as redefined578 maintaining a healthy tension between the two sets of 
                                                            
573  2012 (1) SA 256 (CC), hereafter Everfresh 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC). A clause in a lease agreement gave the 
Appellants the option to renew the lease on expiry on the same terms and conditions, subject to agreement 
being reached on the rental. The Respondents rejected the offer of renewal and argued that the renewal clause 
did not constitute a legally binding and enforceable right and that it was hence not obliged to negotiate. The 
question before the Court was whether the common law should be developed in terms of section 39(2) so as to 
place a duty on contractants to negotiate in good faith.  The minority judgment held that the issue had merit 
and that it should be referred back to the High Court for determination. Whilst the majority it left the question 
open by deciding that it was not in the interests of justice to entertain the appeal (the Appellants having raised 
the constitutional issues for the first time in the Constitutional Court) the majority did acknowledge the 
importance of infusing the common law with constitutional values, including the value of ubuntu [para [71]. 
The Court elaborated to say that contractants “certainly need to relate to each other in good faith” [para [72]. 
574  (Interim interdict) 2009 (5) SA 304 (GSJ). The case concerned a clause that conferred a discretionary power on 
the bank to terminate the contract between the bank and the applicant for any reason. 
575  Hoffmann 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC). 
576  The cases are discussed in a footnote in para 2.3.3 above and in chapter 1 para 1.3.3. 
577  Barkhuizen2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) discussed in chapter 1 para 1.3.3.. 
578  The Barkhuizen court redefined public policy as incorporating the concept of ubuntu and as being the 
repository of those values that the society hold most dear (para [28]), the general sense of justice of the 
community, the boni mores, manifested in public opinion (para [73]) and as incorporating the notions of 
fairness, justice and equity, and reasonableness (paras [51] and [73]) and the necessity to do simple justice 
between individuals (para [51]). 
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values. The evidence from other disciplines of law579 and from a few recent decisions in 
contract law580 suggests that contract law will take the second path. 
 
2.8.1 Analysis 
Of the English, Scottish, American, Australian, and South African legal systems, all of which have 
their origin in the classical philosophy of contract law, the South African approach is most 
closely rooted in the classical tradition. The American system, with its acknowledgment of a 
general defence of unconscionability, judicial interpretation, duty of disclosure, and the notions 
of good faith and equity, has moved the furthest in the direction of the promotion of 
substantive equality and fairness. Provisions relating to unconscionability have severely dented 
the facade of impenetrability traditionally associated with the caveat emptor rule, a rule which 
in the South African context has attained an almost reverential status often with disastrous 
consequences for those negatively impacted by its application. 
The English system lacking only an acknowledgement of a general defence of unconscionability 
and considerations of good faith has also substantially loosened the bondage of the classical 
tradition. As is the case in America, the process has been advanced by legislative enactments.581 
The Australian system with the introduction of the new Australian Consumer Law is closer to 
the American system, whilst the Scottish system trails the English system. These systems all 
acknowledge some form of relief, to a greater or lesser degree, based on equitable principles. 
The civilian systems being, code based, are firmly rooted in attainment of substantive equality 
and fairness.582 The United Nations CISG (1980) has also been used as a model for the drafting 
                                                            
579  Some of these are discussed in chapter 4 para 4.2.4.2(A)(i). See also para 4.2.4.2(A)(ii). 
580  Some of these are discussed in chapter 4 para 4.2.4.2(A)(iii). 
581  English law has also been influenced by the European Union directives which have adopted civilian concepts 
such as good faith as has the CISG: Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract 25; Kröll et al The 
United Nations Convention 119-124.  
582  Practically all civil codes have a good faith clause or one comparable to it: Hawthorne (2006)69 THRHR 58 n83. 
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of domestic laws.583 Good faith is also firmly entrenched in the UNIDROIT Principles (2004) and 
the PECL. 
The conclusion to be drawn is that whilst certainty is important in the aforementioned legal 
regimes, it is not used at the expense of contractual fairness as is the case in South Africa.584  
 
2.9 Conclusion 
The classical contract law orientation of the South African law of contract that has its basis in 
the assumption that contractants are fully knowledgeable about the facts, know the law and act 
rationally to further their self-interest predisposes a conclusion that all agreements to a 
reasonable price or rental or to a unilaterally determined price or rental are fair. This approach, 
operating in concert with the following factors militates against the recognition of the validity 
of contracts of sale at a reasonable price or at a unilaterally determined price: (i) the use of 
public policy and certainty as blunt instruments for the enforcement of contractual 
obligations;585 (ii) a narrow approach to public policy that relegates the significance and role of 
the constitutional values of dignity, equality and freedom;586 (iii) standardised rules;587 (iv) the 
objective theory of interpretation that resists a more subjective and contextualised approach to 
contractual interpretation;588 and (v) the rejection of individualised standards such as unequal 
bargaining power, unconscionability, the duty of good faith589 Recognition would compromise 
equality of bargaining power and by extension the constitutional values of dignity, equality and 
freedom. In the light of the foregoing, it is concluded that validity should not be bestowed on 
contracts of sale at a reasonable price or at a price that is unilaterally determined. 
                                                            
583  Bonell (2008) 56 Am. J. Comp. Law 5-6. 
584  Para 2.6 above. 
585  Para 2.6 above. 
586  Para 2.3 above. 
587  For example, the parol evidence and caveat subscriptor rules discussed in para 2.3.2.2 in this chapter. 
588  Para 2.4.5 above. 
589  Para 2.8 above. 
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Chapter 3 
Overview of consumer protection legislation: its impact on certainty and freedom of contract. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In chapter 2, the discussion of the classical law approach to the notion of freedom of contract 
highlighted the disadvantages and the problems associated with the recognition and 
application thereof. It was concluded that the approach, as applied in South African contract 
law, raised public policy concerns and impacted negatively on the constitutional values of 
dignity, equality and freedom which values should inform the practice of contract law in South 
Africa.590 
Legislatures in different countries have recognised the disparities created by the 
presumption591 of freedom in the market-place and have sought to address this reality by 
means of consumer protection legislation.592 In general, consumer protection legislation is 
                                                            
590  See, for example, Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) discussed in para 1.3.3 of chapter 1 and throughout 
chapter 2. See also chapter 4. 
591  See chapter 2 and in particular para 2.2.2. 
592  Furmston and Bradgate The Law of Contract (2010) paras [1.47]-[1.51], hereafter Furmston and Bradgate The 
Law of Contract; Harvey & Parry The Law of Consumer Protection and Fair Trading (1992), hereafter Harvey & 
Parry The Law of Consumer Protection.    
The Australian Attorney-General in introducing the Trade Practices Bill of the Commonwealth of Australia 
stated that unfair practices are widespread in consumer transactions, the law still being based on the caveat 
emptor principle. “The untrained consumer is no match for the businessman who attempts to persuade the 
consumer to buy goods or services on terms and conditions suitable to the vendor”: Harvey & Parry The Law of 
Consumer Protection 14.  
In the United States of America, the position is regulated by the Uniform Commercial Code (the UCC): Maurer 
‘Consumer Protection and Social Models of Continental and Anglo-American Contract Law and the 
Transnational Outlook’ (2007) 14 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 353, 360, hereafter Maurer (2007) 14 
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 353.  
In the European Union (the EU)), the Maastricht Treaty Establishing the European Union (1992) spelt out the 
EU’s commitment to consumer protection by undertaking to promote consumer protection and to ensure a 
high level of consumer protection: Martin ‘An Emerging Worldwide Standard for Protections of Consumers in 
the Sale of Goods: Did We Miss an Opportunity with Revised UCC Article 2?’ (2006) 41 Texas International LJ 
223, 239, hereafter Martin (2006) 41 Texas International LJ 223. The importance of consumer protection and its 
realisation as a policy consideration has seen its incorporation as a main target of EU policy in EU treaties: 
Maurer (2007) 14 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 359 and 371. The most important source of regulatory 
legislation has been the EU Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 1993: Naude ‘The Consumer’s 
‘Right to Fair, Reasonable and Just Terms Under the New Consumer Protection Act in Comparative 
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aimed at protecting consumers from unsafe and/or flawed goods or services, fraudulent, 
misleading or undesirable trading practices, insufficient information,593 and economic 
exploitation through lack of competition or excessive prices.594 Another aim is to provide 
consumers with inexpensive, accessible and effective recourse to enforce their statutory rights. 
In attaining these goals, it promotes the practical realisation of the principles of freedom, 
sanctity and certainty of contract and thereby the dignity, equality and freedom of the 
contractants.595  
The discussion that follows outlines the jurisprudential basis and some of the public policy 
considerations underlying such legislation. Thereafter follows a brief discussion of some of the 
developments in South African law in regard to consumer protection legislation coupled with a 
commentary on the interrelationship between consumer protection legislation and the 
principles of freedom, sanctity and certainty of contract that predominate in contract law. The 
aim is to lay a foundation for a determination of the extent, if any, to which an acceptance of 
contracts of sale and lease at reasonable price and rental respectively or at a unilaterally 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Perspective’(2009) 126 SALJ 505, hereafter Naude(2009) 126 SALJ 505. Currently, there is a proposal for a new 
EU Consumer Rights Directive covering unfair terms: Willett (2011) 60(2) International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly 355, 355.  
In England, the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 was the first general statute dealing with the unfair contracts 
whilst the EU Directive on Unfair Contract Terms 1993 was implemented by the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contract Regulations 1999. The main purposes of the latter two are to protect consumers against substantially 
unfair terms and secondly to protect consumers against unfair surprises. The 1999 Regulations is more general 
in nature than the 1977 act which dealt mainly with exemption clauses: Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the 
Law of Contract (2005) 15, 20, 313, 317 and 319, hereafter Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of 
Contract.  
France has a separate consumer code whilst Germany incorporated protection within the BGB, its Civil Code, as 
has the Netherlands in the NBW: Howells, Ramsay & Wilhelmsson Handbook of Research on International 
Consumer Law (2010) 13-17, 19 and 21-23, hereafter Howells et al Handbook of Research.    
The United Nations Guidelines for Consumer Protection 1985 and 1999, though constituting soft law, has been 
influential in South America, Asia and Australia. It is the first attempt at viewing consumer rights on an 
international scale: Howells et al Handbook of Research 10 and 23. The conclusion is that most legal systems, 
regardless of their differing legal traditions, have taken account of the need for consumer protection. 
593  The role and control of information is central to consumer protection law and policy: Cartwright ‘Publicity, 
punishment and protection: the role(s) of adverse publicity in consumer policy’ (2011) Legal Studies 1-2, 
hereafter Cartwright (2011) Legal Studies. 
594   Harvey & Parry The Law of Consumer Protection. 
595  The realisation of these goals will be illustrated in the discussion of each of the three pieces of legislation in this 
chapter. See also paras 3.6.10, 3.9 and 3.10 below.  
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determined price or rental596 would run counter to the jurisprudential basis of and the public 
policy objectives of such legislation.597 A further aim is to establish whether the public policy 
considerations underlying the legislation operate in harmony with the principles of contract 
law. This is relevant in light of the contention that public policy considerations as informed by 
the constitution and its values and imperatives may be determinative of the acceptance of the 
obiter dicta.     
 
3.2 Historical development 
Consumer protection statutes are of relatively recent vintage598 especially in the developing 
world where it came to the fore in the last quarter of the twentieth century.599 
One of the earliest South African statutes that sought to regulate unconscionable conduct600 
was the Hire-Purchase Act601 which required disclosure of certain vital terms602 to enable a hire-
                                                            
596  As per the obiter dicta in NBS Boland Bank v One Berg River Drive and others; Deeb and another v ABSA Bank 
Ltd; Friedman v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA), hereafter NBS Boland Bank 1999 (4) 
SA 928 (SCA) and in Genac Properties JHB (Pty) Ltd v NBC Administrators CC 1992 1 SA 566 (AD), hereafter 
Genac Properties 1992 1 SA 566 (AD). See the discussion in chapter 1 paras 1.1, 1.2 and 1.4.2. 
597  See in this chapter paras 3.4, 3.6.2, 3.7.1 (policy objectives) and para 3.5 (jurisprudential basis). The policy 
objectives are also dealt with in the discussion of the various provisions in this chapter.   
598  Cotterell argues that whilst writers such as Savigny, Sumner and Erlich saw the potential of legislation as a 
source of law, they could not have foreseen the potential use of legislation as a tool “to restructure ... 
economic enterprise on a massive scale, to promote peaceful revolution in social relations ..., and to shape 
attitudes and beliefs ...” that became a reality in the twentieth century: Cotterell The Sociology of Law: An 
Introduction (1992) 44, hereafter Cotterell The Sociology of Law. Cotterell elaborates that law as a precision 
instrument for social and economic planning requires a strong state, technological support for surveillance and 
control and networks of mass communication (44). However, the view that consumer protection legislation did 
not enjoy attention in the past is an over-simplification because legislation aimed at protecting consumers has 
been around for centuries. For example, in England, the Magna Carta in 1215 provided for uniformity of 
measure of wine, ale, corn and cloth and a statute of 1709 empowered justices of the peace to fix the weight 
and price of bread and bakers had to mark their loaves with its size and quality. There is a full discussion in 
Harvey & Parry The Law of Consumer Protection 1-6. See also Howells et al Handbook of Research 559. 
599  Howells et al Handbook of Research 9-10 and 48. In Germany, the dominance of consumer protection emerged 
with the enactment of the Standard Contract Terms Act in the 1970s although it was preceded by more than 25 
years of judicial review of standard form contracts. In the United States of America, the landmark case on the 
recognition of the doctrine of unconscionability which was codified in UCC 2-320, was the 1969 case of 
Williams v Walker Thomas Furniture Company: Maurer (2007) 14 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 369. 
See also Pretorius 2005 (68) THRHR 262. 
600  Unconscionability does not have a fixed meaning. In contract law, it is used to describe situations where, in the 
absence of fraud or duress, it is believed that one contractant took advantage of or exploited another. It 
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purchase purchaser to understand the extent of their financial obligations. Whilst these 
provisions were aimed at protecting consumers,603 the statute did not contain any general 
provision regulating unconscionable conduct.604 Neither did the Rent Act and the Rent Control 
Act.605 
The development in South African law regarding general provisions regulating unconscionable 
conduct may be traced back to the Conventional Penalties Act606 which appears to be the first 
legislative enactment containing general provisions regulating the use of oppressive and 
unconscionable contractual terms.607 Draft legislation for the introduction of fairness and 
reasonableness as general principles in the law of contract have not been acted on.608 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
consists of a procedural as well as a substantive enquiry. The procedural aspect aims at determining whether 
an element of vulnerability existed, for example, impaired intellectual ability or absence of choice (in the case 
of monopolies, for example). The substantive element requires proof that the contract or term itself was 
substantively unfair: Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract 300. 
601  36 of 1942. 
602  Section 5(1) mandated the inclusion of terms relating, inter alia, to the price, deposits and instalments. It also 
provided for compulsory disclosure of the provisions of section 13, discussed in the footnote below, and gave 
the credit consumer the right to choose the official language in which the agreement was to be recorded. 
Furthermore, section 6(1)(d) prohibited the exclusion of clauses implied at common law. 
603  A major innovation was to grant the buyer the power to resile from the contract within five days (the so-called 
“cooling-off” period) of its conclusion where the contract was concluded at the initiative of the seller at a place 
other than the seller’s place of business (the so-called “door-step” sales). See section 13. 
604  Furmston and Bradgate The Law of Contract at para [1.48] (2010), explains with reference to the English Hire-
Purchase Acts that the law sought to regulate the bargaining process without regulating the bargain itself. The 
emphasis was on process rather than on the substance of an impugned provision.  
605  43 of 1950 and 80 of 1976 respectively: Aronstam Consumer Protection (1979), hereafter Aronstam Consumer 
Protection discusses the two statutes fully (151 et seq). Aside from these, there are other pieces of “specialist” 
legislation that protect contractants in specialised areas of contract law, for example, the Alienation of Land Act 
68 of 1981 and the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937. Whilst such legislation may serve to protect contractants, 
they do not have generalised provisions aimed at regulating unconscionable conduct. The other main 
distinguishing feature between the position then and today is that then contractants had to rely on specialist 
advice and assistance given by, for example, attorneys or conveyancers. Today, such advice and assistance are 
dispensed by statutory bodies often for free or at a fraction of the fees charged by a professional.     
606  Act 15 of 1962. Section 3 thereof grants to the court an equitable discretion to reduce a stipulated penalty if it 
is out of proportion to the actual prejudice suffered. However, in Western Credit Bank Ltd v Kajee 1967 (4) SA 
386 (N) the court whilst recognising the fact that a “debtor” may not be in a position to bargain with the 
“creditor” at date of contract is a factor to be considered, cautioned that fair play for the debtor should “not be 
at the expense of the creditor – he is not to suffer prejudice” (390). 
607  Aronstam Consumer Protection 49 which is part of a comprehensive discussion of early legislation aimed at 
protecting consumer interests (47-168). 
608  See South African Law Commission Project 47 Report on Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and the 
Rectification of Contracts (1998): Huyssteen, Van der Merwe& Maxwell Contract Law in South Africa (2012), 
para [108]. 
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In South Africa, the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 is historically significant in that it 
constitutes the first statute aimed at providing a comprehensive legal framework for consumer 
protection.609 It serves as an overarching piece of legislation containing generalised provisions 
which impacts on the Rental Housing Act and the National Credit Act and other specialist pieces 
of legislation such as the Alienation of Land Act.610 The Consumer Protection Act read together 
with legislation such as the Rental Housing Act and the National Credit Act has introduced a 
formidable range of protections for the consumer. These three statutes are representative of 
legislation in the post-constitutional era designed to give expression to the constitutional ethos 
of freedom, dignity and equality. 
The impetus for consumer protection legislation may be traced to the classical theory of 
contract law that, in general, did not recognise subjective considerations such as 
unconscionability and good faith in the determination of contractual validity. This approach 
which often left consumers with little or no legal protection had significant socio-economic 
implications.611 Consumer protection law was viewed as a driver to effect socio-economic 
reforms.612 
 
 
 
                                                            
609  Read together with other legislation such as the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 and the National Credit Act 34 
of 2005 it has introduced a formidable range of protections for the consumer.  
610  See paras 3.6.2 (National Credit Act) and 3.8.5 (Rental housing Act) in this chapter. Contracts for the sale of 
land have to comply with the requisites of the CPA relating, for example, to the exclusion of implied warranties. 
The CPA cuts across many pieces of legislation and impacts most industries that involve the supply of goods 
and services. See further para 3.6 below. Prior to this, the interests of consumers were addressed piecemeal in 
various statutes. The development from a piece-meal approach to a comprehensive one is also to be discerned 
in the international arena: Howells et al Handbook of Research 10. 
611  As evidenced by the discussion in chapter 2 of, for example, standard form contracts (para 2.4.2), restraint of 
trade agreements (para 2.3.2.2(C) and exemption clauses (para 2.4.3). 
612  The potential of using legislation as a tool “to restructure ... economic enterprise on a massive scale, to 
promote peaceful revolution in social relations ..., and to shape attitude and to shape attitudes and beliefs ...” 
that became a reality in the twentieth century was recognised by writers such as Savigny, Sumner and Erlich: 
Cotterell The Sociology of Law 44. 
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3.3 Socio-economic basis  
Protectionist legislation, such as consumer protection legislation, is the product of socio-
economic drivers.613 It evolves from the recognition of the need to protect consumer rights and 
thereby to create a more equitable dispensation.614 The need for such protection has been 
acknowledged both nationally615 and internationally.616 In South Africa, under the democratic 
dispensation, the Constitution plays an important role in the drive towards an equitable 
dispensation in the socio-economic paradigm of its citizens. Section 26 places an obligation on 
the State to take reasonable legislative and other measures for the progressive realisation of 
the right of access to adequate housing. A similar obligation on the State exists in terms of 
section 27 in respect of access to health care, food, water and social security.617 The legislation 
discussed in this chapter is representative of some of the initiatives undertaken by the State in 
response to the challenges presented by sections 26 and 27 of the Constitution.    
The constitutional imperatives must be viewed in the context of the classical theory of contract 
law618 that propounded that absence of state interference is, not only, a necessary aspect of 
contract law theory, but also, the driver of a free market economy where the law of supply and 
demand is dominant. Ideally such a system creates an environment in which individuals buy 
products that they need at prices that they can afford.619 The ideal, however, does not always 
play out in practice where individuals may contract for goods or services that they may not 
need at prices that they may not afford and subject to terms and conditions that they may not 
                                                            
613  Rycroft & Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law (1992) 225, hereafter Rycroft & Jordaan A Guide to 
South African Labour Law.  
614  Oughton & Lowry Textbook on Consumer Law (1997) 15, hereafter Oughton & Lowry Textbook on Consumer 
Law. 
615  For example, the Hire-Purchase Act 36 of 1942 and the Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980, both since repealed; 
the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008; National Credit Act 34 of 2005; Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999. 
616  See the footnote in para 3.1 in this chapter. See also Howells et al Handbook of Research 13-17, 19 and 21-23; 
MacKee Lahave and Koning (2011) September ‘Responsible Finance: Putting Principles to Work’ Focus Note 73 
Washington D.C. CGAP 4-5, hereafter MacKee et al (2011) September Focus Note 73 Washington D.C. CGAP.  
617  See further the discussion of sections 26 and 27 in para 3.4 below. 
618  See chapter 2 para 2.2.2. 
619   See the discussion in chapter 2 paras 2.2.1 and 2.2.4. 
 
 
 
 
113 
 
have control over; a real possibility being that such terms and conditions could be harsh and 
unconscionable.620 In an environment of imbalance, be it market related or political-
historical,621 it becomes necessary for the State to intervene in its capacity as a public-
governing authority. In the process, consumer contracts are removed from the sole governance 
of private law and given a public law orientation,622 the primary concern whereof is the public 
interest.623 Further impetus for this development is the increasing provision for administrative 
rather than judicial processes for the resolution of disputes.624 
                                                            
620  The following evidence presented to Select Committee of the House of Assembly in 1939 on the subject of the 
Hire-Purchase Bill summarises the State’s concern in this regard: “There can be no question that the evidence 
put before us shows very clearly that very many people are tempted to buy goods that they cannot afford at 
all, because of the easy terms of payment offered to them, or they are tempted to buy goods at a far higher 
purchase price than they can afford to pay”: Diemont Marias & Aronstam The Law of Hire-Purchase in South 
Africa Juta (1974) iii. See also Manuel ‘SA’s debt time bomb’ The Times 4 November 2011, 1, 1-2, where the 
Minister warned about the level of over-indebtedness in South Africa; Renke ‘Measures in South African 
consumer credit legislation aimed at prevention of reckless lending and over-indebtedness: An overview 
against the background of recent developments in the European Union’ (2011) 74 THRHR 208, hereafter Renke 
(2011) 74 THRHR 208; Kelly-Louw ‘The prevention and alleviation of consumer over-indebtedness’ (2008) 20 SA 
Merc LJ 200, 204-205. Early case law that acknowledge this propensity and the dangers inherent therein are 
Smit and Venter v Fourie & Another 1946 WLD 9, 13 and National Motors v Fall 1958 (2) SA 570 (E) 571. See 
also chapter 2 paras 2.3 and 2.4. 
621  In South Africa, it is both. Aside from the human rights aspects (discussed in para 3.5 in this chapter below), 
consumer protection legislation has a political-historical context. The policy of Apartheid had negative socio-
economic consequences. This is explicitly acknowledged in the Preamble of the Consumer Protection Act as 
well as in Section 3(1)(b)(iv) thereof. 
622  Rycroft & Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 10. 
623  The net result of public-interest legislation is that freedom of contract may be constrained in the public 
interest. A lessor may, for example, be compelled to conclude a lease agreement with a lessee with whom the 
lessor refused to contract solely on the basis of race or gender. The Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 (1) 
SA 1 (CC) case (discussed in chapter 1 para 1.3.3) serves as an illustration. Similar considerations also impacted 
contract law in England. Examples are the Sex Discrimination Act 1995 and the Race Relations Act 1976: Atiyah 
An Introduction to the Law of Contract at 22-23. See also MacKee et al (2011) September Focus Note 73 
Washington D.C. CGAP 2; Hosten Introduction to South African Law and Legal Theory (1995) 945. Similar 
developments are present in the Law of Property: Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s 
The Law of Property (2006) 4-6 and 579-583, hereafter Badenhorst et al Property.  
624  The possibility of litigation as a compliance mechanism is, in itself, insufficient. Leff is of the opinion that one 
cannot think of a more expensive and frustrating course than to seek goods or contract “quality” through 
repeated law suits against inventive “wrongdoers”: ‘Unconscionability and the crowd-consumer and the 
common law tradition’ (1970) 31 University of Pittsburgh LR 349, 356. See also Cartwright (2011) Legal Studies 
2. The fact that greater emphasis is placed on accessible and affordable public remedies (administrative 
tribunals etc.) rather than private remedies which are often time-consuming and prohibitively expensive mean 
that more people are provided with access to justice. The costs, risks and effort associated with litigation in the 
courts are beyond the means of ordinary consumers, “including middle class consumers”: Naude (2009) 126 
SALJ 526. Other factors that may impact on a decision whether or not to litigate include that the consumer may 
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3.4 Policy objectives 
Chapter 2 illustrates that a lack of commercial knowledge, expertise and sophistication may 
result in a contractant either over-extending itself or in being exploited. This, coupled with a 
strict application of the classical principles of contract law could result in unforeseen and 
iniquitous consequences and an impairment of the constitutional values of dignity, equality and 
freedom. It is in this context that consumer protection legislation asserts itself. However, 
legislative imperatives alone do not guarantee the realisation of the desired outcomes. It must, 
inter alia, be supported by consumer awareness and an effective and affordable system of 
redress in the event of breach on the part of the supplier. Hence, disclosure provisions in 
legislation are becoming more detailed because consumer awareness is largely dependent on 
information and disclosure.625 The main aim thereof is to assist consumers in deciding on the 
prudence of entering into a proposed agreement bearing in mind their needs and their financial 
situation.626 The need for effective and affordable mechanisms for redress to prevent the 
legislation from becoming paper law led to the creation of administrative tribunals627 to combat 
abuse.628  
The discussion thus far may be summarised by noting that consumer protection is advanced 
through disclosure and information, regulation and through a more expedient and accessible 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
feel intimidated by the supplier or by the court process itself or by the consumer’s lack of knowledge of the 
legal process: Howells et al Handbook of Research 482-483.  
625  See para 3.6.3.3 below. 
626  Renke (2011) 74 THRHR 211-212. 
627  Administrative action tends to be faster and less costly in that no legal representation is needed. It is 
inquisitorial in nature, allowing the presiding officer to put question to the litigants which can be very useful in 
those (not so rare) instances where a party is not represented or lacks legal sophistication. Hearings must be 
conducted as expeditiously and as informally as possible. Allowance is made for a departure from inflexible 
rules of procedure which work to the disadvantage of those litigants with no access to legal representation or 
who lack sophistication of the law. See section 142(1)(a) of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 that regulates 
the conduct of the National Consumer Tribunal. 
628  One of the first South African statutes to do so was the Trade Practices Act 76 of 1976. Similar tribunals to 
combat unconscionable abuse of bargaining power had also been adopted in the British and other legal 
systems: Aronstam Consumer Protection 54. 
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system of adjudication.629 By employing these mechanisms, the South African consumer 
protection legislation serves to drive the constitutional imperative to foster socio-economic 
reforms for the creation of a just and egalitarian society which has its basis in the constitutional 
values of dignity, equality and freedom.630  
 
3.5 Jurisprudential basis 
The principle of paternalism631 justifies State interference with individual autonomy out of 
altruistic concern for the welfare of its subjects,632 the reasoning being that the individual will 
be better off or will be protected from potential harm. The autonomy of the individual is 
subjugated in an attempt to balance disparate societal interests.633 
Consumer protection legislation in the contractual law setting is yet another example of the 
principle of paternalism in action. Such legislation is engaged in the pursuit of broad social 
goals.634 Whereas the primary function of contract law in terms of the classical theory was to 
protect individual rights of autonomy and freedom,635 consumer protection legislation is 
concerned with the pursuit of collective goals. The legislation has replaced the classical theory’s 
prescription of minimal state regulation and sanction with accountability to the public at large 
                                                            
629  Roach & Sossin ‘Access to justice and beyond’ (2010) 60 University of Toronto LJ 373, 382, hereafter Roach & 
Sossin (2010) 60 University of Toronto LJ 373. The theory is explained below. 
630  See the founding provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. See also, for example, the 
Preamble to the Consumer Protection Act.  
631  The principle is descriptive of interference by the state or an individual in the autonomy of another latter. See 
further footnote explanations in chapter 2 paras 2.2.2 and 2.3.1. 
632  This development is in response to an ever-increasing sophistication and complexity of commercial contracts. 
In the South African context, the socio-economic structure of South African society coupled with the apartheid-
induced legacy of enormous disparities in wealth, power and resources also plays a role. See the Preamble of 
the Consumer Protection Act. Pretorius observes that paternalistic intervention is most needed when the 
contractant is weak or naive: 2005 (68) THRHR 253, 262-263. See also chapter 2 para 2.3.2. 
633  Rycroft & Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 9. There are numerous examples of the principle of 
paternity in public interest legislation, for example, road traffic legislation and legislation aimed at the control 
of dependence inducing substances. 
634  Atiyah Law and Modern Society (1995) 127, hereafter Atiyah Law and Modern Society.  
635  See chapter 2 para 2.2. 
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and to the appropriate ministers or organs of state.636 In this may be detected an (enforced) 
public demonstration of a general requirement of good faith.  
The enforcement of rights is primarily the responsibility of the state through its organs such as 
the office of the public protector the office of the ombudsman. A consequence of this 
development is a shift from an individualist approach where the individual has both the right 
and the responsibility to enforce his/her rights through (costly) litigation which may place the 
attainment of justice beyond the reach of many, to an approach where the enforcement of 
rights become the responsibility of the state through its organs such as the National consumer 
Tribunal.637 
Thus, consumer protection legislation places a limitation on the principles of individual 
autonomy and freedom of contract638 for the benefit of the consumer.639 The major policy 
purposes of such legislation are, inter alia, (i) to ensure that the consumer is adequately 
informed to facilitate self-protection and informed choices; (ii) to protect the consumer from 
unconscionable contractual terms;640 (iii) to promote the safe and satisfactory functioning of 
goods and services and to provide quick and affordable relief in the event of defective 
performance.641 Such legislation give practical expression to the principle of reasonableness, 
fairness and good faith by targeting contracts which appear to be manifestly unfair.642 
                                                            
636  For example, the National Consumer Commission discussed in para 3.6.7 below.  
637  Discussed in paras 3.6.7 and 3.7.1 below. 
638  Discussed in chapter 2 para 2.2. 
639  It will become evident in this chapter that such legislation stimulates rather than inhibits freedom of contract 
and participation in commerce. Compare this with the limitations placed on individual autonomy by 
monopolistic business practices such as standard form contracts and exemption clauses discussed in chapter 2 
paras 2.4.2 and 2.4.3.  
640  This is achieved by enabling the consumer to assess the basic features of the contract. These include the nature 
of the goods, the quality, quantity and price thereof as well as the conditions of the sale: Martin (2006) 41 
Texas International LJ 239. 
641   Examples from selected consumer protection legislation are discussed below in this chapter. 
642  Corones The Australian Consumer Law para [2.55].  
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Perhaps not so ironically, such legislation benefits, not only, the consumer, but also the whole 
economic enterprise643 because markets do not operate optimally and efficiently “on the basis 
of sub-optimal risk assessment by consumers”.644 Consumers may be more willing to contract if 
they are informed consumers and if they know that they enjoy protection.645 Rather than 
weakening the intrinsic values of the classical theory of contract law646 it serves to strengthen 
them by redressing the weaknesses that resulted from its presumption of equal bargaining 
power.647 Disclosure and information provisions promote autonomy and consensus and lend 
credence and content to the classical contract law assumption that contracts are the result of a 
rational choice.648 Furthermore, disclosure and information provisions which are adhered to by 
suppliers close down avenues of contractual avoidance by consumers, thereby fortifying the 
core classical contract law principle of sanctity of contracts.649 
In the International Law context, consumer rights are regarded as being of universal 
application, it being justified on human rights grounds.650 Consumer rights contain the three 
main features of human rights, namely, universality,651 improvement of individual well-being652 
                                                            
643  The introduction of consumer protection laws changes the economic profile of from one of a free-market 
economy to a mixed one in the sense that there is a blending of free-market policies with central regulation of 
trading practices: Corones The Australian Consumer Law [2.60]. To paraphrase MacKee et al, responsible trade 
and commerce requires a careful balancing of clients’ benefits with the providers’ long-term viability, and client 
protection “must be built into the design and business at every level”: MacKee et al (2011) September Focus 
Note 73 Washington D.C. CGAP 2. Consumer protection legislation have similar considerations in mind. The 
writers’ further observation in respect of micro-financing that “[p]products must offer reasonable value-for-
money and minimise potential harm, such as over-indebtedness” is apposite in respect of all consumer 
transaction. 
644  Corones The Australian Consumer Law para [2.55]. 
645  Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract 8 and 19. 
646  Freedom of contract, autonomy and certainty discussed in chapter 2 paras 2.2 and 2.3.2. 
647  The availability of information to make informed choices, the protections afforded, and the right to expedient 
and inexpensive redress inspires confidence with a corresponding reduction in unwillingness to contract. 
Freedom of contract is the ultimate beneficiary: Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract 16-20. 
See also Beale Chitty On Contract  Volume 1 (2008) [7-126], hereafter Beale Chitty on Contract Volume 1; 
Furmston and Bradgate The Law of Contract para [1.52]; Oughton & Lowry Textbook on Consumer Law 15. 
648  Both the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 and the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 have extensive provisions 
relating to disclosure and information. See paras 3.6.3.3 and 3.7.2.3 below. 
649  See the discussion of sanctity of contracts in chapters 1 para 1.3.3 and chapter 2 para 2.3.2. 
650  Howells et al Handbook of Research 18-27 and 43. 
651  There is a growing recognition of such rights in both national and international legislation. See para 3.1 above. 
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and protection against strong governments.653 The evolution of consumer rights is viewed as a 
reaction to “post-modern global world and scientific evolution” and is regarded as a third 
generation right, it being a “new extension of international human rights law.”654 The 
international jurisprudence is evident in the socio-economic provisions of the Constitution655 
which has given impetus to the enactment of consumer protection legislation. 
Hereafter follows a brief discussion of a few of the more innovative aspects of the Consumer 
Protection Act, the National Credit Act and the Rental Housing Act with a view to illustrating the 
protections afforded to consumers. The discussion is intended to bring into sharp relief the 
narrowness of the approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal to contract law as illustrated in 
chapter 2 and thus to consider whether the conclusion reached in chapter 2 finds support in 
consumer protection legislation. The second aim is to determine whether the policy 
considerations underpinning the consumer protection legislation support the obiter dicta that 
would recognise the validity of contracts of sale and lease at a reasonable price or rental 
respectively, or at a unilaterally determined price or rental.656 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
652  The right to fair trade, safe products and access to justice are granted to maintain human dignity which is one 
of the founding principles of the South African constitution.  
653  Big businesses are equated with powerful governments and are seen as controlling the consumer: Howells et al 
Handbook of Research 18-27. 
654  Howells et al Handbook of Research 21. 
655  For example, sections 26 and 27. 
656  Chapter 2 illustrated that the Supreme Court of Appeal rejected subjective considerations such as good faith as 
determinants of contractual validity on the basis that it would devalue the principles of freedom and sanctity of 
contract. The discussion in this chapter illustrates that subjective considerations and the public policy 
imperatives that inform their application in the legislation not only operate in harmony with the principles of 
freedom and sanctity of contract, but also, serve to promote legitimacy of these principles. See, for example 
paras 3.6.10, 3.9 and 3.10 below. The policy considerations underpinning the legislation will assist in 
determining whether the incorporation of the obiter dicta into our law is desirable from a policy perspective.  
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3.6 Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 
3.6.1 Introduction 
The discussion will commence with a brief discussion of the policy objectives and the field of 
application of the Consumer Protection Act (the CPA). It will be followed by a discussion of a 
few of the more relevant657 substantive provisions. 
 
3.6.2 Policy objectives and field of application 
One of the principal policy objectives of consumer protection legislation is to combat 
unconscionable conduct to ensure that the reasonable expectations of the consumer658 are met 
and that the consumer gets what he/she paid for.659 This policy objective also underlies the 
South African Consumer Protection Act660 (CPA). The goal is buttressed by the fact that the CPA 
has adopted a “single enterprise approach” which imposes an obligation on all those in the 
supply chain to accept responsibility for the goods and services that they provide.661 The result 
is a codification that, not only, broadens and reinforces certain common law consumer rights, 
                                                            
657  For the purposes of the thesis. 
658  The Consumer Protection Act has a wide definition of consumer. A consumer includes not only the contractant 
but also any person to whom goods or services are marketed, and the user of goods or the 
recipient/beneficiary of services even where these entities were not party to the contract. 
659  The goal being that consumers should enjoy more protection than before. 
660  It is especially evident in the Preamble as well as the purposes and policy provisions of the CPA (section 3) and 
in the comprehensive provisions relating to fundamental consumer rights set out in chapter 2 of the CPA. The 
policy objectives outlined in para 3.4 above also inform the provisions of the CPA. To avoid repetition and for 
the sake of brevity, these will not be outlined separately but will be highlighted in the discussion of the 
provisions of the CPA. 
661  The supply chain consists of the manufacturer and all other intermediaries down to the immediate seller even 
though there may be no contractual nexus between the consumer and the parties other than the immediate 
seller. In not requiring a contractual nexus, the position is similar to that in New Zealand, Australia, Spain and 
France but unlike that in the European Union where a contractual nexus is required: Howells et al Handbook of 
Research 195-196. See also Corones The Australian Consumer Law para [2.60]; Jacobs, Stoop & van Niekerk 
‘Fundamental Rights under the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008: A Critical Overview and Analysis’ (2010) 
13(3) PER/PELJ 302, 303, hereafter Jacobs et al (2010) 13(3) PER/PELJ. The adoption of a single comprehensive 
regulatory framework covering a multitude of scenarios that replaces the many outdated laws that regulated 
consumer protection in a piece-meal manner further advances this cause. See the long title of the Act. See also 
Gouws ‘A Consumer’s Right to Disclosure and Information: Comments on the Plain Language Provisions of the 
Consumer Protection Act’ (2010) SA Mercantile Law Journal 79, hereafter Gouws (2010) SA Merc LJ 79. 
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but also, promulgates a new generation of consumer rights662 and that regulates previously 
unregulated business practices.663 
The CPA which became fully operational on the 1st of April 2011,664 in seeking to 
comprehensively regulate consumer relations, has taken a rights-based approach that has 
entrenched, enhanced and expanded consumer rights.665 It applies to almost every transaction 
in South Africa666 for the supply of goods667 and services668 in exchange for a consideration.669 It 
                                                            
662  See para 3.6.3 below. 
663  For example, customer loyalty programmes (section 35), and the regulation of times when a consumer may be 
contacted for direct marketing. See section 12 read with Prohibited Times for Contacting Consumers Notice 
published under GN R293 in GG 34180 of 1 April 2011. 
664  The CPA has limited retrospective effect. Item 3 of Schedule 2 of the Act. 
665  The protections enjoyed by consumers at common law have, not only, not been comprehensive but where 
such protections did exist, they were often excluded by contract. So for example, store warranties limited a 
consumer’s right of recourse for defective goods to repairs subject to various qualifications (e.g. the rights of 
repair lapsing after a specified time period). Repairing is a cheaper option than giving a refund or replacing the 
product. The CPA has drastically changed this practice by giving the consumer the right, subject to exceptions, 
to choose between full refund, replacement or repair (the consumer’s three “Rs”). The right must be exercised 
within six months from date of receipt of the goods. Thus the CPA changes the common law significantly. At 
common law, the implied warranty against latent defects placed an onus on the consumer to prove (i) that the 
defect is latent in that it existed at date of contract and was not discernible on ordinary inspection, and (ii) that 
the defect rendered the goods substantially unfit for its ordinary purpose or for the particular purpose for 
which it was bought and of which the seller was aware: Bradfield, Lehmann, Khan, Havenga, Havenga & Lotz 
Principles of the Law of Sale and Lease (2010), 32-34, hereafter Bradfield et al Principles. See also Kerr The Law 
of Sale and Lease (2004) 114-120, hereafter Kerr Sale and Lease. A supplier in the past could simply dismiss any 
claim by attributing breakdown in the goods to faulty use by the consumer, thereby placing the onus on the 
consumer to prove otherwise. In giving the rights as described in this footnote to the consumer, the CPA places 
the onus on the supplier to prove that the defect was the result of improper use. In providing that the statutory 
rights are additional to any common law rights (section 56(4)(a); see also section 2(10)) or contractual rights 
expressly agreed upon, the CPA leaves unaffected a consumer’s use of the common law implied warranty 
against latent defects in respect of defects that manifest itself after the expiry of the six months period. The 
CPA, not only entrenches this common law right, but also, goes further by legislating against its exclusion by 
the inclusion of a voetstoots clause (section 55 read with section 56). See further para 3.6.5 in this chapter. 
666  Foreign suppliers of goods or services in South Africa are also covered regardless of whether they reside in or 
have their principal office in South Africa. Section 5(8). The definition appears to be sufficiently wide to cover 
sales over the internet as well. The internet has opened up trade across borders and across continents. The 
problem lies not so much with its regulation but with the enforcement of any such regulation. See para 3.6.6 
below. The CPA has an extensive reach and the exceptions are dealt with in section 5(2).  
667  This has a wide definition and includes any goods (anything marketed for human consumption whether 
tangible or intangible) for sale, rental, exchange or hire. Section 1. 
668  The concept “services” also has a wide definition and includes the performance of work, the provision of 
education, advice, transport and entertainment. The provision of access to or use of immovable property by 
way of rental is one of the services to which the CPA relates. Section 1. 
669  Section 5. For the exceptions see Section 5(2)-(4) read with Section 5(5). Section 5(5) provides that exempted 
goods and the chain of suppliers are nevertheless subject to the stipulations of section 60 (safety monitoring 
and recall) and section 61 (liability for damage caused by goods). Section 61 is discussed in para 3.6.5 below.  
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applies to all such contracts where the supplier is an entity engaged in the ordinary course of 
business670 and the consumer is any individual or a juristic person whose asset value or annual 
turnover does not exceed the threshold as determined by the Minister.671 It also applies to 
goods bought in terms of the National Credit Act.672 
 
3.6.3 Unconscionable conduct 
3.6.3.1 Introduction 
The Act breaks new ground in that it specifically proscribes unconscionable conduct.673 It 
regulates the conduct of the contractants from the marketing stage to the recovery of the 
goods from the consumer674 and makes it unconscionable for a supplier to knowingly take 
advantage of a consumer’s inability to protect its own interests due to a range of factors 
including, physical or mental disability, illiteracy, ignorance, and poor command of the language 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Consideration means anything given and accepted in exchange for goods and services rendered and includes 
anything from money to electronic credit to loyalty credit to labour, to any thing, undertaking, promise, 
agreement or assurance irrespective of its intrinsic value. Section 1. 
670  Section 5. It must be the business of the supplier of selling that particular product or service. See also Fourie’s 
Trustee v Van Rijn 1922 OPD 1. 
671  Section 5(2). Currently the threshold is R2 million: GN 294, GG 34181, 1 April 2011. The Act seeks to protect 
vulnerable consumers and not big businesses, hence the threshold. The threshold does not apply to franchisees 
under franchise agreements.  
672  Section 5(2)(d). In such a case, the credit agreement is regulated by the National Credit Act but the goods are 
regulated by the CPA. This means, for example, that the notion of strict liability introduced by the CPA also 
applies to goods bought under the NCA: Melville & Palmer ‘The Applicability of the Consumer Protection Act 
2008 to Credit Agreements’ (2010) 22 SA Merc LJ 272, 273 and 275. Strict liability is discussed in para 3.6.5 in 
this chapter.   
673  Section 40. Unconscionable is defined in section 1 as conduct as characterised in section 40 or conduct that is 
so unethical or improper that it would shock the conscience of a reasonable person. In the United States of 
America, the UCC provisions require that contractants must act reasonably and in good faith and that the 
agreement must not be unconscionable: Warkentine ‘Article 2 Revisions: An Opportunity to Protect Consumers 
and Merchant Consumers through Default Provisions’ (1996-1997) 30 J. Marshall LR39, 44. See also Lawrence 
Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code Volume 1 (2003). English law does not have a general requirement 
of unconscionability: Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract 15. See also Beale Chitty On 
Contract Volume 1 para [7-126]. 
674  Section 40(1). 
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of the agreement.675 In doing so, it goes beyond codifying the common law ground of 
improperly obtained consensus.676 
Hereafter follows a discussion a few of the more important aspects of the CPA677 designed to 
combat unconscionable conduct. 
 
3.6.3.2 Unfair terms 
The CPA, in general, and in section 40 in particular, directs that consumer contracts be 
regulated by the standard of good faith678 by legislating against conduct that is unconscionable, 
unreasonable, unfair or unjust.679 Part G, of Chapter 2 of the CPA, contains extensive provisions 
                                                            
675  Section 40(2). See also section 3(1)b). This may be interpreted as meaning that consumers are presumed to 
have certain weaknesses relative to the supplier: Willett (2011) 60.2 International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly 366. Similar provisions apply in foreign jurisdictions where contracts may be set aside on the basis of 
unconscionability.  
Both American and English law provide that a substantially unfair contract may be set aside where the 
contractant is “‘poor and ignorant’ (e.g. illiterate)”: Beale Chitty On Contract Volume 1 paras [7-128] and [7-
136] See also Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract 7; Peel Treitel The Law of Contract (2011) 
para [10-044], hereafter Peel Treitel The Law of Contract.  
In Australia, taking advantage of a contractant’s weakness or vulnerability is deemed to be unconscionable: 
Davis, Seddon and Masel The Laws of Australia Contract (2003) para [7.18]; Carter & Hartland Contract Law in 
Australia (2002) paras [1504] and [1514]. In terms of section 21 of the Australian Consumer Law (2010), courts 
must take into account all the circumstances of the case, including the relative bargaining positions of the 
supplier and consumer, whether the conditions imposed on the consumer were reasonably necessary for the 
protection of the legitimate interests of the supplier, whether the consumer was able to understand the 
documents relating to the goods or services, whether any unfair tactics were used, and the amount for which 
and the circumstances under which the consumer could have acquired identical or equivalent goods or 
services: Corones The Australian Consumer Law para [5.20]. 
In Germany inexperience or infirmity of will or judgment may vitiate a contract (BGB 138(2).  
In the Netherlands, special circumstances such as a state of necessity, dependency, wantonness, abnormal 
mental condition or inexperience play a role (NBW 3.44(4)). 
676  For the common law position see chapter 2 and specifically para 2.3.2.2(B). The provisions in this regard are 
significant because at common law illiteracy and poor command of language do not feature as considerations 
that may vitiate a contract. The CPA provisions also go much wider than the common law which is concerned 
only with improperly obtained consensus whereas this section regulates the conduct of the contractants from 
the marketing stage to the recovery of the goods from the consumer: Jacobs et al (2010) 13(3) PER/PELJ 347, 
and generally regarding unconscionable conduct (346-353). See also chapter 2 paras 2.3.2 and 2.6.3.  
677  For the purposes of the thesis. 
678  In England, the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 gave good faith, a notion traditionally 
thought as having little or no importance in English law, a central role in consumer relations: Smith Atiyah’s An 
Introduction to the Law of Contract 317.  
679  Section 3(1)(d). The provisions of the Act in this regard (e.g. those in sections 40, 48, 51 and 52 discussed 
below) are geared towards establishing a balance in the negotiating powers between consumers and supplier, 
a balance that that has been seriously out of kilter and in favour of suppliers due to, for example, the 
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that specifically regulate contractual terms that are unfair, unreasonable or unjust.680 The more 
significant of these prohibit the imposition of prices and terms that are unfair, unreasonable or 
unjust,681 or that are so excessively one-sided, that it favours a party other than the consumer 
or the recipient or the goods or services,682 or that are so adverse to the consumer as to be 
inequitable,683 or that contain an assumption, or exclusion or limitation of liability or an 
indemnity that is unfair, unreasonable, unjust or unconscionable towards the consumer.684 The 
levels of education, experience, sophistication, and bargaining power of the consumer and 
supplier relative to each other play a role in determining whether the contract or term thereof 
is unfair, unjust or unconscionable.685 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
prevalence of standard form contracts and the approach of our courts. See the discussion in chapter 2 and in 
particular in para 2.4.2.     
680  See sections 48-52. Section 48(2)(c) seems to extend the common law liability of a contractant for a dictum et 
promissum by deeming a term to be unfair, unreasonable or unjust if a consumer relied on a statement of 
opinion made by on behalf of the supplier. With a dictum et promissum the statement must be one of fact and 
not opinion: Phame (Pty) Ltd v Paizes1973 (3) SA 397 (A). The definition of what constitutes “unfair, 
unreasonable or unjust” is to be found in sections 48(2)(a)&(b). A term is unfair, unreasonable or unjust if it is 
excessively one-sided towards a person other than the consumer or other person to whom goods or services 
are supplied (section 48(2)(a)) or the terms or agreement are so adverse to the consumer as to be inequitable. 
In terms of the EU Unfair Terms Directive a term is unfair if, “contrary to the requirement of good faith, it 
causes significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of 
the consumer”: Naude (2009) 126 SALJ 516.  
Similarly BGB 307 provides that an unclear or an incomprehensible provision may create an unreasonable 
disadvantage. It further provides that provisions are ineffective, if contrary to the requirement of good faith, 
they create an unreasonable disadvantage.  
In Australia, section 24 of the Australian Consumer Law provides that a term is unfair if it would cause a 
significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties and is not necessary to protect the legitimate 
interests of the advantaged party, and if it would cause detriment (financial or otherwise) if it were to be 
applied or relied on: Corones The Australian Consumer Law para [6.75]. In terms of section 23(1) and (2) of the 
Australian Consumer Law such a term would be void if it is contained in a standard form consumer contract: 
Corones The Australian Consumer Law para [6.20] The provisions of the Australian Consumer Law in this regard 
fill the gap in Australian Consumer Protection laws left by the non-recognition by the common law courts of 
substantive unfairness as a basis for intervention: Corones The Australian Consumer Law at para [6.05]. In this 
regard, the Australian courts followed an approach similar to that of the South African courts, namely, the 
primacy of freedom of contract: see chapter 2 paras 2.2.4 and 2.4.4.  
681  Section 48(1)(a)(i) and (ii). 
682  Section 48(2)(a). 
683  Section 48(2)(b).  
684  See section 48 (1)(c). The protection afforded to the consumer in terms of section 48(1)(c) is extended to any 
person to whom the goods or services are supplied at the direction of the consumer. See also section 3(1)(d) 
which states the aim of the Act as protecting consumers from unconscionable, unfair and unreasonable trade 
practices or deceptive, misleading or fraudulent conduct.  
685  Section 52(2) and specifically subsection (b). However, the emphasis in Section 52, as in the case of section 49 
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The protections are strengthened by section 51 that prohibits agreements, the effect whereof is 
to subvert, whether directly or indirectly, the rights of the consumer.686 The inclusion of 
provisions that grey- and black-lists contractual clauses ensure fast, real and effective consumer 
protection.687 Grey-listing raises a presumption of unfairness and unreasonableness,688 placing 
the onus on the supplier where it belongs.689 Significant for the purposes of the thesis is the 
presumption of unfairness and unreasonableness of granting the supplier unilateral 
discretionary powers, for example, to increase a price agreed upon without giving the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
discussed in a footnote in para 3.6.3.3 in this chapter below, is on procedural fairness rather than on the 
substantive fairness of the impugned contract or term thereof. Section 52 requires a court to take into account 
the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the contract. For example, the conduct of the contractants 
and whether there was any negotiation, whether the plain language requirement was satisfied: Naude (2009) 
126 SALJ 515. 
686  These are the so-called black-listed clauses. A consumer cannot, for example, be required to waive its rights 
under the Act. Any avoidance of the supplier’s statutory obligations is also prohibited. Note that these rights 
are in addition to the consumer’s rights at common law. See section 2(10). The equivalent of section 51 in the 
National Credit Act is to be found in section 90 thereof.  Section 90 is discussed in para 3.7.2.2 below. 
687  Naude (2009) 126 SALJ 520. Such lists enhance the effectiveness of the control of unfair terms, promote 
proactive conduct on the part of suppliers and strengthen the hand of administrative bodies and consumer 
councils to obtain a result that has wide-ranging application to the consumer industry as whole as opposed to 
costly litigation by consumer which, even if reported in official and/or lay publications, may be benefit the 
consumer “alone” and which may be ignored by the rest of the consumer industry. The courts also do not fulfil 
a policing role unlike bodies such as the Consumer Commission, which, inter alia, has a monitoring function: 
Naude ‘The Use of Black and Grey Lists in Unfair Contract Terms Legislation in Comparative Perspective’ (2007) 
124 SALJ 128, hereafter Naude (2007) 124 SALJ 128. The role of the Consumer commission is discussed in para 
3.6.7 below. 
688  Some presumptions of unfairness are in relation to terms excluding or limiting the liability of the supplier in 
certain circumstances; excluding rights or remedies of the consumer in the event of total or partial non-
performance; limiting the supplier’s obligation to respect its commitments; excluding the consumer’s rights to 
take legal action or exercise any other legal remedy; restricting the evidence available to the consumer; 
imposing burdens of proof on the consumer not allowed by law; allowing the supplier the right to interpret any 
term of the contract. See also Regulation 44 of the Consumer Protection Act Regulations published under GN 
R293 in GG 34180 of 1 April 2011.  
The BGB contains an extensive list of black-listed terms as well as terms that are grey-listed: Naude (2007) 124 
SALJ 130. 
The EU Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 1993 also contains grey-list provisions. It does not 
contain black-list provisions: Naude (2009) 126 SALJ 511.  
In the United Kingdom, under the influence of the EU Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 193, the 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 contain only a grey-list whereas the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1977 contains both a grey- and a black-list: Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract 
326-327. 
689  Naude (2009) 126 SALJ 521. It would cause to suppliers to revisit and redraft their standard form contracts to 
bring them into line with the provisions of the Act. The EU Unfair Terms Directive grey-lists terms that have the 
“object or effect of limiting the business’s liability for statements or promises made by its employees or agents, 
or making its liability for statements or promises subject to formalities.” Naude 523. 
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consumer a right to terminate the contract, or that allows the supplier to unilaterally alter the 
terms of the contract.690 
The foregoing provisions691 have their basis in considerations of fairness, reasonableness and 
good faith and are designed to promote conscionable conduct. It colours all the provisions of 
the CPA and reflects the Constitutional Court’s caution that the notion of sanctity of contract 
must be tempered by considerations of morality and public policy as discerned from the values 
embodied in the Constitution, and especially the Bill of Rights.692 The development of the 
                                                            
690  See Regulation 44(3)(h) and (i) of the CPA Regulations published under GN R293 in GG 34180 of 1 April 2011. 
The onus of disproving the presumption being on the supplier puts the supplier on notice to revise its contracts 
and trade practices and relieves the consumer from the burden of proof, a burden which many consumers 
would have foregone because of time, energy and financial constraints. Though such provisions are deemed to 
raise a presumption of unfairness only, any attempt to exercise such unilateral discretionary power will in all 
probably come to nought bearing in mind the purposes and policy of the Act as expressed in section 3 and in 
the long title as well as the innumerable references to fairness and reasonableness in the context of the 
protection and/or promotion of consumer rights. Other policy issues that militate against a relaxed 
interpretation of this provision include that contained in a front page headline warning by Trevor Manuel, 
Minister in the Presidency, that South Africa is facing a debt time bomb. See Manuel ‘SA’s debt time bomb’ The 
Times 4 November 2011, 1. The Minister ascribed this to either marketing that is so powerful that “we cannot 
help ourselves,” or to an attempt to “try and keep up with the Kunenes” The Minister referred to a release by 
the Reserve Bank that indicated that household indebtedness is at 75.9% of disposable income and that if the 
ratio is disaggregated it would indicate that “the middle classes are way in above 100% - all of next year’s 
earnings are already spent.” A list of behavioural characteristics that lead to over-indebtedness is given in 
MacKee et al (2011) September Focus Note 73 Washington D.C. CGAP 9. The writers, for example, mention that 
consumers tend “to discount greatly the future for the present.” Evidence of this is that credit consumers are 
more focussed on “the allure of up-front cash than the interest and other costs that they have to pay over the 
life of the loan.” Another feature is that consumers base their decisions on erroneous conclusions or 
assumptions which are often based on simple calculations. It can be added that these calculations are often 
also erroneous and/or based on an erroneous or wishful understanding of the true facts and/or the 
implications of such facts. See also Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract 320. 
691  Relating to unfair terms. 
692  See para [30] of Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC). The Constitutional Court explained that the test to 
determine the constitutionality of a contractual clause is whether it is contrary to public policy and that the 
content of public policy is to be found in “the values that underlie our constitutional democracy as given 
expression by the provisions of the Bill of Rights” (paras [29] and [30]). Public policy is defined, at para [51], as 
being informed by the concept of ubuntu and, at para [28], as being a repository of “those values that the 
society hold most dear” and, at para [73], of “the general sense of justice of the community, the boni mores, 
manifested in public opinion” and, at paras [51] and [73], incorporates the notions of fairness, justice and 
equity, and reasonableness. The Court added that unequal bargaining power is another factor that plays a role 
in the consideration of public policy (para [59]). It also incorporates the necessity to do simple justice between 
individuals, (para [51]). See also para [36] where the Court held that considerations of reasonableness and 
fairness play a role in determining whether contracts are against public policy. See further chapter 1 para 1.3.3. 
 
 
 
 
126 
 
notion of unconscionable conduct will receive further impetus when regard is had to foreign 
law and international conventions693 where the notion is already well-established.694 
 
3.6.3.3 Disclosure and information 
The ability to make an informed choice,695 which involves a clear appreciation and 
understanding of the nature and consequences of an act, as well as of the nature and value of 
goods and services, depend on the availability of information696 and on the simplicity and clarity 
of the language used.697 The CPA698 makes provision for both in that it provides for a right to 
disclosure of information and the manner in which information must be disclosed. 
The most important obligations for the purposes of informed consent are the obligations of the 
supplier to display the price of the goods for sale,699 to refrain from misleading advertising, 
product labelling and trade descriptions700 and to disclose that goods have been reconditioned 
                                                            
693  Section 2 of the CPA empowers the courts and the National Consumer Tribunal (the Tribunal) to consult, inter 
alia, foreign law and international conventions. See further the discussion in para 3.6.6 below. 
694  See chapter 2 paras 2.3.1, 2.3.2.2(B) and 2.8. 
695  This is one of the policy objectives as set out in the Preamble. See also MacKee et al (2011) September Focus 
Note 73 Washington D.C. CGAP 2.  
696  In the perfect market of economic theory, all role-players have perfect information. Perfect information 
promotes equality. However, perfect markets are conspicuous by their absence renders as evidenced by the 
discussion of, for example, standard form contracts in chapter 2 para 2.4.2. The acknowledgment of the 
imperfection of the markets renders moot the value of the paradigm of perfect markets as a framework for 
analysis. In economic theory, as in law (see the discussion in chapter 2 para 2.2), the justification for the 
presumption of equality is autonomy, certainty and efficiency: Cartwright (2011) Legal Studies 12. 
697  Other considerations may be quality and detail of information provided. Intellectual ability, level of literacy and 
numeracy and fluency in the language used also play a role. See Section 3(1)(b)(iv) of the CPA. The United 
Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) defines literacy as ‘the ability to identify, 
understand, interpret, create, communicate, compute and use printed and written material associated with 
varying contexts’: Gouws (2010) SA Merc LJ 79, 87. The position under the CPA must be contrasted with the 
harsh position under the common law. The recognition of these considerations as determinants of validity 
brings into sharp relief the irrationality of the insistence of South African law on certainty in the face of such 
considerations. See, for example, Mathole v Mothle 1951 (1) SA 256 (T) 258-9 where an illiterate contractant 
was held bound by Latin phrases that he did not understand. See also Khan v Naidoo 1989 (3) SA 724 (N) where 
an illiterate contractant was also held bound to the contract.  See chapter 2 and in particular paras 2.2.5 and 
2.3.2.2(B). 
698  In Part D. 
699  Section 23. 
700  Section 24. 
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or are grey-market goods.701 Whilst these obligations enjoy recognition at common law,702 the 
specificity required by the CPA703 amounts to an innovation. 
The existence of any term(s) that purport either to limit or to impose risks or liability for the 
supplier and the consumer and the nature and consequences thereof must be brought to the 
attention of the consumer.704 Furthermore, the consumer must be given an opportunity to 
receive and comprehend the term(s).705 A presumption of unfairness exists where the supplier 
                                                            
701  Section 25. 
702  The duty to disclose the price was required in terms of, for example, section 5(1) of the Credit Agreement Act 
75 of 1980 and section 7 of the Price Control Act 25 of 1964 whilst tthe other two obligations are covered by 
the common law principle of misrepresentation. 
703  See for example, section 23 relating to price which is briefly discussed in para 2.6.3.3. 
704  Section 49(1), (2) and (4). The prescriptions of section 49(2) regulate any activity or facility that is subject to any 
risk that is unusual in nature or character, the presence whereof the consumer or ordinary alert consumer 
could not reasonably be expected to have noticed or contemplated in the circumstances. The section also 
regulates any activity or facility that could result in serious injury or death. Section 49 is discussed in para 
3.6.3.4(B) below. Provisions such as these are intended in the main to protect consumers from unfair surprises. 
In England, the Unfair Terms in Contracts Regulations 1999 have a similar objective: Smith Atiyah’s An 
Introduction to the Law of Contract 319. Significantly, section 49(2) further requires, in respect of section 49(2) 
terms, that the consumer must acknowledge the term by signing or initialling against it or otherwise have acted 
in a manner consistent with an acknowledgment of the notice, awareness of the risk and acceptance thereof. 
The plain language requirement applies (section 49(3)). However, section 49(2), though it requires the supplier 
to draw the consumer’s attention to term, raises the spectre of the Afrox decision in that a consumer, whose 
bargaining power is weak, may sign away his/her right of recourse for death or personal injury caused by the 
negligent conduct of the supplier. In the Afrox case, it was decided that the exemption clause in question was 
binding because the patient had signed the document. Furthermore, because the clause was deemed to be not 
unexpected in contracts of the kind signed by the patient, no obligation existed to draw the patient’s attention 
to the clause. The court did not consider the circumstances in which the document was signed. See the 
discussion of the Afrox case in chapter 2 para 2.3.2.1. See also the discussion of section 52 in para 3.6.3.2 of 
this chapter above.  
Exemption clauses relating to bodily injury or death are by and large regarded as unfair per se in Europe: Naude 
511. In England, the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 places a total ban on clauses exempting liability for 
negligence for personal injury or death: Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract 324. Though the 
South African legislature did not follow the same route, the CPA Act brings into reckoning subjective 
considerations such as literacy and level of education (not recognised at common law) and thus introduced a 
more nuanced approach than the one used in the Afrox case.   
705  Section 49(5). This requirement would address the issues raised by, for example, the inclusion of exemption 
clauses such as the one in the Afrox case. At common law the obligation is much more narrowly constructed. 
The obligation is one of notification only and that obligation does not exist where the clause can be reasonably 
expected in the contract. Although not expressly so stated, section 49(5), read in the context of the section as a 
whole, places an additional and onerous burden on a supplier to prove that the consumer comprehended the 
term in question. It is submitted that suppliers will, in order to protect themselves, have to go beyond the 
provisions of the Act to ensure that the consumer has understood the term. A supplier may have to break a 
clause down to its nuts and bolts into a virtual “idiot’s guide” so as to ensure that the consumer understands 
the nature and import thereof in order to comply with the requirement. 
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did not draw the fact, nature and consequences of a section 49 term to the consumer’s 
attention.706 
Though section 49 represents a significant improvement on the common law position relating 
to, for example, exemption clauses, the weakness, in general, of section 49 lies therein that it 
focuses on procedural fairness (dotting the “i(s)” and crossing the “t(s)) instead of the 
substantive fairness of the term itself. In doing so, it does not deviate from the approach of the 
Court of Appeal in, for example, the Afrox case.707 Though the comprehension requirement 
coupled with countersigning promotes informed consent, it does not adequately address the 
issue of bargaining power and the substantive fairness of the impugned term.708 
Equally important is the duty requiring the supplier to expressly inform the consumer that the 
goods are supplied in a specific condition.709 Failure to do so will result in liability for any defect 
whether patent710 or latent with the common law voetstoots or “as is” clause711 providing no 
relief. The provisions of the CPA, furthermore, promote clarity and transparency by providing 
clear protocols to ensure compliance and enforcement.712 The CPA also strengthens the 
                                                            
706  See section 48(2)(d)(ii). By placing the onus on the supplier to prove compliance, this provision favours the 
consumer who would otherwise probably not have pursued the matter due to time, effort and financial 
constraints. 
707  The case was discussed in chapter 2 paras 2.4.3 and 2.4.4. 
708  Naude (2009) 126 SALJ 510-512. 
709  Section 55(6)(a). This must be done in plain language. See the discussion in para 3.6.3.4 in this chapter. The 
consumer must expressly accept the goods in the condition so described or must knowingly have acted in a 
manner consistent with such acceptance. The onus would probably be a difficult one for a supplier to discharge 
and will probably inspire suppliers to act with greater caution. 
710  Section 55(2)(b) which provides a consumer with the right to receive goods of good quality, in good working 
order and free of any defects. (Emphasis added). The inclusion of the adjective “any” takes section 55 beyond 
the realm of being a mere codification of the common law. The provision is also not limited to material defects. 
This is a significant extension of the common law protection of the consumer. At common law, the consumer 
did not enjoy the protection of the aedilitian remedies where the defect was a patent: Kerr Sale and Lease 137-
138. See also Bradfield et al Principles 33. 
711  At common law, such a clause protects a seller, in the absence of fraud on its part, from the buyer’s remedies 
in the event of the goods having a latent defect: see Kerr Sale and Lease 150; Bradfield et al Principles 34-35. 
See also para 3.6.2 above. 
712  For example the plain language requirement. See further para 3.6.3.4 below. Transparency promotes informed 
choice, market discipline and post-contractual enforcement: Willett (2011) 60.2 International & Comparative 
Law Quarterly 375-376. 
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consumer’s right of redress by providing affordable and accessible enforcement mechanisms 
for the resolution of disputes or the enforcement of rights.713 
The CPA contains detailed provisions regarding the disclosure of the price of goods and 
services.714 The price of goods must be displayed on the goods and a consumer may not be 
charged a price higher than that so displayed.715 A consumer may also not be charged for 
preparing an estimate unless the supplier has disclosed the price for preparing that estimate 
beforehand and the consumer approved of it.716 Furthermore, the supplier may not charge a 
price that exceeds the estimate unless the consumer has consented to the increase before 
commencement of the work.717 The consumer may not be charged for any work done unless 
the work is specifically authorised.718 Any written contract must provide an itemised break-
down of the consumer’s financial obligations.719 The provisions regarding price serve to ensure 
that contractants are not ambushed with payment obligations that they did not bargain for and 
that contractants are informed and active participants in the obligation-creating process 
regarding the essentiale of price.720 In the process, the principle of consensus is infused with 
actual value in that the consensus is real and not presumed. The obiter dicta that calls for the 
recognition of a reasonable price and rental and a unilaterally determined price and rental 
would undermine these policy goals by bestowing the power to determine the price to an 
                                                            
713  See the discussion in para 3.6.7 below. 
714  Section 23. For example, a consumer cannot be compelled to pay a price higher than the one on display. 
Section 8(1)(b) prohibits differential pricing of the same goods. The National Credit Act (the NCA) also contains 
provisions aimed at informing the credit consumer about the financial implications of the transaction. See 
section 92 of the NCA.  
715  Section 23(3) read with section 23(6). If two or more prices are displayed for the same product the consumer is 
entitled to the lowest price so displayed. Exceptions to rule are set out in section 23. 
716  Section 15(3). 
717  Section 15(2) read with section 15(4).   
718  Section 15(2). This is after the consumer received the estimate or the consumer has declined the offer an 
estimate or the consumer pre-authorised the work up to a specified maximum.  
719  Section 50(2)(b)(ii). After each transaction, the supplier must furnish the consumer with a sales record (section 
26). Section 26(3) prescribes the minimum content thereof. Inter alia, it must contain the unit price, the total 
price as well the applicable taxes. Sections 108 and 109 of the NCA and section 5(3)(b) of the RHA are similar in 
content.  
720  See further in this regard chapter 4 and in particular para 4.2.4.3. 
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unknown entity (in the case of a reasonable price) and on the empowered contractants in the 
case of a unilaterally determined price,721 thereby perpetuating the classical theory’s 
presumption of consensus. 
 
3.6.3.4 Section 22 - plain language requirement 
(A) Introduction 
In general, plain language refers to clear and succinct writing which avoids verbosity, jargon, 
tortuous language, convoluted sentence construction and is aimed at advancing understanding 
as quickly and as expeditiously as possible.722It promotes knowledge and understanding, 
thereby contributing to the process of making informed choices, in turn promoting the 
consensual requirement of contract law.  
 
(B) Content 
Section 22 read with section 50723 of the CPA provides that consumer agreements724 which are 
reduced to writing must be in plain and understandable language.725 The test726 for compliance 
                                                            
721  See further chapter 4 para 4.3. 
722  Gouws (2010) SA Merc LJ 81. This provision addresses some of the concerns of Sachs J when the learned judge 
criticised the use of obscure legalese in standard form contracts: Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) para 
[135] discussed in chapter 1, para 1.3.3. See also chapter 2 para 2.4.2. 
723  In terms of section 50(2)(a) the plain language requirement applies to all agreements signed by the both 
contractants as well as to those signed by the supplier only or by the consumer only. See also Gouws (2010) SA 
Merc LJ 85-86. The provision (section 50(2)(a)) regarding the validity of a written contract not signed by the 
consumer is at odds with the tenor of the Act and could lead to exploitation of the consumer: Jacobs et al 
(2010) 13(3) PER/PELJ 358. However, the legislature probably simply intended to confer on the consumer, and 
not the supplier, the power to rely on the terms of a written agreement even though it had not signed it: 
Naude (2009) 126 SALJ 514. 
724  Section 50(2).The requirement also applies to any notice, document or visual representation that is required by 
law. See section 22(1). The requirement must be met in all instances where the Act does not prescribe the use 
of a specific form.  
725  Plain language is also a requirement of the National Credit Act. Section 64 thereof provides that documents be 
provided in one of the official languages and section 63(1) allows the consumer to choose the official language 
in which a document required by the Act is be drafted.  
In the European Union, the Unfair Contract Terms Directive requires the contract to be in plain, intelligible 
language, with doubts being resolved in the consumer’s favour. Similar provisions are found in state laws in the 
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is whether it is reasonable to conclude that an ordinary consumer of the class of persons, for 
whom the document was intended, with average literacy skills and minimal experience as a 
consumer of the relevant goods or services,727 could be expected to understand the content, 
significance and import of thereof without any undue effort.728 Contractual provisions that 
must in terms of section 49729 be brought to the attention of the consumer must comply with 
the plain language requirement.730 
 
(C) The plain language test 
The plain language requirement is significant in that it goes beyond the mere provision of 
information. It places an additional obligation on the supplier to convey the information in a 
manner that makes it reasonably capable of being understood. Bearing in mind that consumers 
are the largest economic group in the country,731 the test is a comprehensive and meticulous 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
United States of America: Martin (2006) 41 Texas International LJ 240. See also Gouws (2010) SA Merc LJ 79, 
80. 
726  The test can be referred to as the lowest common denominator test: See DLA Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Consumer 
Protection Act Practical implications for your company Seminar Material (4 October 2011) 16. The test is much 
more generous to the consumer than, for example that of the European Court of Justice where a consumer is 
defined as one ‘who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect”: Howells et al 
Handbook of Research 12. 
727  Emphasis added. 
728  Section 22(2). Subsections (a)-(d) contain provisions such as the context and comprehensiveness, the 
organisation, form and style, the vocabulary and sentence structure of the notice that must be taken into 
account when making the assessment. In using the standard of the consumer with “minimal experience as a 
consumer of the relevant goods or services,” the Act sets the bar lower than at common law where the 
reasonable person test prevails. In contracts of sale, the reasonable person is used as standard when 
determining whether the goods are of merchantable quality: Zulman Norman’s Purchase and Sale 218. A latent 
defect is one that is not reasonably discoverable or discernible to the ordinary purchaser on normal inspection: 
Bradfield et al Principles 33. Unlike at common law, the Act accommodates an otherwise sophisticated 
consumer who lacks sophistication in the particular class of goods or services. The recent recall by Toyota of 8.5 
million vehicles worldwide illustrates the fact that even sophisticated/educated consumers face difficulties 
when confronted with the sophistication of modern technology such as complicated electronic devices: Woker 
‘Why the Need for Consumer Protection Legislation? A Look at Some of the Reasons Behind the Promulgation 
of the National Credit Act and the Consumer Protection Act’ (2010) Obiter 217, 230, hereafter Woker (2010) 
Obiter 217. 
729  Discussed in para 3.6.3.3 above. 
730  Section 49(3). 
731  Du Preez ‘The Consumer Protection Bill: A Few Preliminary Comments’ (2009) TSAR 58, 82. 
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one, with a low common denominator732 that seeks to accommodate the broadest possible 
cross-section of the consumer population.733 
Unlike the, National Credit Act,734 the Act does not specify the language which must be used. A 
supplier who uses either English or the dominant language of the region may be in compliance 
potentially leaving a consumer in the dark. However, the consumer is saved by the fact that the 
Act specifically seeks to ameliorate the disadvantage of consumers whose fluency in the 
language used is deficient.735 
Though the requirement does, at the very least, improve the consumer’s capacity to make an 
informed choice by promoting the understanding of the nature and the consequences of the 
contract, it does not necessarily improve the consumer’s negotiating power especially in 
respect of standard form contracts.736 Furthermore, compliance with the test is made 
dependent on “the class of persons for whom the agreement is intended.” Aside from the 
difficulties of determining whether a consumer belongs to a particular class and the difficulty 
associated with determining what constitutes average levels of literacy, a major drawback is 
that it excludes from protection consumers who may not belong to that particular class or who 
display a level of literacy lower than that of the average.737 
                                                            
732  The test is based, inter alia, on the consumer with minimal experience as a consumer in relation to the goods 
and services (section 22(2)).  
733  Non-compliance does not invalidate the contract or the affected term(s). Section 52(2)(g) simply lists the 
section 22 plain language requirement as one of the factors (section 52(2)(g) to be taken into account when 
making a determination of whether a contract or a term thereof is unfair, unreasonable or unjust. A similar 
position prevails in Germany (BGB 307 dealt with in a footnote in para 3.6.3.2 above. 
734  Section 63(1) of the National Credit Act provides the consumer with a right, subject to certain qualifications 
(e.g. practicality and expense), to receive any document required in terms of the National Credit Act in an 
official language that the consumer reads or understands. See also the provisions of section 64 of the National 
Credit Act discussed in an earlier footnote in this paragraph. 
735  Section 3(1)(b)(iv). A court may, in such circumstances, find that the use of English or a dominant language does 
not satisfy the plain language requirement. 
736  Standard form contracts are discussed in chapter 2 para 2.4.2. 
737  Take, for example, an agreement which is reasonably capable of being understood by a consumer from the 
particular class of consumers for whom the agreement is intended and who displays average levels of literacy 
and who has minimal experience as a consumer in relation to the class of goods or services offered. Though 
such an agreement would meet the plain language requirement of section 22(2), it would leave unprotected a 
consumer who does not belong to that class of consumer or the consumer who possesses below-average levels 
 
 
 
 
133 
 
The meaning of the undue effort requirement is also problematical.738 Would referral of the 
agreement to a professional, for example, an attorney, fall foul of the plain language 
requirement and hence result in non-compliance with the undue effort requirement?739 Equally 
problematic is that a consumer of the affected group whose literacy levels exceed those of the 
average may escape the consequences of the contract where the plain language requirement 
fails because of, for example, the undue effort test.740 
 
3.6.4 Equality 
Section 8 of the Act prohibits unfair discrimination on a number of listed grounds.741 Section 
8(2) prohibits differential treatment based on any of the grounds listed in section 9 of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
of literacy whether the consumer belongs to that particular class of consumers or not. Surely this result could 
not have been intended particularly when viewed through the prism of the Preamble to the Act that 
acknowledges, not only, variations among consumers because of differing levels of literacy and other forms of 
social and financial inequalities, but also, the need to offer protection to such consumers. See Gouws (2010) SA 
Merc LJ 87-88. A possible answer is that since the Act is aimed at proscribing unconscionable conduct in 
consumer contracts, a finding would take into account subjective characteristics such as literacy levels and 
language proficiency (section 3(1)(b)(i)-(iv)) in order to give effect to the purposes and policy of the Act as per 
section 3.   
738  Gouws (2010) SA Merc LJ 88-89. 
739  It can be argued that the mere referral of the agreement to an attorney means that it could not be understood 
without undue effort. The approach here should probably be to regard this as a question of fact. Such an 
approach would mean that situations may be distinguished each according to its own context. For example, a 
situation where an agreement is referred to a professional as matter of prudence would be distinguished from 
one where it is referred because it is incomprehensible as per the provisions of section 22(2). 
740  This consequence can probably be reconciled with the fact that the Act intends to benefit the broadest possible 
cross-section of the consumer population. On the other hand, the process of regulating unconscionable 
conduct cuts both ways in the sense that Act seeks to exclude unconscionable conduct on the part of both 
consumers and suppliers. Such a consumer (with literacy levels higher than the average) would probably not be 
able hide in the shadows of the CPA since any ruling would have to take into account such subjective 
characteristics (e.g. literacy levels and language proficiency) especially when viewed against the foundational 
principles of the CPA, namely to provide rights and protection to the historically disadvantaged, vulnerable and 
marginalised sectors of the consumer population: see the Preamble and section 3(1)(b)(i)-(iv) of the Act. 
741  For example, a supplier may not supply a different quality of goods or services to any person or category of 
persons or exclude persons from the supply of goods and services; give any class of consumer preferential 
treatment.  The supplier may also not apply different criteria when assessing a consumer’s ability to meet its 
obligations or when proposing terms and conditions of a transaction. Provision is made in section 9 for 
reasonable grounds for differential treatment. The NCA contains similar provisions against unfair discriminatory 
practices in respect of credit (Section 61). 
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Constitution742 or in Chapter 2 of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act.743 A presumption of unfairness arises in the event of any differential 
treatment contemplated in section 8, burdening the supplier with the onus of proving 
otherwise.744 Similarly a presumption of unfairness exists where the supplier did not draw the 
fact, nature and consequences of a section 49 term to the consumer’s attention. 
 
3.6.5 Implied warranty of quality, strict liability and class action 
A warranty of quality is implied into each transaction for the supply of goods.745 The supplier 
warrants that the merchandise is of good quality and in good working order and that they are 
fit for their ordinary purpose or for the specific purpose for which they were sold where the 
seller was aware of this purpose. The warranty will not apply if the consumer has been 
expressly notified of the specific defects and has expressly accepted the goods in the condition 
described or acts in a manner consistent with such acceptance. This radically changes the 
common law position where a seller could exclude the implied warranty against latent defects 
by including a voetstoots clause.746 The provision significantly enhances the position of the 
                                                            
742  Section 9 of the Constitution (the equality clause), prohibits discrimination on a number of grounds, for 
example, race, ethnic or social origin, gender, disability, religion. 
743  4 of 2000. Chapter 2 which gives effect to the spirit and letter of the Constitution contains grounds of 
prohibition similar to those in section 9 of the Constitution. However, Chapter 2 also prohibits discrimination 
on specific grounds over and above those cited in section 9 of the Constitution. For example, it prohibits 
discrimination that causes or perpetuates systemic disadvantage or that undermines human dignity. Section 29 
read with item 9b of the Schedule, for example, declares the inclusion of contractual terms, conditions and 
practices, the effect whereof are to perpetuate the consequences of past discrimination, as well the unfair 
limitation or denial of contractual opportunities, to be practices which amount to unfair discrimination. Thus, 
the CPA gives effect to the constitutional imperative to foster socio-economic reform and to strive for the 
attainment of a just and egalitarian society based on the values of dignity, equality and freedom.  
744  Section 10(2). Similarly a presumption of unfairness exists where the supplier did not draw the fact, nature and 
consequences of a section 49 term to the consumer’s attention (section 48(2)(d)(ii)). See the discussion of 
section 49 in para 3.6.3.3 above. 
745  Section 56. This provision amounts to a radical redefinition of the common law implied warranty against latent 
defects.  For example, the warranty is owed by each person or entity in the supply chain. At common law the 
warranty only applied to the seller and not to other persons in the supply chain: Bradfield et al Principles 32-34; 
Kerr Sale and Lease 106-109. 
746  The CPA prevents the exclusion of this warranty by the legislating against the inclusion of a voetstoots clause 
(section 55 read with section 56.) Section 90(2)(g)(ii) of the National Credit Act also has the effect of preventing 
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consumer who at common law stood in a relatively weak bargaining position in that the 
consumer was invariably faced with a take-it-or-leave-it attitude when it came to issues of this 
kind. The requirements of reasonableness and fairness are to be discerned in the policy 
considerations that underpin these provisions.747 The consumer’s position is further enhanced 
in that, in stark contrast to the position under the common law, the risk of loss remains with 
seller until delivery.748 
The CPA imposes strict liability749 for harm750 resulting from defective products. A supplier751 
incurs liability for unsafe or defective products even in the absence of negligence. This provision 
is weighted heavily in favour of the consumer in that it constitutes a radical departure from the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
the voetstoots sale of goods on credit in that the credit grantor may not exempt itself from liability for a latent 
defect.  
Similar provisions exist in the European Union: Maurer (2007) 14 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 359. In 
the United States of America, UCC 2-315 incorporates an implied warranty of fitness and UCC 2-314 deals with 
the implied warranty of merchantability, both of which resemble the South African and the European legal 
position except that provision is made for contractants to contract out of these implied warranties. The use of 
exclusions such as “as is” or “with all faults” clauses, similar to the now prohibited South African voetstoots 
clause, is permitted by UCC 2-316(3): Maurer (2007) 14 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 361-364. In 
essence, the position in the United States of America resembles the position as it prevailed at common law 
prior to the enactment of the Act. The conclusion is that despite the development of a strong tradition of 
regulating unconscionable behaviour (see chapter 2), the legal system in the United States still displays loyalty 
to the classical theory of contract law with its “philosophical traditions” of contractual freedom and (presumed) 
equality that celebrate individual property rights and freedom of contract: see Maurer (2007) 14 Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies 366. In England, a consumer has a right in terms of the Unfair Contract Terms 
Act 1977 to receive goods of “satisfactory” quality and which are reasonably fit for their purpose and a seller 
cannot exclude its responsibility for defective goods: Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract 314.  
747  Botha & Joubert ‘Does the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 Provide for Strict Product Liability? A 
Comparative Analysis’ (2011) 74 THRHR 305, 312, hereafter Botha & Joubert (2011) 74 THRHR. 
748  Section 19(2)(c). At common law, the risk of accidental loss passes to the buyer as soon as the sale is perfect, 
meaning as soon as an intention to buy and sell is present and the goods and price have become ascertained: 
Kerr Sale and Lease 237-240; Bradfield et al Principles 43-46. The change brought about by the Act is significant 
in that the interval between the date on which the sale became perfect and the date of delivery can be quite 
significant. However, the statutory implied warranty may be excluded by agreement (section 19(2)) which is 
probably what will happen especially in standard form contracts.  
749  Section 61 of the CPA. The exceptions are set out in section 61(4). Strict liability provisions also exist in the 
United States of America, the European Union and Australia: Botha & Joubert (2011) 74 THRHR 306. 
750  Harm includes death, injury or illness to a natural person, or loss of or physical damage to movable or 
immovable property or economic loss resulting from damage resulting from unsafe products, product failure, 
or inadequate instructions alerting the consumer hazards arising from the use of the goods. Section 61(5) read 
with section 61(2). Section 58 imposes an obligation on a supplier to notify or alert the consumer in respect of 
unsafe products, product failure, or consumer hazards. 
751  This includes the producer, distributor or retailer. Joint and several liability is also a possibility (Section 61(1), 
(2) and (3)). Moreover, the supplier may not contract out of strict liability (Section 51). 
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requirements for delictual liability under the common law.752 The Act, not only, provides for 
joint and several liability in the supply chain, but it also shifts the onus from the consumer to 
the relevant parties in the supply chain. 
In providing for class actions,753 consumers and consumer organisations become enforcers of 
the law.754 Consumer rights are immeasurably strengthened whilst suppliers are placed on 
notice to be vigilant. Consumers, who, through lack of resources would otherwise not have 
found relief, stand to benefit755 whilst the financial and reputational fall-out756 for suppliers, 
from adverse publicity,757 could be devastating.758 
                                                            
752  Under the common law, the consumer would have had to prove, inter alia, fault to found liability under the 
Actio Legis Acquilia for damage caused by a defective product: Neethling, Potgieter, Visser & Knobel The Law of 
Delict (2010) 123-124; Loubser, Midgley, Mukheibir, Perumal & Niesing The Law of Delict in South Africa (2010) 
99-100, hereafter Loubser et al The Law of Delict (2010). This was a difficult onus to prove especially as against 
a manufacturer. More difficult was pursuing a claim against a manufacturer or a person in the supply chain 
with whom the consumer had no contractual nexus. At common law, consequential losses for latent defects 
may be claimed only, inter alia, where the seller was also the manufacturer of the goods: Bradfield et al 
Principles 39. The common law position made it possible for manufacturers and especially those who did not 
directly sell to the public, to engage in unconscionable conduct such as poor quality control in the 
manufacturing process secure in the knowledge that the ordinary consumer had limited resources or appetite 
to pursue a claim. Consequently, strict liability has a preventative effect in that suppliers, and especially 
manufacturers who no longer enjoy the arms length protection of the common law, will exercise greater care 
in relation to the quality and safety of goods sold. Strict liability is also necessary because consumers often lack 
the specialised knowledge and resources to establish the safety of products. This is especially true in light of 
the increasing sophistication of modern technology: Loubser et al The Law of Delict 247. Further policy 
considerations underlying the imposition of strict liability are discussed by Botha & Joubert (2011) 74 THRHR 
305-310 and 310-312.  
753  Section 4(1)(c) read with section 69. Persons acting in the public interest may also, with the leave of the 
Tribunal or a court, bring an action. Section 4(1)(d) read with section 69. 
754  In playing a much more active role in enforcing the law, their role becomes much more than being mere 
plaintiffs/complainants or informers: Howells et al Handbook of Research 71-72. In addition, a positive result 
benefits a whole class of people.    
755  Howells et al Handbook of Research 71. 
756  Reputation is relevant to the quality of product and service as well as to integrity: Cartwright (2011) Legal 
Studies 5. 
757  Negative publicity that may emerge from general media coverage and press releases is viewed as an important 
tool in securing policy objectives of consumer protection legislation. Press releases assist consumers in making 
informed choices. They also serve to alert consumers and suppliers about unacceptable conduct, what is being 
done about it, what disciplinary steps may or have been taken and what consumers and suppliers should be 
alert to.  
The South African National Consumer Commission, for example, is tasked with increasing public knowledge by, 
inter alia, publishing orders and findings of the National Consumer Tribunal or the courts (section 96 of the 
Act). See also for example, the press coverage discussed in a footnote in para 3.6.7 below of possible 
infringements in the airline industry. Negative publicity may have a deterrent effect for both the supplier 
concerned or generally for the industry. A poor public image may also have many negative consequences. For 
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The provisions of the CPA discussed above, will probably inspire industry-led initiatives such as 
codes of conduct and standards of care.759 Suppliers will have to review not only their 
commercial practices but also the terms and conditions of their contracts to bring them into 
line with the prescriptions of the CPA. Thus, standard terms and conditions which to date have 
met with judicial approval will have to be revisited and probably redrafted or excluded.760 
 
3.6.6 Interpretation 
The courts and the Tribunal are directed to promote the spirit and purpose of the Act and to 
develop the common law so as to promote the realisation and enjoyment of consumer rights by 
the consumer population in general and, in particular, by the vulnerable and marginalised.761 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
example, it may result in a loss of business, difficulty to attract or to retain reputable employees, 
disillusionment in the share market of the particular supplier, difficulty in raising (inexpensive) funds from 
financial institutions, and difficulty in negotiating with regulatory institutions. (The National Consumer 
Commission, for example, plays a vital role in the development of industry codes and in recommending 
industry-wide exemptions from one or more provisions of the Act. See sections 82 and 5(4) respectively of the 
Act.)  
The Confederation of British Industries and research by the Office of Fair Trading have confirmed that the 
threat of negative publicity has a deterrent effect for both small and large firms and is crucial in motivating 
compliance: Cartwright (2011) Legal Studies 4-12. In Los Angeles, the Restaurant Hygiene Quality Cards system 
that requires restaurants to post in their front windows the grade that reflected inspection findings has 
resulted in increased revenue for restaurants with good ratings, whilst those with low grades suffered: 
Cartwright (2011) Legal Studies 22. Negative publicity may also alert consumers, post-contract, to the fact that 
they have a grievance and that they have a right of redress: Cartwright (2011) Legal Studies 15. 
758  Class action to protect consumer rights is allowed in a number of countries with considerable success. The 
United States of America is a prime example. Class action legislation has been enacted in Canada and Australia 
but it is not permitted in England: Howells et al Handbook of Research 517-519. 
759  Industry-led initiatives are recognised as a factor in promoting consumer protection. It is considered that it 
should be at the core of such protection: MacKee et al (2011) September Focus Note 73 Washington D.C. CGAP 
3. 
760  Further impetus for such reform may be found in, for example, the plain language provision discussed in para 
3.6.3.4 above, and in the provisions regulating acknowledgement or exclusion of liability discussed in para 
3.6.3.2 above. 
761  Section 4(2) read with section 3(1)(b). Section 3(1)(b) lists the following persons as deserving of special 
attention and protection: low-income consumers, consumers resident in remote, isolated or low density areas 
or communities, vulnerable consumers such as minors or seniors, consumers whose ability to read and 
comprehend  is compromised by low levels of literacy, vision impairment or limited fluency in the language of 
communication. The list is extensive and brings into sharp relief the fact that common law did not grant any 
special protection to such contractants. See the discussion in chapter 2 paras 2.2.4, 2.3.2.1 and 2.3.2.2(B).   
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The directive that any inconsistency or ambiguity in a document issued by the supplier762 
should, with due regard for the purposes and policies of the Act, be resolved for the benefit of 
the consumer763 extends the scope of the contra preferentem rule.764 Any exclusion or 
limitation of a consumer’s right must be restrictively interpreted for the benefit of the 
consumer in light of the expectations a reasonable person would have with due regard to the 
content of the document, the manner and form of its preparation and presentation and the 
circumstances of the transaction or agreement.765 Where the provisions of the CPA 
irreconcilably conflict with the provisions of any other Act, the provisions that afford the 
consumer better protection, prevail.766 
The CPA, in providing for reference to be had to applicable foreign law, international law, 
conventions declarations or protocols when its provisions are interpreted,767 promotes a 
purposive interpretation as opposed to the literal interpretation permitted at common law.768 
The significance, from a consumer rights perspective, of jurisprudence so generated is 
                                                            
762  This includes standard form contracts. Contrast this with the approach to standard form contracts at common 
law discussed in chapter 2 para 2.4.2. 
763  Section 4(4)(a). 
764  The directive that the purposes and policies of the Act should play a role is significant because it promotes a 
more purposive interpretation than the literal interpretation used at common law. See the discussion in 
chapter 2 para 2.4.5. See also Jacobs et al (2010) PER/PELJ 13(3) 307. See the discussion of the contra 
preferentem rule in chapter 2 para 2.4.5. 
765  Section 4(4)(b). See also section 4(2)(b) which contains provisions of similar import. In light of these 
considerations, the Afrox case discussed in chapter 2 would have been decided differently especially in light of 
the requirement that due regard must be had to the circumstances of the agreement.  
766  Section 2(9). 
767  Section 2(2). It has already been mentioned, in chapter 2 and in para 3.6.3.2 in this chapter, that the notion of 
unconscionable conduct is well-established in international law. The value, though persuasive only, of 
international judicial interpretation and academic comment will be of immense in the judicial arena in South 
Africa where the notion of unconscionable conduct suffered judicial neglect. It will also stimulate academic 
discourse in an area of law that is recognised in international circles as a third generation human right. See para 
3.5 above. 
768  See chapter 2 para 2.4.5. English law recognises a less literal interpretation of contracts. See the discussion in 
chapter 2 para 2.4.5. The United States of America also follows a more conscionable interpretation of 
contracts: Lawrence Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code Volume 2A (2008) UCC 2-302:90.  
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underscored by the fact that the decisions of a consumer court, ombud or arbitrator may be 
used as precedents to the extent that it has not been set aside by a higher court.769 
 
3.6.7 Expedient and affordable relief 
In addition to providing a new and comprehensive legal framework that entrenches consumer 
rights,770 the CPA has also put in place a new and multi-faceted and integrated regulatory 
structure to promote the realisation and enforcement of those rights.771 
The National Consumer Commission772 is the principal authority entrusted with the task of 
enforcing the provisions of the Act and promoting consumer protection. Its function is not to 
intervene in or to directly adjudicate any dispute773 but rather to promote informal dispute 
resolution and to investigate, refer, monitor and recommend.774 Any agreement reached 
between the National Consumer Commission and a supplier may, by consent, be made an order 
of a court or of the National Consumer Tribunal.775 From the enforcement perspective, the 
National Consumer Commission may refer matters for adjudication to consumer court or to the 
                                                            
769  The various High Courts, the Supreme Court of Appeal, and the Constitutional Court. See section 2(2)(c). 
770  The provisions of the Act discussed above are aimed at promoting respectable business practices, value-for-
money exchanges, and quality services thereby minimizing the potential for harm. 
771  See chapter 3 thereof. The provision of effective and accessible dispute resolution mechanisms serve as a 
safety net in the event of a breakdown in the system. 
772  Its powers are investigative whereas the powers of the National Consumer Tribunal are adjudicative. The 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and the Office of Fair Trading in the United Kingdom fulfil a 
function similar to that of the Consumer Commission: Howells et al Handbook of Research 498-499.  
773  Section 99(a). 
774  Section 99. The National Consumer Commission’s jurisdiction consists, inter alia, of investigating consumer 
complaints, referring them to appropriate fora (section 72(1)), monitoring markets (section 99(c)), issuing 
compliance notices (section 100), recommending legislative reform (section 94 read with section 98), and 
interacting with the Minister of Trade and Industries to develop industry codes (section 82(3)-(7)) and to advise 
the Minister on industry-wide exemptions (section 5(4)). It may entertain only those complaints regarding 
consumer contracts concluded after 1 April 2011, and fixed term agreements extending beyond April 2013 
(sections 92-98). It must exercise its powers in the most cost-effective and efficient manner as possible in 
accordance with constitutional values and principles (Section 85(2)). In England, the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations 1999 grant the Director General of Fair Trading and other named bodies the power to 
apply for injunctions to prevent future use of unfair terms and also the power to negotiate terms with firms 
instead of going to court: Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract 317. 
775  Section 74. 
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National Consumer Tribunal.776 It may also refer alleged offences to the National Prosecuting 
Authority.777 Provincial consumer authorities also have the power to issue compliance notices 
and to facilitate mediation and conciliation of a dispute.778 
The status of the Act as an effective tool for the protection and enforcement of consumer rights 
is further enhanced by the roles allocated to National Consumer Tribunal, consumer courts, 
779courts780 and alternative dispute resolution agents,781 including ombudspersons,782 industry 
ombudspersons783 and conciliation, mediation or arbitration agents,784 as well as inspectors and 
investigators.785 The Act also makes provision for the establishment of industry codes of 
conduct786 which function as self-regulatory systems787 and which must be consistent with the 
                                                            
776  It has a right of appearance in the National Consumer Tribunal. See section 99(h). 
777  Section 99(i). The powers enumerated above, prevent the Commission from becoming a toothless tiger by 
imbuing it with the authority to enforce the provisions of the Act. 
778  Section 84. The powers may be exercised only in respect of persons resident, or businesses operating 
exclusively in the particular province.  
779  Section 70(1)(d). A consumer court must be distinguished from a court. The former is a body or a consumer 
tribunal established in terms of applicable provincial consumer legislation (definition of a consumer court in 
section 1). 
780  Section 76. The courts have jurisdiction only when all the remedies provided by national legislation have been 
exhausted (section 69(d)). The standard of what is just and reasonable informs the court when making any 
orders relating to unconscionable, unjust, unreasonable or unfair conduct (section 52(3)).  
781  Section 70. 
782  This refers to an ombud who has jurisdiction over a supplier in terms of any national legislation, for example, 
the financial services ombud (section 1).  
783  Accredited in terms of section 82(6). Besides being impartial, affordable, speedy and informal, the attraction of 
a statutory system of ombuds is that it provides for specialised dispute resolution.  
784  In terms of the definition of alternative dispute resolution agents in section 1. 
785  Section 88. 
786  Section 82. 
787  The value of industry codes as systems of self-regulation should not be under-estimated. They contribute to 
preventing harmful business practices by providing guidelines regarding acceptable conduct which the 
members of the particular code must adhere to and against which consumers may judge conduct. The 
expertise within an industry promotes early detection and resolution of abuses as opposed to state 
intervention which may be cumbersome and where action is often only taken after a complaint has been 
lodged: Woker (2010) Obiter 221-223.  With reference to the financial services sector it has been acknowledged 
that providers of services to the poor must adhere to standards of care that minimises risks for their customers, 
who typically have low and variable incomes, little margin for error in financial decision-making, and little 
formal education and exposure to formal finance: MacKee et al (2011) September ‘Responsible Finance: 
Putting Principles to Work’ Focus Note 73 Washington D.C. CGAP 1. The same considerations apply to 
consumers generally and especially in markets with constantly changing products and product information 
making it difficult for the average consumer to keep up to date with the product ranges and product 
knowledge. The system of self-regulation which is provided for by the CPA would go a long way towards 
redressing this situation and improving the position of the average consumer. Adding further protection and 
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purposes and policies of the Act.788 In addition, provision is made for accredited consumer 
protection groups789 to initiate or intervene, to protect the interests of consumers individually 
or collectively, in any matter before any forum contemplated in the Act.790 
The powers of the National Consumer Commission, the provincial consumer protection 
authorities and accredited consumer councils allow for proactive resolution of problems arising 
from unfair terms that have industry-wide application.791 Courts have a very wide discretion in 
instances where the Act does not provide a remedy or the remedy is inadequate, to make 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
comfort to consumers is the further requirement that any industry code must be aligned to the purposes and 
policies of the Act (section 82(4)). Such codes are subject to the jurisdiction of the Minister of Trade and 
Industry who may request the Commission to review an industry code with a view to determining its efficacy 
and to make recommendations to amend or to withdraw all or parts of the industry code (section 82(5)).   
788  Section 82(4). A consumer seeking redress has the option of referring the matter to the Tribunal (section 69(a)), 
or the appropriate ombud (section 69(b)). If there is no such ombud, the consumer may take the matter to the 
applicable industry ombudsection (69(c)(i)), or an alternative dispute resolution agent (section 69(c)(iii) read 
with section 70), or may apply to a consumer court (section 69(c)(ii)), or file a complaint with the Consumer 
Commission (section 69(iv) read with 71). The fact that there is no hierarchy of fora may lead to forum-
shopping: Jacobs et al (2010) PER/PELJ 13(3) 308. In practice, most complaints will probably be directed to 
Consumer Commission which will probably be the most visible face of the enforcement mechanisms. The 
Commission, in turn, would then refer the complaint in terms of section 72 to one of the agencies mentioned in 
that section, for example, the Tribunal, alternative dispute resolution agent, or another regulatory authority 
with jurisdiction.   
789  The National Consumer Commission has the power of accreditation (s 78(3)) and may impose reasonable 
conditions on the accreditation (s 78(4)).  
790  Section 78. 
791  In 2011, the South African National Consumer Commission found the airline industry to be in breach of a 
number of the provisions of the CPA. For example, the validity of airline tickets ranged from three months to 
two years whereas section 63 of the CPA specifies that a prepaid certificate, card, credit, voucher or similar 
device has a life of three years; the practice of issuing non-refundable tickets falls foul of section 17(2) that 
provides for cancellation of any advance booking, reservation or order subject to payment of a reasonable 
cancellation fee; the practice of over-selling or over-booking is contrary to section 47: Power ‘Airlines said to be 
out of kilter with the new consumer laws’ Sunday Times 13 November 2011, 
http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/2011/11/13/airlines-said-to. In issuing a compliance notice, the 
individual consumer is relieved of the burden of initiating and seeing through a complaint. The result of a 
consumer-driven complaint, if favourable to the consumer, would in all probability have only limited effect, 
benefitting only the particular consumer, leaving the supplier to continue with the unfair practice. Note that in 
terms of section 52(3)(b)(iii), a court may, having found that a term is unconscionable, unjust, unreasonable or 
unfair make an order requiring the supplier to cease any practice, or to alter any practice, form or document so 
as to prevent a repeat of the supplier’s conduct. However, such an action would be reactive in nature in that it 
is dependent on a consumer lodging a court action and would be of no assistance to others who have already 
suffered the harm. It is instructive to note that the Office of Fair Trading in the United Kingdom has made a 
great deal of progress in eradicating unfair terms. It has relied mainly on negotiations with informal 
undertakings from businesses and has seldom made use of its injunctive powers: Naude ‘Enforcement 
Procedures in Respect of the Consumer’s Right to Fair, Reasonable and Just Contract Terms under the 
Consumer Protection Act in Comparative Perspective’ (2010) 127 SALJ 515, 516 and 519-521, hereafter Naude 
(2010) 127 SALJ 515. 
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orders that it deems to be just and equitable after taking into consideration the principles, 
purposes and provisions of the Act.792 
The emphasis on alternative dispute resolution mechanisms has a clear policy objective bias, 
namely, the promotion of access to justice. The main benefits of such mechanisms being that 
they are cost- and time-efficient.793 Enforcement institutions such as the National Consumer 
Commission may also be more effective in ensuring wide-spread compliance over shorter 
periods of time than court action which may, at the most, only incrementally advance the cause 
of the consumer.794 In addition, the ability to target specific policy objectives makes such bodies 
better suited to address the vulnerabilities of consumers.795 
                                                            
792  Section 52. In matters where the CPA provides insufficient remedies to correct prohibited conduct, unfairness, 
injustice or unconscionability, a court may make an order that is just and reasonable, taking into account the 
principles, purposes and provisions of the Act and with due regard to a range of factors, inter alia, the 
circumstances of the agreement and the conduct of the supplier and consumer, the state of knowledge of the 
consumer of the contractual terms and the implications thereof. 
793  From a commercial perspective, the spin-off is that the more accessible and the more affordable the protection 
mechanisms are the more willing people would be to conclude contracts. And a better informed public serves 
to magnify the spin-off. Canada is an example of the success of such bodies in promoting access to justice. 
Ontario’s Landlord and Tenant Board proclaims itself as “Canada’s highest-volume dispute resolution body, 
handling somewhere around 70 000 matters annually”: Roach & Sossin (2010) 60 University of Toronto LJ 393. 
So also the Financial Ombudsman Service in England. It is a dispute-settling mechanism in the mortgages, loans, 
pensions, insurance and credit card markets: Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract 330-331. 
794  This has been the experience in the United Kingdom and in Germany: Naude (2009) 126 SALJ 527-529. 
Disadvantages of “private” litigation include the fact that costs, time and effort limit access to courts; court 
decisions have limited effect, binding only the business concerned; judicial control is reactive in that it comes 
after the harm has been suffered; suppliers faced with a challenge may be tempted to settle with the particular 
consumer and continue to use the impugned term with other consumers; many cases would be heard in the 
lower courts whose decisions are seldom reported: Naude (2007) 124 SALJ 379-380. See also Naude (2010) 127 
SALJ 516. The National Consumer Commission also plays an educational role. It educates consumers of their 
rights and facilitates complaints about breaches. It also educates the particular business/industry and other 
businesses/industries of deficiencies or other more systemic problems. Decisions of the Advertising Standards 
Authority fulfil a similar role when reported in the media: Cartwright (2011) Legal Studies 16. It also serves as a 
powerful counter-agent to suppliers who may employ the policy of “attrition through litigation,” a useful tool 
for companies with deep pockets. Such suppliers may, through drawn-out litigation wear down even the most 
ardent consumer activists or media executive or through threat thereof scare them off from prying into 
company affairs: Richards ‘Consumer Protection in the United States’ (1999) 4(4) The Harvard International 
Journal of Press Politics 122, 122 & 124. In Australia, the possible enforcement actions available for 
unconscionable conduct in terms of the Australian Consumer Law include undertakings, public warning notices, 
injunctions, damages, compensatory orders and adverse publicity orders. Contraventions do not give rise to 
criminal liability: Corones The Australian Consumer Law paras [5.15-5.25].  
795  Roach & Sossin (2010) 60 University of Toronto LJ 374 & 393. Compliance with consumer protection provisions 
will result in vulnerable sectors of the market having better access to markets. Both the consumer and the 
supplier who has complied with the statutory obligations will reap the rewards of better protection. In the 
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3.6.8 E-commerce and consumer protection 
Online communication is growing at an impressive rate around the world.796 However, the fact 
that it is possible to trade across borders and continents, from the figurative boot of a car, 
means that the risks of fraud and other unconscionable conduct are inherently higher than in 
the traditional business797 model due to the anonymous (there being no identified or 
identifiable counterparty) nature of the transaction.798 Even if identified or identifiable,799 the 
enforcement mechanisms listed above will be of little assistance to a consumer who has been 
overextended by unconscionable conduct800 on the part of a trader who conducts business 
from outside of the country. Even if such agreements are in place, the prohibitive costs of cross-
border or cross-continent litigation, place the attainment of justice even further beyond the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
microfinance sector, the imposition of similar rules did not adversely affect innovation and expanded access for 
the poorer and underserved customers: MacKee et al (2011) September Focus Note 73 Washington D.C. CGAP 
8.  
796  The use of the internet in consumer transactions is steadily increasing, resulting in a “democratization of 
entrepreneurship”: Howells et al Handbook of Research 333-335.   
797  In comparison with the traditional “brick-and-mortar” businesses model, on-line transactions are more 
convenient and cost-effective: Zhang & Zhang ‘Does E-commerce Reputation Mechanism Matter?’(2011) 15 
SciVerseScienceDirect Procedia Engineering 4885 <www.elsevier.com/locate/procedia> , hereafter Zhang & 
Zhang (2011) 15 SciVerseScienceDirect Procedia Engineering 4885. 
798  The growth in the number of smaller operators, as opposed to larger operators with more experience who may 
operate with legal guidance, is problematic from a regulatory perspective. The absence of an intermediary, 
such as media houses with in-house legal experts, means that there is no editorial control over advertising: 
Howells et al Handbook of Research 333-335. See also Zhang & Zhang (2011) 15 SciVerseScienceDirect Procedia 
Engineering 4885. Chapter 7 of the South African Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 
contains consumer protection measures to be applied to all cases heard by a South African court. These 
measures which are applicable regardless of the applicable legal system (section 47) do not exclude the 
protections afforded by any other law (section 44(4)). Legislative controls, however, serve to increase the legal 
obligations on the service provider, resulting in increased costs and possibly hindering the development of e-
commerce: Zhang & Zhang (2011) 15 SciVerseScienceDirect Procedia Engineering 5519&5521. 
799  The difficulty of arriving at such agreements is illustrated by the fact that though the United States of America 
and the European Union have an elaborate set of consumer protection rules, the regulatory approaches to 
protection are substantially different: Maurer (2007) 14 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 359 and 356. In 
order to foster greater cooperation between its member states, the EU has promulgated a Regulation urging 
cooperation for the enforcement of consumer protection laws: Howells et al Handbook of Research 336. 
800  Website ratings that allow consumers to evaluate suppliers before doing business with them, reintroduce the 
“relentless regime” of caveat emptor: Howells et al Handbook of Research 335. 
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reach of the average consumer.801 Globalisation weakens consumer protection because of the 
dearth of accessible enforcement mechanisms.802 
From the perspective of the consumer, the best-placed scenario would be self-regulation803 and 
regulation by regulatory bodies and independent consumer organisations that name and shame 
or that encourage boycotts of goods and services. Investigations conducted by, and reports 
issued by such mechanisms contribute to a breakdown in consumer satisfaction and consumer 
trust in the organisation under investigation, translating almost immediately into economic 
losses.804 The possibility of this compels recalcitrant suppliers to comply with minimal standards 
of good practice and fair dealing.805 Whilst name-and-shame and boycott-provoking tactics may 
be implementable in the national arena where it can serve a very useful and constructive 
function, its viability and efficacy in the global market is to be doubted.806 
The discussion reveals that consumer protection legislation does not adequately address 
problems that may arise from e-commerce, especially cross-border e-commerce. For example, 
the right of redress (refund, repair, replace – s 56(2)) may prove to be illusory, or the 
enforcement mechanisms may prove to be ineffective, where the trader has delivered a 
defective product.  
 
 
                                                            
801  Language differences and geographical distance are additional impediments: Howells et al Handbook of 
Research 350. 
802  Maurer (2007) 14 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 359 and 381. 
803  In the United States of America, self-regulation is the preferred method.  However, this method depends on 
self-discipline and a conscious effort on the part of service providers and the absence of legally enforceable 
rights do not assist the consumer’s cause: Zhang & Zhang (2011) 15 SciVerseScienceDirect Procedia Engineering 
5521. 
804  Research has shown that a favourable feedback leads to increased price as well as increased sales: Zhang & 
Zhang (2011) 15 SciVerseScienceDirect Procedia Engineering 4886 & 4889. 
805  Maurer (2007) 14 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 379-381. 
806  For example, generating sufficient publicity on a global scale is perhaps possible only in the event of high-
profile global suppliers and then also only in those instances where negative trade practices have affected a 
significant portion of the consumer population. 
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3.6.9 Fines and penalties 
Breaches of the provisions the CPA may result in criminal conviction that incurs the imposition 
of a fine or a period of imprisonment or both.807 The Tribunal may impose an administrative 
fine that may not exceed 10% of annual turnover during the preceding financial year or R1 
million whichever is the greater.808 The possibility of criminal sanction addresses the more 
serious infringements and also those situations where the financial penalty amounts to no 
more than a slap on the wrist.809 The severity of the penalty or fine or the duration of 
imprisonment aside, the potential reputational damage may be equally or even more dire.810 
 
3.6.10 Conclusion 
The aforementioned provisions811 will necessitate businesses to revisit business practices812 
that were based on the common law approach to, for example, standard form contracts and 
exemption clauses.813 The possibility that contracts or terms thereof may be declared null and 
                                                            
807  Section 111. 
808  Section 112. Similar provisions are contained in section 151 of the NCA in respect of breaches of that Act. 
809  Examples of the predominant enforcement modes in other jurisdictions are: In the United Kingdom, financial 
penalties imposed by criminal courts but penalties are too low to act as a deterrent and greater use should be 
made of administrative financial penalties. In Australia, civil remedies predominate. The injunctive relief is 
often effective in stopping illegal conduct but there is limited capacity for imposing financial penalties except 
for the most serious cases. In the Netherlands, there is a dependence on self-regulation and enforcement of 
private rights which works well where the cases are simple and businesses are benevolent. However, the 
system is dependent on consumer activism and there is inadequate deterrent for malevolent businesses: 
Howells et al Handbook of Research 551. The South African system attempts to combine all of these strategies 
thereby minimising the weaknesses of each.  
810  Businesspersons abhor being branded as criminals and the word crime has a symbolic meaning for the public, 
criminal law being “stained so deeply with notions of morality and immorality, public censure and punishment, 
that labelling an act as criminal often has consequences that go far beyond mere administrative effectiveness”: 
Ball & Friedman ‘Use of criminal sanctions in the enforcement of economic legislation: A Sociological View’ 
(1964-1965) Stanford Law Review197, 216-217.  
811  Relating to unfair terms; disclosure and information; implied warranty of quality, strict liability, class action; 
expedient and affordable relief; and fines and penalties. 
812  Businesses will also have to ensure that employees receive appropriate (re)training. 
813  The disclosure and information provisions, for example, represent a significant milestone in the development 
of consumer rights and alter the consumer contract landscape by significantly levelling the playing fields 
between the consumer and the supplier. Suppliers will, for example, no longer be able hide behind legalise, 
jargon, and fine print which often characterise contracts and especially standard form contracts. The duty to 
notify and to bring certain terms and their nature and consequences to the attention of the consumer is a 
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void with the resultant economic losses, coupled with penalties and administrative fines that 
could be imposed, both of which could be ruinous economically and/or reputationally for 
businesses, will, surely, provide the impetus for compliance.814 
The disclosure and information requirement, coupled with plain language requirement, 
concretizes the general contractual requirement that parties must be in agreement.815 It serves 
to illustrate that the classical contract law assumption that contracts are the result of a rational 
choice816 are best be realised if the consumer is as fully informed as possible.  
The provision of a fully functional, effective and affordable system of redress serves to prevent 
legislation from becoming paper law. In doing so, it, not only, promotes the realisation of a core 
value of contract law, namely, that contracts must be honoured, but it  also promotes the 
constitutional right to access to justice.817  The enforcement mechanisms provided for in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
significant departure from the common-law hands-off approach where the caveat subscriptor rule reigns 
supreme. The buyer-beware warning will in all likelihood be tempered by a new warning, viz., that the seller 
must beware. 
814  Momentum for change may also come from the activities of indirect compliance and enforcement mechanisms 
such as quality labels and independent consumer organisations which may come into being as a result of the 
detailed provisions of the CPA. Aspirational quality labels such as the South African Bureau of Standards serve 
to strengthen consumer rights by inspiring compliance. In addition, such labels promote consumer trust and 
loyalty by their assurance that a product or service meets certain quality thresholds: Howells et al Handbook of 
Research 138-139. Independent consumer bodies or consumer watchdogs which, for example, investigate and 
publish or broadcast consumer experiences, or which publish reports on the quality of goods and services, have 
obvious reputational implications for suppliers: Howells 138-140. Example of consumer watchdogs are: media 
publications or programmes such The National Consumer Forum’s “Speak Out” programme on SABC 2; “Carte 
Blanche” on MNet; “Third Degree” on E-TV; consumer columns in newspapers, for example “off my Trolley” in 
the Athlone News, a community newspaper. Adverse publicity in community newspapers have impact at 
grassroots levels and may also inspire compliance. 
815  The is a comprehensive discussion of the consensual aspect of contract law in Van der Merwe, van Huyssteen, 
Reinecke and Lubbe Contract: General Principles (2012) 17 et seq, hereafter Van der Merwe et al Contract. See 
also Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract 241. It can hardly be argued that there is agreement where the 
contractant, for example, is not au fait with Latin phrases or technical or legal terminology in a contract.  
816  See the discussion in chapter 2. 
817  Section 34 of the Constitution. Although access to courts is guaranteed on a theoretical level, the reality on a 
practical level is somewhat different. Considerations of the costs, time and effort of litigation often have an 
adverse impact on the decision to exercise the right of access to courts. Hence, access to courts is not 
synonymous with access to justice. The provision of relatively inexpensive and ready access to regulatory 
regimes, not only, lessens the need for access to courts, but also, promotes access to justice. In addition, access 
to justice is also attained by promoting access to markets: Roach & Sossin (2010) 60 University of Toronto LJ 
374. 
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CPA, if properly resourced and utilised, will serve to give effect to the constitutional values of 
dignity, equality and freedom. 
The price provisions818 underscore the importance of price as the essence of contracts.819 They 
characterise price transparency as one of the hallmarks of the CPA; information regarding price 
being a vital component of the prized notion of making an informed choice.820  The provisions 
are also aimed at ensuring that consumers do not overextend themselves by concluding 
contracts without being fully aware of their financial commitments.821 Hence, the provisions 
constitute a significant departure from the common law where there is no regulation in respect 
of price and contractants are, in the absence of improperly obtained consensus, bound by the 
price agreed upon.822   
The price provisions, coupled with the provisions regarding information and disclosure, display 
a clear policy bias in favour of certainty (a hallmark of contract law)823 as to price founded on 
good faith negotiations;824 a bias that serves to respect and protect the contractual dignity of 
                                                            
818  See paras 3.6.3.2 and 3.6.3.3(D) above. 
819  Price as the essence of contracts of sale is explained in chapter 4 para 4.3.3.3(D). 
820  Contractual autonomy and the presumption of informed consent are the hallmarks of the classical theory of 
contract law and are discussed in chapter 2 and in particular in para 2.2.2 thereof. A 1997 research paper of the 
Office of Fair Trading in England concluded that to make informed choices, consumers require information 
about price, quality and terms of trade and that an unregulated market does not always provide this: 
Cartwright (2011) Legal Studies 13. “[I]mperfect information about prices” may also precipitate high prices: 
Armstrong ‘Economic Models of Consumer Protection Policies.’ Paper prepared for conference on “The pros 
and cons of consumer protection,” organised by the Swedish Competition Authority, held on 11 November 
2011, 2 and 7. These observations are important in the context of the question posed in this thesis regarding 
the obiter dicta. See further chapter 4 para 4.5. 
821  In addition, although there is no price control, the CPA does constrain the parameters within which a supplier 
may operate in setting a price by prohibiting a price that is unfair, unreasonable or unjust (ssection 48(1)(a)(i)). 
The fair value or the amount for which the goods or services could have been acquired elsewhere is, inter alia, 
used to determine whether the term is unfair, unreasonable or unjust (section 52(2)). Non-compliance renders 
the agreement or the particular provision void (ssection 51(3) read with the remainder of section 51 and 
sections 3 and 22). The provisions of the Act appear to constitute a revival of the essence of the laesio enormis 
doctrine (discussed in chapter 2 para 2.3.2.1: Jacobs et al 2010 13(3) PER/PELJ 302, 355.  
822  Kerr Sale and Lease 30; Bradfield et al Principles 21–22. 
823  See chapter 2 para 2.6. 
824  Certainty as to price and the role of good faith is elaborated on in chapter 4 and in particular para 4.2.4.4. 
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the contractants and that gives substance to the values of freedom, and equality presumptively 
proclaimed825 by the South African courts as flagships of contract law.826  
In the context of the question whether there is duty to conduct negotiations in good faith 
raised in the Everfresh case827 a reductive analysis of the provisions of the CPA reveal a distinct 
duty to act in good faith, a duty that forms the gravamen of the contractual obligations 
between the contractants and which is all pervasive from the pre-contract stage through to the 
post-contract stage.828 This analysis supports the obiter dictum in the Everfresh case in favour of 
a duty to conduct negotiations in good faith. The Constitutional Court said that in light of the 
value of ubuntu “which inspires much of our constitutional compact,” it would be hardly 
imaginable that our constitutional values would not require that the negotiation must be done 
reasonably, with a view to reaching an agreement and in good faith.829 The court concluded 
that “[t]he proposition that common law contract principles provides meaningful parameters to 
render an agreement to negotiate in good faith enforceable is decidedly more consistent with 
section 39(2) than a regime that does not.”830  
Against this backdrop, the conclusion is that there is no place in our law for a development that 
would recognise a sale at a reasonable price or at a unilaterally determined price in that such 
development would undermine the consensual and certainty aspects of contact law.831 It would 
                                                            
825  See chapter 2 para 2.4. 
826  See generally chapter 2. 
827  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC), hereafter Everfresh 2012 
(1) SA 256 (CC). 
828  See further chapter 4 para 4.2.4.4. 
829  Everfresh 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC) para [72] (majority judgment).    
830  Everfresh 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC), per Yacoob J para [36] (minority judgment). Though there was a minority 
judgment, the court as a whole appeared to be in agreement regarding the importance of good faith. The court 
differed on whether, on the fact, the matter had to be referred back to the High Court for it to consider, with 
reference to the facts of the case, whether to develop the common law to incorporate a duty to conduct 
negotiations in good faith.  
831  It raises the questions, inter alia, what constitutes a reasonable price, how it must be determined and by whom 
are all uncertain. See further chapter 4, para 4.3. 
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also run counter to the duty of good faith that pervades the provisions of the CPA and that has 
received favourable mention in the Constitutional Court.832  
 
3.7 National Credit Act 34 of 2005 
The National Credit Act833 (the NCA) which came into operation on 1 June 2007 is the result of a 
process that commenced in 1994834 when the South African Law Reform Commission reviewed 
the Usury Act 73 of 1968.835 Its promulgation was inspired by significant political, social, and 
economic changes combined with technological advances836 and a dysfunctional credit 
market837 regulated by a number of statutes, some overlapping and some creating anomalies, 
others outdated and in need of revision.838 Other factors that generated concern and that 
motivated the enactment of the NCA were the rising levels of over-indebtedness coupled with 
                                                            
832  Everfresh 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC). 
833  Prior to this enactment, consumer credit legislation consisted mainly of the Hire-Purchase Act 36 of 1942, the 
Usury Act 73 of 1968, the Credit Agreements Act 74 of 1980 and the Exemption Notices 1992 and 1999: Scott, 
Baqwa, Eiselin, Humby, Kelly-Louw, Konyn, Kopel, Mukheiber, Schoeman, Smit, Sutherland and Van der Bijl The 
Law of Commerce in South Africa: commercial law (2009) 168, hereafter Scott et al The Law of Commerce. See 
also Kelly-Louw ‘Introduction to the National Credit Act’ 15(4) JBL The Quarterly Law Review for People in 
Business 147, hereafter Kelly-Louw 15(4) JBL The Quarterly Law Review for People in Business 147.  The NCA 
repeals the Usury Act 73 of 1968 as well as the Credit Agreements Act 74 of 1980. See the long title of the NCA. 
834  Whilst credit sales were in evidence since the era of Roman law, the idea of sales on instalments subject to 
conditions of delayed transfer of ownership coupled with a right of repossession on breach by the buyer gained 
prominence only in the 19th Century: Swanepoel, Makins, Lapping & Reynecke Introduction to Mercantile Law 
(1994) 157. 
835  Kelly-Louw 15(4) JBL The Quarterly Law Review for People in Business 147. 
836  Kelly-Louw 15(4) JBL The Quarterly Law Review for People in Business 147. 
837  This encompassed ineffective consumer protection, particularly for the low-income groups that comprised 85% 
of the population, the high cost of credit, and in some areas, the lack of access to credit: Kelly-Louw 15(4) JBL 
The Quarterly Law Review for People in Business 147. 
838  Scott et al The Law of Commerce 169. The policy issues and the processes are discussed fully in Kelly-Louw 
15(4) JBL The Quarterly Law Review for People in Business 147-149. See also Scott et al The Law of Commerce 
168-169. In the European Union, a harmonization and restructuring process also took place. The 2008 EU 
Consumer Credit Directive (Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2008-04-23 
on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC (OJ L133/66 22.5.2008)) had 
as its purpose to harmonize certain aspects of the laws, regulations and administrative procedures of member 
states regarding credit agreements. The Directive has policy directives which are similar to the policy 
considerations that underlie the NCA: Renke (2011) 74 THRHR 210-211. 
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reckless behaviour by credit providers and the exploitation of consumers by micro-lenders, 
intermediaries, debt collectors, and debt administrators.839 
 
3.7.1 Policy objectives 
The main challenge of the NCA is to impose integrity in the consumer credit market840 and to 
clothe consumers with the necessary protection.841 Its general purpose is to promote a fair and 
non-discriminatory marketplace for access to consumer credit by providing for the general 
regulation of consumer credit and improved standards of consumer information.842 In addition, 
it also aims to resolve specific consumer market problems.843 It seeks to attain this goal by 
creating a single system of credit regulation844 and a National Credit Regulator845 (the 
Regulator) to administer the credit industry by promoting the development of an accessible 
credit market,846 ensuring the registration of industry role-players,847 and a National Consumer 
Tribunal (the Tribunal) to adjudicate contraventions of, and applications made in terms of the 
                                                            
839  Scott et al The Law of Commerce 169; Kelly-Louw 15(4) JBL The Quarterly Law Review for People in Business 
147. 
840  Kelly-Louw 15(4) JBL The Quarterly Law Review for People in Business 150.  
841  In light of these broad policy objectives, its field of application is much wider than those of its predecessors: 
Renke (2011) 74 THRHR 210. 
842  Vessio ‘What Does the National Credit Regulator Regulate?’ (2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 227 quotes the Chairperson 
of the National Credit Regulator as follows: “The National Credit Act seeks to make a fundamental change in 
the way in which the South African credit market operates, with specific provisions intended to address 
undesirable practices and improve transparency and fairness.” 
843  The aim of the NCA, for example, is to prohibit unfair credit and credit-marketing practices, to prohibit reckless 
credit extension, to prevent and alleviate over-indebtedness of consumers and to curtail the high cost of credit, 
for example, by placing caps on interest rates (see the long title). A host of countries have adopted measure 
aimed at promoting responsible lending and combating reckless credit extension: Howells et al Handbook of 
Research 393-397.  
844  Scott et al The Law of Commerce 170; Kelly-Louw 15(4) JBL The Quarterly Law Review for People in Business 
150; Howells et al Handbook of Research 369. 
845  Section 12. 
846  Sections 13. 
847  Section 14. In terms of section 14 the Regulator must ensure and police the registration of all credit providers, 
credit bureaux, and debt counsellors. 
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provisions of the NCA.848 As in the case of the Consumer Protection Act, the ethos of good faith 
underpins the NCA.849 
 
3.7.2 Content 
The NCA applies to all arms length850 credit agreements851 that defer some of the repayment 
with a fee, charge or interest in respect of the deferred payment, or afford a discount when 
prepayments are made.852 
The NCA proposes to promote and advance the social and economic welfare of South Africans 
and to protect credit consumers853 by promoting a fair, transparent,854 competitive, 
sustainable, responsible, efficient, effective and accessible credit market.855 The Act seeks to 
address imbalances in negotiating powers between consumers and credit providers856 and to 
provide a “consistent and accessible system of consensual resolution of disputes...”857 
Imbalances in negotiating powers are addressed by providing, inter alia, for compulsory 
                                                            
848  Section 27(a)(i) and (ii). The Tribunal has since acquired additional powers under the Consumer Protection Act. 
See para 3.6.6 above. 
849  See, for example, section 86(5)(b) that explicitly imposes a duty of good faith on the participants in a debt 
review process with a view to facilitating a responsible debt rearrangement. See also section 3, the provisions 
whereof are all underwritten by the notion of good faith.  
850  See section 4. An example of an agreement that is not at arms length is one between family members where 
the parties are co-dependent on one another or where the one is dependent on the other (section 4(2)(b)(iii)). 
851  A credit agreement includes a credit facility (section 8(3)), e.g. a credit card; a credit transaction (section 8(4)), 
e.g. an instalment credit agreement; a credit guarantee (section 8(5)), e.g. a suretyship or a combination of 
these. See Section 8. There is a full discussion in Scott et al The Law of Commerce 171-174. 
852  Section 8. See also Scott et al The Law of Commerce 171; Kelly-Louw 15(4) JBL The Quarterly Law Review for 
People in Business 151.  
853  International client protection practices in the microfinance sector are evolving rapidly: MacKee et al (2011) 
September Focus Note 73 Washington D.C. CGAP 6-7. The article mentions that the practices in terms of the 
South African National Credit Act compare favourably with those of countries such as Peru and Ghana. 
854  Transparency is promoted when the terms are “available at point of contract; there is a reasonable opportunity 
to become acquainted with them; they are in clear jargon-free language and decent sized print; the sentences, 
paragraphs and overall contract are well structured; and appropriate prominence is given to particularly 
important terms (whether those that significantly reduce the rights of consumers or those that impose 
significant burdens on consumers)”: Willett (2011) 60(2) International &  Comparative Law Quarterly 356.  
855  Section 3. 
856  It does so, inter alia, through its provisions on education of credit and consumer rights and its provisions 
providing for adequate disclosure of standardised information in order to make an informed choice. See 
section 3(1)(e). 
857  Section 3(h). 
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disclosure of information, plain language contracts, entrenching consumer rights, enforcement 
mechanisms and affordable avenues of redress.858 Hereunder follows a few of the more 
significant protections that have an effect on addressing imbalances in negotiating powers.  
 
3.7.2.1 Debt review and debt relief 
An innovation that suspends the common law rights of a credit grantor introduced into 
consumer credit law with the view to assisting overburdened consumers is the obligation of a 
credit provider to deliver a section 129(1)(a) notice to the consumer859 prior to enforcing a 
credit agreement.860 This affords the credit consumer with an opportunity to approach a debt 
counsellor to propose a debt repayment plan which, if agreed to by the credit provider, would 
stay the credit provider’s debt enforcement rights861 and effectively render nugatory a lex 
                                                            
858  See also MacKee et al (2011) September Focus Note 73 Washington D.C. CGAP 7. 
859  Section 129(1)(a) provides that a credit provider may, on default of the consumer, bring the default to the 
attention of the consumer in writing and propose that the consumer refer the credit agreement to a debt 
counsellor, alternative dispute resolution agent, consumer court or ombud so that the parties may resolve any 
dispute under the agreement or develop and agree on a plan to bring the agreement up to date. 
860  Section 129(1)(b) stipulates that a credit provider may not commence legal proceedings before giving a section 
129(1)(a) notice to the consumer. Though sections 129(1)(a) and 129(1)(b) are non-peremptory, the provisions 
of sections 130(1) and 130(3)(a) convert the provisions of section 129(1)(a) into mandatory ones. This 
precludes the credit provider from enforcing its rights prior to serving a section 129(1)(a) notice. See Rossouw 
& Another v First Rand Bank Ltd 2010 (6) SA 439 (SCA) para [2]; Van Heerden & Boraine ‘The Conundrum of the 
Non-compulsory Notice in terms of Section 129(1)(a) of the National Credit Act’ (2011) 23 SA Merc LJ 45, 45-46, 
47 & 53; Boraine & Van Heerden ‘To sequestrate Or Not To Sequestrate In view of the National Credit Act 34 of 
2005: A Tale of Two Judgments’ (2010) 13(3) PER/PELJ 84, 85, hereafter Boraine & Van Heerden (2010) 13(3) 
PER/PELJ 84. On non-compliance by the credit provider, a court is obliged, in terms of section 130(4)(b), to 
adjourn the matter and to direct the steps that the credit grantor must take prior to the resumption of the 
matter. The provisions and effect of a section 129 (1)(a) notice has generated a lot of academic comment. See 
for example, Van Heerden & Otto  ‘Debt enforcement in terms of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005’ (2007) 
TSAR 655, 658-668; Tennant ‘A Default Notice Under the National Credit Act Must Come to the Attention of the 
Consumer Unless the Consumer is at Fault’ (2010) TSAR 852, 852-862; Otto ‘Notices in terms of the National 
Credit Act: Wholesale National Confusion - Absa Bank Ltd v Prochaska t/a Bianca Cara Interiors; Munien v BMW 
Financial Services; Starita v Absa Bank Ltd; FirstRand Bank Ltd v Dhlamini’ (2010) 22 SA Merc LJ 595, 595-607. 
None of these articles impugn the value of a section 129(1)(a) notice for the consumer of the debt relief 
process.  
861  Boraine & Van Heerden (2010) PER/PELJ 13(3) 84, 85. If not agreed to, the debt counsellor must, in terms of 
section 86(8)(b) refer the matter to the Magistrate’s Court. 
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commissoria in a credit agreement.862 A consumer has a right to apply863 for debt review864 to 
be declared over-indebted865 and to have debts rescheduled.866 
The aim is to grant over-indebted consumers an opportunity to rescue themselves from their 
economic dilemma: a dilemma which may also impact on their daily lives. A side-benefit is that 
it may result in an improvement in the socio-economic health of the country, an objective in 
the constitutional imperative to promote socio-economic reform. 
 
3.7.2.2 Unlawful provisions 
Section 90 contains a comprehensive list of provisions which are prohibited.867 The provisions 
of section 90 read with the plain language provision will impact on the use of standard form 
                                                            
862  See Kelly-Louw ‘The Default Notice by the National Credit Act 34 of 2005’ (2010) 22 SA Merc LJ 568, 568. At 
common law, a lex commissoria enables a creditor to terminate a contract on breach by the debtor where the 
contract contains a specific clause to this effect: Van der Merwe et al Contract 306; Hutchison, Pretorius, Du 
Plessis, Eiselen, Floyd, Hawthorne, Kuschke, Maxwell, Naudé and De Stadler The Law of Contract in South Africa 
(2012) 286-287. 
863  A consumer may apply to a debt counsellor. If the debt counsellor rejects the application the consumer may, 
with the leave of the Magistrate’s Court apply directly to the Magistrate Court. 
864  Section 86. 
865  A consumer is over-indebted when on the basis of the preponderance of information available and with due 
regard to the consumer’s financial means, prospects, obligations and history of debt repayment, it is 
determined that the consumer is or will be unable to satisfy all obligations in a timely manner. See section 
79(1). The number of consumers who have applied for debt review in the relatively short period since the NCA 
came into full effect on 1 June 2007 is an illustration of the greater number of consumers who have become 
over-indebted due to consumer spending: Renke (2011) 74 THRHR 208-209. 
866  Otto ‘Over-indebtedness and Applications for Debt Review in Terms of the National Credit Act: Consumers 
Beware! FirstRand Bank Ltd v Olivier’ (2009) 21 SA Merc LJ 272, hereafter Otto (2009) 21 SA Merc LJ 272. The 
debt review process may result in a debt-rearrangement plan voluntarily agreed upon by the credit consumer 
and the credit provider(s). This agreement must be filed as a consent order by the National Consumer Tribunal 
or by a court. If no such agreement can be reached, and if a finding of over-indebtedness is made, the court 
may make an order declaring one or more of the credit agreements reckless (see s 80 read with 81(2)) and/or 
that one or more of the consumer’s obligations be rearranged. This may involve, inter alia, extending the 
period of the agreement and reducing the amount of each repayment or by postponing the due dates for 
payment (s 86(7)(c)). The requirements for a declaration of recklessness put the credit provider on notice to 
ascertain whether or not the consumer has the requisite knowledge and understanding to make an informed 
decision. The aim is to minimise the possibility of contractual default. The requirements also place the onus on 
the credit provider to prove that the consumer had the requisite knowledge and understanding. 
867  These black-list provisions are similar to the provisions of the CPA discussed in paras 3.6.3.2 and 3.6.5 above. 
Section 90 provides, for example, that a provision would be unlawful where the general purpose or effect 
thereof is to defeat the purposes or policies of the NCA, or to mislead or deceive the consumer, or to deprive a 
consumer of its rights in terms of the NCA or of its common law rights applicable to the credit agreement 
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contracts by, not only regulating the contents thereof, but also, by curtailing the use of 
language and style of writing that will undermine the provisions of the Act.    
As in the case of the CPA, which contains similar prohibitions, these prohibitions, based as they 
are in public policy, serve to promote the good faith element of consumer contracts. 
 
3.7.2.3 Disclosure of information 
The NCA gives effect to the notion of informed consent868 and promotes the balance in 
negotiating power by educating consumers about their rights869 and by requiring disclosure of 
“standardised information.”870 To this end, the NCA also contains comprehensive provisions on 
pre-agreement disclosures.871 The credit provider must furnish the credit consumer with a 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
(section 90(2)(c), for example, the implied warranties against latent defects and eviction), or that purports to 
limit or indemnify the liability of the credit provider under the NCA, or purports to limit or exempt the credit 
provider from any guaranty or warranty. Also prohibited is an agreement to forfeit money if the consumer 
seeks lawfully to terminate the agreement, or consenting to the jurisdiction of a specific court in circumstances 
where such court either does not have jurisdiction or has concurrent jurisdiction. The latter relates to where 
the contractants agree to the jurisdiction of the High Court in circumstances where the Magistrates’ Court has 
concurrent jurisdiction. Section 90(2)(k)(vi) of the NCA also precludes forum shopping: Van Heerden 
‘Perspectives on Jurisdiction in terms of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005’ (2008) TSAR 840, 845-846, 
hereafter Van Heerden (2008) TSAR. Section 90 is clearly aimed at addressing the abuse of standard form 
contract and at trying to establish a balance between the bargaining powers of credit providers and consumers. 
This policy objective is also to be discerned in the Preamble to the NCA. See also Renke, Roestoff & Haupt ‘The 
National Credit Act: New Parameters for the Granting of Credit in South Africa’ (2007) Obiter 229, 251-252, 
hereafter Renke et al (2007) Obiter. Unlawful provisions are void and may be severed from the agreement or 
may result in the whole agreement being declared unlawful. A court may, in addition, make any additional 
order that it deems just and reasonable in the circumstances. Section 90(4). 
868  The Policy Framework that preceded the NCA reasoned that a more discerning and knowledgeable consumer 
will increase competition in the credit market and promote better levels of service: Renke (2011) 74 THRHR 
218. 
869  This is done, inter alia, by detailing the rights of the credit consumer. See Part A, entitled ‘Consumer Rights,’ of 
Chapter 4. In addition, section 16 makes it a specific duty of National Credit Regulator to promote public 
awareness of consumer credit matters. The issue is canvassed more fully in Renke (2011) 74 THRHR 218-219. 
This duty is in line with a recommendation of the International Federation of Insolvency Practitioners (INSOL 
(International)) that over-indebtedness be addressed by application of the adage that prevention is better than 
cure: Roestoff & Renke ‘Solving the Problem of Overspending by Individuals: International Guidelines’ (2003) 24 
Obiter 1, 8-9 hereafter Roestoff & Renke (2003) 24 Obiter. 
870  See section 3(e)(i)-(ii). 
871  See section 92. Different requirements apply to small credit agreements on the one hand and intermediate and 
large credit agreements on the other hand. This section must be read with the plain and understandable 
language requirement contained in section 64.                   
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statement containing the main features of the proposed agreement.872 The fact that the pre-
agreement disclosure statement is binding for 5 business days presents the credit consumer 
with an opportunity within which to acquaint himself/herself of the contents873 of the proposed 
agreement and to make an informed decision as to whether or not he/she wishes to conclude 
the contract at all or on the terms and conditions proposed in the pre-agreement statement. 
The pre-contract disclosure provisions also serve to promote (i) the equalisation of the 
bargaining powers of consumers and suppliers,874 (ii) consensus and (iii) certainty. Hence, they 
validate the principles of freedom and sanctity of contract. 
If the contract is subsequently concluded the credit consumer is entitled to a copy thereof. The 
copy must contain all the financial features of the contract as well as a comprehensive 
presentation of the consumer’s rights as set out in the Act.875 In addition, the credit provider 
must furnish the consumer with periodic statements of account for free.876 These post-contract 
document provisions fulfil a very important policy objective of informing the consumer about 
                                                            
872  These include providing adequate information regarding the conditions and obligations of the agreement as 
well as the total costs thereof. The latter includes the principal debt, the proposed distribution of that amount, 
the interest rate and other costs associated with the credit: Renke (2011) 74 THRHR 211. 
873  Especially the financial obligations therein. 
874  Information of price, product, quality and terms provide knowledge that, in theory, may serve as bargaining 
tools and also forms the basis of consensus and promotes certainty. There is a full discussion of the benefits of 
such disclosure provisions in Renke (2011) 74 THRHR 212-213. See also Renke et al (2007) Obiter 253-254. The 
2008 EU Consumer Credit Directive contains a provision similar to the plain language provision of the NCA: 
Renke (2011) 74 THRHR 212. The English Consumer Credit Act 39 of 1974 provides that the credit provider 
must furnish the credit consumer with the true cost of credit in a reasonable and understandable manner. Non-
compliance renders the agreement enforceable against the debtor only on order of court: Beale Chitty On 
Contracts: Specific Contracts Volume 2 (2008) para [38-70]. See also Roestoff & Renke (2003) 24 Obiter 21. 
Furthermore, Section 3 of the (English) Misrepresentation Act 1967 prohibits terms that exclude or restrict (i) 
liability for a misrepresentation made before the conclusion of the contract or (ii) any remedy available to the 
contractant suffering the misrepresentation subject to the requirement of reasonableness as stated in section 
11(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977: Peel Treitel The Law of Contract paras [17-077] and [9-115]. See 
also Treitel An Outline of the Law of Contract (2004) 106. 
875  The contents of the contract must contain the detailed information set out in Regulation 30 read with Form 
20.2 in respect of small agreements and in Regulation 31 in respect of intermediate and large agreements, for 
example, the cost of credit. 
876  See section 108. Different periods are prescribed for different categories of credit agreements but may be 
varied by agreement. Except for mortgage agreements where the period is every six months, the period 
between statements may not exceed three months. 
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his/her financial obligations to enable him/her to conduct himself/herself in a financially 
responsible manner.877 
 
3.7.2.4 Interest rate and the in duplum rule 
Fees, interest rates and other charges878 are strictly regulated.879 The regulation of the 
maximum interest rates that may be charged has a long-standing history in South African 
consumer credit law and serves as a tool to prevent over-indebtedness.880 It also serves to 
contain unconscionable conduct in a market that is flooded with demand for credit.881 Though 
the Act provides for interest rates to change during the currency of the agreement, the Act 
stipulates that the variation must be by a fixed relationship to a reference rate stipulated in the 
agreement.882 The design is clearly to ensure transparency and certainty and to prevent the 
consumer from being ambushed and subjected to unconscionable and unanticipated changes 
to its financial obligations. The inclusion of reference rate in the contract places a limitation on 
the discretionary power of the credit provider. The limitation of the discretionary power by an 
objective and ascertained mechanism echoes the Westinghouse principle and has policy 
significance in the context of arriving at a solution to the question of law in this thesis, namely 
whether to recognise a sale or lease at a reasonable price or rental or at a unilaterally 
determined price or rental.883 
                                                            
877  For example, to decide whether or not to assume the particular debt or further debt. See Renke (2011) 74 
THRHR 218. 
878  These comprise the principal debt, an initiation fee, service fees, interest, the cost of credit insurance, default 
administration charges and collection costs.  
879  See Part C of Chapter 5 of the NCA. See also section 92(3) which provides parameters within which the interest 
rate charged may exceed the interest rate contained in the statutorily required quotation. 
880  Renke (2011) 74 THRHR 220. 
881  Manuel ‘SA’s debt time bomb’ The Times 4 November 2011, 1-2. 
882  The current use of the prime Reserve Bank lending rate used by the major banks serves as an example.   
883  See chapter 4 para 4.3. Many countries, including, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, some Australian and some 
American states have interest rate ceilings: Howells et al Handbook of Research 397-401.  
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The statutory in duplum rule884 is much more debtor-friendly and affords better protection than 
the common law rule which is now effectively codified and significantly expanded.885 The 
codification means that “a spiral of ever-escalating running costs can no longer hold the 
consumer ransom for the rest of his/her life.”886 
 
3.7.2.5 Interpretation  
The NCA, like the CPA, provides for a purposive approach to interpretation887 and enables the 
use of appropriate foreign and international law in the application or interpretation of its 
provisions.888 
 
3.7.2.6 Expedient and accessible relief 
Parties are encouraged to resolve disputes through mediation, conciliation or arbitration or to 
make use of either the provincial consumer courts or other such agencies before resorting to 
the Tribunal and the courts.889 Referrals to the Magistrate’s Court are not cost-effective 
                                                            
884  Section 103(5). The court in National Credit Regulator v Nedbank 2009 (6) SA 295 (GNP) held that In terms of 
the statutory rule the amounts that become due during default, for example, service fees, interest or collection 
fees, “may not, in aggregate, exceed the unpaid balance” (319-320). The credit provider may not charge further 
interest subsequent to payments made by the consumer during the period of default. At common law interest 
may again be levied when once the unpaid interest drops below the outstanding capital. Note also the common 
law covers only interest charges whereas the NCA includes other charges such as initiation fees, service fees, 
and the cost of credit insurance: Campbell ‘The in duplum Rule: Relief for Consumers of Excessively Priced 
Small Credit Legitimised by the National Credit Act’ (2010) 22 SA Mercantile Law Journal 1, 3-5, hereafter 
Campbell (2010) 22 SA Mercantile Law Journal 1. 
885  Campbell (2010) 22 SA Mercantile Law Journal 1. 
886  De Villiers ‘National Credit Regulator Versus Nedbank Ltd and the Practice of Debt Counselling in South Africa’ 
(2010) 13(2) PER/PELJ 128, 151, hereafter De Villiers (2010) 13(2) PER/PELJ.  See also Kelly-Louw ‘Better 
Consumer Protection under the Statutory in Duplum Rule’ (2007) 19 SA Merc LJ 337 et seq.  
887  See section 2. Section 2(1) determines that the provisions of the NCA must be interpreted to give effect to the 
purposes thereof as expressed in section 3. 
888  In these regards, the comments in para 3.6.7 in this chapter relating to interpretation under the CPA apply here 
as well. See also Van Heerden (2008) TSAR 841. 
889  See Chapter 7 of the NCA. In adopting this approach, the legislature is in line with one of the recommendations 
of the INSOL (International) which in May 2001 published a report recommending extra-judicial rather than 
judicial proceedings. Besides being less time-consuming and more cost-effective, the design of such 
proceedings makes it possible for the consumer’s debt problems, which often are of a non-legal nature, to be 
addressed in an appropriate and integrated manner: Roestoff & Renke (2003) 24 Obiter 8.   
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because such referrals are considered to be applications which require compliance with the 
provisions of the Magistrate’s Court Act.890 They do not provide the benefits of speed, simplicity 
and costs that characterise administrative actions.891 
The provision of administrative processes serves to enhance access to justice because of its low 
cost structure, informal nature, and speed. The creation of the office of debt counsellor 
contributes to this in no small way. The debt counsellor is a neutral functionary892 who does not 
advance any particular party’s cause in the debt review process. He/she is meant to facilitate 
and mediate between over-indebted consumers and their credit providers to terminate 
disputes and/or to agree on a rearrangement of payments or an extension thereof.893 
Furthermore, a counsellor who has referred a matter to the Magistrate’s Court “has a duty to 
assist the court and should be available and able to render assistance by way of furnishing 
evidence or making submissions as to his or her proposal or to answer any queries raised by the 
Court.”894 
The National Credit Regulator895 is tasked with registration896 and deregistration897 of credit 
providers, credit bureaux and debt counsellors as well as dealing with complaints, promoting 
alternative dispute resolution,898 and enforcement and compliance with the Act. He/she must 
                                                            
890  For example, that service of notices or documents contemplated in terms of sections 86 and 87 be effected by 
the Deputy Sheriff of the court, thereby adding to the costs of the already debt-compromised credit consumer. 
891  De Villiers (2010) 13(2) PER/PELJ 135-137. 
892  Regulation 1 of the National Credit Regulations 2006 published under GN 489 in GG 28864 of 31 May 2006 as 
amended by GN R1029 pf 30 November 2006. 
893  Boraine& Van Heerden (2010) 13(3) PER/PELJ 84, 107; Otto (2009) 21 SA Merc LJ 276; Roestoff, Haupt, Coetzee 
& Erasmus (2009) 12(3) PER/PELJ 246, 251. 
894  National Credit Regulator 2009 (6) SA 295 (GNP) 313 
895  See Part A of Chapter 2. 
896  Sections 14 and 39-53. 
897  Sections 14 and 57-59. 
898  On 14 December 2010, the Regulator announced an agreement by the four big banks to a “conditional 
moratorium” on terminating debt reviews and attaching property: Wasserman ‘Banks give indebted a 
break’http://www.fin24.com/Money/Money-Clinic/Banks-give-indebted-a-. 
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also monitor the markets and industry and ensure that prohibited conduct is prosecuted.899 As 
part of its enforcement functions, it must promote informal resolution of disputes. 
The National Consumer Tribunal is an independent entity from the Regulator. It may adjudicate 
on a wide variety of applications and is responsible for hearing cases against credit providers 
that may contravene the Act. It must conduct its hearings in an inquisitorial manner, and as 
expeditiously and informally as possible and give expression to the principles of natural 
justice.900 It may issue fines.901 It may also make consent orders reflecting a resolution arrived 
at through an alternative forum.902 
The enforcement mechanisms display an attempt at resolving problems created by 
(over)indebtedness in a manner that does not increase the financial burden on consumers and 
that gives consumers a fair opportunity of settling their debt burden in a manner that is 
respectful of their dignity.  
 
3.7.2.7 Fines and penalties 
The provisions of these903 are similar to those under the CPA and similar principles to those 
discussed in relation to the CPA apply. 
 
3.7.2.8 Conclusion 
The provisions discussed above are indicative of some of the aims in section 3 of the NCA, 
namely, to discourage reckless credit extension by credit providers and to regulate aspects of 
consumer predicaments. The object of both is to prevent contractual default by credit 
consumers. The innovations significantly improve the position of credit consumers. Whilst both, 
                                                            
899  The functions may be delegated to parallel entities in the provinces. 
900  Section 142. 
901  See section 151 the provisions whereof resemble the provisions of section 112 of the CPA discussed in para 
3.6.9 in this chapter. 
902  Sections 138 and 150. 
903  See section 151 for fines and section 161 for the penalties.  
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Section 129(1)(a) and debt review proceedings are aimed at alleviating the debt burden on the 
consumer, they also are pre-emptive in nature904 by providing the consumer with alternatives 
aimed at debt reduction and, ultimately, debt settlement.905 The provisions also seek to obviate 
time-consuming and costly litigation.  
The possibility of a declaration that credit was recklessly extended and the adverse 
consequences thereof may inspire credit providers to adopt a more astute and judicious 
approach to credit extension. This in turn may result in a better informed consumer population 
that has both the capacity as well as the resources to service their debts.906 In doing so, the Act 
preserves and promotes the notion of sanctity of contract which the Constitutional Court 
considered to be a constitutional value.907 
In summary, the provisions of the NCA are designed to promote fair and reasonable, 
responsible and transparent practices in credit market, the effect whereof is to serve the needs 
of members of the public for credit in a manner that is respectful of their integrity and dignity.   
In conclusion, it cannot be gainsaid that the consumer, under the NCA as in the case of the CPA, 
is better off than under the common law, the emphasis being on substantive908 as well as 
procedural fairness. 
 
                                                            
904  This is true especially for recommendations made in terms of section 86(7)(b) discussed above. 
905  For example, suspension of the credit agreement may involve extending the period of the agreement and 
reducing the size of the periodic repayments. The pressure on the consumer is decreased both as to time and 
money and the possibility of ruinous litigation is minimised. It is important to note that the proceedings are not 
aimed at debt-cancellation but at a rearrangement of the consumer’s obligations to create a win-win situation. 
Also important is that whilst reckless extension of credit may result in the setting aside of some or all of the 
consumer’s rights and obligations, it does not invalidate the contract and the credit provider may still be able 
to recover the goods: Boraine & Van Heerden (2010) 13(3) PER/PELJ 84, 98. See also Renke (2011) 74 THRHR 
227. 
906  Conversely, it could result in a reduction in the number of those who are overextended by debt as well as a 
reduction in the severity of such over-indebtedness. This would be an extremely healthy positive development 
from a policy perspective. 
907  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) discussed in chapter 1 para 1.3.3. 
908  For example, subjective factors such as illiteracy, command of language, reasonableness and fairness and good 
faith now play a role in determining the validity of a contract or a term thereof. The common law position on 
such factors was outlined in chapter 2 paras 2.3.2, 2.4 2.6 and 2.9.  
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3.8 Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999  
3.8.1 Introduction 
The Rental Housing Act (the RHA), which came into operation on 1 August 2000, was enacted to 
give effect to section 26 of the Constitution which invests everyone with the right of access to 
adequate housing.909 Hence, it serves to give effect to the constitutional mandate to promote 
socio-economic reforms for the creation of a just and egalitarian society based on the values of 
dignity, equality and freedom.910 In Maphango & Others,911 the Constitutional Court placed the 
interpretation of the RHA firmly within the context of the Constitution and its values.912  
The purpose of the RHA is, inter alia, to promote rental housing, to promote access to housing, 
to improve conditions in the rental housing market and to facilitate the provision of rental 
housing. It aims to do so by laying down general requirements for lease agreements, providing 
for the establishment of Rental Housing Tribunals in each of the provinces, and establishing 
conflict resolution principles for the rental housing market.913 
Unlike the CPA and NCA, the RHA is not explicitly consumer orientated.914 In fact, it purports in 
its Preamble to address the need to strike a “balance between the rights of tenants and the 
rights of landlords” and the need “to create mechanisms to protect both tenants and landlords 
                                                            
909  See the Preamble of the RHA. In Maphango & Others v Aengus Lifestyle Properties CCT 57/11 [2012] ZACC 2, 
hereafter Maphango & Others CCT 57/11 [2012] ZACC 2 the Constitutional Court held that the RHA is an act 
that was expressly enacted to give effect to the right of access to adequate housing (para 57]). The RHA may 
also be viewed as one of the enactments designed to promote the land reform programme in South Africa. See 
section 25 of the Constitution which mandates the State to embark on a process of land reform by fostering 
conditions to enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis. Land tenure reform is one of the 
objectives of section 25 of the Constitution. Some of the other pieces of legislation dealing with land reform 
issues are the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996, Transformation of Certain Rural Areas Act 94 of 
1998, and the Extension of Security and Tenure Act (ESTA) 62 of 1997: Badenhorst et al Property 585-565. See 
also Van der Walt ‘Exclusivity of Ownership, Security of Tenure and Eviction Orders: a Model to Evaluate South 
African Land Reform Legislation’ (2002) TSAR 254 and especially 263 et seq; Carey Miller & Pope Land Title in 
South Africa (2000) 282-551. 
910  See Preamble of the Constitution. See also Maphango & Others CCT 57/11 [2012] ZACC 2 para [31]. 
911  CCT 57/11 [2012] ZACC 2 para [57]. CHECK   
912  Paras [31]-[34]. 
913  See the long title of the RHA. 
914  Unlike the CPA and the NCA, it is also not very innovative in that other than creating statutory naturalia and the 
office of the National Housing Tribunal, the RHA does not change the common law in any significant way: 
Badenhorst et al Property 403. 
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against unfair practices and exploitation.”915 The Constitutional Court has described the RHA as 
superimposing its unfair practice regime on the obligations that contractants negotiate for 
themselves.916 Thus, the RHA subjects the conduct of both landlords and tenants to the 
standards of fairness and equity. 
However, in deciding that the eviction requirements of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from 
and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act (PIE)917 have to be complied with, in addition to the 
common law requirements of the rei vindicatio, in the so-called holding-over cases,918 the 
Supreme Court of Appeal has swung the balance in favour of the tenant.919 The landlord’s 
negotiating power to include a lex commissoria in the lease agreement is effectively 
terminated; so also any contractual discretionary power it may have had920 on fulfilment of the 
lex commissoria. 
 
                                                            
915  In Maphango & Others CCT 57/11 [2012] ZACC 2 para [50]. The position of the landlord is regulated in order to 
allay concerns about its rights and to promote rental housing. This is illustrated, for example, in section 13(5)(b) 
which requires the Rental Housing Tribunal when making a ruling on the rental payable to take into account, 
inter alia, the need for a realistic return on investment for investors in rental housing. The position of the lessee 
is addressed, not only, from the perspective of equalising bargaining power, but also, to give expression to the 
provisions of section 26 which grants everyone the right to housing. The rental housing market has witnessed 
the hardships resulting from abuse of tenants “at the hands of unscrupulous landlords/landladies.” Examples of 
the abuse include unlawful evictions, disconnection of the water supply and illegal lockouts: Mohamed Tenant 
and Landlord in South Africa: The Book for Residential Tenancies and the Rental Housing Act (2010) 1, hereafter 
Mohamed Tenant and Landlord. See also the Preamble to the RHA. The even-handed approach is in recognition 
by government that “maximum private investment will be attracted within a normalised market”: Mukheiber 
‘The Effect of the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 on the Common Law of Landlord and Tenant’ (2000) Obiter 
325, 326 and 350. See also Louw The Right to Adequate Housing: Making Sense of Eviction Procedures in the 
Context of Rental Housing After Ndlovu v Ngcobo. Thesis presented in partial fulfilment for the degree of 
Masters of Law at the University of Stellenbosch December 2004 1-2 and 8-10.  
916  In Maphango & Others CCT 57/11 [2012] ZACC 2 para [51]. 
917  19 of 1998. 
918  Holding over refers to the category of situations where the occupation commenced lawfully in terms of a valid 
legal basis such as a lease agreement, but became unlawful on termination of the legal basis. The Supreme 
Court of Appeal in Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker v Jika 2003 (1) SA 113 (SCA) held that on termination of the legal 
basis of occupation, the lawful occupier becomes an unlawful occupier and becomes subject to the provisions 
of PIE.  
919  The procedure under PIE is more onerous than the comparatively simple and powerful (from the landlord’s 
perspective) common law rei vindicatio. 
920  Other than waiving its power to enforce the eviction. The Ndlovu decision has significantly reduced the 
common law discretionary powers of the landlord. 
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3.8.2 Disclosure and information 
Though the RHA does not require a lease agreement to be reduced to writing, the landlord 
must, on request by the tenant, reduce it to writing.921 All lease agreements must contain 
clauses that encapsulate the standard rights and obligations of the landlord and tenant as listed 
in section 5(3).922 
Provision is made for the establishment of Rental Housing Information Offices, the functions 
whereof are to, inter alia, educate and advise landlords923 and tenants about their rights and 
obligations and offer advice about resolving disputes including referral to the Tribunal.924 
 
3.8.3 Unfair practices 
An unfair practice is defined as any act or omission in contravention of the RHA925 or any 
practice that unreasonably prejudices the rights or interests of either the tenant or the 
landlord.926 Accordingly, a contractual clause would be unfair where it renders nugatory the 
statutory rights and obligations conferred on the tenant and landlord. In addition, the 
provisions of the CPA relating to unfair, unreasonable and unjust clauses and clauses which are 
                                                            
921  See sections 5(1) and 5(2). 
922  The rights and obligations set out in section 5(3) constitute mandatory terms, meaning that they may not be 
waived. See section 5(4). They include the rights and obligations in respect of joint inspection of the leased 
premises both before the tenant takes occupation and prior to termination of the lease, the rights and 
obligations in respect of any deposit that was given by the tenant. Section 5(3) was inserted as a compromise 
for the decision to not legislate for lease agreements to be reduced to writing. It was deemed to offer sufficient 
protection to tenants. The Housing Portfolio Committee regarded written lease agreements as affording 
landlords an opportunity to draft contract favouring them at the expense of their tenants. Accepting unwritten 
contracts coupled with the section 5(3) deeming provision was regarded as offering protection to tenants: 
Thatcher ‘Rental Housing Bill (B29-99); discussion 1 September 1999’ Parliamentary Monitoring Group 
/Parliament of South Africa 2 (http://www.pmg.org.za/print/70056). The provisions of section 5(3) are 
amplified by the provisions of the CPA. The provision of access to or use of rental accommodation falls under 
the definition of “service” in section 1 in the CPA. 
923  The term landlord is used in the RHA and will be used in this thesis as well. 
924  See section 14. 
925  Inserted by section 1 of the Rental Housing Amendment Act 43 of 2007. 
926  Section 1. Section 15(1)(f) lists a number of situations around which regulations relating to unfair practices may 
be formulated, for example, damage to property, demolitions and conversions, forced entry or obstruction of 
entry, overcrowding and health issues. Also, in criminalising unlawful lock-outs and termination of utilities 
(section 16(hA)), the RHA regards such conduct as constituting unfair practices.   
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prohibited also apply.927 The CPA’s requirement that contracts be substantially fair928 
neutralises the standard provisions in lease agreements which exclude the common law rights 
of a lessee.929 
 
3.8.4 Enforcement mechanisms 
The Rental Housing Tribunal is intended to provide an expedient and cost-effective dispute 
resolution mechanism.930 It provides for mediation and adjudication.931 Rulings of the Tribunal 
are considered to be an order of a Magistrate’s Court and are enforceable in terms of the 
Magistrates’ Courts Act.932 
The Rental Housing Tribunal has a wide jurisdiction933 to hear all disputes relating to unfair 
practices934 which must be determined by the Tribunal.935 It may also adjudicate on spoliation 
applications and issue attachment orders and interdicts.936 It may also order the discontinuance 
of exploitive rentals.937 Once the Tribunal rules that an unfair practice exists, it may order that 
                                                            
927  See paras 3.6.3.2 and 3.6.5 above. 
928  See paras 3.6.3.2 and 3.6.5 above. 
929  For example, the implied warranty of fitness.  
930  See the Preamble. The Director General, Department of Housing (as it was known then), Ms MZ Nxumalo-
Nhlapo in reply to a question posed by a member of Housing Portfolio Committee said that both tenants and 
landlords did not want to resolve their disputes by engaging in “lengthy, costly proceedings.” The Director-
General continued to say that the whole idea is to get a speedy resolution and that most lease disputes did not 
involve legal questions: Thatcher ‘Rental Housing Bill (B29-99); briefing, 31 August 1999’Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group /Parliament of South Africa 2 (http://www.pmgorg.za/print/7005). 
931  Sections 13(2)(c) and (d).   
932  32 of 1944.See section 13(13) of the RHA. A right of review lies to the High Court in its area of jurisdiction. 
Section 17. 
933  This is to give effect to the Preamble recognising the need for speedy resolution of disputes at minimum costs 
to the parties. However, in terms of section 13(14) it has no jurisdiction in respect of evictions orders. (Section 
13(14) was inserted by section 6(d) of the Rental Housing Amendment Act 43 of 2007.) In terms of section 
26(3) of the Constitution evictions may only be authorised by courts which a Tribunal is not.  
934  See section 13. When an issue of unfair practice contemplated in the RHA rears its head in proceedings before 
the Magistrate’s Court, the Magistrate may refer it to the Tribunal. See section 13(11). The Tribunal appears, in 
terms of section 13(9), to have exclusive jurisdiction in respect of unfair practices despite the use of the adverb 
“may” in section 13(11): Stoop (2011) 74 THRHR320-321. 
935  Section 13(9). 
936  Section 13(12)(c).  
937  The policy consideration to be detected is to curb exploitation of the scarcity of housing.  
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the provision(s) of the RHA must be complied with938 or may make any order that is just and fair 
in the circumstances.939 The advantage of the Tribunal procedure is that it is more cost and 
time effective than the court procedure allowing more people to exercise their constitutional 
right to have access to justice.940 
The above provisions reduce the vulnerability of tenants in the rental housing sector to unfair 
discrimination which is one of the State’s responsibilities941 and serves to give effect to the 
constitutional injunction that the State must take legislative means to “foster conditions which 
enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis.”942 
 
3.8.5 Application of the provisions of the CPA to the RHA 
Earlier943 the CPA was described as an overarching piece of legislation that contained 
generalised provisions that also impact on RHA. This impact is briefly outlined below. 
Though the RHA does not contain any provisions regarding plain language, the CPA 
provisions944 apply. A contract of lease, if reduced to writing, would have to comply with the 
plain language provisions. These would require landlords to ensure that the language, form, 
style and organisation of leases are such as to render the document reasonably capable of 
being understood by tenants with average literacy skills and minimal experience as consumers 
in the rental housing market. 
                                                            
938  Section 13(4)(a). 
939  Section 13(4)(c). 
940  See ssection 34. The fact that the rulings are enforceable, obviating the need for the time-consuming and cost-
incurring process of having the rulings made an order of a Magistrate’s Court so that it may be enforced, adds 
to the benefit and value of utilising the Tribunal as a forum for dispute resolution: Stoop (2011) 74 THRHR321-
322, 323-324.  
941  See section 2.  
942  Section 25(5) of the Constitution. 
943  Para 3.2 above. 
944  Discussed in para 3.6.3.4 above 
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A lease period may not be for longer than two years.945 A longer period is valid only if expressly 
agreed upon and the landlord (supplier) is able to show a demonstrable benefit for the tenant 
(consumer).946 Provision is made for termination prior to the expiry of the lease period.947 The 
tenant need not provide any reasons for early termination whilst the landlord may do so after 
the tenant falls in mora after being placed on terms by the landlord to remedy a material 
breach on its part.948 
 
3.8.6 Fines and penalties 
Contraventions949 may attract a fine or imprisonment not exceeding two years or both.950 
 
3.8.7 Conclusion 
The information and disclosure provisions951 coupled with the provisions against unfair 
practices952and the enforcement mechanism953 constitute significant protection for tenants 
                                                            
945  Section 14(2)(a) of the CPA read with the Regulation 5(1) of the Consumer Protection Act Regulations Published 
under GN R293 in GG 34180 of 1 April 2011 provides that fixed-term consumer agreements may not exceed a 
maximum of two years.   
946  Regulation 5(1)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act Regulations Published under GN R293 in GG 34180 of 1 April 
2011. The tenant (consumer) benefits in that it may be locked into a longer period only if a ‘demonstrable 
benefit” is proved. Refusal to grant a lease because the tenant does not wish to sign for a period longer than 
two years would constitute an unfair practice. So also where a tenant is coerced into signing for a longer period 
in the absence of a demonstrable benefit. On termination of the two year period, and in the absence of any 
express agreement to a new fixed term, the lease automatically continues on a month-to-month basis. See 
section 14(2)(d). 
947  Section 14(2)(b) of the CPA. The tenant has to give only 20 days’ notice of cancellation. A reasonable 
cancellation fee may be charged in terms of section 14(3)(b)(i). 
948  Section 14 of the CPA. 
949  See section 16. It relates, inter alia, to non-compliance with the provisions of sections 4 (tenant’s rights relating 
to unfair discrimination and privacy; landlord’s rights to, inter alia, rental); 5(2) (tenant’s right to written 
contract; or 9 (composition of the Tribunal) of the RHA. Section 16(h)(A) specifically makes it an offence to 
unlawfully lock out a tenant or shut off the utilities to the rental housing property. Section 16(h)(A) was 
inserted by the Rental Housing Amendment Act 43 of 2007. The provisions of the CPA in respect of 
contraventions also apply. The RHA, like the CPA and NCA criminalises conduct and, in doing so, it promotes 
enforcement of rights and enhances compliance.   
950  Section 16. 
951  Para 3.8.2 above. 
952  Para 3.8.3 above. 
953  Para 3.8.4 above. 
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against unfair practices such as arbitrary evictions and disconnections of water and/or 
electricity supplies.954 In enacting the RHA, the State has acted in terms of the obligation placed 
on it by section 26 of the Constitution to take reasonable measures for the progressive 
realisation of the right to access to adequate housing. In doing so, the State is giving effect to 
the constitutional imperative to effect socio-economic reforms for the creation of a just and 
egalitarian society based on the values of dignity, equality and freedom.     
 
3.9 Analysis 
In any system of regulation the purpose of essential codes of conduct may be summarised as 
reflecting a desire to promote a safe environment to allow participants an equal opportunity to 
display their skills. 955 In sport, for example, the rules are continually fine-tuned to cater for 
changing circumstances in order to safeguard and promote the essence of that which it seeks to 
regulate.  
Likewise, consumer protection laws, introduced to keep pace with ever-changing conditions956 
and which target specified “abuses,”957  play a complementary role in preserving the integrity of 
contract law, in general, and in reinvigorating the essence thereof. For example, the provisions 
relating to disclosure, information and consumer education958 promote the consensus ad idem 
                                                            
954  Mohamed Tenant and Landlord 1-2. 
955  The essentialia in contract law fulfil a similar function. A prerequisite for the validity of any contract is whether 
the general requirements and specific requirements for a contract have been complied with. Natural terms, like 
essential terms, also play a role in creating an environment in which prospective contractants have an equal 
opportunity to participate. The nature and function of essential (and natural terms) are discussed in chapter 4 
and in particular para 4.2.4.  
956  The assumption that rules of contract are the same for all types of contracts is increasingly eroded by the 
legislative enactments that provide different rules for different kinds of contracts. The observation is true for 
most countries where there is consumer protection legislation: Furmston Cheshire, Firfoot and Furmston’s Law 
of Contract (2007) 29 and 231-253. 
957  The CAA targets abuses in commercial contract law; the RHA targets the rental housing market; and the CPA 
targets consumer contracts generally.  
958  For example, the extensive provisions relating to information and disclosure of the financial implications of a 
transaction. Paras 3.6.3.3(D) and 3.7.2.3 above. 
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requirement of contract959 and lend credibility to the classical contract law assumption of 
contractual equality and informed consent, thereby concretising and promoting the principles 
of freedom and sanctity of contract. 960 In addition to signifying a commitment to good faith, 
and an attempt to address the reality of unequal bargaining power,961 they also promote 
certainty of contract by regulating contractual terms and contractual conduct, and by regulating 
pre-contract conduct as well as conduct during the existence of the contract. 962  The provision 
of expeditious and cost-effective rights of recourse contributes to the attainment of these 
goals. In promoting these principles, they also give effect and practical content to the 
constitutional values of dignity, equality and freedom. Hence, the provisions of the three pieces 
of consumer legislation illustrate that public interest considerations which have clear policy 
imperatives, can be utilised in harmony with existing principles of law. 963 
 
3.10 Conclusion 
Consumer protection legislation signifies a shift from an individualist approach where a 
contractant had both the right and the responsibility to enforce his/her rights through litigation 
                                                            
959  Since perfect knowledge cannot be assumed, consumer protection legislation is aimed at increasing levels of 
knowledge in recognition of this weakness of the classical theory. Atiyah Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract 
(1979) at 703.  
960  Howells et al Handbook of Research 158. 
961  For unequal bargaining power see chapter 2 para 2.4.4. 
962  The legislation promotes equitable and wholesome business practices by mandating fair and equitable business 
practices, thus allaying consumer fears and thereby promoting consumer confidence and inspiring consumer 
participation in the economic enterprise. In doing so, they advance the free market system. MacKee et al 
(2011) September Focus Note 73 Washington D.C. CGAP 1 and 2. The authors comment that “[o]ver time the 
market should reward retailer providers that adequately protect clients’ interests, affirmatively treat them 
well, offer a product line responsive to their needs, and deliver good value for money.” The comment made in 
respect of microfinance applies equally to consumer protection legislation. 
963  Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract 20. Public law legislation requiring a vehicle to be 
roadworthy and that drivers be in possession of a valid driver’s licence in order to use public roads curbs 
freedom of property for the public good. Such legislation, far from inhibiting road usage and the right to private 
property, promotes it by providing a safe environment for its use. Hence, they promote the constitutional 
values of dignity, equality and freedom of all road users. 
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to a paternalist 964  approach where the enforcement of rights also become the responsibility of 
the state through its organs such as the office of the National Consumer Commission and the 
office of the ombudsman.965 Contractual autonomy becomes the backdrop against which 
constitutional and/or social and/or economic principles of justice operate. 
Correcting the information asymmetry is of cardinal importance in promoting the making of 
informed choices.966 The reality that the information that consumers require to make a fully 
informed choice is likely to be absent from many markets967 dictates that the policy 
considerations that underlie consumer protection legislation as a paternalistic intervention 
mechanism, require the retention of the common law requirements regarding the essence of 
the contract, namely agreement on an ascertained or objectively ascertainable price and rental 
and militate against a relaxation thereof to accommodate the obiter dicta. Contractual 
autonomy becomes the backdrop against which constitutional and/or social and/or economic 
principles of justice operate. 
In particular, the information and disclosure provisions in relation to price968 signal the 
importance of price in contractual relations and the need to make informed decisions in respect 
of this vital area of contract creation. The removal of this aspect of contract creation on policy 
grounds from the will of the contractants and replacing the will with policy considerations as 
justification may be located in the theory that agreement on price constitutes the essence of 
the contract.969 The conclusion that it gives rise to, namely that there is a duty to arrive at an 
                                                            
964  The principle of paternalism is discussed in chapter 2 paras 2.2.2, 2.3.1-2.3.2 and in para 3.5 in this chapter. 
Cockrell ‘Substance and Form in the South African Law of Contract’ (1992) 109 SALJ 40.  
965  The benefit of expedient and cost-effective access to justice, ensuring more complaints or claims are 
processed, and the spectre of criminal rather than civil sanction with the associated reputational damage, will 
likely act as insurance for compliance and pro-active action. 
966  Further bolstering the policy considerations underlying the information and disclosure provisions is that recent 
studies in behavioural economics suggest that consumer choices are guided by the short term, tend to be over-
optimistic and tend to use heuristics to assess factors such as risks. See chapter 4 paras 4.3.3.3 and 4.3.4.3(E). 
967  Cartwright (2011) Legal Studies 13. 
968  See para 3.6.3.3(D) above. 
969  This theme is developed more fully in chapter 4 and specifically in para 4.3.3.3(D). 
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ascertained or objectively ascertainable price does not detract from the principles of 
contractual autonomy and freedom of contract.970 Rather, it constitutes a recognition that 
voluntary contractual capacity is a derivative and not an absolute power. The individual is free 
to bind himself/herself to the extent permitted by the law.971 Thus, the recognition of sales at a 
reasonable price or at a unilaterally determined price would run counter to the provisions of 
the consumer protection legislation discussed above, which provisions have strengthened the 
consensual and certainty aspects of contract law.  
In summary, the design of the three pieces of legislation is to create market conditions, 
reflective of the constitutional values of dignity, equality, freedom and ubuntu:972 the public 
policy considerations underlying the legislation and the constitutional values of dignity serve as 
the outer boundaries for the principles of freedom and sanctity of contract.973 Thus, the three 
pieces of legislation demonstrate that freedom of contract can exist only within the limits of 
constitutionality and legality. Morality evident in the duty of good faith that pervades the 
legislation provides another limit.974  
The approach that recognises limitations in the public interest is geared towards the attainment 
substantive justice, 975 and stands in stark contrast to the sterility of the classical theory that 
concentrates on procedural justice at the expense of substantive justice.  It also demonstrates 
that the consideration of subjective factors, inspired by policy initiatives, is not inimical to the 
principles of law, namely freedom, sanctity and certainty of contract, and may, in fact serve to 
strengthen these principles. In promoting these principles, the legislation also give effect and 
                                                            
970  See chapter 4 para 4.2.4.2(B). 
971  See further chapter 4 paras 4.2.1-4.2.3; Hogg Promises and Contract Law Comparative Perspectives (2011) 269. 
972  The Barkhuizen case discussed in chapter 1 para 1.3.3. 
973  See further chapter 4 paras 4.2.1-4.2.3 for the discussion of a conceptual framework that imposes limitations 
on freedom and sanctity of contract.  
974  Horn, Kötz, and Leser, German Private and Commercial Law An Introduction (1982) 85. The writers conclude 
with the axiom that freedom of contract has never existed in unlimited form. 
975  Amongst others, subjective factors such as illiteracy and command of language now play a role in determining 
the validity of a contract or a term thereof. As indicated in chapter 2 paras 2.3.2.2(B) and 2.4.2 the use of 
jargon and Latin phrases did not persuade our courts to invalidate a contract or the offending contractual term. 
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practical content to the constitutional imperatives to promote socio-economic reforms976 for 
the creation of a just and egalitarian society based on the values of dignity, equality and 
freedom. The State, in enacting these three pieces of legislation would have acted to fulfil its 
mandate in terms of sections 26 and 27 of the Constitution to effect the progressive realisation 
of the socio-economic rights to adequate housing and food, water, health and social security. 
The constitutional imperatives and the policy considerations that inform the role of consumer 
protection legislation in promoting the principles of freedom of contract and certainty, and in 
protecting vulnerable contractants also underpin the discussion of the role and function of the 
essential of price.977  
                                                            
976  See sections 26 and 27 of the Constitution. 
977  See chapter 4 and in particular para 4.2. 
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Chapter 4 
The constitutional, jurisprudential and policy imperatives informing the role and function of 
the essentialia of price and rental – contractual freedom and certainty 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In chapter 2 above, it was concluded that the fundamental analytical framework of contract law 
centred on the “voluntary choices of individuals or more specifically, the voluntary assumption 
of obligations” and that the function of contract law “is conceived as principally the facilitation 
of voluntary choices by giving them legal effect.”978 It was explained that this approach is 
justified on the basis that public policy demands contractual autonomy, and freedom and 
sanctity of contract.979 Adherence to these notions is deemed necessary for the promotion of 
legal and commercial certainty.980 
Chapter 3 dealt with the policy considerations and the constitutional values informing 
consumer protection legislation and the impact thereof on the principles of consensus and of 
                                                            
978  Pretorius ‘The basis of contractual liability (1) Ideologies and approaches’ (2005) 68 THRHR 253, 260, 
hereafter Pretorius (2005) 68 THRHR. The corollary of this is that the law must decline to enforce choices that 
are not truly voluntary – an approach not generally followed as evidenced by the enforcement of exemption 
clauses. This has consistently been the approach of our courts (see for example, Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 
1 (SCA), hereafter Brisley 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) and Bredenkamp and Others v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2010 (4) 
SA 637 (SCA) and was granted constitutional legitimacy when the Constitutional Court in Barkhuizen v Napier 
2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) confirmed that “[s]elf-autonomy, or the ability to regulate one’s own affairs, even to 
one’s own detriment, is the very essence of freedom and a vital part of dignity” (para [57]). See further 
chapter 2 paras 2.2.2-2.24 and below in this chapter. Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) is hereafter 
referred to as Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC). It will be recalled that in chapter 1 it was explained that there 
are three cases involving the Applicant and that the Applicant’s name was spelt differently in two of the three 
cases. The precautionary measures described in chapter 1 para 1.3.3 to avoid confusion between the cases 
are also followed in this chapter and are repeated here for the sake of clarity. The spellings of the Applicant’s 
name as per the case citations will be retained and to avoid any confusion between the cases, the cases will 
hereafter be referred to as follows: Breedenkamp (interim interdict) 2009 (5) SA 304 (GSJ); Breedenkamp 
(return date) 2009 (6) SA 277 (GSJ); and Bredenkamp (appeal) 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA). 
979  See chapter 2 para 2.3.  
980  See, for example, Brisley 2002 (4) SA 1 SCA where the court, in affirming the decision in SA Sentrale Ko-op 
Graanmaatskappy Bpk v Shifren en Andere 1964 (4) SA 760 AD regarding the validity of a non-variation 
clause, said that the resultant commercial consequences, legal uncertainty, and evidentiary problems do not 
justify a departure from that decision [para [8]]. See also para [10] of the Brisley case and generally the 
discussion in chapter 2, that illustrate that the principles of autonomy, freedom, and sanctity of contracts and 
certainty are vital cogs in South African contract law.  
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freedom, sanctity and certainty of contract and concluded that policy considerations can 
operate in harmony with, and even promote these principles. 
This chapter considers the question whether an agreement to a reasonable price or rental or a 
unilaterally determined price or rental981 can be said (i) to be the result of a voluntary choice; 
(ii) to promote certainty;982 (iii) to be reflective of the constitutional, jurisprudential and policy 
imperatives that inform the essentialia983 of price and rental and (iv) to be in line with the policy 
direction of recent consumer protection legislation.984 
Part one of this chapter discusses the constitutional, jurisprudential and policy imperatives that 
inform the essentialia of price and rental, laying the foundations for a conclusion regarding 
their role and function in the promotion of the principles of contractual freedom and certainty. 
Part two deals with the court’s function in the determination of the essentialia of price and 
rental985 and how such role affects the principles of contractual freedom and certainty. 
The aim is to provide a basis for a conclusion about the impact that recognition of the obiter 
dicta would have on the principles of freedom of contract, consensus and certainty that form 
the basis of the law of contract in South Africa.986 
 
                                                            
981  It will be recalled that in NBS Boland Bank v One Berg River Drive and others Deeb and another v ABSA Bank 
Ltd Friedman v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA), hereafter NBS Boland Bank 1999 (4) 
SA 928 (SCA), the Supreme Court of Appeal was of the view that our law should recognise the granting of a 
discretionary power to one of the contracting parties to unilaterally determine the price or rental in contracts 
of sale and lease respectively. In Genac Properties JHB (Pty) Ltd v NBC Administrators CC 1992 (1) SA 566 (A) 
hereafter Genac Properties 1992 (1) SA 566 (A) the then Appellate Division opined that contracts of sale and 
lease at a reasonable price or rental, respectively, should be regarded as valid. 
982  Discussed in chapter 2 para 2.6. 
983  Discussed in para 4.2.4 below. 
984  Discussed in chapter 3 paras 3.4, 3.6.2, 3.7.2 and 3.10. 
985  As explained in a footnote in chapter 1 para 1.2 there is a marked similarity between contracts of sale and 
contracts of lease: Cooper Landlord and Tenant (1994) 6-7, hereafter Cooper Landlord and Tenant. Hence, the 
practice of referring mainly to the law relating to the price in contracts of sale followed in the previous 
chapters will be continued in the interest of brevity and avoiding repetition. Differences between the two will 
be highlighted. 
986  The principles of freedom of contract (incorporating consensus) and certainty were discussed in chapter 2 
paras 2.2 and 2.6.  
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4.2 The constitutional, jurisprudential and policy imperatives underlying essentialia and their 
implications for the principles of contractual freedom and certainty  
4.2.1 Introduction 
The law as understood today consists of secular legal norms designed to regulate human 
conduct in an orderly manner to maximise harmony and opportunities for all.987 The law 
acquires its authority from a contract between the State and its citizens in terms of which the 
citizens surrender their unlimited freedom988 for the promotion of peaceful co-existence and 
prosperity. The authority of the law is, to a large extent, informed by John Locke’s theory of the 
                                                            
987  Hosten Introduction to South African Law and Legal Theory (1995) 11 and 20, hereafter Hosten Introduction; 
Scott, Baqwa, Eiselin, Humby, Kelly-Louw, Konyn, Kopel, Mukheiber, Schoeman, Smit, Sutherland and Van der 
Bijl The Law of Commerce in South Africa: commercial law (2009) 1-5, hereafter Scott et al The Law of 
Commerce; Du Bois, Bradfield, Himonga, Hutchison, Lehmann, le Roux, Paleker, Pope, van der Merwe & 
Visser Wille’s Principles of South African Law (2007) 20-22, hereafter Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles; 
Petersmann ‘Human Rights and International Economic Law: Common Constitutional Challenges and 
Changing Structures’ 2012/07 European University Institute, Florence Department of Law EUI Working Paper 
LAW 1, 8 
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/21434/LAW_2012_07_Petersmann.pdf?sequence=1> 
hereafter Petersmann ‘Human Rights and International Economic Law.’  
Though a definition of the law is given here, it must be cautioned that the definition does not (and cannot in 
the context of this work) contain a description of the “interdependencies of the various parts of a general 
theory of law”: Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (1978) (viii), hereafter Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously. 
Dworkin explains that a general theory of law “must be normative as well as conceptual.” The normative 
theory that includes a theory of legislation, adjudication, and compliance from the perspective of the 
lawmaker, the judge and the ordinary citizen, is “embedded in a more general political and moral philosophy 
which may in turn depend upon philosophical theories about human nature or the objectivity of morality.” 
The conceptual theory draws on “the philosophy of language and therefore upon logic and metaphysics” (vii-
(ix). See also Edwards The History of South African Law: an outline (1996) 1-2. The conceptual framework of 
this chapter is discussed in the paragraph following this footnote reference.  
988  This happens through an implicit agreement to obey laws. 
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social contract.989 The notion of the social contract is in line with the philosophical and 
jurisprudential underpinnings of the classical contract law doctrine.990 
 
4.2.2 Conceptual framework 
South Africa is a constitutional democracy and the constitution is the symbolic embodiment of 
the social contract. The social contract is implicit in the Preamble of the Constitution. In it the 
people of South Africa adopt the Constitution “as the supreme law of the Republic of South 
Africa so as to...[l]ay the foundations for an open and democratic society in which government 
is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by the law." The 
Constitution functions as an enabler of rights and powers but the rights and freedom are not 
absolute.991 The Constitution places limitations on the exercise of these rights and powers by 
ordinary people and government officials and institutions.992 The boundaries are set by the 
rights of others and “by important social concerns such as public order, safety, health and 
democratic values.”993  
The rule of law which is entrenched in the founding provisions994 serves to protect individual 
rights whilst the founding values of dignity, equality and freedom995 represent the boundaries 
                                                            
989  Locke (1632-1704), an English philosopher, was a proponent of natural law who preached the theory of 
individualism which propagates a belief in the competence of people to make their own decisions and to 
conduct their affairs without regard to others: Feinman ‘Essay Critical Approaches to Contract Law’ (1982-
1983) 30 UCLA LR 829, 839, hereafter Feinman (1982-1983) 30 UCLA LR. Locke saw the task of the State as 
being an impartial and objective one of protecting people’s rights and he hence grounded the justification of 
the state in its ability to protect human rights better than individuals could: Johnson, Pete & Du Plessis 
Jurisprudence: A South African Perspective (2001) 40, hereafter Johnson et al Jurisprudence. See also Smith 
Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract (2005) 10, hereafter Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law 
of Contract; Hosten Introduction 66-67.        
990  Discussed in chapter 2 para 2.2. See also the discussion of the notion of a social contract in paras 4.2.2 and 
4.2.3 of this chapter. 
991  Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 163, hereafter Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights.  
992  Devenish A commentary on the South African bill of rights (1999) 16. 
993  Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights 163. Section 36 of the Constitution, for example, provides the criteria for 
the limitation of the rights in the Bill of Rights. 
994  Section 1 of the Constitution. 
995  Section 1 of the Constitution. 
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of legitimate human conduct.996 The conceptual framework of this chapter, as indeed of the 
thesis as a whole, is anchored in the fundamental rights and values of the Constitution and 
especially the values of dignity, equality and freedom which enjoy “double constitutionality” in 
the sense that they are amongst the foundational values of the Constitution997 and they are 
also enumerated as basic human rights in the Bill of Rights.998 The values also occupy a central 
place in our understanding of the section 36 limitation clause999 as well as in the section 39 
interpretation clause.1000 
In the endeavour to achieve the goal of promoting peaceful co-existence and prosperity,1001 the 
law safeguards, and, at the same time, delimits the freedom of the individual in relation to the 
freedom of others. One of the ways the law does so is by securing, protecting, and promoting 
individual freedom within the framework of the limitations placed on it by the law itself.1002 It 
would not be inapposite to say that an important aspect of the legitimacy of the law is its 
attitude to the individual, including its assumptions and presumptions about the individual’s 
                                                            
996  The consumer protection legislation (discussed in chapter 3), testify to this as well as the provisions of the 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 that declare the inclusion of 
contractual terms, conditions and practices, the effect whereof are to perpetuate the consequences of past 
discrimination, as well the unfair limitation or denial of contractual opportunities, to be practices which 
amount to unfair discrimination. See section 29 read with item 9b of the Schedule of Act 4 of 2000. 
997   Section 1 reads: “The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following 
values: (a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and 
freedoms…” Section 7 provides that the Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa and that it 
“enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, 
equality and freedom.” Emphasis added. 
998  Sections 9 (equality), 10 (dignity) and 12 (freedom and security of person). 
999  Section 36(1) provides that the limitation of the rights in the Bill of Rights may occur “only in terms of a law of 
general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom ...“ 
1000  Section 39 (1) provides that when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum must promote the 
values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. See 
further the discussion of these values and rights in para 4.2.4.2 below.  
1001  See para 4.2.1 above. 
1002  For example, whilst section 16 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of expression, it also limits those 
rights by proscribing, for example, hate speech. The right to freedom of expression is also limited by the 
common law in that it extends only so far as the boundary of, for example, the delict of defamation. Another 
example concerns the individual’s right to control over his/her physical being which is limited by the crime 
that prohibits the consumption of illegal substances. See the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992. 
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capacity to deliberate and exercise choices.1003 The law, therefore, invests the individual with 
power and, at the same time, curbs the individual’s power of self-determination or self-
realisation through acts of their choice.1004 This dichotomy is also evident in the notion of 
essentialia discussed below.1005 
By way of summary, the law, in essence, has a boundary-defining purpose.1006 The purpose of 
legal boundaries is to provide vital information to regulate the creation of rights and obligations 
and thereby to promote certainty and to curtail disputes in order to secure a just and 
harmonious society. The realisation of this boundary-defining function is dependent on 
knowledge (actual or imputed) of these boundaries. In President of the Republic of South Africa 
and Another v Hugo1007 the Constitutional Court said that “[a] person should be able to know 
the law, and be able to conform his or her conduct to the law.” In the absence of such 
knowledge, and within the context of the social contract theory, the law will have failed to 
identify and to communicate the boundaries that must be observed and respected. Individuals 
would not be able to accurately ascertain what constitutes lawful conduct and on what 
commitments they may rely. The result would be that “[d]isputes that might otherwise have 
been avoided will occur, and the attendant uncertainties … will discourage beneficial 
reliance.”1008 
In contract law, the boundary-defining function is realised if the consent to assume obligations 
is manifested “in a manner that provides a criterion for enforcement” and by the acceptance 
that “[o]nly a general reliance on objectively ascertainable assertive conduct will enable a legal 
                                                            
1003  This is illustrated by the assumptions underlying the policy initiatives of consumer protection legislation. See 
chapter 3. 
1004  See also chapter 2 para 2.7. 
1005  See paras 4.2.4.2(B), 4.2.4.3 and 4.2.4.4 below.  
1006  Barnett ‘Contract is Not a Promise; Contract is Consent’ Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research 
Paper No. 11-29 (2011) Georgetown Law The Scholarly Commons, 
<http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/615> 1, 13, hereafter cited as Barnett ‘Contract is Not a 
Promise; Contract is Consent.’ 
1007  1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) para [102]. 
1008  Barnett ‘Contract is Not a Promise; Contract is Consent’13. 
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system to perform its boundary-defining purpose.”1009 Essentialia serve, at a basic or atomistic 
level, both to define and to communicate knowledge of such boundaries1010 and in doing so 
they promote the principles of consensus and certainty which play a central role in contract 
law.1011 
To fulfil the role of social organisation,1012 the law must, inter alia, be certain,1013 clear, 
transparent, consistent and uniform.1014 It must not be ambiguous but must be framed with 
such a degree of clarity that its requirements are comprehensible. In Dawood and Another v 
Minister of Home Affairs and Another,1015  the Constitutional Court held that it is an important 
principle of the rule of law that rules be stated in a “clear and accessible manner.” In President 
of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo,1016 the Constitutional Court1017 held that a norm can be 
regarded as law only if “it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to 
regulate his conduct: he must be able – if need be with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a 
degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may 
                                                            
1009  Barnett ‘Contract is Not a Promise; Contract is Consent’ 13-14. 
1010   See the discussion of essentialia in paras 4.2.4.2, 4.2.4.3 and 4.2.4.4 below.  
1011  Van der Merwe, van Huyssteen, Reinecke & Lubbe Contract: General Principles (2012) 192 et seq, hereafter 
Van der Merwe et al Contract.The requirement of certainty features as a separate requirement for the 
validity of contracts in general and it also finds expression in the requirement that the offer must be certain. 
Offer and acceptance constitute agreement (consensus) which is the first requirement for a valid contract: 
Van Huyssteen, Van der Merwe & Maxwell Contract Law in South Africa (2012) para [135]. See also Lubbe & 
Murray Farlam & Hathaway Contract Cases, Materials and Commentary (1988) 307, hereafter Lubbe & 
Murray Contract. The principle of certainty is sufficiently elastic to accommodate contracts where an aspect 
thereof has been left open for determination at a later stage subject to the key requirement that such an 
arrangement renders the consequences objectively ascertainable: Van der Merwe et al Contract 192-193 and 
197-201. An example of this would be where the price of an object is tied to the price list of the seller or a 
competitor of the seller. See Shell SA (Pty) Ltd v Corbitt and Another 1984 4 SA 523 (CPD). 
1012   The preceding discussion revealed that one of the functions of the law is to provide justification for conduct, 
the law being, inter alia, an enabler of conduct. 
1013  The doctrine of stare decisis, a characteristic of developed legal systems, is emblematic of the principle of 
certainty: Hosten Introduction 386-388. It promotes stability, the protection of justified expectations, the 
efficient administration of justice, equality of treatment and the enforcement of justice: Hosten 508-509. See 
also chapter 1 para 1.3.2.1 
1014  President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) para [102], hereafter Hugo 
1997 (4) SA 1 (CC); Hosten Introduction 13-15; Scott et al The Law of Commerce 10-11. 
1015  2000 (3) 936 CC para [47]. 
1016  1997 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
1017  See para [99], quoting the European Court of Human Rights in The Sunday Times v The United Kingdom (1979) 
2 EHRR 245. 
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entail.”1018 In the absence of such formulation, it would, indeed, be difficult to expect legally 
responsible behaviour between individuals, and between individuals and society at large. 
In South Africa, the law finds its authority and legitimacy in the Constitution1019 which provides 
that every aspect of the legal system must conform to its values and principles, including 
chapter 2 thereof, which contains the Bill of Rights. Section 2, that enshrines the Constitution as 
the supreme law of the Republic of South Africa, pronounces as invalid any law, or conduct that 
is inconsistent with it.1020 The chief constitutional values are those of freedom, equality, and 
dignity.1021 
 
4.2.3 Contractual framework 
A fundamental tenet of the social contract theory is the notion that all branches of the law have 
a contractual foundation hence the notion of contract is fundamental in legal science.1022 
Contracts allow contractants to create laws for themselves.1023 In the context of this paradigm, 
the classical notion of freedom of contract with its emphasis on autonomy and individual liberty 
                                                            
1018  See also Currie & de Waal The Bill of Rights 10-13. 
1019  Sections 2, 7 and 8 of the Constitution. See also Currie & de Waal The Bill of Rights 8-10. See also chapter 2 
para 2.8. 
1020   In addition, Section 39(2) enjoins every court, tribunal, or forum to promote the spirit, purport, and objects of 
the Bill of rights when developing the common or customary law. Section 172 provides that a court with 
jurisdiction must declare any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution, invalid, to the extent 
of its inconsistency. See also Currie & de Waal The Bill of Rights 8-10. 
1021  See section 1 of the Constitution. See also para 4.2.4.2(A) below. 
1022  Public law being a contract between the State in its capacity as a public governing authority and its subjects; 
and Private and Commercial law providing the capacity for a range of diverse contractual relationships 
between legal subjects. Contract is also evident in other disciplines, amongst others, theology, political 
science, sociology and economics. Pesqueux ‘Social contract and psychological contract: a comparison’ (2012) 
7 Society and Business Review1, 14-15, hereafter Pesqueux (2012) 7 Society and Business Review1. See also 
Llewellyn ‘What Price Contract? – An Essay in Perspective’ (1931) 40 Yale LJ 704, hereafter Llewellyn (1931) 
40 Yale LJ704, for an insightful perspective on the role, function and development of contract as an avenue 
for creating binding relations. 
1023  Feinman referring to Holmes OW The Common Law (1881) 299-303 and Story W A Treatise of the Law of 
Contract Not Under Seal (1844) 4 in (1982-1983) 30 UCLA LR 832. Its purpose, inter alia, is to promote 
efficiency in transactions: Posner ‘Tribute to Ronald Dworkin and a Note on Pragmatic Adjudication’ (2007-
2008) 63 NYU Annual Survey of American Law 9, 12. See also Kerr Contract 3. 
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would appear to reign supreme.1024 However, the individual’s power to create laws for 
himself/herself is exercised within the parameters laid down by the law, in conformity with the 
Constitution.1025 The Constitution, as the supreme law, exercises control at a fundamental level 
since all laws and conduct derive legitimacy from it.1026 
Since a contract represents the law made by the contractants for themselves in that it is 
descriptive of the rights and duties that bind them, the law governing the creation of a contract 
must also display, inter alia, the qualities and values displayed by the law in general, namely, 
certainty, clarity, transparency, consistency and uniformity.1027 These qualities and values are 
promoted if the rules regulating the conduct are exact.1028 The notions of certainty and clarity 
are also subsumed in one of the general requirements for the validity of contracts, namely, that 
the contractants must reach consensus by means of offer and acceptance. Both the offer and 
acceptance must, inter alia, be clear and precise in order to achieve consensus.1029 Certainty1030 
is also one of the general requirements for the validity of a contract.1031 In the context of the 
law-making function of contracts, the essentialia of each specific contract serve to give effect to 
the characteristics of the law by promoting certainty, clarity, transparency, consistency and 
uniformity.1032 
                                                            
1024  See the discussion in chapter 2 para 2.2 of the classical law approach to the notion of freedom of contract 
and the discussion in para 2.4 of that chapter of the limitations on that notion.    
1025  See the discussion in para 4.2.2 in this chapter above. See also Kerr Contract 3. Scott et al The Law of 
Commerce 42-47. 
1026  See sections 2, 7, 8, 39(2) and 172 of the Constitution. See also the discussion in para 4.2.2 above; Cockrell 
‘Second-guessing the exercise of contractual power on rationality grounds’ (1997) Acta Juridica 26, 48-49, 
hereafter Cockrell (1997) Acta Juridica.  
1027  The law of contract being a subset of the law in general, it must conform to the qualities of the law in general. 
See para 4.2.2 above for a discussion of the latter. 
1028  See the discussion of rules and standards in para 4.2.4.3 below. 
1029  Van der Merwe et al Contract 48-49 and 53; Hosten Introduction 703; Hutchison, Pretorius, Du Plessis, 
Eiselen, Floyd, Hawthorne, Kuschke, Maxwell, Naudé and De Stadler The Law of Contract in South Africa 
(2012) 48-49, hereafter Hutchison et al Contract. O’Donovan MacKeurtan’s Sale of Goods in South Africa 
(1972) 29-30, hereafter O’Donovan MacKeurtan’s. 
1030  And, by implication, clarity, transparency consistency and uniformity. 
1031  Van der Merwe et al Contract 221 et seq; Hutchison et al Contract 210-216. 
1032  See the discussion of essentialia in paras 4.2.4.2(B) and 4.2.4.3 below. 
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A contract is essentialist in its orientation in that it encapsulates, inter alia, the will, the 
agreement, the promise, the obligation, the pledge to honour the commitment, the 
expectation,1033 the assurance and cooperation, and the sanction of the contractants.1034 These 
undertakings are contained expressly or implicitly in the terms of a contract.1035 Accordingly, 
the terms1036 of a contract fulfil the fundamental role of structuring the legal relationship 
between the contractants.1037 A vital aspect is that they regulate the uncertainty regarding the 
conditions under which a performance may occur to minimise the risk that the cost-to-benefit 
ratio of a contract may be somewhat different to what may have been contemplated or 
anticipated at date of contract.1038 Hence, contract law contains rules that have the effect of 
attenuating the possible adverse consequences of contracts and of reducing the risks to the 
contractants. The notion of essentialia represents one such set of rules.1039 
Since price is an essentiale of a contract of sale, the discussion that follows concerns the 
constitutional, jurisprudential and policy imperatives underpinning essentialia1040 in order to 
ascertain the role and function of price as an essentiale in contracts of sale. 
 
                                                            
1033  On a psychological level, the contract represents the expectations of the contractants: Bankins Investigating 
the Dynamics of the psychological contract: How and why individuals’ contract beliefs change Doctor of 
Philosophy Thesis, School of Management, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia (2012) 
1-2.  
1034  Pesqueux (2012) 7 Society and Business Review 14. As will be illustrated the content of these rights and 
obligations is not determined exclusively by the intentions of the contractants.  
1035  Van der Merwe et al Contract 241-245; Hutchison et al Contract 236-237; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 797; 
Beale Chitty On Contract Vol 1 (2008) para [12-001], hereafter Beale Chitty on Contract Vol 1. The terms 
define the performances of the contractants, setting out, inter alia, the nature and description of the 
commodities or services due by the contractants and the manner, time and place of performance: Havenga et 
al General Principles of Commercial Law 97; Gibson Wille’s Principles of South African Law  (1970) 340.  
1036  The terms of a contract are classified into essentialia, naturalia, and incidentalia. See chapter 1 paras 1.1, 
1.3.1 and 1.4.2. 
1037  They give practical content to the construction that the law of contract serves mainly to determine the limits 
within which contractants may bind themselves. See the discussion of the boundary-defining functions of the 
law in para 4.2.2 above. 
1038  In Cobble Hill Nursing Home, In. V Henry & Warren Corp., 548 N.E. 2d 203, 206 (N.Y. 1989), the court said that 
certainty ensures that contractants are not bound by unintended contractual duties. 
1039  See further the discussion in para 4.2.4.2(B) below. 
1040  Naturalia and incidentalia are briefly discussed in two footnotes in para 4.2.4.2(B)(i) below. 
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4.2.4 Essentialia 
4.2.4.1 Introduction 
Cognisant of the context of the exigencies of the classical contract law notion of individual 
autonomy within which it operates,1041the term essentialia refers, in general, to those 
requirements on the compliance whereof the validity of all contracts is dependent.1042 Over and 
above its generic meaning, the term essentialia encapsulates those (minimum) terms that typify 
the contract as belonging to a particular genus and that must be agreed upon for the validity of 
the contract as a member of that particular genus.1043 In other words, essentialia specify the 
threshold terms that must be stipulated for a contract to belong to a particular genus. 
Consequently, the essentialia, not only, distinguish the different specific contracts from one 
another, but also, articulate the legal and economic functions of each contract.1044 In this 
                                                            
1041  Individual autonomy being regarded as the jurisprudential fountainhead of the related concepts of 
consensuality, freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda: Pretorius (2005) 68 THRHR 260. See also Lubbe 
& Murray Contract 21; chapter 2 para 2.2. 
1042  These essentialia are usually referred to as the general requirements for the validity of contracts and consist 
of the following: offer and acceptance, contractual capacity, formalities where required by law or by the 
contractants, legality, possibility of performance and certainty: Van der Merwe et al Contract 46-211; 
Hutchison et al Contract 149-216; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 740-772; Wessels & Roberts The Law of 
Contract in South Africa (1951) paras [42-54], hereafter Wessels & Roberts The Law of Contract in South 
Africa.  
1043  The common law identifies specific contracts by means of their essentialia. A valid contract comes into 
existence on agreement about the essentialia. Essentialia encapsulate the essence of the contract which is 
fleshed out by the naturalia, and incidentalia where the latter have been agreed upon: Van der Merwe et al 
Contract 245. See also Hutchison et al Contract 237; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 790. The fact that the 
essentialia are not complied with does not necessarily result in the overall invalidity of the contract. The 
contract may then fall into another genus in that it may display the essentialia of that genus or it may be 
classified as a sui generis or an innominate contract. So, for example, where, in a contract of “sale”, the 
counter-performance does not consist in the payment of a sum of money but in the delivery of some object, 
the contract would not be a contract of sale but rather one of exchange: Van der Merwe et al Contract 245. 
The same position prevails in Australia and England: Lücke ‘Illusory, Vague and Uncertain Contractual Terms’ 
(1977-1978) 6 Adel LR 1, 6, hereafter Lücke (1977-1978) 6 Adel LR1. In May & Butcher v The King [1934] 2 K.B. 
17, 22 the court re-iterated that it is a “well known and elementary principle of contract law ... that, unless 
the essential terms of the contract are agreed upon, there is no binding and enforceable obligation.” 
1044  Lubbe & Murray Contract 416. They determine the legal rights and obligations (for example, the title 
transferred and received) as well as the economic benefit (for example, the ability to use and enjoy or to 
alienate) derived by the contractants.  
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context, they serve an important function in that the class of contract determines the naturalia 
of the particular contract.1045 
In addition to serving as a tool for identifying a contract as belonging to a specific class or 
category,1046 essentialia also address the certainty requirement in each type of contract.1047 
Essentialia do so by providing the basic authoritative framework – the basic code of conduct – 
within which contractants are expected to fashion their rights and obligations. In the process, 
they identify and emphasise the most important obligations that flow from that contract.1048 
Essentialia provide not only, theoretical and practical guidance, but also, clarity and precision to 
the code of conduct which the contractants create for themselves.1049 
By framing the boundaries of the choices facing the contractants,1050 essentialia, not only, 
enable contractants to agree to a performance, but also, serve to minimize the possibility of the 
one being subjected to the mercy of the other, and, conversely, they maximize the consensual 
aspect of the contract.1051 In doing so, they seek to minimize the scope for a contractant to 
inflict harm by pursuing economic interests1052 at the expense of the other.1053 In fulfilling this 
role, essentialia gives practical effect to the Aristotelian notion of distributive justice1054 by 
                                                            
1045  Van der Merwe et al Contract 246-247. Havenga et al General Principles of Commercial Law 99. 
1046  Hosten Introduction 720. 
1047  Naude ‘The preconditions for recognition of a specific type or sub-type of contract – the essentialia-naturalia 
approach and the typological method’ (2003) 3 TSAR 411, hereafter Naude (2003) 3 TSAR 411. See further 
para 4.2.4.3 below. 
1048  Van der Merwe et al Contract 245; Hosten Introduction 770.  
1049  Essentialia are, in essence, the building blocks on which the particular contract is built. 
1050  This accords, not only, with the boundary-defining function of the law (see para 4.2.2 above), but also with 
the enabling function of contracts (see para 4.2.3 above). 
1051  As explained in chapter 2, above, the place of consensus is cemented into the contract law landscape. 
1052  Such as securing a price, quality, or terms at the expense of the other. The role of consumer protection 
legislation in addressing the possibility of exploitation has been discussed in chapter 3 above. 
1053  By requiring each contractant to participate in the decision-making the risk of exploitation is minimized. 
1054  Aristotle distinguished between distributive and commutative or corrective justice. Distributive justice has to 
do with the equal treatment of people before the law and relates to the distribution of goods whilst 
commutative justice is concerned with rectifying disturbances in the distribution of goods, for example, 
where one person acquires goods meant for another: Johnson et al Jurisprudence 15; Hosten Introduction 24-
25; Speidel ‘The Borderland of Contract’ (1983) 10(2) Northern Kentucky LR 163; Du Bois et al Wille’s 
Principles 15-16. See also the discussion of distributive justice in chapter 2 paras 2.3.1 and 2.3.3. 
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treating the contractants as equals, both on a procedural as well as a substantive level.1055 They 
promote freedom by providing, paradoxically, the framework that ensures responsible conduct. 
Equality is attained by imposing the framework on all the contractants. The equal treatment of 
all the contractants promotes dignity.1056 Hence, essentialia embody or personify the notions of 
dignity, equality and freedom which are the hallmarks of the Constitution and which the 
proponents of the classical contract law theory presumptively proclaim as the hallmark of their 
doctrine.1057 
 
4.2.4.2 The constitutional dimensions of essentialia 
(A) The role of dignity, equality and freedom in modern jurisprudence 
In order to engage in a discussion of the constitutional dimensions of essentialia, it is necessary 
to discuss the role and function and of the double constitutional1058 values of dignity, equality 
and freedom in modern jurisprudence. 
 
(i) The position in public law 
In modern jurisprudence, equality is deemed to be at the heart of justice.1059 Section 9 of the 
Constitution1060 provides that “[e]veryone is equal before the law and has the right to equal 
protection and benefit of the law.”  
                                                            
1055  The role of essentialia as an instrument of equality is dealt with in paras 4.2.4.2(B), 4.2.4.3 and 4.2.4.4 below. 
1056  See the discussion of the inter-relationship between dignity and equality in the text following this footnote 
reference. Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles observe that the engine of a “constitutional value system” is driven 
by the “pursuit of dignity and equality” (38).   
1057  In chapter 2, it was explained that the principle that contracts must be honoured is justified by classical law 
theorist on the basis that it serves to give expression to the dignity, equality and freedom of the contractants. 
It was also explained that the theory operates in a vacuum in that it did not take cognisance of, for example, 
unequal bargaining power and the impact of standard form contracts and exemption clauses on a 
contractant’s freedom to negotiate with dignity. Hence, the notion of presumptive consensus. See further the 
discussion of the dignity, equality and freedom in chapters 1 and 2. See also chapter 9 on the right to equality 
in Currie & de Waal The Bill of Rights. 
1058  See para 4.2.2 above and para 4.2.4.2(B) below. 
1059  Hosten Introduction 982. 
1060  The equality clause. 
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In Satchwell v President of Republic of South Africa & Another,1061 the Constitutional Court was 
confronted with the question whether sections 8 and 9 of the Judges’ Remuneration and 
Conditions of Employment Act 88 of 1989 was in conflict with section 9(3) of the 
Constitution.1062 The Court granted the order of unconstitutionality on the grounds that the 
impugned sections violated the section 9(3) prohibition against unfair discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation and marital status.  
In Khoza & Others v Minister of Social Development & Others1063 the Constitutional Court had to 
comment on the constitutionality of certain sections of the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992. 
The Court1064 concluded that the impugned sections that disqualified non-South African citizens 
from receiving certain welfare grants was not a reasonable manner to achieve the realisation of 
the right to achieve social security and severely impacted on the dignity of such persons. It 
further held that the exclusions were unfair and discriminatory and infringed the right to 
equality.  
In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs1065 that invalidated 
the common law offence of sodomy,1066 the Constitutional Court focused, not only, on the 
section 9(3) right not to be discriminated against on the basis of sexual orientation, but also, on 
the rights to privacy and dignity.1067 
                                                            
1061  2002 (6) SA 1 (CC). 
1062  The impugned sections made provision for the payment of certain benefits to the surviving spouse of a 
deceased judge. 
1063  2004 (6) SA 504 (CC). 
1064  Paras [70]-[85]. 
1065  1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) paras [23], [28]-[30], [60]-[62]. 
1066  Para [27]. 
1067  In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 (2) 
SA 1 (CC) the Constitutional Court based its decision on the rights to equality and dignity in deciding that 
same-sex couples had the same right as married couples to the enjoyment of immigration benefits and 
privileges (paras [28]-[29], [36]-[37], [40], [42] and [53]-[54]). Similar considerations applied in Dawood and 
Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Other 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) where the Constitutional Court held that 
the requirement that foreign spouses of South African citizens had to return home before their application 
for permanent residence could be considered was an infringement of their right to dignity (paras [35]-[37]). 
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The above cases are also grounded in the notion of human dignity which is probably the most 
important right in the Constitution.1068 The recognition of same-sex life partnerships as 
marriages takes dignity “beyond the merely restitutional, and articulates a fundamentally 
transformative vision of our politics.”1069 Human dignity is “a pre-imminent value in the 
Constitution, even more so than the right to life.”1070 In S v Makwanyane1071 the Constitutional 
Court said that “the rights to life and dignity are the most important of all human rights…By 
committing ourselves to a society founded on the recognition of human rights we are required 
to value these two rights above all others.”  
The Constitutional Court has also said that “unfair discrimination…means treating persons 
differently in a way which impairs their fundamental dignity as human beings, who are 
inherently equal in dignity.”1072 
In defining the right to dignity, the Constitutional Court, per Ackermann J, in Ferreira v Levin,1073 
placed respect for the “uniqueness” of the individual at the core of the right. Offering a 
                                                            
1068  See chapter 10 in Currie & de Waal The Bill of Rights.  
1069  Woolman ‘On Rights, Rules, Relationships and Refusals: A Reply to Van Marle’s ‘Jurisprudence of Generosity’ 
(2007) 18 Stell LR 508, 511, hereafter Woolman (2007) 18 Stell LR. 
1070  Davis, Cheadle & Haysom Fundamental rights in the constitution: commentary and cases: a commentary on 
chapter 3 on fundamental rights of the 1993 constitution and chapter 2 of the 1996 constitution (1997) 70. 
The International Criminal Tribunal has said that “[t]he general principle of respect for human dignity is the 
basic underpinning and indeed the very raison d’être of international humanitarian law and human rights law; 
indeed in modern times it has become of such paramount importance as to permeate the whole body of 
international law. This principle is intended to shield human beings from outrages upon their personal 
dignity”: Heath ‘Human Dignity at Trial: Hard Cases and Broad Concepts in International Criminal Law’ 
(DRAFT) 1, 22, <http://works.bepress.com/jbenton_heath/3>, hereafter Heath ‘Human Dignity at Trial: Hard 
Cases and Broad Concepts in International Criminal Law’ (DRAFT) 1.  
1071  1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). The Constitutional Court held that the death penalty was an unconstitutional form of 
punishment (para [144]). The Court also held that the right to dignity was included as one of the “relevant 
factors” to be considered in determining whether punishment is cruel, inhuman or degrading (paras [94] and 
[135]). Whilst there was unanimity that the death penalty constituted cruel, inhuman and degrading 
punishment, there was no unanimity that it violated the right to life with the majority of the court deciding 
that it did.  
1072  Prinsloo v Van Der Linde 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC), para [31]. In other words, the infringement of human dignity 
by virtue of unequal treatment amounts prima facie to unfair discrimination for the purposes of the right to 
equality. The case dealt with the constitutionality of section 84 of the Forest Act 122 of 1984 on the ground 
that it imposed a presumption of negligence on landowners in respect of fires that occurred in “non-
controlled” areas whereas this presumption was absent in respect of fires that occurred in “controlled” areas. 
In the circumstances, the provision did not amount to an impairment of dignity in that the differentiation was 
not based on the attributes and characteristics of those affected. 
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different perspective, the Constitutional Court1074 per Mokgoro J in S v Makwanyane defined 
dignity in the context of ubuntu.1075 Mokgoro described ubuntu as humaneness and explains 
that “[i]n its most fundamental sense, it translates as personhood and morality.” It envelopes 
“the key values of group solidarity, compassion, respect, human dignity, conformity to basic 
norms and collective unity.”1076 Hence, ubuntu refers to an interconnectedness between the 
individual and society and society and the individual. In this paradigm, human dignity, although 
relating to the individual, is conceived as being part of the notion of humaneness: dignity 
meaning compassion and caring for vulnerable members of society.  
The Mokgoro definition which goes much wider than the traditional conceptions of dignity,1077 
acknowledges that human dignity is as much a matter of moral rights as it is of positive law.1078  
Because morality has to do with how people should lead their lives and how they should treat 
one another, the precepts of morality overlap many aspects of behaviour that are governed by 
rules of law.1079  Morality “enjoins each actor to respect the other’s humanity ... and celebrates 
pursuits that involve others not only without disrespecting them (that is “using” them in 
Kantian terminology,) but also by furthering their own pursuits as they further the actor’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
1073  1996 (1) SA 984 (CC), para 49, hereafter Ferreira 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC). This case dealt with the interpretation 
to be given to the guarantee of “the right to freedom of security of the person” contained in section 11(1) of 
the Interim Constitution. The Constitutional Court ruled against the use of evidence compulsorily obtained in 
a liquidation enquiry in a subsequent criminal case against the person who had given such evidence.    
1074  1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), para [308]. 
1075  See also the discussion of ubuntu in chapter 1 para 1.3.3.   
1076  Para [308]. 
1077  Mokgoro J’s definition incorporates, inter alia, the notion of humanness, social justice and fairness (see also 
the discussion in chapter 1 para 1.3.3). National and international courts “often agree on only a few ‘core 
elements’ of ‘human dignity.’” These would include the beliefs that “(1) every human being possesses an 
intrinsic worth and moral entitlement to human rights, merely by being human; (2) this moral worth and 
entitlement must be recognized and respected by others; (3) also the state must be seen to exist for the sake 
of the individual human being, and not vice versa”: Petersmann ‘Human Rights and International Economic 
Law’ 1. See also Heath ‘Human Dignity at Trial: Hard Cases and Broad Concepts in International Criminal Law’ 
(DRAFT) 7-8 for the expanded interpretation and application of human dignity. 
1078  See Petersmann ‘Human Rights and International Economic Law’ 2.  
1079  Fried ‘The Convergence of Contract and Promise’ (2007) 120 Harvard LR 1, 2, hereafter Fried (2007) 120 
Harvard LR. 
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pursuit.”1080 The Mokgoro paradigm provides the context for the transformation of society into 
a more just and egalitarian one, both in the public and private law spheres.1081 
The indivisibility of human dignity and equality and other human rights was expressly 
recognized by the Constitutional Court in Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and 
Others when the Court observed that dignity is “a value that informs the interpretation of 
many, possibly, all other rights.” 1082  Hence, the right to dignity is foundational to the 
fundamental rights. 
The right to dignity is also evident in section 26 of the Constitution that provides for a right of 
access to adequate housing. The obligation placed on the State by section 26 to provide 
conditions for the realisation of the right finds expression1083 in the Prevention of Illegal 
Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act.1084 The purpose of the Act is to prohibit the 
arbitrary eviction of unlawful occupiers; evictions must comply with prescripts of the Act. Sachs 
J expressed the constitutional dimensions when he declared that the main aim of the Act is to 
                                                            
1080  Fried (2007) 120 Harvard LR 3. 
1081  Chaskalson P is critical of the Ackermann approach in that it may constrain the lawmaker “from effecting 
critical social and economic reforms required by the Constitution itself and the process of transformation to a 
more just and egalitarian society.” Chaskalson perceives Mokgoro’s definition as providing the context for 
such transformation: Devenish The South African Constitution (2005) 63. Fried (2007) 120 Harvard LR is of a 
similar view when he writes: “Law can be, should be, but need not be a set of institutions that underwrite, 
facilitate, and enforce the demands and aspirations of morality in our dealings with each other (3). The 
consumer protection legislation, discussed in chapter 3, evidences of the resolve to attain a more just and 
egalitarian society. The same impetus may be perceived in the examples of contract case law discussed in 
para 4.2.4.2(A)(iii) below.  
1082  2000 (3) SA 936 (CC).The Constitutional Court explained that the notion of dignity, which is, not only, a 
constitutional value, but also a “justiciable and enforceable right that must respected and protected,” has 
been used to interpret rights such as the right to gender equality (Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC)); the right not to 
be punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way (Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC)); and the right to life 
(Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC)) (para [35]). In Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC),  the Constitutional 
Court said that “[r]ecognising a right to dignity is an acknowledgment of the intrinsic worth of human beings 
… [t]his right is therefore the foundation of many of the other rights …”(para [328]). See also para [144]).  
1083  Currie & de Waal The Bill of Rights 567. 
1084  19 of 1998. Another example of legislation aimed at realising socio-economic rights in the housing sector is 
the Housing Development Agency Act 23 of 2008. The Act acknowledges the need to fast-track housing 
development to address the lack of adequate housing delivery in an environment where there is an 
increasing backlog in housing delivery.  In order to meet its constitutional commitment the State enacted the 
Act to create a Housing Development Agency to co-ordinate and facilitate the acquisition of land and landed 
property, in a way that complements the capacities of Government across all sectors (section 2). 
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overcome “abuses and [to ensure] that eviction, in the future, took place in a manner 
consistent with the values of the new constitutional dispensation.”1085  The balancing of the 
rights of landowners and unlawful occupiers evident in the title of the Act had to occur within 
the framework of the values of dignity, equality, and freedom.1086 In Government of the 
Republic of South Africa v Grootboom1087 the Constitutional Court held:  
“The right of adequate housing is entrenched because we value human beings and want to 
ensure that they are afforded their basic human rights. A society must seek to ensure that the 
basic necessities of life are provided to all if it is to be a society based on human dignity.” 
The above decisions and, in particular, those reflecting the interconnectedness between dignity 
and the other foundational rights lend further weight to the Constitutional Court’s approval of 
the idea that sanctity of contract cannot be viewed in isolation but must be understood in the 
context of the core constitutional values of dignity and freedom.1088 They constitute evidence of 
a more prominent role for the double constitutional values and especially for the value of 
human dignity in contract law1089 and, more specifically, in the requirement of essentialia.1090 
Other evidence of a more defined role for the constitutional values may be found in the 
provisions of consumer protection legislation1091 and other post-constitutional legislation.1092 
                                                            
1085  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 271 (CC) 224C. 
1086  Badenhorst et al Property 250. The approach of the Act as interpreted in the Port Elizabeth Municipality case 
seeks to replace the system in the pre-constitutional dispensation that was characterized by insensitivity and 
disregard for the humanity of those being evicted with a more humane and principled approach. In the pre-
constitutional dispensation, for example, it happened that a local authority proceeded with the eviction of 
unlawful occupiers in the early hours of the morning with the assistance of police helicopters that flew 
overhead and police with guard dogs that patrolled the area issuing orders through loudhailers. People were 
threatened with arrest if they did not pack up and leave the area: Administrator, Cape, and Another v 
Ntshaqela and Others 1990 (1) SA 705 (AD). 
1087  2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) para 44. 
1088  Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) paras [57] and [87]. They also serve to temper the Supreme Court of Appeal’s 
opinion in Bredenkamp (appeal) 2010 (4) SA 637 (SCA) paras [27] – [28] that sought to negate the Barkhuizen 
court’s opinion. See chapter 1 para 1.3.3. 
1089  See para 4.2.4.2(A)(iii) below 
1090  See para 4.2.4.2(B) below. 
1091  See chapter 3. 
1092  Examples of such legislation are: Family Law: the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998, the 
Civil Union Act 17 of 2006; Labour Law: Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997; Employment Equity 
Act 55 of 1998; Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000; Property Law: 
The Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998. 
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In summary, the values of dignity, equality, and freedom symbolise the soul of the South 
African Constitution. They represent the clean break from the old to the new; from the 
undemocratic past to the egalitarian present. The Constitution being the fountainhead of all 
law in South Africa, its values transcend the bounds of Public Law and apply, and inspire with 
equal vitality, verve, and vigour in the Private Law arena.1093 “The Constitution is not a piece of 
text, a book of rules or even a definitive set of values written down for all time. Rather, it is the 
legal embodiment of the values of post apartheid South Africa.” The Constitution is “nothing 
less than South Africa in legal form.”1094 
 
(ii) The position in international perspective 
The interconnectedness between the notions of dignity, equality and freedom, manifest in 
judgments of the Constitutional Court and in democratic-era legislation, is also evident in 
various international human rights instruments and institutions.1095 The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR)1096 proclaims that all human beings are “born free and equal in dignity 
and rights.” Because human beings “are endowed with reason and conscience,” they are 
expected to act towards one another in a “spirit of brotherhood.”1097 The European Union 
Court of Justice has acknowledged that respect for human rights – including a ‘human right to 
respect human dignity’ – is a condition of the lawfulness of the acts of the EU institutions ...”1098 
                                                            
1093  The Barkhuizen case serves to illustrate this. See further para 4.2.4.2(A)(iii) below. 
1094  Roederer ‘Post-Matrix Legal Reasoning: Horizontality and the Rule of Values in South African Law’ (2003) 19 
SAJHR 57, 78 & 80-81. See also para 4.2.2 above. 
1095  “[T]he holistic conception of the ‘indivisibility’ of human rights continues to be acknowledged in numerous 
human rights instruments since its first affirmation in the UDHR of 1948”: Petersmann ‘Human Rights and 
International Economic Law’14. 
1096  Text available at <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml>  
1097  Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted 10 December 1948. 
1098  Petersmann ‘Human Rights and International Economic Law’ 14. Hawthorne writes that that notion of 
equality in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not aimed at the elimination of all forms of social 
equality, but is aimed at “equality on a fundamental level to provide an equivalent life for all.” Whilst “[t]his 
interpretation allows for differentiation among people,” it “rejects differentiation which leads to inequality in 
regard to human dignity”: Hawthorne ‘The Principle of equality in the law of contract’ 1995 (58) THRHR 157, 
159, hereafter Hawthorne 1995 (58) THRHR 157. Human dignity’s respected status in the international 
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The value of human dignity also occupies a central place in judgments of the International 
Criminal Court.1099 
The notion of human dignity of all human beings who, as stated in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR), “are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one 
another in a spirit of brotherhood”1100 also inform many national constitutions, regional human 
rights conventions and all UN human rights instruments.1101 In Germany, the notion of good 
faith served as the entry point for constitutional values in the contract law arena.1102 
 
(iii) The position in contract law 
In Hoffmann v South African Airways,1103 the Constitutional Court, in ordering the respondent 
to offer Hoffmann a contract of employment as a cabin attendant, decided that the 
respondent’s refusal impaired Hoffmann’s dignity and amounted to unfair discrimination. The 
court concluded that the refusal to employ Hoffmann because he was HIV positive violated his 
right to equality, guaranteed in Section 9 of the Constitution.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
context is also evident in that it is foundational to many human rights instruments: Petersmann ‘Human 
Rights and International Economic Law’ 3. P 
1099  The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda found that ‘hate speech targeting a 
population on the basis of ethnicity, or any other discriminatory ground, violates the right to respect for the 
dignity of the targeted group as human beings”: Heath ‘Human Dignity at Trial: Hard Cases and Broad 
Concepts in International Criminal Law’ (DRAFT) 3-4. The writer describes the judgment as a unique and 
powerful precedent in the field of international criminal law, invoking the broad preambular language of the 
Universal Declaration Human Rights and suggests that the innovative use of dignity in the case may aid “the 
outward expansion of international criminal, allowing judges to address new situations and criminalize new 
forms of conduct” (4). 
1100  Article 1. 
1101  Petersmann ‘Human Rights and International Economic Law’ 1 & 3. In contrast to this, the United States 
Constitution places “the value of individual liberty at the highest level”: Currie & de Waal The Bill of Rights 
272.  
1102  Markesinis, Unberath & Johnston The German Law of Contract: A Comparative Treatise (2006) 132. In one 
instance, an employee who was serving a trial period was dismissed apparently because he was homosexual. 
The court ruled that the dismissal was unconstitutional in that it violated his constitutionally guaranteed right 
to personality. The decision resembles the decision in Hoffmann v South African Airways discussed in chapter 
1 para 1.3.3 and in the para immediately below. 
1103  2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) discussed in chapter 1 para 1.3.3. 
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In Barkhuizen v Napier,1104 the Constitutional Court cautioned that sanctity of contract must be 
tempered by considerations of morality and public policy as discerned from the values 
embodied in the Constitution, and especially the Bill of Rights.1105 The Barkhuizen judgment 
also affirmed that the basic values of dignity, equality and freedom and the rule of law that 
underpin the Constitution and the Bill of Rights find expression in the principles of freedom and 
sanctity of contract that form the bedrock of the law of contract.1106 In reconciling the 
competing interests represented by the notion of freedom of contract, which, in itself, is a 
constitutional value, and the values enshrined in the Constitution which inform public 
policy,1107 it is evident that a contract or contractual term that is unfair, unjust or unreasonable 
would be one that is contrary to public policy and hence unacceptable. 
In the Affordable Medicines Trust and others v Minister of Health and Others,1108  the 
Constitutional Court, with reference to the Section 22 right to choose a trade, occupation or 
profession, reasoned that human dignity lies at the heart of the right to choose a vocation. In 
the same vein, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Reddy v Siemens Telecommunications (Pty) 
Ltd1109 commented that the section 22 right was expressive of the connection between the 
right to choose a profession and the “nature of a society” based on the constitutional value of 
human dignity. The role of human dignity as a justification for revisiting the freedom of contract 
basis for the enforcement of restraint of trade cases is evident in Advtech Resourcing (Pty) Ltd 
t/a Communicate Personnel Group v Kuhn1110 where the Court, after referring to the Affordable 
                                                            
1104  2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) discussed in chapter 1 para 1.3.3.  
1105  Para [30]. 
1106  See, for example, paras [29] and [30]. Freedom and sanctity of contract are also discussed in chapter 2 para 
2.2. 
1107  Paras [28-30], [51] and [73]. 
1108  2006 (3) SA 247 (CC), para [59]. The case dealt with a legislative requirement that medical practitioners and 
dentists, amongst others, require a licence issued by the Director-General of the Department of Health to 
dispense medicines. 
1109  2007 (2) SA 486 (SCA), para [15]. 
1110  2008 (2) SA 375 (C), para [28]. 
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Medicines case and other cases, opined that the onus should be on the employer to justify a 
limitation upon the right to work. 
The role of human dignity is also not unknown or unacknowledged in pre-constitutional 
contract law.1111 It is inherent in the enunciation in Jajbhay v Cassim1112 that “public policy 
should properly take into account the doing of simple justice between man and man” which 
was quoted with approval in Sasfin v Beukes.1113 In the Sasfin case, the court came to the rescue 
of the respondent who was placed in a position of economic servitude in favour of the 
appellant.1114 
The jurisprudence evident in the above sample of judgments is that the principle of dignity 
operates, not only, as an interpretive tool, but also, as a constitutional value for the 
determination of legality and validity.1115 
The jurisprudence also constitutes evidence that the purpose of the South African 
constitutional and democratic order is the establishment of a society in which all human beings 
will be accorded equal dignity and respect.1116 This is necessary to bring about social and 
                                                            
1111  That human dignity was in pre-constitutional contract law jurisprudence only grudgingly recognised as a 
factor, was illustrated with reference to case law in chapter 2. 
1112  1939 AD 537, 544. In this case, the appellant applied for an order of ejectment on basis of the illegality of the 
lease agreement in that it was concluded in contravention of legislation. The court refused to relax the par 
delictum rule and hence to order the ejectment of the respondent.   
1113  1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 9. 
1114  In this case, a cession in securitate indebiti vested the appellant with effective control over the respondent’s 
earnings and entitled the appellant to recover book debts owed to the respondent by his debtors and to 
retain such money regardless of whether the respondent was indebted to it in the amount or at all. The 
termination of the cession was at the will of the appellant and other creditors of the respondent, and neither 
the absence of indebtedness, nor reasonable notice of termination by the respondent would suffice to 
terminate the cession. In declaring the cession to be unconscionable and incompatible with public interest 
and therefore contrary to public policy, the Court likened the position of the respondent to that of a slave. 
1115  The role of dignity, equality, and freedom in the provisions of the consumer protection legislation and the 
policy considerations underlying these statutes was demonstrated in chapter 3. 
1116  The Constitutional Court in Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) made this observation in the course of explaining the 
reason for the prohibition against unfair discrimination (para [41]). The case dealt with a prisoner, the father 
of a child under the age of twelve years, who sought to have a Presidential Act that granted special remission 
of sentence to, inter alia, “all mothers in prison on 10 May 1994, with minor children under the age of 12 
years” declared unconstitutional on the ground that it unfairly discriminated against him on the grounds of 
sex or gender and indirectly against his son. In upholding the constitutionality of the Presidential Pardon, the 
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economic reforms for the creation of a just and egalitarian society founded on the 
constitutional values of dignity, equality, and freedom.1117 
 
(B) The values of dignity, equality and freedom in relation to essentialia 
(i) Introduction 
Essentialia play a singularly important role in that a contract is only complete when agreement 
is reached on the essentialia, there being no need to agree on any incidentalia.1118 The 
recognition that naturalia1119 and incidentalia play a complementary or ancillary role highlights 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Court said that the prohibition against unfair discrimination was not promoted by insisting on identical 
treatment in all circumstances and that each case had to be decided on its own merits (para [41]).   
1117  Similarly in Europe, the founding fathers (Adenaeur, de Gasperi, Monet, Schuman) of the European Union 
placed the principles of dignity, equality and freedom at the core for the attainment of a Europe that is free 
from fear, misery and misfortune. Vidal Gil ‘The Social State Based on the Rule of Law in the Europe of Rights’ 
chapter 8 in Ballesteros J et al (eds.) Globalisation and Human Rights, Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives 
on Law and Justice Vol 13 Part 3 (2012) 179 < DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-4020-4_8.>. 
1118  In contracts of sale, the existence of incidentalia is dependent on the finalisation of agreement on the 
essentialia - without the latter the former cannot exist. Incidentalia are neither required nor imposed by law 
but consist of provisions that reflect those parts of the agreement which suit the particular needs of the 
contractants. Contractants may, for example, utilise incidentalia to regulate the risks that may adhere to the 
contract. Incidentalia give practical effect to the principles of individual freedom and autonomy that are 
embedded in the law of contract in that contractants may utilise incidentalia, within the parameters laid 
down by the law, to expand their legal commitments by developing and broadening the essentialia and 
naturalia or even by qualifying or excluding the latter where this is permissible. Some of the more common 
contractual terms used to this effect are suppositions, conditions, time clauses, modal clauses and exemption 
clauses. The contractants could, for example, provide for a clause specifying the method of calculating the 
purchase price. They could also provide for a clause that stipulates the date of payment. The former 
complements the essentiale that the purchase price be ascertained or ascertainable; the latter modifies the 
naturalia that, in the case of a cash sale, the purchase price must be paid on delivery: Van der Merwe et al 
Contract 247; Hutchison et al Contract 238; Lubbe & Murray Contract 416-417 and 424. Autonomy and 
freedom of contract are discussed in chapter 2, and specifically in para 2.2 thereof. The principles of 
autonomy and freedom of contract that find expression in incidentalia and that recently received 
constitutional recognition in Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) also inform the view that it is not the function of 
the courts to make, to supplement or to modify contracts. The function of the courts is discussed in para 4.4 
below. The view that it is not the function of the court to make contract is also evident in the cautious 
approach of the courts to the importation of tacit terms into a contract. In this regard, the Court, in City of 
Cape Town (CMC Administration) v Bourbon-Leftley & Another NNO 2006 (3) SA 488 (SCA) said that the 
reason for the reluctance “is closely linked to the postulate that the courts can neither make contracts for 
people nor supplement their agreement merely because it appears reasonable or convenient to do so” (para 
[19]). See also Van der Merwe et al 242-245; Lubbe & Murray Contract 21 and 416-419. Kerr Contract 254-
370. See also para 4.3.4.2(C)(viii) below. 
1119  Naturalia are terms that automatically latch onto a contract when agreement is reached on the essentialia. 
The valued attributes of freedom of contract and individual autonomy (see chapter 2) survive this imposition 
in that contractants are, in theory, at liberty to exclude the operation of naturalia from their contract: Van 
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the role of essentialia as encapsulating the essence1120 of the legal relationship between 
contractants. Hence, essentialia identify and define the most important and the most 
fundamental obligations of the contractants and a degree of fidelity1121  commensurate with its 
status is apposite. The requisite degree of fidelity is inherent in or prescribed by the duty-
imposing and power-conferring components of essentialia which concretize the double 
constitutional values of dignity, equality and freedom.1122 Bearing in mind that it has long been 
recognised that freedom of contract is not an end in itself but that it is a vehicle for self-
determination, 1123  the doctrines of freedom of contract and paternalism operate 
simultaneously, each exerting a corrective influence on the other.1124 
Essentialia, in providing for certainty, clarity and transparency in contractual obligations, and 
thereby concretizing the constitutional values of dignity, equality and freedom, give expression 
to the constitutionally entrenched principle of the rule of law.1125 In this context, it must be 
borne in mind that essentialia allow freedom of contract by authorizing contractual relations 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
der Merwe et al Contract 246-247. See also Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 790; Wessels & Roberts The Law of 
Contract in South Africa para 263; Vorster ‘The bases for the implication of contractual terms’ (1988) 2 TSAR 
161, 166, hereafter Vorster (1988) 2 TSAR 161; Cockrell ‘Substance and Form in the South African Law of 
Contract’ (1992) 109 SALJ 40, 53 et seq, hereafter Cockrell (1992) 109 SALJ 40 53. Naturalia are deemed to be 
complementary and not abrogatory in nature. Vorster (1988) 2 TSAR 167. There is no closed list of naturalia 
and additional naturalia could be recognised to align the law to changing circumstances and new needs: A 
Becker & Co v Becker and Others 1981 (3) SA 406 (A) 419F-H; South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 
2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA), para [28]. Existing naturalia could also function to accommodate changed 
circumstances: Van der Merwe et al Contract 246; Vorster (1988) 2 TSAR 178. It is generally understood that 
they originate in statute, precedent, custom, trade usage or old authorities: Vorster (1988) 2 TSAR 167; 
Cornelius ‘The unexpressed terms of a contract’ (2006) 17 Stell LR 494, 499-500; Van der Merwe et al 
Contract 246; Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974 (3) SA 506 (A) 531, 
hereafter Alfred 1974 (3) SA 506 (A). 
1120  See also para 4.3.3.3(D) below. 
1121  In the sense of factual accuracy, precision, reliability, conformity, dependability. 
1122  See para 4.2.4.2(B)(ii) below. 
1123  Zimmermann The New German Law of Obligations: Historical and Comparative Perspectives (2005) 205. The 
discussion of the consumer protection legislation in chapter 3 serve to illustrate that the Act does not so 
much limit freedom of contract as to give expression to the notion of self-determination of contractual 
content. In doing so, it has incorporated the constitutional values of dignity, equality and freedom into the 
law of contract. See the chapter 3 para 3.6.10, 3.9 and 3.10    
1124  The consumer protection legislation, discussed in chapter 3, illustrate this symbiosis. 
1125  Section 1(c) of the Constitution. On a Public Law level, the rule of law protects basic rights by requiring the 
State to act in accordance with pre-announced, clear and general rules which must be enforced impartially 
and in accordance with fair procedures: Currie & de Waal The Bill of Rights 10-13. 
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within certain parameters. They promote equality by requiring compliance with certain 
prerequisites. They also conform to the value of ubuntu in that they seek to protect vulnerable 
members of society by requiring both contractants to have a say in a fundamental aspect – the 
essence - of their contractual relations. They also conform to the narrower definition of dignity 
in Ferreira v Levin in that, in the process of setting out the respective rights and obligations of 
the contractants, they provide for the uniqueness of the individual to come to the fore. On both 
readings of the notion of dignity,1126 essentialia allow control over issues that have a definitive 
bearing on the cost-to-benefit ratio of their contract. 
In summary, the notion of essentialia as imposing a positive duty of compliance on contractants 
does not detract from the principles of contractual autonomy and freedom of contract but 
rather enhances them.1127 The recognition of essentialia as imposing a positive duty on 
contractants serves to give expression to societal norms that embody values such as good faith, 
dignity, equality and freedom. In complying with the demands made of them by essentialia, 
contractants act in concert with these societal norms.1128 
 
(ii) The duty-imposing and power-conferring characteristics of essentialia 
Essentialia, like legal norms, are both duty-imposing as well as power-conferring.1129 Thus, like 
legal norms, they have a boundary-defining function1130 as well as an enabling function.1131 The 
duty-imposing aspect requires contractants to reach agreement on the essentalia within certain 
                                                            
1126  See para 4.2.4.2(A)(i) for theMokgoro and the Ackermann interpretations. 
1127  Essentialia provide the parameters within which individuals are free to bind themselves to ensure contractual 
integrity and to give expression to the function of law as one of promoting a peaceful and harmonious society 
based on the universal values of dignity, equality and freedom. See para 4.2.4.2(A)(ii) above. 
1128  Hogg Promises and Contract Law Comparative Perspectives (2011) xiii-xiv, hereafter Hogg Promises and 
Contract Law.  
1129  Hosten Introduction. The authors explain that legal norms refer “generally to that component of a legal 
system which directs the behaviour of human beings by imposing duties or conferring powers on them...” 
(18-19).  
1130  The boundary-defining function of the law is discussed in para 4.2.2 above. 
1131  The enabling function of contracts is discussed in para 4.2.3 above. 
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parameters,1132 whereas the power-conferring aspect permits contractants the freedom to 
determine the specifics of the essentialia within the confines of the parameters so set.1133 This 
is in line with the social contract theory where there is a simultaneous promotion and limitation 
of individual rights and freedoms.1134 In contracts of sale, for example, it is required that 
contractants must agree on the price and that the price must be objectively ascertainable ex 
facie the agreement,1135 which affords the contractants the liberty to decide by which method 
the price will be determined.1136 
Essentialia reflect the tension evident in the law of contract between certainty and 
flexibility.1137  The duty-imposing aspect which places all contractants in the position of 
formal,1138 procedural1139 and substantive equality,1140 both as far as risk1141 and recourse are 
concerned, promotes certainty whilst the power-conferring aspect is conducive of flexibility. 
                                                            
1132  The duty is an absolute one that is based on principle and policy as explained in the text following this 
footnote reference. 
1133  In a similar vein Dworkin in Taking Rights Seriously distinguishes duty-based theories from rights-based 
theories. Whilst both place the individual at the centre, regarding his/her decision to be of fundamental 
importance, the former treat codes of conduct as “of the essence” and conformity is obligatory, with adverse 
consequences following on non-conformance. In the latter, codes of conduct are instrumental in protecting 
the rights of others (172).  
1134  Discussed in paras 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 above. 
1135  This includes the express and tacit terms of the contract. See Lubbe & Murray Contract 314 and the cases 
mentioned there. 
1136  In this context, the thesis is concerned with the question whether an agreement to pay a reasonable price or 
a unilaterally determined price (being the manifestation of the exercise of the power-conferring component 
of the essentiale) satisfies the duty imposed on the contractants. 
1137  See the discussion of the tension in chapter 1 para 1.3.3. 
1138  Formal equality is attained in that the duty displays the characteristics of uniformity, consistency, 
predictability, generality and impartiality: Hosten Introduction 29-30. 
1139  The notion of procedural equality is aimed maximizing equality amongst the members of society by taking 
cognizance of socio-economic inequalities. 
1140  In the first half of the nineteenth century, equality was understood to mean formal equality in the sense that 
equality is promoted by the uniform application of a principle regardless of the individual (the notion of equal 
treatment under the law).  Formal equality, however, resulted in the entrenchment of social and economic 
inequalities. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the notion of procedural equality gained 
acceptance when the law began to recognise and to correct social inequalities. The notion of substantive 
equality that takes the discourse further and includes taking affirmative steps to redress existing social and 
economic inequalities, is a product of legal discourse in the late twentieth century: Hawthorne 1995 (58) 
THRHR 158-160. See also Petersmann ‘Human Rights and International Economic Law’ 8.  
1141  The importance of the “risk-regulatory” role cannot be over-emphasised, more so if one takes into account 
the fact that it is illusory to accept, as matter of principle that equal bargaining power exists. See the 
discussion in chapters 2 and 3 in regard to bargaining power. 
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Hence, the essentialia promote equality, and hence dignity,1142 on the formal, procedural and 
substantive levels. The duty-imposing element of essentialia promotes formal equality in that 
compliance is incumbent on everyone without exception. In promoting formal equality 
(requiring joint decision-making), essentialia also serve to give expression to the principles of 
autonomy and consensus which are central to classical theory of contract law. In doing so, it 
acknowledges the classical contract law’s recognition of these notions as being inherently 
worthy of respect and of protection. It also acknowledges the fact that this recognition was 
granted constitutional legitimacy in the Barkhuizen case.1143 
By imposing a duty on both contractants to negotiate and reach agreement on a price, the law 
seeks to level the playing field,1144 thereby affording both sides the opportunity to participate, 
in a meaningful way, in the decision-making process. The classical contract law notion of the 
primacy of individual liberty and autonomy also find practical expression in the duty to 
negotiate and reach agreement on the price.1145 
The concept of joint participation is enhanced by the fact that the power-conferring function 
must be exercised within defined parameters. This is evidenced by the requirement in contracts 
of sale that the agreement between the contractants must be such that the price must be 
ascertained or objectively ascertainable. The notions of reasonableness and fairness are 
inherent in the requirement that the price must be ascertained or objectively capable of 
ascertainment.1146 In other words, the general rationale for the requirement of objective 
                                                            
1142  See the discussion of the interconnectedness between the notions of dignity and equality in para 4.2.4.2(A) 
above.  
1143  Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) discussed in chapter 1 para 1.3.3 and in chapter 2. 
1144  An uneven playing field exists as a result of, for example, standard form contracts, exemption clauses, and 
unequal bargaining power brought about by, inter alia, economic and social inequalities. See chapter 2 para 
2.4. 
1145  See also Hosten Introduction 30-31 and the discussion in chapter 2 para 2.8. 
1146  In Westinghouse v Bilger 1986 (2) SA 555 (A), hereafter Westinghouse 1986 (2) SA 555 (A), the Appellate 
Division held that “there can be no valid contract of sale unless the parties have agreed, expressly or by 
implication, upon a price. They must either fix the amount of that price in their contract or agree upon some 
external standard by the application whereof it will be possible to determine the price without reference to 
them” (547C-D). The decision affirms the principle that it should be possible for even a total stranger to 
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ascertainability is the promotion of reasonable and fairness in contract. Hence, reasonableness 
and fairness cannot function as an alternative to the requirement of objective 
ascertainability.1147 
The considerations underlying the duty-imposing and power-conferring aspects of essentialia as 
discussed above (and below) find resonance in the policy considerations underlying the duty of 
disclosure, especially in regard to price, in the consumer protection legislation1148 and are, 
similarly, suggestive of a duty to negotiate in good faith.1149 
In summary, the duty imposed to reach consensus on the price responds both to the 
requirement of good faith that is evident in consumer protection legislation and that is implicit 
in contract law (though the notion has not received express recognition by the South African 
courts)1150 as well as to the public policy protection of vulnerable consumers.1151 In so doing, 
the duty provides additional protection for the reasonable expectations of the contractants. By 
tying the hands of the contractants, essentialia have the effect of promoting credible 
commitments amongst contractants and of aligning their material interests. By requiring 
agreement on the price, the law seeks to bring force to bear on contractants to minimise the 
risk factor by providing, where relevant, for future uncertainties. By insisting on compliance 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
ascertain the price by utilising the external standard specified in the contract; the contractants then playing 
no role in this process other than to pay and to receive the price. See also Murray & Roberts Construction Ltd 
v Finat Properties (Pty) Ltd 1991 (1) SA 508 (A) 14G-H, hereafter Murray & Roberts 1991 (1) SA 508 (A); 
Lambons (Edms) Bpk v BMW (Suid-Afrika) (Edms) Bpk 1997 (4) SA 141 (SCA) 158F-H, hereafter Lambons 1997 
(4) SA 141 (SCA); Kerr Sale and Lease30-34. The rental requirement in contracts of lease is similarly 
formulated in Proud Investments v Lanchem International (Pty) Ltd 1991 (3) SA 738 (A) 746G-H. See further 
chapter 1 paras 1.2 and 1.4.2.2(A). 
1147   Considerations of reasonableness and fairness, and good faith (see para 4.2.4.4 below) provide justification 
for the duty-imposing component that requires contractants to jointly decide on the price and rental. Hence 
they provide the rationale why the right corresponding to the duty may not be surrendered by agreeing to a 
reasonable price or rental or to a unilaterally determined price or rental.    
1148  The discussion in chapter 3 revealed that price transparency is one of the hallmarks of the Consumer 
Protection Act; information regarding price being a vital component of the prized notion of making an 
informed choice. 
1149  See the discussion of good faith in chapter 3 and in particular in paras 3.6.10, 3.9 and 3.10. See further the 
discussion of essentialia and the duty of good faith in para 4.2.4.4 below. 
1150  See the discussion in chapter 2 para 2.8. 
1151  See the discussion in chapter 3 above. 
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with the duty-imposing aspect, contract law minimises the potential for disputes, thereby 
promoting the (continued) existence of an ordered and orderly contract. In promoting the 
above, the duty-imposing component of essentialia facilitates procedural and substantive 
fairness, and, in the process, gives practical effect to the constitutional values of dignity, 
equality, and freedom. Hence, the right corresponding to the duty to agree on a price belongs 
to the category of rights which is too fundamental to bargain away by, for example, concluding 
an agreement that allows for a reasonable price or for the unilateral determination of the price.  
Against this background, the introduction of a unilateral discretionary power to settle the price 
or rental1152 would impoverish the constitutional values as constituent elements of the duty-
imposing and the power-conferring components of essentialia and have the effect of 
introducing uncertainty, thereby increasing the element of risk.1153 
 
(iii) Reconciling the duty-imposing and power-conferring aspects of essentialia 
Essentialia by their very nature constrain contractual autonomy and individual freedom but in 
doing so they promote certainty, fairness, equity and stability in the legal order. They do so by 
protecting the reasonable expectations of the contractants by requiring both sides to plan their 
future (basic) commitments efficiently and as accurately as possible at date of contract. The 
significance of this role is underlined by the fact that whilst the principles of contractual 
autonomy and individual liberty, valued by classical law contract lawyers, permit the 
                                                            
1152  See para 4.3.3 below. It will be recalled that in NBS Boland Bank 1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA) the court was of the 
view that an agreement that gave one on the contractants the power to unilaterally determine the price or 
rental in contracts of sale and lease respectively, should be regarded as valid.  
1153  Such a development would run counter to the policy considerations underlying legislation seeking to give 
effect to the constitutional imperative to promote socio-economic reforms for the attainment of a just and 
egalitarian society. See, for example, the legislation discussed in chapter 3; the Housing Act 107 of 1997 (to 
promote and coordinate the building and provision of housing); the Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995 
(to fast track the development of land; to improve security of tenure to land users); the Prevention of Illegal 
Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (provides the procedure for the eviction of 
persons who occupy land unlawfully); the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 0f 1997 (relating to wages 
and working hours). The uncertainty and risk may also diminish the value of, and trust in contract as an 
obligation-creating mechanism. 
 
 
 
 
 201 
  
qualification and even exclusion of naturalia,1154 this possibility does not exist in relation to 
essentialia. The policy considerations underlying essentialia1155 may therefore be said to trump 
the considerations informing the notions of contractual autonomy and individual liberty1156 in 
that they preclude the exclusion of the core protective mechanisms imposed by the law, 
namely, that the content of the agreement on the essentialia must be objectively ascertainable 
ex facie the contract. 
It was pointed out earlier1157 that rigid adherence to rules may compromise individual and 
judicial discretion, with good faith, fairness, and reasonableness amongst the casualties, whilst 
(excessive) flexibility may dilute certainty, with the rule of law and respect of the law as 
possible casualties. Furthermore, it was suggested that public policy, as informed by the 
provisions and values of the Constitution appears to be the mechanism favoured by the 
Constitutional Court to achieve a balance between certainty and flexibility.1158 It is submitted 
that the same mechanism favours maintaining the balance between the duty-imposing and 
power-conferring aspects of essentialia that the Westinghouse principle1159 brings. In other 
words, public policy, as informed by constitutional values, militates against the evisceration of 
the duty-conferring aspect that would result from the recognition of contracts of sale at a 
reasonable price or a unilaterally determined price.1160 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1154  Where such exclusion is permitted by the law. 
1155  Discussed in para 4.2.4.2(B)(i) and (ii) above. 
1156  See chapter 2 paras 2.2 and 2.3 for a discussion of the principles of autonomy and individual liberty. 
1157  In chapter 1 para 1.3.3. 
1158  See Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) paras [87] and [28] discussed in chapter 1 para 1.3.3. 
1159  The principle requires that the price must be objectively ascertainable ex facie the contract. 
1160  This being the question of law under investigation in this thesis. 
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4.2.4.3 Essentialia as rules or standards 
(A) Essentialia as rules 
The significance of the role of essentialia can further be illustrated with reference to difference 
between rules and standards.1161 Whilst both constitute legal norms that are used to determine 
and adjudicate human conduct, rules impose stricter limits on the exercise of discretion in 
conduct and adjudication, whilst standards are more open-ended,1162 allowing for greater 
latitude for discretionary conduct and “fact-specific” adjudication.1163 In practice, the costs1164 
to the judiciary in determining whether a litigant has complied with a standard or to a 
contractant to prove that a standard has not been complied with,1165 or to an individual who 
has to wrestle with the problem of determining which level of precaution is sufficient to escape 
censure, is significantly higher than in the case of rules. Rules provide a model of clearly defined 
                                                            
1161  The rule being that a reasonable price or a unilaterally determined price does not satisfy the requirement 
that the price must be objectively ascertainable ex facie the contract. Viewed as a standard, such agreements 
would constitute valid contracts of sale. See the discussion in chapter 5. 
1162  For example, the standards of the reasonable person, good faith and unconscionability. 
1163  Feldman & Lifschitz ‘Behind the Veil of Legal Uncertainty’ (2011) Vol 74  Bar ILan Univ. Pub Law Working 
Paper No 11-10, 125, 126-127 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1633429>, hereafter Feldman & Lifschitz (2011) Vol 
74  Bar ILan Univ. Pub Law Working Paper No 11-10; Feinman (1982-1983) 30 UCLA LR 829, 844-845. 
Standards are fact specific in that the facts of the case have a large bearing on the outcome. This may give 
rise to a multiplicity of precedents that may compromise certainty, uniformity and clarity: Speidel 
‘Restatement Second: Omitted Terms and Contract Method’ (1981-82) 67 Cornell LR785, 791-792. Camero 
‘Level Up: Employing the Commerce Clause to Federalize the Sale of Goods’ 1, 13 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2027482> [last accessed on 06 December 2012]. 
Accepted for publication 2013. Publication details as follows: Jennifer Camero, Level Up: Employing the 
Commerce Clause to Federalize the Sale of Goods, 50 San Diego Law Review (2013); Danzig ‘A Comment on 
the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code’ (1974-1975) 27 Stanford LR 621, 632 & 626-631, 
hereafter Danzig (1974-1975) 27 Stanford LR; Murphy, Speidel & Ayres Studies in Contract Law (2003) 29; 
Ayres & Gertner ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules’ (1989-1990) 99 
Yale LJ 87, 89 n13. See also chapter 5 para 5.2.2.2(D)(i)(c). 
1164  In a broad sense this would include factors such as time, effort, energy, costs associated with litigation.  
1165  In the context of the notion of a reasonable price or one that is unilaterally determined, the onus would be on 
the “disempowered” contractant who would have to bear the brunt of the transaction costs associated with 
litigation. These include having to decide whether or not to litigate which would be dependent on 
considerations such as the likelihood of success, capacity and inclination to prosecute the claim, cognitive 
ability, resources available in terms of means, time and energy. 
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and highly administrable principles that promote individual autonomy and consensus that form 
the basis of contract law.1166 
Any society, regardless of size and complexity, “that seeks the advantages of modernity ... 
requires rules to guide the conduct of individuals...”1167 The effective functioning of such rules 
requires that “the rules must display a significant degree of regularity, comprehensibility, and 
stability – what Professor Lon Fuller has called the ‘internal morality of law.’”1168 Conventional 
wisdom suggests that rules are to be preferred when an activity occurs frequently.1169 
“Uniformity and universality are essential characteristics of it … The essential meaning and 
intention of the rule must be uniform.”1170 It is these qualities that make rules typically easier to 
apply. In addition, rules are easier for the public to understand and hence for the public to 
predict their effects and to tailor their (the public’s) conduct accordingly. The resultant 
certainty inspires confidence in contract as an obligation-creating mechanism.1171 The costs of 
legal advice are also lower.1172 
However, the characterisation of essentialia as rules does not suggest a mechanical application 
thereof. It was explained above that the duty-imposing part requires the participation of both 
contractants in the setting of the price whilst the power-conferring part allows for the exercise 
of discretion within certain parameters, and, that individually and cumulatively, the two give 
expression to the notions of reasonableness and fairness and the constitutional values of 
dignity, equality, and freedom. Hence, the approach allows for a purposive adjudication in that 
                                                            
1166  Kennedy ‘Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication’ (1975-1976) 89 Harvard LR 1685, hereafter 
Kennedy (1975-1976) 89 Harvard LR 1685.   
1167  Fried (2007) 120 Harvard LR1, 1. 
1168  Fried (2007) 120 Harvard LR1, 2; Feinman (1982-1983) 30 UCLA LR829, 844. 
1169  Allen Law describes a legal rule as establishing a “generalization for an indefinite number of cases of a certain 
kind” (384). See also Kennedy (1975-1976) 89 Harvard LR 1689. 
1170  Allen Law 384. 
1171  Feinman (1982-1983) 30 UCLA LR 829, 844. Certainty allows for planning and increases the likelihood that 
private activity will follow a desired pattern. It also disinhibits contractants who would otherwise be cautious 
when “gains are subject to sporadic legal catastrophe.” Kennedy (1975-1976) 89 Harvard LR 1688-1689.    
1172  Feldman & Lifschitz (2011) Vol 74 Bar ILan Univ. Pub Law Working Paper No 11-10, 127. 
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a court may examine the conscionability of the product of the exercise of the power-conferring 
aspect of essentialia. A process of purposive adjudication would facilitate the alignment of 
classical contract law with the social and policy goals that underpin, for example, consumer 
protection legislation which, in turn, are in alignment with the constitutional values of dignity, 
equality, and freedom.1173 
 
(B) Essentialia as standards 
Standards, on the other hand, “do best when behaviour varies so greatly that any particular 
scenario is rare.”1174 Standards allow for “purposive adjudication,” the idea being that “a ‘just’ 
legal outcome should be produced on the facts of each case, even if this involves introducing a 
measure of uncertainty.”1175 It has been suggested that standards, though affording realisation 
of the notion of altruism, produce ad hoc decisions which have little value as precedents.1176 
Thus, rules promote certainty by minimising the role of judicial discretion1177 whilst standards 
have the opposite effect.1178 
 
(C) Analysis 
When viewed from the perspective of the distinction between rules and standards, the notions 
of a reasonable price and a unilaterally determined price, both of which would operate as 
standards, introduce uncertainty1179 which would be exacerbated by the casuistic interpretation 
                                                            
1173  See chapter 3. See also the cases discussed earlier in this chapter and the examples of legislation in other 
areas of the law that reflect similar aspirations. 
1174  Feldman & Lifschitz (2011) Vol 74 Bar ILan Univ. Pub Law Working Paper No 11-10, 127.   
1175  Cockrell (1992) 109 SALJ 43. 
1176  Kennedy (1975-1976) 89 Harvard LR 1685. See also chapter 5. 
1177  This is in line with the philosophy of the Supreme Court of Appeal as is evident in the discussion of relevant 
cases in chapter 2 and particularly in paras 2.6 and 2.8 thereof.  
1178  See also chapter 5 para 5.2.2.2(D)(i)(c). 
1179  The incompleteness of the generalization, this being a consequence sought to be avoided by legal rules, “may 
produce results which are antithetic to the very purpose of the generalization”: Allen Law 385. See also para 
4.3.4 below regarding the indeterminateness of the standard of a reasonable price. 
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thereof.1180 It is further submitted that a ‘just’ legal outcome is best attained by allowing the 
contractants to determine what is just with reference to their own personal circumstances.1181 
For example, the plain language requirement of the Consumer Protection Act1182 exemplifies 
the notion of self-determination and hence the constitutional value of human dignity. The 
conclusion that recognition of a reasonable price and a unilaterally determined price would 
introduce uncertainty, and that contractants are in the best position to judge what is just for 
themselves is supported by the notion that “[l]aw and justice exist for the regulation of actual 
rights and duties.”1183 
Since contracts of sale occur daily at a frequency that is probably immeasurable, it is reiterated 
that the rules framework for essentialia best suit the needs and aspirations of those who 
engage in it. This is especially true in relation to payment of the price (and rental), it being a 
fundamentally important self-imposed obligation.1184 The significance of this observation is 
underscored by the fact that contracts of sale (and lease) are practically the most important 
contract in modern commercial society.1185 One of the purposes of negotiation, bearing in mind 
                                                            
1180  Bearing in mind the fundamental role played by essentialia (as explained in paras 4.2.4.2(B) and 4.2.4.3)) the 
casuistic development of the obiter dicta may further estrange the (lay-) contractant from the intricacies of 
the law as courts, in arriving at solutions, consider “the deposits of their own or their predecessors’ prior 
dealings with similar situations.” In the process the law of contract would give “the cautious and canny 
layman an advantage over his unschooled adversary”: Llewellyn (1931) 40 Yale LJ 713-714. See further in this 
regard the discussion of the notions of reasonableness, the reasonable person as well as that of the arbitrio 
boni viri, and the problems associated with the notion of developing a gold standard for the test of 
reasonableness in para 4.3.4 below. 
1181  Since the contractant is knowledgeable about his/her personal circumstances, the contractant would, in 
theory, be in the best possible position to determine what is “just” for himself/herself. In chapter 2 para 2.2, 
it was shown that the classical approach to contract law, followed in South Africa, emphasises values of 
individual freedom and equality. It was also shown there that utilisation of legal rules on the assumption that 
the values are realised could result in hardship, for example, in the case of unequal bargaining power. The 
policy issues underlying consumer protection legislation (discussed in chapter 3) are clearly aimed at 
countering abuses that resulted from an adherence to the classical law approach to the notions of individual 
freedom, autonomy and the presumption of consensus. 
1182  Chapter 3 para 3.6.3.4 
1183  Allen Law in the Making (1964) 385, hereafter Allen Law.  
1184  See further para 4.3.3.3(D) below. 
1185  Robbers The Legal Systems of European States An Introduction to German Law (2003) 240.  Van der Bergh 
notes that Van der Linden (1756-1835), a Roman-Dutch writer, acknowledged that contracts of sale were the 
most common transactions in society: Van der Bergh “The Roman tradition in the South African contract of 
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that price is amongst the major determining factors in decisions to purchase, is to augment 
customer information and to facilitate comparative shopping. 1186  Thus in terms of the 
methodology of the legal realists that is committed to the task of testing ‘the desirability, 
efficiency and fairness of inherited legal rules and institutions in terms of the present day needs 
of society,’1187 the rule-orientated approach to essentialia is apposite in that it promotes, not 
only, business efficiency and fairness, but also the constitutional values of dignity, equality and 
freedom, by requiring contractants to negotiate and agree on a crucial aspect of the law that 
they create for themselves. In preventing the usurpation of the right to negotiate and reach 
agreement on a price,1188 freedom of contract as well as social justice is promoted. Hence, the 
trade-off between certainty and discretion in favour of certainty is justified.1189 
Furthermore, our courts have interpreted public policy as suggesting that contractants are 
bound by their voluntarily assumed choices and have expressed a marked reluctance to come 
to the assistance of a contractant on the basis of “vague” notions such as good faith.1190 In this 
regard, it was commented that “the limited number of grounds on which a party may escape 
liability under an agreement satisfying the general requirements for the validity of contracts is 
indicative of our courts’ adherence to the theory that public policy demands recognition of the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda.”1191 The principle of contractual autonomy would suggest that 
there is nothing wrong with an agreement to grant unilateral discretionary power because the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
sale” (2012) 1 TSAR 53, 62. Bearing in mind the approximately 200 year gap between the two observations, it 
is probably not incorrect to conclude that the observations hold true for all time. 
1186  See the policy considerations underlying consumer protection legislation discussed in chapter 3. 
1187  Priest ‘Contracts Then and Now: An Appreciation of Friedrich Kessler’ (1994-1995) 104 Yale LJ2145, 2150; Van 
Zelst The Politics of European Sales Law: A Legal-Political Inquiry Into the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, Vienna Sales Convention, the Dutch Civil Code and the European Consumer SA (2008)40. 
1188  Usurpation would be a consequence attendant on the recognition of both a reasonable price and a 
unilaterally determined price. 
1189  Lending further support to the conclusion that certainty ought to be favoured is the theory that “when the 
social norms of non-compliance serve individuals’ self-interests, legal rules are preferable to legal standards 
as a tool to achieve compliance.” Feldman & Lifschitz (2011) Vol 74 Bar ILan Univ. Pub Law Working Paper No 
11-10, 127. 
1190  See the discussion of good faith in chapter 2 para 2.8. 
1191  Lubbe & Murray Contract 387. See also chapter 2 para 2.3. 
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contractants had agreed thereto. Hence, so the argument would go (ignoring considerations 
such as unequal bargaining power)1192 the element of risk was assumed voluntarily. However, 
the validity of this argument is negated by the fact that factors such as limited markets and 
information costs1193 limit the choice of contractual partners and contractual terms. Hence, the 
voluntary nature of the allocation and acceptance of risk is highly suspect.1194 
A rule-based approach promotes negotiation which is vital in contract-creation in that it 
induces disclosure thereby providing vital information.1195 Negotiation promotes awareness 
and allows a contractant to pay due attention to the various options available to him/her. It 
also promotes awareness of options available to the other contractant over which he/she (the 
first mentioned contractant) has no control and which may have a bearing on his/her own 
decision. Equally important, is that it allows a contractant to take into account personal 
priorities, enabling him/her to attain those consequences most favourable to him/her.1196 
Negotiation on price, in a nutshell, promotes informed decision-making on a cardinally 
important aspect of contractual relations. In the result, it creates a much sounder basis for the 
public policy imperative that contracts must be honoured.1197 These benefits underpin the 
information and disclosure and plain language provisions of the consumer protection legislation 
discussed in chapter 3. 
In contradistinction to this, negotiation as a self-protective mechanism in the context of the 
standard of reasonableness vanishes like mist in the sun. Agreements to a reasonable price or 
one that is unilaterally determined prevent the public from “do[ing] the best that they can for 
                                                            
1192  See for example, the discussion of cases such as the Afrox case in chapter 2. 
1193  For example, the cost, time and energy expended in making comparisons; cognitive limitations to anticipate 
consequences and/or to identify and provide for future developments. 
1194  See also the discussion in chapters 2 and 3. 
1195  The importance of information and disclosure is illustrated in the discussion of the consumer protection 
legislation in chapter 3. 
1196  Speidel ‘Unconscionability, Assent and Consumer Protection’ (1970) 31 University of Pittsburgh LR 359 n3, 
hereafter Speidel (1970) 31 University of Pittsburgh LR 359. 
1197  The conclusions are supported by the consumer protection legislation provisions relating to disclosure 
discussed in chapter 3. 
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themselves, given their circumstances.”1198 Such agreements detract from, not only, the 
principle of contractual autonomy, but also, the requirement of consensus. 
 
(D) Conclusion 
The submission is that the integrity of contract as a regulatory institution that promotes 
contractual trust and integrity, and the constitutional values as enunciated in the Barkhuizen 
case1199 is best attained in a rule-based dispensation - the rule being that the price must be 
objectively ascertainable ex facie the contract. Hence, it stands to reason that the security of 
human rights and capital investment can best be guaranteed by a rule that is known today and 
that can be enforced tomorrow.1200 The essentiale of price, cast as rules, serve to ensure that 
one of the fundamental principles underlying legality and contractual validity, namely, that 
contractants have knowledge of the nature and consequences of their (contractual) conduct, is 
not frustrated. The standard of the arbitrio boni viri,1201 denigrated as “generalised second-
guessing of the exercise of contractual powers on rationality grounds...”1202 would fly in the 
face of these attributes and specifically of the attribute that the law must provide, inter alia, 
certainty, predictability and uniformity and in so doing promote the dignity, equality and 
freedom of the contractants. 
 
 
 
                                                            
1198  Schwartz ‘Justice and the Law of Contracts: A Case for the Traditional Approach’ (1986) 9 Harvard Journal of 
Law and Public Policy 107, 108.  
1199  2007 (5) SA 323 (CC). In chapter 1, it was concluded that the judgment  confirmed that the basic values of 
dignity, equality and freedom and the rule of law that underpin the Constitution and the Bill of Rights find 
expression in the principles of freedom and sanctity of contract that form the bedrock of the law of contract. 
1200  Reavley ‘The Rule of Law for Judges’ (2003) 30(1) Article 2 Pepperdine LR 1. 
1201  In  NBS Boland Bank 1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA) the standard of the arbitrio boni viri was proffered as a safeguard 
against the possibility of exploitative conduct that may result from the unilateral exercise of power to settle 
the price. See further para 4.3 below. 
1202  Cockrell (1997) Acta Juridica 32. 
 
 
 
 
 209 
  
4.2.4.4 Essentialia and the duty of good faith 
As in the case of the rule of law,1203 essentialia have both a formal and a substantive 
component:1204 in compliance with the former, the conduct must not be arbitrary or capricious 
whilst in respect of the latter, essentialia exact respect for the rights of the individual 
contractants. Capricious conduct is averted by requiring both contractants to decide jointly. 
Substantive fairness is attained by providing parameters within which joint decision-making 
must be exercised. Thus, essentialia serve to preclude unconscionable conduct in that they 
allow for both contractants to participate in the process of making meaningful choices whilst at 
the same time minimizing the possibility of contractual terms that are unreasonably favourable 
to one of the contractants.1205 
In general, a contract is deemed to be unconscionable when there is an absence of a 
meaningful choice on the part of one of the contractants (procedural unconscionability) 
coupled with contract terms that are unreasonably unfavourable to one of the contractants 
(substantive unconscionability).1206 In the context of contracts of sale, the requirement that the 
price must be objectively ascertainable ex facie the contract, at one stroke ensures the 
contractants meaningful choice on the price (procedural conscionability) and simultaneously 
serves to prevent one of the contractants from unilaterally setting the price (substantive 
conscionability). Hence, it also operates to minimise the risk of weak (for example, poor, 
illiterate, needy) consumers who may serve as inviting targets for opportunistic sellers.1207 
                                                            
1203  See paras 4.2.2 and 4.2.4.2(B) above. See also Currie & de Waal The Bill of Rights 12-13.  
1204  See also para 4.2.4.2(B)(ii) above.  
1205  Exploitation consequent on the exercise of a unilateral discretionary power or the imposition of unfair or 
unreasonable terms is avoided.   
1206  Horowitz ‘Reviving the Law of Substantive Unconscionability: Applying the Implied Covenant of Good Faith 
and Fair Dealing to Excessively Priced Consumer Credit Contracts’ (1986) 33 UCLA LR 940. 
1207  The invidious position of such weak consumers, both in the commercial as well as in the legal domain, was 
dealt with in general in chapter 2. Chapter 3 illustrated the policy initiatives to overcome such weaknesses.  
 
 
 
 
 210 
  
The discussion thus far suggests a duty to conduct negotiations in good faith.1208 For example, 
earlier,1209 it was shown that the duty-imposing and power-conferring aspects of essentialia 
embody the notions of dignity, equality and freedom. It was also shown that essentialia reflect 
the pursuit of a balance between certainty and flexibility (freedom/discretion) that 
characterizes the law.1210  It was further shown that in the South African constitutional 
dispensation, the balance between certainty and flexibility is sought to be attained by the 
utilization of the values of dignity, equality and freedom.1211 The standard of good faith that in 
practical terms entails that a contractant may not over-protect its interests at the unreasonable 
expense of another1212 reflects the constitutional values of dignity, equality and freedom as 
defined and explained by the Constitutional Court.1213 Hence, the concept of good faith as being 
reflective of the values of dignity, equality and freedom is inherent in the notion of essentialia.  
This much is borne out in the obiter dicta in Everfresh Market Virginia v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) 
Ltd.1214 In that case, the Appellants had argued that the Constitutional Court, as per its 
constitutional mandate,1215 should develop the common law by imposing on contractants a 
duty to negotiate in good faith and in accordance with the values of ubuntu. The Constitutional 
Court responded by suggesting that in light of the value of ubuntu “which inspires much of our 
                                                            
1208  The very strong obiter dicta in the Everfresh Market Virginia v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC) 
in favour of the recognition of a duty to negotiate in good faith supports such a conclusion. See the discussion 
in the text after this footnote reference. 
1209  Para 4.2.4.2(B) above. 
1210  Paras 4.2.4.2(B) and 4.2.4.3 above. 
1211  Para 4.2.4.2(A)(i) above. 
1212  Van der Merwe et al Contract 277-280. 
1213  See, for example, the cases referred to in para 4.2.4.2(A)(iii) of this chapter above. In giving practical content 
to the values of dignity, equality and freedom, negotiations would be open and transparent and based on full 
disclosure. The result would see a tempering of the adversarial paradigm in which each contractant seeks to 
exact the best possible deal without giving up too much with a resultant diminution in the level of trust that 
each has for the other. Contracts would regarded as a cooperative ventures where contractants are perceived 
as being engaged in a mutually beneficial relationship based on trust and joint action as seems to be the case 
in some civil law jurisdictions: Flechtner ‘The Several Texts of the CISG in a Decentralized System: 
Observations on Translations, Reservations and other Challenges to the Uniformity Principle in Article 7(1)’ 
(1997-1998) 17 Journal of Law and Commerce 187, 202-204. 
1214  2012 (1) SA 256 (CC). 
1215  See section 39(2). 
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constitutional compact,” it would be hardly imaginable that our constitutional values would not 
require that the negotiation must be done reasonably, with a view to reaching an agreement 
and in good faith.1216 Indeed, the solution to the question concerning a duty to conduct good 
faith negotiations that arose for decision in the Everfresh case could have been located in the 
essentiale (of rental) which incorporates the duty of good faith. This conclusion is supported by 
the court’s finding that “[t]he proposition that common law contract principles provides 
meaningful parameters to render an agreement to negotiate in good faith enforceable is 
decidedly more consistent with section 39(2) than a regime that does not.”1217 
The beginnings of the recognition of a duty to negotiate in good faith may be located in the 
decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Southernport Developments (Pty) Ltd v Transnet 
Limited. 1218  The Southernport Court concluded that in an agreement that required the 
contractants to conduct good faith negotiations, the inclusion of a deadlock-breaking 
mechanism in the form of an arbitrator whose decision would, in the event of a dispute, be final 
and binding, was sufficient to render the agreement enforceable.1219 The Southernport decision 
may be viewed as a precursor to the recognition of a general duty to negotiate in good faith.1220 
The final step that needs to be taken and one that is already on the cards in view of the very 
                                                            
1216  At para [72]. 
1217  Per Yacoob J para [36]. 
1218  2005 (2) SA 202 (SCA). The Appellant sought to enforce an agreement in terms whereof the Respondent had 
agreed to enter into good faith negotiations regarding the lease of certain properties. A further term in the 
agreement provided that in the event of a deadlock, the dispute would be referred to an arbitrator whose 
decision would be final and binding. The Respondent contended that the agreement to conduct good faith 
negotiations amounted to nothing more than an agreement to agree. In an earlier case (Premier, Free State, 
and Others v Firechem Free State (Pty) Ltd 2000 (4) SA 413 (SCA)) the Supreme Court of Appeal held that an 
agreement to agree was unenforceable because of the absolute discretion it vested in the contractants to 
agree or to disagree; the court would be unable to enforce the agreement in the event of a breakdown in 
negotiations. The Southernport court distinguished the Premier, Free State decision on the basis that the 
latter did not contain a deadlock-breaking mechanism.  
1219  See also Letaba Sawmills (Edms) Bpk v Majovi (Edms) Bpk 1993 (1) SA 768 (A) 775-776 where the inclusion of 
a provision for arbitration rendered valid an option to renew a lease at a rental still to be negotiated; Van der 
Merwe et al Contract 195; Bhana Annual Survey of South African Law 205-206.   
1220  This is so despite the fact that the Court, at para [16], was at pains, despite its reference to the recognition of 
a duty to negotiate in good faith in labour law, at para [12], and in overseas jurisdictions, at paras [13]-[16], to 
make it clear that good faith, in itself, did not constitute a consideration that would render an agreement to 
negotiate, enforceable. 
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strong obiter dicta in the Everfresh case,1221 is to discard the requirement of a deadlock-
breaking mechanism.1222 Such an approach finds support in the submission that the duty to 
negotiate in good faith is implicit in the notion of essentialia as discussed above. Further 
support may be found in the constitutional values of dignity, equality, and freedom and the 
values that inhere in the notion of ubuntu all of which are evident in the duty-imposing and 
power-conferring components of essentialia.1223  
The provisions of the consumer protection legislation1224 discussed in chapter 3 that illustrate 
that the public policy considerations and the constitutional values that inform the legislation 
can operate in harmony and even promote contract law principles, lend further support. 
Indeed, they underscore the conclusion that good faith requires the contractants to agree on a 
price that is objectively ascertainable ex facie the contract. The introduction of a duty of good 
faith in the pre-contract stage does not detract from the principle of certainty. Certainty is 
maintained by the fact that both contractants are required by the duty-imposing component of 
essentialia to agree to a price that is objectively ascertainable ex facie the contract. The duty of 
good faith, being an integral component of essentialia requires compliance with the duty-
imposing function and at the same times serves as a boundary to regulate the substantive 
fairness of the negotiations and the resultant agreement (the power-conferring function of 
essentialia.)1225 
 
                                                            
1221  See, for example, paras [20], [23], [24], [36], [37], [71] and [72]. See also Van der Merwe et al Contract 196. 
1222  The discarding of the deadlock breaking mechanism has already been mooted. In Indwe Aviation (Pty) Ltd v 
The Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2012 JDR 0924 (WCC), in an application for an 
interdict, Baartman J was of the view that the inclusion of an objective dispute resolution mechanism as per 
the Southernport case was not a sine qua non for enforcing an agreement to negotiate in good faith (para 
[30]). Hence, the Indwe and Everfresh judgments both point to a duty to negotiate in good faith. In light of 
these judgments it appears that it will probably only be a matter of time before such a duty receives judicial 
recognition.     
1223  See para 4.2.4.2(B) above. 
1224  Discussed in chapter 3. For example, in the pre-contractual duty of disclosure on the supplier, the plain 
language requirement, the provisions concerning grey- and black-listed terms. 
1225  See the discussion in para 4.2.4.2(B) above. 
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4.2.5 Conclusion 
Essentialia are not meant to be a mechanical and a value-free set of rules. In seeking to 
promote considerations of economic efficiency and distributive fairness, they serve to provide a 
foundation on which contractants may anchor their choices so as to obtain, in principle, 
mutually satisfactory consequences. An unsound foundation may result in uncertainty and the 
frustration of the intended outcome(s), with the valued notions of dignity, equality and 
freedom being further casualties. 
The preceding discussion focused on the constitutional values of essentialia 1226  and 
contextualised its policy relevance.1227 It also located the notion of essentialia within the 
framework of rules1228 and clarified its relationship to the duty of good faith.1229From these 
discussions, it is evident that essentialia serve to limit the risk of the contractants by stipulating 
the minimum requirements demanded by society for the creation of legal liability.1230 In setting 
minimum standards, essentialia promote justice by providing an approach to the creation of 
contractual obligations that is even-handed, one that avoids excessive rigidity1231 and permits 
individualism. They also serve a communitarian1232 purpose, inter alia, to promote consensus 
and certainty, 1233  to prevent disputes regarding content, and to counteract possible 
malpractices.1234 Accordingly, it follows that the communitarian orientation of essentialia is 
                                                            
1226  See para 4.2.4.2(B) above. 
1227  See paras 4.2.4.2(B) and 4.2.4.3 above. 
1228  See para 4.2.4.3 above. 
1229  See para 4.2.4.4 above. 
1230  In paras 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 above, the law was described as having, in essence, a boundary-defining purpose. The 
discussion there also applies here. 
1231  See the duty-imposing and power-conferring functions in para 4.2.4.2(B) above. 
1232  “While individualism is a thesis of separation, communitarianism, as does ubuntu, stresses the value of 
connection: members of society are viewed as being interdependent on one another and who place their 
needs and cares on par with those of others. Feinman (1982-1983) 30 UCLA LR 842-844.  
1233  Certainty is discussed in chapter 2 para 2.6. 
1234  These functions ascribed in Neethling v Klopper en Andere 1967 (4) SA 459 (A), 464, to formalities are also 
descriptive of the functions of essentialia. Section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 that requires 
any alienation of land to be reduced to writing and to be signed by or on behalf of the contractants on their 
written authority exemplifies these functions. The purpose thereof “is to promote legal certainty regarding 
the authenticity and contents of contracts, thereby limiting litigation and preventing malpractice and fraud”: 
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conclusive of the fact that the rights and obligations of the contractants are not determined 
exclusively by the intentions of the contractants.1235 Since communitarianism emphasizes 
“reciprocity, solidarity and co-operation, and is committed to an ethics of altruism in terms of 
which the interests of others make a legitimate claim on us,”1236 the role and function that 
essentialia, as described above, make them a perfect vehicle for the practical implementation 
of the concept of ubuntu and for incorporation of the constitutional values of dignity, equality 
and freedom in the contract law paradigm.1237 
Earlier, it was concluded that the Constitutional Court1238 confirmed that the basic values of 
dignity, equality and freedom and the rule of law that underpin the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights find expression in the notions of freedom and sanctity of contract that form the bedrock 
of the law of contract. It is submitted that the recognition of the obiter dicta that recommend 
the recognition of a contract of sale and lease at a reasonable price and rental respectively, or 
at a unilaterally determined price or rental would compromise the freedom of a contractant to 
participate in the formation of one of the cardinal aspects (the essence) of the contract.1239 
Such recognition would call into question the ability of a contractant to compete on a platform 
of equality with a resultant deleterious effect on the contractant’s dignity. It is submitted that 
the constitutional values of dignity, equality and freedom which are inherent in the notion of 
essentialia act as a constitutional restraint on contractual autonomy that render an agreement 
to a reasonable price or a unilaterally determined price, invalid as being contrary to public 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Hutchison et al Contract 161. See also Slabbert and Others v Slabbert and Others (A55/2011) [2011] ZAFSHC 
165 (20 October 2011). The requirement of writing also responds to the fact that the contract is enforced or 
administered or implemented by third parties or state officials. Fried (2007) 120 Harvard LR 4. The formalities 
in consumer protection legislation, discussed in chapter 3, also exemplify the legislator’s concern to reduce 
risk and to promote certainty as well as to reduce the possibility of (prohibitively) costly litigation. 
1235  The same orientation is evident in the consumer protection legislation discussed in chapter 3. 
1236  Cockrell (1992) 109 SALJ 42. 
1237  See the discussion in chapter 1 para 1.3.3 read with para 4.2.4 in this chapter. 
1238  Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) discussed in chapter 1 para 1.3.3. 
1239  Price as the essence of the contract is discussed in para 4.3.3.3(D) below. 
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policy.1240 Hence, the values of dignity, equality and freedom confer constitutional legitimacy 
on the jurisprudential and policy considerations, as discussed in this chapter that underpin 
essentialia. Put differently, essentialia serve as the embodiment or practical manifestation of 
the notions of dignity, equality and freedom of all human beings engaged in the contractual 
domain.  
That the constitutional aspects of the role and function of essentialia1241 are deserving of more 
attention is supported by the fact that in the sphere of International Economic Law, a process 
of “judicial balancing” of human and economic rights has been operative in European courts for 
years and is now also being emulated in regional courts outside of Europe.1242 In addition, more 
United Nations human rights institutions are acknowledging the need to strengthen human 
rights in International Economic Law.1243 Judicial balancing can contribute to poverty reduction 
and to protecting, respecting and fulfilling human rights of citizens1244 as is evident in the policy 
perspectives of the recently enacted consumer protection legislation.1245 The protection of, 
                                                            
1240  The correctness of this line of reasoning has been recognised where an agreement infringes on an individual’s 
bodily integrity. For example, see the minority judgments of O’Reagan and Sachs JJ in S V Jordan and Others 
(Sex Workers Education and Advocacy Task force and Others as Amici Curiae) 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC). See also 
the situation where the agreement “reduces a person to economic servitude” - Coetzee v Comitis 2001 (1) SA 
1254 (C). The Jordan case dealt with the statutory prohibition of prostitution which was challenged on several 
grounds whilst the Coetzee case dealt with a contract that incorporated the National Soccer League Rules and 
Regulations, which prevented a professional soccer player from moving from one soccer club to another 
without obtaining the prior consent of the first club. This line of reasoning is also to be detected in pre-
constitutional jurisprudence. See, for example, Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 13-14, where the 
court declared an agreement that placed the respondent in a position of economic servitude was 
unconscionable and incompatible with public interest and therefore contrary to public policy. See also Naudé 
& Lubbe ‘Exemption Clauses – A Rethink Occasioned by Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom’ (2005) 122 SALJ 441, 
452, hereafter Naudé & Lubbe (2005) 122 SALJ.   
1241  See para 4.2.4 above. 
1242  Petersmann ‘Human Rights and International Economic Law’ 2-3.  
1243  Petersmann ‘Human Rights and International Economic Law’ 2-3.  
1244  Petersmann ‘Human Rights and International Economic Law’ 2-3. 
1245  See the discussion in chapter 3. 
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respect for and fulfillment of human rights1246 are also objectives of our own constitutional 
dispensation and there are tentative signs of their reception in contract law.1247 
 
4.3 Unilateral discretionary powers and reasonable price or rental 
4.3.1 Introduction  
It was postulated that a contract constitutes a record of the rights and obligations and of the 
nature and consequences of the legal relationship between the contractants.1248 Contractants 
must have a clear understanding of their legal commitments towards one another. Such 
understanding is to be gained from the terms of their contract, the most significant of which 
constitute the essentialia. Hence, essentialia constitute the fountainhead of all that legally 
connect contractants.1249 Agreement on price is one of the essentialia in contracts of sale and 
agreement on rental in contracts of lease. 
The fundamental purpose or essence of a contract of sale and lease1250 is agreement on the 
exchange of the goods for a sum of money. At common law, the parties may agree on any price, 
                                                            
1246  This would include poverty reduction, the provision of adequate health and educational services. See sections 
26 and 27 of the Constitution.  
1247  See the discussion in para 4.2.4.2(A)(iii) above and in chapter 1 para 1.3.3. The Supreme Court of Appeal has 
not been very receptive to the idea of integrating public law principles in the sphere of contract law. See, for 
example, Brisley 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) where the court said “’n [h]of kan nie skuiling soek in die skaduwee van 
die Grondwet om vandaar beginsels aan te val en omver te werp nie...” (para [24]). See also Bredenkamp 
(appeal) 2010 (4) SA 637 (SCA) para [39] and Potgieter and Another v Potgieter NO and Others 2012 (1) SA 
637 (SCA) paras [31]-[36], hereafter Potgieter 2012 (1) SA 637 (SCA). These cases are discussed in chapter 1 
para 1.3.3 and in chapter 2 para 2.2.4 (Bredenkamp); para 2.8 (Brisley); para 2.3.2.1 (Potgieter). The call for 
the integration of private and public law echoes the criticism of the Critical Legal Scholar movement of the 
distinction between private and public law: Van Doren ‘Critical Legal Studies and South Africa’ (1989) 106 
SALJ 648, 659-661. 
1248  Para 4.2.4.2(A)(iii) above. 
1249  Zulman & Kairinos Norman’s Law of Purchase and Sale in South Africa (2005) 1-3, hereafter Zulman & Kairinos 
Norman’s Law of Purchase and Sale for a list of definitions of a contract of sale going back to Gaius 
(Institutionem) 3.1.39. 
1250  See para 4.3.3.3(D) below for a discussion of price and rental as the essence of the contract. As stipulated 
earlier, only the position relating to sale will be referred to because of the similarity between sale and lease. 
This is done to avoid repetition and for the sake of brevity.  
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there being no rule that the price must reflect any particular criterion,1251 the only requirement 
being that the price must be certain in the sense that it is either ascertained or objectively 
ascertainable. The need for certainty regarding price is to ensure that the contract, in its 
essential aspects, reflects the wishes of the contractants.1252 
The requirement that the price must be ascertained does not present a problem.1253 Regarding 
the requirement of ascertainability, the common law accepts that the price is ascertainable 
where a nominee has been appointed to fix the price1254 or where the contract contains a 
formula.1255 In both instances (nomination and formula) the Westinghouse principle1256 is 
complied with, the contract coming into existence on agreement about the nominee or the 
formula.1257 However, problems arise when the external standard, itself, is considered to 
generate uncertainty. This has been the gravamen of the argument advanced against the 
recognition of a reasonable price1258 and a unilaterally determined price.1259 Before discussing 
                                                            
1251  Be it, for example, the market price or the cost of manufacture or that it must approximate such a price: See 
Kerr Sale and Lease 30 and 258-262. See also Bradfield Sale and Lease 21–22; Cooper Landlord and Tenant 
55-59; Benlou Properties (Pty) Ltd v Vector Graphics (Pty) Ltd 1993 (1) SA 179 (A) 185D-E, hereafter Benlou 
1993 (1) SA 179 (A); Engen Petroleum Ltd v Kommandonek (Pty) Ltd 2001 (2) SA 170 (W) 173G-I and 175H-I. 
However in respect of consumer sales, Section 48(1)(a)(i) of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008, 
prohibits a price that is unfair, unreasonable or unjust. The fair value or the amount for which the goods or 
services could have been acquired elsewhere is a factor that is used to determine whether the term is unfair, 
unreasonable or unjust (Section 52(2)). Likewise, in contracts of lease, section 13 (4) and (5) of the Rental 
Housing Act 50 of 1999 empowers Rental Housing Tribunals to replace a rental with one that is “just an 
equitable” to the lessor and lessee. It is submitted that the two provisions give expression to the submission 
that the notion of good faith is an integral component of essentialia (see para 4.2.4.4), and that the power-
conferring component of essentialia is subject to the duty of good faith. 
1252  Zimmermann The Law of Obligations The Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990) 254, hereafter 
Zimmermann Obligations (1990).  
1253  See chapter 1 para 1.4.2.2(B). 
1254  See chapter 1 para 1.4.2.2(C) and para 4.4 above. 
1255  See chapter 1 para 1.4.2.2(C). 
1256  The principle requires agreement on a criterion or criteria on the basis whereof the price may be objectively 
determined without further reference to contractants. See further chapter 1 paras 1.1 and 1.2. 
1257  Nomination and formula are representative of the general contract law principle that an agreement that does 
not fully set out its consequences may, nevertheless, be effective provided that it lays down an external 
standard which renders the consequences thereof objectively ascertainable. The standard, itself, must be 
clear and the facts necessary for its application must be established: Van der Merwe et al Contract 197-201. 
See further chapter 1 para 1.4.2.2(C). 
1258  See, for example, Adcorp Spares P.E. (Pty) Ltd v Hydromulch (Pty) Ltd 972 (1) SA 663 (TPD) 668. 
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the notion of a unilateral discretionary power to settle the price and the notion of a reasonable 
price, it is apposite to restate the question of law under investigation. 
 
4.3.2 Restatement of the legal question 
It is well established law that the price agreed upon must be certain in that it must be either 
ascertained or objectively ascertainable.1260 This requirement constitutes one of the protective 
mechanisms devised and refined by our common law to promote certainty and to prevent 
abuses and disputes regarding the counter-performance expected of the buyer. 1261 
Confounding the simplicity of this fundamentally important requirement is the devil in the 
detail, namely, what ought to be the accepted routes for arriving at such agreement? This 
question has pertinently presented itself in legal discourse as a result of an obiter dictum of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal1262 that suggests that a discretionary power to unilaterally settle the 
price and rental meets the requirement of certainty. Such power, the Court explained, would 
have to be exercised arbitrio bono viri as required at common law in respect of the exercise of 
any discretionary power.1263 A closely related question is whether contracts of sale and lease at 
a reasonable price or rental, respectively, should be regarded as valid as suggested in another 
obiter dictum of the then Appellate Division.1264 Accordingly, the question of law is whether 
South African law should confer validity on contracts of sale and lease at a reasonable price and 
rental, respectively, or at a unilaterally determined price or rental. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
1259  See, for example, Westinghouse 1986 (2) SA 555 (A) 574D-E; Genac Properties 1992 1 SA 566 (AD) 576I-577B; 
Lambons 1997 (4) SA 141 (SCA) 158F-H.   
1260  This is evident from definitions of the contract of sale from the time of Gaius to the present: Kerr Sale and 
Lease 3–5 and 30–34. See also Zulman & Kairinos Norman’s Law of Purchase and Sale 1-2 and 41-46. 
1261  See the discussion in paras 4.2.4.2(B) and 4.2.4.3. See also Kerr Sale and Lease 66; Zimmermann Obligations 
(1990) 254-255. 
1262  NBS Boland Bank 1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA) para [32] discussed in chapter 1 paras 1.2 and 1.4.2. 
1263  Para [25]. 
1264  Genac Properties 1992 (1) SA 566 (AD) 578 B-C discussed in chapter 1 paras 1.2 and 1.4.2. 
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4.3.3 Unilateral discretionary power to settle the price or rental and the notion of certainty in 
constitutional, jurisprudential and policy perspective  
4.3.3.1 Introduction 
In order to answer the question in respect of a unilateral discretionary power to settle the 
price, it is necessary to discuss the concept of unilateral discretionary power. 
 
4.3.3.2 Unilateral discretionary power 
The concept refers to the situation where the contractants agree that one or more terms of the 
contract should be determined at the discretion of one of them.1265 Hence, it permits post-
contract division of the “contractual pie”1266 and allows the power-holder to change the legal 
position of another for better or for worse.1267 The latter in turn “labours under a liability in the 
sense that his or her legal status is susceptible to alteration”1268 by the power-holder. The 
wielding of power allows for three possibilities: (i) an exercise of power that favours the 
interests of the empowered contractant; or (ii) one that favours the disempowered 
contractant; or (iii) one that favours both in that it is neutral.  
                                                            
1265  For example, an agreement that empowers a contractant to individualise the subject-matter of the sale from 
a genus or from a number of specified alternatives. Van der Merwe et al Contract 203.  
1266  A phrase borrowed from Feldman, Schurr & Teichman ‘Reference Points and Contract Interpretation: An 
Empirical Examination’ (2012) 1, 9, available at 
<http://scholar.google.co.za/scholar_url?hl=en&q=http://works.bepress.com/context/teichman/article/1008
/type/native/viewcontent&sa=X&scisig=AAGBfm1FLL3r_G6RrcE83njMvWzJCp8uMQ&oi=scholaralrt> 
hereafter Feldman et al ‘Reference Points and Contract Interpretation’ (2012). The phrase means that certain 
aspects of the contract are left to be decided after the conclusion of the contract. In this instance, one of the 
contractants is granted the exclusive power to make such decision. 
1267  Cockrell (1997) Acta Juridica 26. Power may originate, for example, in Public Law or in Private Law. An 
example in Public Law is the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 that empowers a range of governmental 
institutions to expropriate property for a public purpose against payment of compensation. At Private Law, 
power originates, for example, in the Law of Persons and the Law of Contract. In the Law of Persons, the 
common law allows for the appointment of a curator bonis to manage the affairs of a person who is legally 
deemed to lack the capacity to manage his/her own affairs: Boezaart Law of Persons (2010) 147-150. In the 
Law of Contract, a contract may contain, for example, a lex commissoria which empowers the creditor (the 
empowered contractant) to cancel the contract on breach by the debtor. The creditor also has this power 
where, in the absence of a lex commissoria, time is of the essence.Van der Merwe et al Contract 299; 
Hutchison et al Contract 286-287. 
1268  Cockrell (1997) Acta Juridica 26. 
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Of the three possibilities, the first is the most likely to happen in practice. It was confirmed in an 
empirical study that contractants are more likely to adopt a self-serving approach in the 
interpretation of contractual terms in order to minimise losses than to maximise profits.1269 The 
writers elaborate by explaining that in the realm of losses “people ... tend to view their 
contractual obligations more selfishly” than when they are “in the domain of gains.”1270 A 
holder of a right [object] would tend to view the sale of the right [object] as a loss1271 whereas 
the acquirer, in turn, would view the acquisition of the right [object] as a gain. Furthermore, 
once a decision has been made to acquire, the tendency is to confirm and justify it and to 
selectively process and rationalise information that supports that decision rather than 
information that does not. This is known as cognitive dissonance.1272 Translated into the sales 
contract context, it means that when once a person has decided to buy a product, he/she will 
rationalise the purchase even in the face of the uncertainties manifest1273 in the notion of a 
reasonable price or in a term conferring power to settle the price on the seller. This reduction 
of human interaction to the pursuit of profit as well as the maintenance of self-interest is 
derided by the legal philosophers Bataille, Lévinas and Derrida who are critical of this dominant 
ethic of the “national and international capitalist economy” with Derrida being of the view that 
the law cannot serve the interests of justice if it is at the mercy of this ethic because then it 
                                                            
1269  Feldman et al ‘Reference Points and Contract Interpretation’ (2012) 3-4. The study built on a large body of 
both psychological and economic studies that suggested that people treated “payoffs framed as gains and 
payoffs framed as losses distinctly”: Feldman et al ‘Reference Points and Contract Interpretation’ (2012) 1, 2. 
1270  Feldman et al ‘Reference Points and Contract Interpretation’ (2012) 21; Van der Walt ‘Law: The Sacrificial 
Tension between Justice and Economics’ (2005) 16 Stell LR 244, hereafter Van der Walt (2005) 16 Stell LR 244, 
who refers to Derrida’s characterisation of the economy as a “restricted economy” meaning one in which 
“the self only engages with others on condition that, at best, some profit can be made out of the transaction 
or, at worst, no loss will be incurred in the transaction.” 
1271  This is the so-called endowment effect where one values things more when once they have been acquired. 
Riesenhuber ‘English common law versus German Systemdenken? Internal versus external approaches’ (2011) 
7(1) Utrecht LR 117, 128 , available at 
<http://www.utrechtlawreview.org/index.php/ulr/article/viewFile/URN%3ANBN%3ANL%3AUI%3A10-1-
101164/149>, hereafter Riesenhuber (2011) 7(1) Utrecht LR. 
1272  Riesenhuber (2011) 7(1) Utrecht LR 117-128. 
1273  See also para 4.3.4.3(E) below. 
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would be unjust.1274 It is submitted that the obiter dicta that would recognise a sale or lease at 
a reasonable price or rental, or a price or rental to be unilaterally determined, serve to promote 
this ethic and would, hence, be unjust.1275 
In the context of a contract of sale, the results of the empirical study would mean that a seller 
(the one “losing” the object) would strive to be paid a higher price than that which the buyer 
would be prepared to pay to acquire the object being sold. The law seeks to circumscribe this 
perfectly logical (from a common sense perspective) attitude by requiring the price to be 
objectively ascertainable at date of contract. In providing a platform for negotiation, the 
requirement seeks to pre-empt a consequence that does not fulfil the mutual interests of the 
contractants so that, in theory at least, a mutually satisfactory arrangement is attained. 
Contractants are normally in the best position to judge their own interests, hence the 
“substance of agreements that result from [their own] consent [is] also likely to be fair.”1276 In 
the event of a unilateral-discretionary-power scenario, such negotiation is absent. Bearing in 
mind that in terms of the traditional economic model of contract-decision-making, contractants 
are “expected to maximise the monetary benefits they can extract from the transaction,”1277 
and against the background of Feldman et al’s empirical study,1278 it is not inconceivable that 
the power-wielder would be likely to adopt a self-serving approach and try to exact maximum 
benefit from the transaction. The possibility that it would also increase the scope for 
exploitation, or, that it may find its way into standard form contracts and the abuses attendant 
on such contracts, can also, likewise, not be discounted. Online transactions exacerbate the 
                                                            
1274  Van der Walt (2005) 16 Stell LR 244-245. 
1275  See the discussion in the text that follows this footnote reference. 
1276  Barnett ‘Contract is Not a Promise; Contract is Consent’ 11.  
1277  Feldman et al ‘Reference Points and Contract Interpretation’ (2012) 2; Posner ‘The Law and Economics of 
Contract Interpretation’ unpublished paper, (2005) Paper 56 American Law & Economics Association Annual 
Meetings 1, 11, hereafter Posner ‘The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation’ unpublished paper, 
(2005) Paper 56 American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1. Contractants will design their 
contracts to best serve their interests.  
1278  Outlined earlier in this sub-paragraph. 
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problem in that they enable sellers to manipulate the manner of contract formation, increasing 
the scope for exploitation.1279 
It is anticipated that the seller, as the contractant who usually has the stronger bargaining 
power,1280 will be the one who, in most cases, will be vested with the unilateral power. The 
result would be a perpetuation of the traditionalist capitalist order (criticised by Bataille, 
Lévinas, and Derrida) which is in stark contrast to the current approach of using the law as a 
tool to achieve the socio-economic reforms called for by the Constitution.1281 This will, in all 
probability, result in the gains attained by the enactment of consumer protection legislation in 
the equalisation of bargaining power being reversed and contribute to the stunting of future 
developments in that direction. This conclusion is reinforced when regard is had to the elevated 
status accorded to the principle of freedom and sanctity of contract in the South African legal 
context.1282 The principle enables sellers to legislate by contract with the result that the notion 
of freedom of contract becomes the exercise of power by contract.1283 Accordingly, and as 
illustrated in chapter 2 above, the principle does not guarantee that all persons are able to 
utilise it to the same extent. Hence, the need for a rule-orientated approach to essentialia in 
order to prevent in the words of Kessler “freedom of contract from becoming a one-sided 
                                                            
1279  Tasneem ‘The Legal Issues of Electronic Contracts in Australia’ (2011) 1(2) Int. J. Manag Bus. Res. 85, 87 
<www.SID.ir>, hereafter Tasneem (2011) 1(2) Int. J. Manag Bus. Res.85. This observation made in respect of 
the exploitation of persons without contractual capacity, applies equally to persons who, because of socio-
economic circumstances seduce themselves into buying products which they may not need and/or on terms 
that they cannot afford. These aspects were considered in chapter 3. In chapter 2, it was explained that an 
inability to make comparisons due to a lack of market choices and/or weak bargaining power and/or lack 
resources (including time, energy, money, cognitive ability) leads to the disempowerment of contractants, 
exposing them to manipulation and exploitation. The same considerations could result in contractual 
discretionary clauses and clauses to pay a reasonable price being foisted upon disempowered contractants, 
for example, by way of standard form contracts.      
1280  See the discussion in chapters 2 and 3. 
1281  See the discussion in para 4.2.4.2(A) above and the discussion elsewhere in this chapter of other legislation, 
such as the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Ac Act 19 of 1998. See also 
the discussion of the consumer protection legislation in chapter 3. 
1282  See the discussion in chapter 2 and in particular in para 2.2.4. 
1283  Kessler ‘Contracts of Adhesion – Some Thoughts About Freedom Of Contract’ (1943) 43 Columbia LR 629, 
640, hereafter Kessler (1943) 43 Columbia LR. 
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privilege.”1284 A rule-orientated approach is in accord with the notion of the constitutional 
values of dignity, equality and freedom as empirical values, as well as operating as 
constitutional constraints to the notion of freedom of contract.1285 
 
4.3.3.3 Unilateral discretionary price or rental 
(A) The current position and criticism thereof 
The current imperative against a unilateral discretionary power to settle the price1286is 
supported by a wealth of authorities and may be traced back to the Digest.1287 Our courts have, 
with respect, “glibly” rejected such contracts a being void for vagueness.1288 This rejection, as 
well as the rationale for it, has been the subject of criticism, the contention being that the only 
difference between a situation where the contractants agree on a third party nominee and one 
where the contractants agree that one of them would settle the price on their behalf is one of 
“the identity of the person who is to make the determination.”1289 Accordingly, it is argued that 
“[e]ither both of these propositions are vague or neither is vague.”1290 Similarly, the Supreme 
                                                            
1284  Kessler (1943) 43 Columbia LR 640. 
1285  See the discussion in para 4.2.4.3 above. 
1286  See, for example, in Shell SA (Pty) Ltd v Corbitt and Another 1984 4 SA 523 (CPD) the court said that a contract 
is not legally enforceable “if it is made to depend solely upon the will of one of the parties what part he 
should perform” (525).   
1287  Wessels & Roberts The Law of Contract in South Africa para 430-433; Kerr Sale and Lease 55; Van der Merwe 
et al Contract 201-202; Joubert General Principles of the Law of Contract (1987) 180; Cooper Landlord and 
Tenant 57; Mostert, Joubert & Viljoen Die Koopkontrak (1972) 11; Van der Bergh TSAR 2012 (1) 61; Kerr & 
Glover ‘May Essential Provisions of a Contract be Determined by One of the Parties Alone’ (2000) 117 SALJ 
201, 202-205, hereafter Kerr & Glover (2000) 117 SALJ; Lubbe ‘Kontraktuele diskresie, potestatiewe 
voorwaardes en die bepaaldheidsvereiste’ (1989) 2 TSAR 159, 165; Hawthorne ‘The contractual requirement 
of certainty of price’ (1992) 55 THRHR 638, 639-640. See also Shell SA (Pty) Ltd v Corbitt and Another 1984 4 
SA 523 (CPD), 525; Murray & Roberts 1991 (1) SA 508 (A), 514G-H; Beretta v Beretta 1924 TPD 60; Schneier & 
London v Bennet 1927 TPD 346; Roberts v Forsyth 1948 (3) SA 926 (N).  
1288  See, for example, Davidowitz v Van Drimmelen 1913 TPD 672, 676; Westinghouse 1986 (2) SA 555 (A) 574D-E; 
Murray & Roberts 1991 (1) SA 508 (A) 514G-H; Genac Properties 1992 1 SA 566 (A) 576I-577B; Lambons 1997 
(4) SA 141 (SCA) 158F-H; NBS Boland Bank 1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA) para [9]. 
1289  The former is accepted as a valid agreement whilst the latter is not. Kerr Sale and Lease 57 et seq. 
1290  Kerr Sale and Lease 57 et seq. See also Kerr & Glover (2000) 117 SALJ 201; Van der Merwe et al Contract 204. 
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Court of Appeal in NBS Boland Bank v One Berg River1291 reasoned that an arrangement 
conferring on a nominee the power to fix the price is as “uncertain” as in the case where the 
power to fix the price is left to the discretion of one of the contractants.1292 Accordingly, the 
court suggested1293 that an arrangement conferring a unilateral discretionary power should not 
be void for vagueness. 
It is submitted, however, that the justification for the invalidity on the ground of “vagueness,” 
unfortunately, obfuscates the real issue.1294 With respect, the case for invalidity is not on the 
imprecise basis of the notion of vagueness. Rather, such an agreement is suspect on the basis 
that a unilateral discretionary power is at odds with the objective standard required to render 
the agreement ascertainable.1295 It is the objective element that gives expression to the 
constitutional values of dignity, freedom, and equality that the classification of the requirement 
as an essentialia seeks to promote.1296 By insisting on joint participation in the process of 
nomination, both contractants, in theory, have an equal say in the ultimate determination of 
the essence of the contract,1297 namely the price, thereby promoting the notions of fairness and 
justice. This contention is supported by the fact that the courts make it clear that the basis for 
invalidity is the fact that the performance depends on the will of one of the contractants.1298 
This reasoning also supports the non-recognition of unilateral price determination as opposed 
to price determination by a nominee. Zimmermann’s twin suggestions for the existence of the 
                                                            
1291  1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA), para [9]. See also the obiter dictum in Benlou 1993 (1) SA 179 (A) 185F-G; Daube 
Studies in the Roman Law of Sale: dedicated to the Memory of Francis De Zulueta (1959) 23. 
1292  See also Benlou Properties (Pty) Ltd v Vector Graphics (Pty) Ltd. 1993 (1) SA 179 (A) 185F-G. 
1293  Para [32]. 
1294  See also Kerr Sale and Lease 58; Kerr & Glover (2000) 117 SALJ 208-209.  
1295  See also the Southernport Developments (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Limited 2005 (2) SA 202 (SCA) case (discussed in 
para  4.2.4.4 above) where an agreement containing an open term was regarded as valid because it contained 
a deadlock-breaking mechanism. The mechanism sufficed to introduce the objective standard to render the 
agreement valid. 
1296  See paras 4.2.4.2(B) and 4.2.4.3 above. See also Van der Bergh (2012) 1 TSAR 53, 61. 
1297  See para 4.3.3.3(D) below. 
1298  See, for example, Murray & Roberts 1991 (1) SA 508 (A) 514G-H, where the court expressed the view that a 
contract would be “void for vagueness” if the “prestation of either party” “depends entirely on the will of a 
party”. 
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rule in Roman times support this thesis. Unilateral discretionary power would, in the words of 
Zimmermann, remove “the institutional check against the danger of gross and unreasonable 
contractual imbalance.”1299 Support is also to be found in the policy considerations underlying 
consumer protection legislation as discussed in chapter 3.1300 
In a case decided a century ago, the court expressed itself as follows: “If a person who claims 
that he had made a contract proves that it depends wholly on his own will what part of it he 
should perform, then according to my view there is no contract.”1301 Unfortunately, the court, 
in summarising its conclusion, ambushes itself by resorting to the tired and over-worked 
phrase, namely, that “[the contract] is void for vagueness.”1302 The characterisation of a term as 
being “void for vagueness” should, as suggested by Kerr,1303 be reserved for those cases where 
“the language used is so obscure that no meaning can be discovered.” It should not be used, as 
has been done, to cover those cases where the language “is crystal clear” but the contract 
suffers a fatal defect due to non-compliance with some or other legal requirement.1304 
 
(B) Retention of the status quo 
The obiter dictum in NBS Boland Bank1305 in advocating that the discretion must be exercised 
“arbitrio bono [sc: boni] viri” [the decision of a reasonable person/a reasonable decision]1306 
                                                            
1299  Obligations (1990) 254. Zimmermann goes on to postulate, firstly, that the rule was to obviate the possibility 
of “a breakdown of the transaction...due to the fact that in end the price might either be lacking or be 
unascertainable.” Secondly, there is the possibility that the concentration of too much power in the hands of 
the “empowered” contractant may lead to abuse of the “disempowered” contractant. 
1300  The policy considerations of the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 were discussed in a footnote in para 4.2.5 
of above. In America, referring to the Statute of Frauds, the court in Walker v Keith Kentucky Court of Appeals 
382 S.W.2d 198 (Ky. 1964), hereafter Walker 382 S.W.2d 198 (Ky. 1964) said that the purpose of writing is to 
assure certainty of the essential terms of a contract and thereby to avoid controversy and litigation. 
1301  In Dawidowitz v Van Drimmelen 1913 TPD 675-676. Emphasis added. 
1302  Dawidowitz v Van Drimmelen 1913 TPD 672, 676. See also Kerr Sale and Lease 60. 
1303  Kerr Sale and Lease 65. 
1304  For example, that the contract does not contain a price or where the formula does not provide adequate 
information from which the price can be determined. In these instances, the contract of sale is invalid 
because the price is not ascertained or ascertainable and hence does not meet the requirement of certainty, 
and not because the contract is vague. 
1305  1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA) paras [24-25]. 
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takes issue with the reasoning that a unilateral discretionary power confers an unfettered 
discretion and that hence it is invalid as a price-setting mechanism. The suggestion is that since 
the discretionary power is qualified by the arbitrio boni viri notion, the basis for the rejection of 
such power, namely, that it leaves it to the will of the empowered contractants, falls away. 
However, the court leaves the question open and admits of the possibility that such a unilateral 
discretionary power may be invalid as being against public policy.1307 
The court’s reasoning elicits the following questions about the proposed limitation to the 
unilateral discretionary power in the guise of the arbitrium boni viri: What benefit does the 
assurance of the notion of the arbitrium boni viri hold for a contractant who does not litigate 
due to the high transaction costs thereof?1308 Another question concerns the options available 
to a contractant where a price is “more shocking” than another with neither reaching the 
threshold of unconscionability,1309 or where it is (way) beyond the means of the particular 
contractant or was not contemplated or anticipated by either or both contractants at date of 
contract.1310 In terms of the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Appeal,1311 a contractant 
who finds himself/herself in any one of these situations would be bound by the contract1312 and 
would have to suffer the consequences, legal and otherwise, attendant on an inability to pay. In 
respect of the second question, and on an analysis based on the acceptance of the notion of 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
1306  Claassen Dictionary of Legal Words and Phrases vol. 1 146-147. See also Erasmus and Others v Senwes Ltd 
and Others 2006 (3) SA 529 (T) 538, hereafter Erasmus 2006 (3) SA 529 (T).  
1307  At para [30]. See further the discussion in this regard in the text following this footnote reference as well as in 
para 4.3.4 below. See also van der Merwe et al Contract 210. 
1308  These include, inter alia, the costs, time, effort, cognitive ability, and concerns regarding the prospect of 
success especially when faced by large corporations. In chapter 3, it was shown that provisions of the 
consumer protection legislation were designed to obviate the need for litigation and hence the incurring of 
the (high) transaction costs associated therewith. 
1309  Bagchi ‘Managing Moral Risk: The Case of contract’ (2011) 111 Columbia LR 1878, 1908. 
1310  In para 2.3 of chapter 2, it was illustrated that contracts, including those signed by “weak” contractants, bear 
a stamp of presumptive validity. Our Supreme Court of Appeal has, for example, held that the mere fact that 
a contractual term is unfair or that it operates harshly does not serve as an independent basis for concluding 
that it offends constitutional principles, confirming the court’s reluctance to employ fairness as a standard for 
judging contractual validity. See further chapter 2. 
1311  See chapter 2. The consumer protection legislation discussed in chapter 3 reveals an awareness of this and 
discloses an attempt at corrective action on the part of the legislature.  
1312  See the various pronouncements of the Supreme Court of Appeal discussed in chapter 2.   
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unconscionability, it would be argued that there is no procedural unconscionability in that there 
was not an absence of meaningful choice: both participated in formulating the contractual 
term. It would also not be substantively unconscionable even though the price may not be what 
the contractant contemplated or anticipated. However, it was shown that the mode of analysis 
adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeal1313 and its strict adherence to the principles of 
contractual freedom and autonomy as a basis for enforcing the contract, not only, unduly 
exaggerates the scope that the individual has to make rational choices, but also, overestimates 
the capacity of contractants to make rational choices.1314  
A contractant in such a predicament could possibly find refuge in the notion of good faith that 
requires, not only, honesty between contractants, but also, that a contractant should “in die 
nastrewing van eie belang” display ‘’n mate van erkenning en respek” towards his/her 
counterpart.1315 The unreasonable advancement of own interest at the expense of the other 
contractant may constitute a breach of the notion of bona fides.1316 Such an approach would 
find resonance in the “mirror notions” of dignity and ubuntu.1317 However, the current 
approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal to the notion of good faith reveals a disinclination to 
utilise the notion in situations where contractants have been overreached.1318 Adding further 
insult to injury, is the then Appellate Division’s reasoning in rejecting the reception of the 
exceptio doli generalis in our law.1319 It will be recalled that the Appellate Division in Bank of 
Lisbon v De Ornelas1320 criticized the exceptio “for being a loosely articulated defence that ran 
counter to the notion that courts ought not to descend into the arena to settle disputes 
                                                            
1313  In respect of voluntariness of consensus. See, for example, chapter 2 paras 2.2.4, 2.3.2 and 2.4.3. 
1314  See chapter 2 generally and in particular paras 2.2.4, 2.3 and 2.4. 
1315  Lubbe (1991) 1 Stell LR 20. 
1316  Lubbe (1991) 1 Stell LR 20. 
1317  See chapter 1 para 1.3.3 and para 4.2.4.2(A)(i) above. 
1318  See chapter 2 para 2.8. 
1319  See chapters 1 and 2. 
1320  1988 (3) SA 580 (A), hereafter Bank of Lisbon 1988 (3) SA 580 (A). 
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concerning the fairness and equity of contractual terms agreed to by the parties.”1321 A similar 
line of reasoning runs through the judgments of the then Appellate Division and the current 
Supreme Court of Appeal until the present.1322 Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, 
the narrow scope allowed for public policy as a mechanism to come to the assistance of 
contractants also does not bode well for such a contractant.1323 
A matter of even greater weight and concern is the “passive” role ascribed to the Constitution 
by recent judgments of the Supreme Court of Appeal.1324 The judgments reflect “a philosophy 
of non-interference of public law with private contractual relationships and a disregard for the 
inequality of [the] bargaining position of the employee [contractants] which was prevalent in 
legal thinking when Magna Alloys was decided.”1325 The tenor of the cases regarding the role of 
the Constitution in the contract law arena1326 is a cause for concern and constitutes another 
reason why the notion of a unilateral discretional power advocated in NBS Boland Bank1327 or a 
                                                            
1321  Glover ‘Lazarus in the Constitutional Court: An exhumation of the exceptio doli generalis?’ (2007) 124 SALJ 
449, 450. 
1322  See the case law discussed in chapter 2. 
1323  Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA), hereafter Afrox Healthcare 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA), 
discussed in chapter 2, serves as an example of a situation where a contractant received short shrift from the 
law. See further the discussion generally in chapter 2. 
1324  Representative of this approach of the courts in this regard is the decision in Brisley2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) where 
the Court, in warning that a court “kan nie skuiling soek in die skaduwee van die Grondwet om vandaar 
beginsels aan te val en omver te werp nie…,” rejected the notion that constitutional values gave it the 
jurisdiction to utilize equitable considerations to disregard contractual provisions freely entered into (para 
[24]). In the same vein, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA) said that “the 
Constitution and its value system does not confer on judges a general discretion to declare contracts invalid 
on the basis of their subjective perceptions of fairness or on the grounds of imprecise notions of good faith” 
(para [7]). The Brisley court’s approach received affirmation in the recent Supreme Court of Appeal decision 
in Bredenkamp (appeal) 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA) and in Potgieter 2012 (1) SA 637 (SCA) discussed in chapter 1 
para 1.3.3 and in chapter 2 and in this chapter. See also the discussion generally in chapter 2. 
1325  Calitz ‘Restraint of Trade Agreements in Employment Contracts: Time for Pacta Sunt Servanda to Bow Out? 
(2011) 22 Stellenbosch LR 50, 54. The writer reached this conclusion after considering the post-Constitution 
decisions that confirmed the authoritative nature of the pacta sunt servanda doctrine and that confirmed the 
common law as enunciated in the Magna Alloys case as settled law and that proclaimed that the Constitution 
had no influence on that position.  
1326  See the case discussions in chapter 2 regarding the primacy of the classical approach to contract law in the 
face of constitutional considerations.  
1327  1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA). 
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reasonable price as suggested in the Genac Properties JHB (Pty) Ltd v NBC Administrators CC1328 
should not, figuratively speaking, be allowed out of Pandora’s box. 
 
(C) Unilateral price and rental determination and public policy 
Unilateral determination of the price falls foul of the notion of public policy as redefined by the 
Constitutional Court in Barkhuizen.1329 Such a term is inherently unfair in that it opens the door 
for exploitation.1330 It is also unjust and unreasonable in that it deprives the “disempowered” 
contractant of the right to negotiate and reach agreement on a fundamentally important aspect 
– the essence1331 - of the contract and requires him/her to accept a unilateral determination of 
a crucial aspect of his/her contractual obligations. In the circumstances, any such submission 
would be constitutionally unsound and indefensible in that it constitutes an erosion of the 
notions of dignity, equality and freedom.1332 In addition, unilateral determination does not 
meet the standards exacted by the Constitutional Court judgments on the notion of dignity.1333 
In the Mokgoro paradigm,1334 the recognition of a unilateral discretionary power lends itself to 
the exploitation of the vulnerable members of society thereby impeding the process of 
transformation to a more just and egalitarian society and rendering it incompatible with the 
spirit and purport of the Bill of Rights.1335 In the context of Ackermann’s hypothesis,1336 the 
                                                            
1328  1992 1 SA 566 (AD).See further para 4.3.4 below for a discussion of the difficulties in defining the notion of a 
reasonableness in relation to price. 
1329  2007 (5) SA 323 (CC). See chapter 1 para 1.3.3 as well as para 4.2.4.2(A)(iii) above. 
1330  Zimmermann Obligations (1990) suggests that this was the motivation for the rule against unilateral price 
determination in Roman law (254). 
1331  See para 4.3.3.3(D) below. 
1332  See the discussion of the values of dignity, equality and freedom in chapter 1 para 1.3.3 as well as in para 
4.2.4.2 above.  
1333  See para 4.2.4.2(A)(i) above. 
1334  See para 4.2.4.2(A)(i) above. 
1335  See section 39(1)&(2) of the Constitution. In this context, it is apposite to repeat that Sachs J in Barkhuizen 
2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) expressed a concern with standard form contracts. The learned judge’s recognition of its 
potential for abuse is evident when he, at paras [184] and [185], leaves for future consideration the question 
whether onerous and unilaterally imposed standard-form contracts of adhesion should, in general, be 
regarded as offensive to public policy in our new constitutional dispensation. In Breedenkamp (interim 
interdict) 2009 (5) SA 304 (GSJ), the court summarised Sachs J’s comments as expressing a concern with “the 
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concentration of the power to fix the price in the hands of one contractant would operate at 
the expense of the individuality and uniqueness of the other contractant. Hence, the defect is 
one of principle and not of fact. In other words, the problem does not lie with the exercise of 
the discretion but with the principle of awarding a discretion. The fact that the decision-maker’s 
power is circumscribed by the notion of the arbitrio boni viri as suggested in the NBS Boland 
Bank obiter dictum does not remedy this defect.1337 
Equally problematical is that the arbitrio boni viri notion becomes the focus of attention only 
after a complaint has been lodged. It saddles the disempowered contractant with the burden of 
deciding whether or not to litigate.1338 The burden of prosecuting the claim and of proving non-
compliance with the suggested standard rests like a yoke on the shoulders of the 
disempowered contractant, who in most cases will be the one in the weaker bargaining position 
and, hence in theory, the one who has the least resources at his/her disposal to discharge the 
onus.1339 In this context, it is apposite to repeat that ever-escalating legal costs exacerbated by 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
manner in which large powerful organizations wield oppressive contractual power in a way that allows them 
to impose onerous and unfair contractual terms on subordinate contractual parties” (paras [60] and [68]). In 
light of these pronouncements and bearing in mind the strict adherence of the Supreme Court of Appeal to 
the principles of freedom and sanctity of contract (see chapter 2), it is submitted that similar concerns about 
the possible abuse or exploitation of unilateral discretionary power or a formula of a reasonable price are not 
without merit. That such terms may find their way into standard form contract is an aggravating 
consideration. A seller (sellers are usually in the better bargaining position) may abuse his/her discretionary 
power and fix a purchase price that exceeds the real value of the commodity secure in the knowledge that 
the buyer would be deterred from litigating by the transaction costs of litigation. The importance of these 
considerations justifies their repetition in this context. See also Kerr The Law of Sale and Lease 72; Kerr & 
Glover (2000) 117 SALJ 207. The possibility that sellers may be required by consumer protection legislation to 
bring such clauses to the notice of the contractant does not detract from the argument. 
1336  See para 4.2.4.2(A)(i) above. 
1337  The standard of the arbitrio boni viri is discussed in para 4.3.4 below. 
1338  The decision whether or not to institute an action would be dependent on various considerations, not least of 
which is the cognitive ability of the disempowered contractant and whether he/she has the resources (inter 
alia, means, time, energy, capacity, inclination) to prosecute his/her claim. The fact that provision is made in 
the Consumer Protection Act and in the Rental Housing Act (see chapter 3) for the price and rental to be 
challenged provides cold comfort for many aggrieved contractants because of high transaction costs. Naude 
‘The Use of Black and Grey Lists in Unfair Contract Terms Legislation in Comparative Perspective’ (2007) 124 
SALJ 128, 152-155, hereafter Naude (2007) 124 SALJ. 
1339  In this respect, it would, in essence, mirror the development in restraint of trade cases where the employee, 
who traditionally has the weaker bargaining power, has the burden of proving that the restraint is unfair. The 
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economic disadvantages “weaken consumers’ protection when they attempt to assert their 
legal rights and protections.”1340 This would see the further entrenchment of, not only, the 
classical approach to the doctrine of sanctity of contract1341 over considerations of fairness and 
equity, but also, of the layers of inequality that permeate South African Society. The latter 
consequence would have a paralysing effect on the constitutional imperative to foster socio-
economic reform for the transformation of the South African society into a more just and 
egalitarian one. 
 
(D) Unilateral price and rental determination in relation to the essence of the contract 
The argument may also be made that a unilateral discretionary power to settle the price and 
rental runs counter to the essence of a contract of sale and lease. In the early days when there 
was no money, no distinction was made between a contract of exchange and one of sale. The 
purpose of a contract of exchange was, and still is, to exchange one thing for another. Hence, 
agreement on what was to be exchanged constituted the essence of the contract. However, the 
practicality of barter/exchange became increasingly problematic due to the difficulty in finding 
a person that required something that one had and that had something that one required.1342 
In the course of time, a substance “to which a permanent or uniform value was attached, was 
used to facilitate the disposal of commodities.” Sale in its modern form with price as an 
essentiale came about when this substance later acquired the stamp of approval of the state, 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
nefarious consequences of an approach that burdens the “weaker” contractant were discussed chapters 2 
and 3 above, as well as in para 4.2.4.3(C) above and elsewhere in this chapter.  
1340  Junke Xu ‘Who Will Protect Chinese Consumers? The Past, Present and Future of Consumer Protection 
Legislation in China’ (2011-2012) 24 Loyola Consumer LR 22. See also Naude (2007) 124 SALJ 151-155; Naude 
‘Unfair Contract Terms Legislation: The Implications of Why We Need it for its Formulation and Application’ 
(2006) 17 Stell LR 361, 379-380; Naude ‘Enforcement Procedures in Respect of the Consumer’s Right to Fair, 
Reasonable and Just Contract Terms under the Consumer Protection Act in Comparative Perspective’ (2010) 
127 SALJ 515, 516-517. 
1341  See the discussion of the adherence of the Supreme Court of Appeal to this approach chapter 2 paras 2.2-2.3.  
1342    Mommsen, Krueger & Watson The Digest of Justinian 18.1.33.1 Volume 2 (1985) 513. 
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acquiring the status of coinage or money which had no intrinsic value but had an artificial value 
that determined its worth.1343 
According to Thomas Aquinas,1344 the nature and essence of a contract is defined by its end or 
purpose.1345 The purpose determines the body of rules that apply to the transaction.1346 The 
most important of the constitutive rules are the essentialia on which there must be sufficiently 
certain agreement to give effect to the contractual purpose;1347 the essentialia of a contract 
being “regarded as the obligations entailed by its definition.”1348 In a contract of sale, the 
purpose is to exchange a sum of money for the permanent use and enjoyment of an object.1349 
The view of Thomas Aquinas was developed by the medieval commentator, Baldus, and the 
Scholastics who required that contractual provisions agreed to by the parties had to be 
consistent with the nature of the contract.1350 In other words, the provisions had to be 
consistent with the contract’s purpose. This meant that contractants were constrained from 
modifying the consequences of the contract so as to derogate from the nature of the contract 
itself.1351 The writers, Naude and Lubbe, then develop this theory by calling for a substantive 
limitation on contractual freedom.1352 The result would be that contractants would not be able 
to contract out of, for example, the exclusion of the implied warranty against eviction because 
this would relieve the seller of his/her most fundamental obligation, namely, to transfer free 
                                                            
1343  O’Donovan MacKeurtan’s 2. The notion of essentialia as being the essence of the contract is also mentioned 
elsewhere in this chapter and more notably in paras 4.2.5 and 4.3.1 above.  See also Horn, Kötz & Leser 
German Private and Commercial Law: An Introduction (1982) 116. 
1344  The content of this paragraph is based on the discussion and development of the philosophy of Thomas 
Aquinas by Naudé & Lubbe (2005) 122 SALJ 445-462.   
1345  At 446. 
1346  Naude (2003) 3 TSAR 415. 
1347  Naude (2003) 3 TSAR 415. 
1348  Naudé & Lubbe (2005) 122 SALJ 446. This echoes the discussion of the nature and content of essentialia in 
paras 4.2.4.1and 4.2.4.2(B)(i) above. 
1349  In lease it is for the temporary uses and enjoyment of immovable property.  
1350  Naudé & Lubbe (2005) 122 SALJ 447. 
1351  The current prohibition against a pactum reservati dominii (a clause that reserves ownership in favour of the 
seller) is an example of a prohibition of a contractual arrangement that is inconsistent with the purpose of a 
contract of sale. Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract 177-178. 
1352  Naudé & Lubbe (2005) 122 SALJ 447-460. 
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and undisturbed sustained use and enjoyment.1353 In reasoning that the essence of a contract is 
no longer a metaphysical concept, but rather a criterion deriving from the basic socio-economic 
purpose of the parties, the writers conclude that the essence of a contract has policy relevance 
and technical meaning that go beyond mere classification of contracts.1354 
Using the Thomastic theory, as developed, and the historical development of coinage as a basis, 
it is submitted that the price is the quid pro quo for receiving the benefit of the bargain. Hence, 
agreement thereon constitutes the essence of the contract of sale and has policy relevance.1355 
Without agreement, the purpose of the contract cannot be realised.1356 In other words, the 
                                                            
1353  Such paternalistic intervention is evident in recent consumer protection legislation. For example, the 
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 precludes a buyer from contracting out of the implied warranty against 
latent defects by agreeing to a voetstoots clause: see chapter 3 para 3.6.5. The constitutionality of such 
paternalistic intervention was acknowledged by the Constitutional Court when it recognised that the RHA 
superimposed its unfair practice regime on the obligations that contractants negotiate for themselves: 
Ntombizodwa Yvonne Maphango & Others v Aengus Lifestyle Properties CCT 57/11 [2012] ZACC 2 para [51].  
1354  Recognition of the essence-of-the-contract thesis and its policy relevance may be found in the Consumer 
Protection Act 68 of 2008. For example, the strict liability provisions that entails that a consumer has a right 
to expect that goods are reasonably suitable for the purposes for which they are generally intended, that they 
are in good working order and free of defects, and that they are usable and durable for a reasonable period 
of time. See further the discussion in chapter 3 para 3.6.5. Referring to Afrox Healthcare 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA), 
discussed in chapter 2, the writers, Naude & Lubbe (2005) 122 SALJ, conclude that the decision in the Afrox 
case was incorrect in that the exemption clause that indemnified the Appellant from negligence of its nursing 
staff, varied the consequences of the contract in a manner that ran counter to the essence of the contract in 
that it undermined “the reciprocity between the essential obligations envisaged by the parties.” Accordingly, 
the writers conclude that the exemption clause offended the underlying principles of good faith and the 
dignity of the patient and that in the circumstances it was surprising and ought to have been disclosed by the 
Appellant. With reference to the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) the impugned clause in the Afrox case would 
have triggered BGB 307 that provides for a presumption of unreasonable disadvantage where a clause limits 
“essential rights or duties inherent in the nature of the contract to such an extent that attainment of the 
purpose of the contract is jeopardized.” BGB 307 further provides that a clause is ineffective if, contrary to 
the requirement of good faith, it unreasonable disadvantages the other contractant. 
1355  See also Walker 382 S.W.2d 198 (Ky. 1964) where the court said that “[n]othing could be more vital in a lease 
than the amount the lessee agrees to pay and the lessor agrees to accept for the use of premises.” The court, 
furthermore, commented that the determination of the price in contracts of sale “lies at the heart of [the 
contract.]” 
1356  Naude (2003) 3 TSAR 411 & 412. See further the discussion of essentialia in para 4.2.4 above. In Joseph 
Martin Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. v Schumacher Court of Appeals New York 1981, 52 N.Y.2d 105, 436 N.Y.S2d 247, 
417 N.E.2d 541, hereafter Joseph Martin 1981, 52 N.Y.2d 105 the Court said, in relation to rental, that 
definiteness as to material matters is of the very essence in contract law. The contract had provided for the 
renewal of a lease agreement at annual rentals “to be agreed upon.” The court reasoned that the rental must 
be the product of an agreement between the contractants. The court proceeded to explain that the rental 
need not be expressly agreed upon but could be arrived at with reference to “an objective extrinsic event, 
condition or standard on which the amount was made to depend.”  
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obligation to agree on a price1357 is inextricably tied up with the basic purpose of a contract of 
sale which is to exchange a sum of money for the permanent use and enjoyment of a 
commodity. The same logic applies in the case of a contract of lease where the rental is the 
quid pro quo for the temporary use and enjoyment of immovable property. Unilateral 
discretionary power runs counter to this purpose, notwithstanding the argument that the 
contractants have (freely) agreed thereto,1358   because it deprives the “disempowered” 
contractant from participating in the formulation of the essence of the contract. Such 
deprivation offends the notion of good faith1359 and the dignity1360 of the disempowered 
contractant.  
The argument may be made that a unilateral discretionary power does not differ from the 
seller’s power, in the absence of an agreement (express or implied), to individualise the goods 
or to exercise his/her discretion regarding the quality of the goods to be delivered.1361 
However, it must be remembered that such discretion does not exist in respect of the actual 
(nature of the) goods that form the subject matter of the sale or the quantity thereof, a matter 
that concerns the essence of the contract. These must (as in the case of the price) be 
ascertained or objectively ascertainable.1362 In the case of the price, “quality,” is not an issue, 
hence the only issue is for agreement to be reached on the price (the amount to be paid). Here 
as in the case of the goods, agreement must be reached in that the price must be ascertained 
or objectively ascertainable. 
 
                                                            
1357  See the discussion of the duty-imposing and power-conferring aspects of essentialia in para 4.2.4.2 (B) above. 
1358  The presumptive voluntariness of an agreement is questionable as shown in chapters 1, 2 and 3.   
1359  Good faith requires that a contractant should, when advancing his/her own interests, display a measure of 
acknowledgment and respect for the interests of the other contractant. Lubbe ‘Bona Fides, Billikheid en die 
Openbare Belang in die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg’ (1991) 1 Stell LR 7, 20, hereafter Lubbe (1991) 1 Stell L. 
See also the discussion of essentialia and good faith in para 4.2.4.4 above.  
1360  See the discussion in paras 4.2.4.2 above.  
1361  Van der Merwe et al Contract 203. 
1362  Kerr Sale and Lease 22-24. 
 
 
 
 
 235 
  
(E) Conclusion 
Unilateral determination of the price and rental would fall foul of the communitarian function 
of essentialia in that the apportionment of the risk would be slanted in favour of the 
contractant who commands the discretionary power. It would also constitute unconscionable 
conduct in that though the contractants may have jointly decided on unilaterality, such 
agreement falls foul of the non-arbitrary, non-capricious requirement of the law1363 and at the 
same time it allows for the unilateral finalization of a vital term that could unreasonably favour 
the contractant bestowed with the discretionary power. The recognition of a unilaterally 
determined price and rental (as well as that of a reasonable price and rental) would impede 
effective and comprehensive planning in that price and rental are crucial and indispensable 
determinants in the planning process.1364 The proposition that price (or rental) can affect the 
future of the whole organization holds true for any institution, whether private or public, and 
whether small, medium or large.1365 
Agreement on price and rental constitutes the essence of the contract and has policy relevance 
and, hence, the right connected thereto, is inalienable. The removal of this aspect of contract 
creation on policy grounds from the will of the contractants is justified on the basis that 
agreement goes to the root of the contract or that it constitutes the essence of the contract.1366 
This justification constitutes a recognition of the submission1367 that the outer boundaries of 
                                                            
1363  See the discussion in paras 4.2.2 and 4.2.4.4 above. 
1364  “In contract, ...a fixed term is often better than an open term because parties can determine appropriate 
performance better and more cheaply than courts”: Gergen ‘The use of open terms in contract’ (1992) 92 
Columbia LR 997, 1000, hereafter Gergen (1992) 92 Columbia LR 997.  
1365  Schlectriem ‘Uniform Sales Law – The UN-Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods’ 1, 29, 
published by Manz, Vienna: 1986 and reproduced with their permission 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schlechtriem.html> [last accessed on 16 November 2012]. 
1366  Precedent for this exists, for example, in the consumer protection legislation discussed in chapter 3 and the 
examples mentioned in a footnote in para 4.3.3.3(D) above. 
1367  See the discussion in para 4.2.4.2(B) above. 
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freedom in respect of contract creation are dependent on that which is permitted by the 
law.1368 
In summary, the recognition of a unilateral discretionary power to determine price would 
compromise the autonomy of the “disempowered” contractant in a vital area of contract 
creation, negatively impacting on his/her dignity.1369 This would run counter to the policies that 
underlie the consumer protection legislation.1370 Public policy considerations that militate 
against its recognition are in line with the constitutional values as discussed earlier in this 
chapter.1371 
 
4.3.4 Reasonable price and rental and the notion of certainty in constitutional, jurisprudential 
and policy context 
As a precursor to a discussion of the notion of a reasonable price, it is appropriate to first 
discuss the notions of reasonableness, the reasonable person, and the arbitrio boni viri 
 
4.3.4.1 Reasonableness, the reasonable person and the notion of arbitrio boni viri 
It is apposite, at this juncture, to preface the discussion by referring to the contents of chapter 
2 where it was argued that “there is no obvious body of doctrine which allows for the judicial 
second-guessing of contractual powers on rationality grounds.”1372 The reticence was ascribed 
to the classical theory of contractual freedom and autonomy and the assumption that the 
                                                            
1368  Hogg Promises and Contract Law 266-269. 
1369  See para 4.2.4 above. 
1370  Discussed in chapter 3. 
1371  See para 4.2.4 above. 
1372  The phraseology is that of Cockrell (1997) Acta Juridica 30. The writer elaborates by saying that “there is no 
established or settled body of doctrine which allows for second-guessing to occur on a generalised basis” 
(31). Quoting from Beatson J ‘Public influences in contract law’ in Beatson & Friedman (eds) Good Faith and 
Fault in Contract Law (1995) at 267, in which the authors describe an analogous position in English law, 
Cockrell concludes that, in the context of contractual powers, it seems that discretion is ‘often taken to mean 
that a matter is remitted to the unrestricted choice of a person’ (30-31). The concern, as was illustrated in 
chapter 2, relates to those situations where there is no delineation of the discretion in the contract with 
reference to objectively ascertainable and verifiable factors in the sense of the Westinghouse principle.  
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contractants are in the best position to determine what is in their best interest.1373 Whilst the 
control and limitation of power in public law may be ascribed to paternalism 1374  and 
accountability,1375 the same cannot be said for contractual relationships where it is presumed 
that contractants bargain from a position of equality.1376 Hence, the absence of a “trigger” for 
judicial intervention means that “paternalistic intervention is [deemed to be] inappropriate ... 
and no ties of accountability link private contracting parties.”1377 
With the above in mind,1378 it is conceded that the notion of reasonableness is well known in 
law. The notion boils down to an acceptance that “the law is free to assume, contrary to fact if 
need be, that all members of the community come to largely similar, if not identical, 
conclusions when asked what reason demands in particular circumstances.”1379 Put differently, 
the notion of reasonableness involves “considering the matter as a reasonable man would and 
then deciding as a reasonable man would normally decide.”1380 
The “curiously enigmatic”1381 notion of arbitrio boni viri1382 is defined as the decision of a 
reasonable person or a reasonable decision.1383 In Benlou Properties (Pty) Ltd v Vector Graphics 
                                                            
1373  See chapter 2 and in particular paras 2.2.2 and 2.3.3. 
1374  As evidenced in, for example, environmental law legislation, road traffic legislation. 
1375  To counteract the power dynamics inherent in state-public relationships. The same considerations, 
paternalism and accountability, would apply in respect of power exercised in other branches of Private law, 
e.g. in the case of the appointment of a curator bonis.  
1376  See the discussion in chapter 2 and in particular paras 2.2.4 and 2.2.5. 
1377  Cockrell (1997) Acta Juridica 31-32. See the discussion of the strict application of the pacta sunt servanda 
doctrine in chapter 2 paras 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. See also the discussion of the limited role of good faith South 
African contract law chapter 2 para 2.8. Good faith is also dealt with in this chapter and particularly in para 
4.2.4.4 above. 
1378  The classical law bent of South African contract law as outlined in chapter 2, above and especially in paras 2.3 
and 2.4. 
1379  Lücke (1977-1978) 6 Adel LR 14. See also Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 (3) SA 
121 (CC) para [41], hereafter Steenkamp 2007 (3) SA 121 (CC), to similar effect and Neethling, Potgieter, 
Visser & Knobel The Law of Delict (2010) 36, hereafter Neethling et al The Law of Delict.  
1380  Vanderbijlpark Health Committee and Others v Wilson and Others 1950 (1) SA 447 (A) 458. See also Minister 
of Safety and Security and Another v Rudman and Another 2005 (2) SA 16 (SCA) para [65] to similar effect. 
1381  A description borrowed from Cockrell (1997) Acta Juridica 32. The description becomes clear in the discussion 
following this footnote reference.  
1382  Cockrell (1997) Acta Juridica 32, categorises the notion as one of a number of “discrete ‘pockets of 
intervention’” that involves “generalised second-guessing of the exercise of contractual powers on rationality 
grounds ...” He goes on to say that “[t]hese are doubtless marginalised zones of law...” The concept “second-
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(Pty) Ltd1384 the notion of arbitrio boni viri was equated with that of a reasonable person. The 
court said that an agreement conferring a discretion is usually “subject to a term implied by 
law; viz, that A must exercise an arbitrium boni viri and that B is consequently only liable in 
respect of expenditure which a reasonable person in the position of A could have incurred.”1385 
In Machanick v Simon1386 the court said that the discretion must be exercised arbitrio boni viri, 
as a reasonable man [person] would. Accordingly, it is argued that the notion of arbitrio bono 
viri introduces an element of reasonableness and fairness that allows for judicial control of an 
unreasonable exercise of contractual power. The arbitrio boni viri notion that involves taking a 
decision honestly, according to the standard of the objective reasonable man, taking into 
account all the circumstances of the case1387 therefore comes into play to limit what would 
otherwise have been an unfettered discretion.1388 The notion involves an ex post facto 
application1389 of the standard of reasonableness. In light of the foregoing, it may be concluded 
that any difference between the notion of the arbitrio boni viri and the reasonable person is 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
guessing” is used in the context of the power of a court to decide whether a power has been legitimately 
exercised whilst “rationality grounds” has to do with substantive issues and not procedural issues such as 
whether the correct procedure for the exercise of the power has been followed. The notion of “rationality 
grounds” concerns the question whether the law considers the empowered contractant to have “acted in a 
manner which the law regards as being substantively illegitimate” Cockrell 28.  
1383  Claassen Dictionary of Legal Words and Phrases Vol. 1, 146-147. See also Erasmus 2006 (3) SA 529 (T) 538. 
1384  1993 (1) SA 179 (A) 188B. 
1385  At 188B. The fact that the court later, at 189C, says, in the context of the facts of the case, that it not 
necessary to decide whether the respondent is liable for the expenditure which is objectively reasonable, or 
the expenditure incurred arbitrio boni viri does obfuscate the matter somewhat. However, in light of its 
earlier unambiguous statement at 188B and the fact that the court does not during the course of its judgment 
draw a clear distinction between the two, it is suggested that the court did not regard the two as being two 
distinct notions.  
1386  1920 CPD 333, 338. 
1387  Machanick v Simon 1920 CPD 333, 338, hereafter Machanick 1920 CPD 333. The court said that the discretion 
must be exercised arbitrio boni viri, as a reasonable would. See also Cockrell (1997) Acta Juridica 32-34.  
1388  NBS Boland Bank 1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA) para [25]; Cockrell (1997) Acta Juridica 34. 
1389  For example, a plaintiff in a claim for damages for breach of contract is under a duty to mitigate his/her loss 
by taking such steps as a reasonable person in his/her position would have taken. The test of reasonableness 
takes into account all the circumstances of the case and “relates to the conduct of the plaintiff after breach of 
contract has been committed…” (Emphasis added). Van der Merwe et al Contract 367. See further the 
discussion in the text that follows this footnote reference. 
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more apparent than real1390 though some court decisions have tried to differentiate between 
the two.1391 Hence it is concluded that the notion of reasonableness is inherent in the boni viri 
notion and the same considerations apply.1392 
However, there are significant problems that bedevil the determination of a gold standard for 
the test of reasonableness for the purposes of the implementation of the obiter dicta, namely 
the recognition of a reasonable price and rental, and unilateral power to determine the price 
and rental, the power being limited by the arbitrio boni viri notion. From a practical and policy 
perspective, these problems, discussed below, militate against the appropriateness of the 
standard of reasonableness as a determinant of the essence of a contract of sale and a contract 
of lease, namely, the price and rental.1393 
 
4.3.4.2 A gold standard for the test of reasonableness 
The test for reasonableness is an objective one1394 and may be determined ex post facto1395 or 
ex ante. In the case of the former, the reasonableness of conduct is determined with the 
wisdom of hindsight whilst in the case of the latter, the reasonableness is determined from “the 
                                                            
1390  The conclusion is supported by the contextual references to the arbitrio boni viri notion in cases such as NBS 
Boland Bank 1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA) para [25]; Joosub Investments (Pty) Ltd v Maritime and General Insurance 
Company Limited 1990 (3) SA 373 (C), hereafter Joosub Investments 1990 (3) SA 373 (C); Machanick 1920 CPD 
333, 338-341. 
1391  For example, in Joosub Investments 1990 (3) SA 373 (C), the court said that a clause granting a discretion must 
be interpreted either as “importing the standard of the arbitrio boni viri, or at the least as precluding the 
party from making an unreasonable decision” (383E). The court continues to say that “[i]n both classes of 
case, an objective standard is taken to be implied and the decision is justiciable by the Court.” Though the 
court appears to be drawing a distinction between the two when it refers to “both classes,” it also seems to 
suggest that the notion of arbitrio boni viri incorporates the notion of reasonableness when it says that the 
clause must be interpreted as importing the arbitrio boni viri standard or “at least” as precluding an 
unreasonable decision. See also McClennan who concludes that the exercise of a discretion boni viri on 
interest payments must be done both fairly and reasonably: McLennan “Unilateral Determination of 
Contractual Performance: The Interest-rate Controversy Solved – but what next?” (2000) 12 SA Merc LJ 485 
487. The conclusion accords with the approach in the United States of America (last para of chapter 5 para 
5.2.2.2(D)(i)(c) and in the Netherlands (chapter 5 para 5.2.6.2(B)).  
1392  See also Cockrell (1997) Acta Juridica 34 n40. 
1393  For the discussion of price as the essence of the contract see para 4.3.3.3(D) above. 
1394  Steenkamp 2007 (3) SA 121 (CC) para [41]; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 1100. 
1395  A view held by most text-book writers. See Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 1100. 
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perspective of a reasonable person in the position of the defendant.”1396 The results may differ 
depending on whether an ex post facto or ex ante approach is used.1397 
In the Law of Contract, the “officious bystander” test1398 used to determine whether a tacit 
term may be read into a contract, has its roots in the reasonable person test.1399 In terms of the 
reliance theory, a reasonable belief of consensus is required in order to satisfy a demand for full 
contractual rights.1400 In the Law of Delict, reasonableness is used as a criterion to judge the 
appropriateness of conduct that has already occurred1401 or as a criterion for determining 
whether or not to impose liability for conduct.1402 In Property law, when deciding whether 
conduct amounts to nuisance, the test of reasonableness has been said to involve drawing a 
balance between the interests of the respective parties in the light of prevailing 
circumstances.1403 
From the examples of the application of the standard of reasonableness above, it may be 
concluded that the standard of reasonableness could (i) comprise the notion of a reasonable 
person as a dispassionate, balanced and objective bystander, one who has no personal interest 
                                                            
1396  Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 1100. 
1397  On an ex post facto approach the conduct of a defendant who shoots in self-defence when confronted with a 
“real-looking” toy gun may be deemed to be unreasonable and hence wrongful. An ex ante examination 
would result in the conduct being reasonable and hence not wrongful. The illustration comes from Du Bois et 
al Wille’s Principles 1100. 
1398  Discussed in para 4.3.4.2(C)(viii) below.  
1399  The bystander when placed in the position of the contractants must display the “the degree of shrewdness, 
knowledge and prudence of persons ordinarily engaged in the conclusion of the relevant contract”: Lubbe & 
Murray Contract 418. See also Kerr Contract 354-370. 
1400  In other words, would a reasonable person in the position of the contractant, having regard to all the 
circumstances, believe that he/she was assenting to the terms proposed by the other contractant? It serves 
to protect the reasonable expectations of a contractant. Whilst the will theory is the primary basis for 
contract, the reliance theory steps in where it is clear that there was not a meeting of minds. Van der Merwe 
et al Contract 33-37; Kerr Contract 9-17, 20, 23; Hutchison et al Contract 15-20.  
1401  For example, in delict, where the defence of necessity is raised in a case of conduct resulting in physical 
injury, the wrongfulness of the conduct will depend on the whether the act of necessity was reasonable in the 
circumstances: Neethling et al The Law of Delict 93; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 1099. 
1402  For example, where the foot-and-mouth virus escapes from a laboratory causing the death of livestock. This 
causes loss not only to the farmers but also to the truck drivers who would normally have transported the 
cattle to the abattoir. It would be reasonable to impose liability in the case of the former but not in the case 
of the latter. From the English case of Weller & Co Ltd v Foot-and-Mouth Disease Research Institute [1996] 1 
QB 569. 
1403  Gien v Gien1979 (2) SA 1113 (T) 1122C.  
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in the dispute or the issue at hand and who judges with the benefit of hindsight (ex post facto). 
It could also involve (ii) considering the conduct of a reasonable person in the position of the 
plaintiff, be it the buyer or seller (ex ante), or (iii) it could involve a process of balancing the 
interests of the respective contractants in the light of the facts of the case.1404 
 
(A) The ex ante approach 
Regarding the second approach, the question1405 arises whether the buyer or the seller can be 
said to meet the standard of the reasonable person, both parties having a subjective and 
personal interest in the ultimate price.1406 The definition of a reasonable person and the 
mechanics of the reasonable person test as per the Vanderbijlpark decision1407 automatically 
exclude the buyer and the seller from consideration. Hence, a reasonable price cannot be 
determined by placing the reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff, being either the 
buyer or the seller.1408 This approach is also objectionable in that it ignores the interests of the 
defendant (the buyer or the seller) in determining the essence of the contract,1409 detracting 
from his/her dignity. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1404  In the international arena, there does not appear to be unanimity as to whether the standard of 
reasonableness involves a subjective or objective approach. Some delegates to the 1977 UNCITRAL 
Conference in Vienna regarded it to have a subjective value whilst others were in favour of an objective 
approach. Some delegates regarded the notion of foreseeability as being objective in orientation whilst 
others criticised it as being too subjective. Eörsi ‘A Propos the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods’ (1983) 32(2) The American Journal of Comparative Law 333, 344. 
1405  A rhetorical one, it is submitted.  
1406  See in this regard paras 4.3.4.2(C)(iii)-(iv) and (vi) below. 
1407  See the footnote reference in para 4.3.4.1 above and the text connected thereto. 
1408  Both have a subjective interest in the matter at hand and (strongly) biased points of departure.  
1409  See the discussion in para 4.3.3.3(D) above. 
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(B) The balancing of interests approach 
On the third approach,1410 the test of reasonableness would involve striking a balance between 
the interests of the respective parties taking into account all the prevailing circumstances. 
Striking such a balance could be well-nigh impossible where the contractants have dissimilar 
competencies.1411 Given the disparity, the probability of a (sharp) dissonance in what each 
perceives to be a reasonable price, should not be surprising.1412 Furthermore, a reasonable 
price is one which would have to be decided with reference to the facts of each case, which 
would be peculiar to each case. It is one that would be difficult to decide with reference to 
other cases.1413 Consequently, a body of precedent would be difficult to develop, with adverse 
consequences for the notion of certainty and the ability of contractants to plan their 
contractual relations.1414 A further consequence could be a decline in the confidence in contract 
as an obligation-creating mechanism and consequently in the respect for, and, confidence in 
the regulatory function of the law itself. 
 
(C) The ex post facto approach 
The first approach, viz., that a reasonable price is that which a reasonable person, being neither 
the buyer nor the seller, would deem reasonable having regard to the totality of circumstances 
                                                            
1410  Viz., that a reasonable price is that which a reasonable person, being neither the buyer nor the seller, would 
deem to be reasonable having regard to all the circumstances of the case, 
1411  This may include cognitive ability, business acumen/sophistication, experience, means, need etc. These and 
other related considerations, as well as the harmful consequences of ignoring such considerations were 
highlighted in chapters 2 and 3. 
1412  This is confirmed by an empirical study that proved that contractants are likely to adopt a self-serving 
approach in the interpretation of contractual terms. Feldman et al ‘Reference Points and Contract 
Interpretation’ (2012) 3-4. 
1413  Elite Electrical Contractors v The Covered Wagon Restaurant 1973 (1) SA 195 (RA) 196H. However, the 
possibility of striking a balance cannot be ruled out where both parties display the same or similar attributes. 
1414  One of the benefits of certainty is that it enables commercial efficiency in that contractants can plan the 
obligations that they wish to assume.  
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surrounding the case, is equally problematical. The following problems, many of which also 
impact on the second and third approaches discussed above, may be highlighted.1415 
 
(i) The identity of the reasonable person 
Who is this reasonable person? How does one go about cloaking him/her with an identity? Is 
he/she “the ‘rational’ man [/woman] employed as a model by game theorists and Chicago-
school economists?”1416 Or is he/she the average person in the informal settlement of Imizamo 
Yethu (Hout Bay, Cape town) or the informal settlement of Du Noon (Milnerton, Cape Town), or 
the average person in Main Road in Cape Town, or in Main Road in Gugulethu, or in Main Road 
in Bishopscourt, or Main Road in Athlone? Is the reasonable person to be selected per informal 
settlement, suburb, or city, or province? Or is there a one-size-fits-all standard for the 
reasonable person?1417 
It has been said that a person’s cultural context has a bearing on that person’s understanding of 
concepts and that a  word may not have the same meaning when used twice, not even by the 
same person.1418 The discrepancies in interpretation and understanding are heightened by the 
level of abstraction of the word or phrases in question.1419 In this instance, the phrase in 
question is a “reasonable price” which it is submitted1420 bears a high level of abstraction. 
Ronald Dworkin, in Laws Empire, makes the point that interpretation in fields such as law is 
concerned with purpose and that “the purposes are those of the interpreter.”1421These 
                                                            
1415  The discussion in chapter 4 illustrates that the international experience does not provide any comfort in these 
regards. 
1416  Speidel (1970) 31 University of Pittsburgh LR 363. 
1417  See also Speidel (1970) 31 University of Pittsburgh LR 363 for comments along similar lines. 
1418  Curran ‘Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in U.S. Comparative Law’ (1998) 46(1) American 
Journal of Comparative Law 43, 49, hereafter Curran (1998) 46(1) American Journal of Comparative Law 43. 
See also chapter 5 para 5.2.7.2(E)(ii) for a discussion along similar lines of the problems presented by 
language issues in attaining uniformity in international practise as envisaged by the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980).  
1419  Curran (1998) 46(1) American Journal of Comparative Law 50. 
1420  And as proven in this paragraph. 
1421  Curran (1998) 46(1) American Journal of Comparative Law 58. See also Hunter Taylor ‘Uniformity of 
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considerations militate against the introduction of the standard of reasonableness in the 
determination of the crucial aspect of contractual relations relating to price and rental. 
The conclusion is that the selection of the reasonable person as “a standard for personal 
behaviour” constitutes an arbitrary choice1422 in that he/she does not and, indeed, cannot 
reflect the characteristics and attributes of the particular contractant(s). Any price that the 
court arrives at using this method would amount to making or remaking the essence of the 
contract.1423 In arriving at a price that is reasonable in the circumstances, a court would be 
supplying a price that reflects the community standards of what is fair and reasonable.1424 Such 
price may not have been within the contemplation or expectation of one or both of the 
contractants at date of contract, thereby ignoring the intention of one or both.1425 This 
discredits the consensual principle of contracts and impacting on the dignity of the 
contractants. Hence, the imposition of such a price is questionable on the grounds of contract 
law principles as well as from a constitutional and policy perspective.  
 
(ii) The totality of circumstances approach  
The rhetorical question arises whether such a cardinal and essential aspect of a contract of sale 
should be left to the unpredictability of an unbridled horse by the name of “totality of 
circumstances.” In a casuistic system, the infinite number of possibilities that could arise from 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Commercial Law and State-by-State Enactment: A Confluence of Contradictions’ (1978-1979) 30 Hastings LJ 
337, 350-352. 
1422  Feinman (1982-1983) 30 UCLA LR 829, 840. 
1423  For price as the essence of the contract see para 4.3.3.3(D) above. 
1424  The constitutional problems associated with the determination and imposition of such standards are 
highlighted in this chapter especially in paras 4.2 above and 4.4 below. 
1425  Van der Bergh (2012) 1 TSAR 53 observes that a reasonable price means that a court or a third party will state 
the price thus “placing a word (or a price) in the mouths of the contracting parties” which would not 
necessarily agree with what the contractant(s) had in mind (67). See also para 4.3.4.2(C)(viii) below for a 
summary of Kerr’s criticism in Kerr ‘Implied Provisions in Contracts: Is There to Be a New Role for/of the 
Hypothetical Bystander? Conflicting Supreme Court of Appeal Decisions’ (2006) 123 SALJ 195, hereafter Kerr 
(2006) 123 SALJ 195, of the role of the courts in this regard. See also further in this sub-paragraph. 
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an almost unquantifiable number of variables1426does not bode well for the establishment of a 
system of precedent and for the promotion of certainty in this vital area of contractual 
relationships.1427 
Furthermore, the basis for the rejection of the doctrine of laesio enormis in Tjollo Ateljees1428 
that served to address the issue of unequal bargaining power militates against the recognition 
of the obiters.1429 The court questioned the pertinence of the doctrine in a modern commercial 
setting with its “highly complicated commercial organisation and its ingenious selling devices 
...” Within the context of the particular question of law at hand in this chapter,1430 and whilst 
not admitting to the correctness of the decision in the Tjollo Ateljees case, it is submitted that 
the arbitrio boni viri notion1431 suffers similar vicissitudes.1432 
 
(iii) Diversity of sellers 
The modern market-place has a multiplicity of institutions offering a multiplicity of goods for 
sale. The multiplicity of institutions include, manufacturers, suppliers, agents, large wholesalers, 
small wholesalers, large retailers, small retailers, upmarket stores, downmarket stores, 
speciality stores, designer stores, boutiques, convenience stores, pop-up shops, corner-shops, 
spaza shops, factory shops, flea-marketers, door to door salespersons, private sellers, e-
                                                            
1426  See the explanation further down in the text following this footnote reference. Also take into account the 
problems in arriving at an identity for the “reasonable person” discussed in para 4.3.4.2(C)(i) above.  
1427  See also chapter 5 para 5.2.2.2(C), for a discussion about the uncertainty created by a multiplicity of 
precedents that results from the incorporation of the standard of reasonableness in price determination. 
1428  Tjollo Ateljees (Eins) Bpk v Small 1949 (1) SA 856 (A), hereafter Tjollo Ateljees 1949 (1) SA 856 (A), also 
discussed in chapter 2 para 2.3.2.1. 
1429  The Court dismissed the doctrine as inherently arbitrary and preposterous, observing that “on closer 
inspection ... it appears to be full of pitfalls and anomalies” and concluded that “it is not surprising that there 
never was unanimity as to detail in its application to practical affairs” (863). 
1430  The question of law in this chapter is whether an agreement for a unilaterally determined price or a 
reasonable price promotes certainty and consensus and whether it is in line with the constitutional, 
jurisprudential and policy imperatives that inform the notion of essentialia and also whether it is in line with 
the role of the courts in this context. 
1431  Which incorporates the standard of reasonableness. See para 4.3.4.1 above. 
1432  See sub-paras (iii)-(v) immediately below for a discussion of some of the concerns alluded to by the Tjollo 
Ateljees court.   
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wholesalers, e-retailers, private electronic sellers. The electronic market (represented by on-
line shop-fronts, electronic market places, online auction sites, business to business and 
business to consumer infrastructure) which may offer a similar range of sellers has its own 
unique range of challenges, not least of which are the challenges presented by cross-border and 
cross-continent sales. The “lack of material presence” of the contractants “coupled with the 
inability of the internet in reflecting attributes of the person”1433 are amongst the factors 
contributing to the difficulties presented by e-commerce because the anonymous nature of e-
commerce makes it more conducive to unconscionable conduct.1434 
 
(iv) Diversity of buyers 
Having considered the notion of reasonableness in relation to the attributes of the seller, the 
question arises whether buyers should be regarded as a homogenous group, bearing in mind 
that buyers come from all walks of life with a complexity of needs, wants, inspirations, 
aspirations, and life experience. Equally important is the question whether the buyer is a 
private buyer or an institutional buyer, bearing in mind that “[p]eople tend to be less price 
sensitive when someone else pays the bill or shares the cost.”1435 
 
(v) Diverse marketing philosophies 
Further muddying the waters in determining the determination of a reasonable price is the 
question as to how to factor in the disparate marketing and sales philosophies and practices, 
and marketing and sales techniques which have a bearing on the price at which products are 
                                                            
1433  An awareness of, for example, the business sophistication of the counterpart may inspire a more cautious 
approach to contracting. 
1434  See Tasneem (2011) 1(2) Int. J. Mang. Res. 85-86. See also the discussion on e-commerce in chapter 3 para 
3.6.8.  
1435  Perreault, Cannon & McCarthy Essentials of Marketing: A Marketing Strategy Planning Approach (2010) 455, 
hereafter Perreault et al Essentials of Marketing. See also para 4.3.4.2(C)(vi) below. 
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sold. In the Tjollo Ateljees case,1436 the court observed, in 1949, that the modern commercial 
setting is a “highly complicated commercial organisation” which has “ingenuous selling 
devices.” The following may serve to illustrate the court’s concern.  
Marketing strategies are influenced, inter alia, by the pricing objective that the seller 
chooses. 1437  Some of the pricing objectives include profit margin maximization; profit 
maximization; revenue maximization; quality leadership; quality maximization; and survival.1438 
Pricing may also depend on factors such as the product mix of the seller, the life cycle of the 
product,1439 and product demand/popularity.1440 Some sellers use an “auction approach” which 
involves sequential price reductions over time. In this approach, the initial offering of the 
product is at a high price. The idea is to sell as much as possible at that high price and 
thereafter to embark on a series of step-by-step price reductions until the product is sold 
out.1441 Other sellers may use the availability of competition, substitutes, or alternatives as the 
basis for its price-setting technique.1442 Yet others may make use of marginal analysis as a price-
setting technique which shows how “costs, revenue, and profit change at different prices.” On 
this model, the price is determined by the quantity that will be sold, hence the seller “needs an 
estimate of the demand curve to compute total revenue.”1443 
 
                                                            
1436  Tjollo Ateljees 1949 (1) SA 856 (A). 
1437  Van Niekerk An investigation into the factors that most often contribute to the insolvency of franchisee 
businesses in the Western Cape, Research report presented in partial fulfilment for the degree of Master of 
Business Administration at the University of Stellenbosch Business School 27 January 2012, 50, hereafter 
cited as Van Niekerk An investigation into the factors that most often contribute to the insolvency of 
franchisee businesses in the Western Cape 50. 
1438  Van Niekerk An investigation into the factors that most often contribute to the insolvency of franchisee 
businesses in the Western Cape 50. 
1439  A product that has a short life cycle will command a higher price in order to maximise profits over the 
shortest period of time. Van Niekerk An investigation into the factors that most often contribute to the 
insolvency of franchisee businesses in the Western Cape 51. 
1440  Van Niekerk An investigation into the factors that most often contribute to the insolvency of franchisee 
businesses in the Western Cape 51. 
1441  Perreault et al Essentials of Marketing 453. 
1442  Perreault et al Essentials of Marketing 450. 
1443  Perreault et al Essentials of Marketing 448. 
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(vi) Personal attributes of the contractants 
Should the personal attributes of the contractants, for example, whether the contractant had 
access to legal counsel, is wealthy, needy, literate, numerate, or knowledgeable about the 
goods or the nature and consequences of the transactions play a role, bearing in mind that such 
considerations play little or no role in the determination of contractual liability?1444 If the 
answer is in the affirmative, the further question arises as to what extent such personal 
circumstances should play a role in the determination of a reasonable price. Or, should the 
standard of the arbitrio boni viri, ignoring for a moment the difficulties implicit in this 
standard,1445 be the gold standard in this context? If so, what if the boni viri is not reflective of, 
for example, the standards, means, knowledge, and intelligence of either the buyer or the seller 
or of both. Mindful of the policy considerations that underlie consumer protection 
legislation,1446 the latter consideration raises the question, once again, whether the recognition 
of a reasonable price is desirable from a policy perspective. 
Further complicating the issue of defining a reasonable price is that some consumers 
(regardless of factors such as wealth, economic status) “don’t devote much thought to what 
they pay for the products they buy.”1447 Also relevant is that consumers often have a “reference 
price” being a price they have in mind or expect to pay for a product and that different buyers 
have different reference prices for the same goods. For example, a person who loves reading 
may have a higher reference price for a novel than a person who does not.1448 On this logic, 
reference prices may also differ depending on the occasion or the purpose for which the 
purchase is made. For example, a buyer who buys a product as Valentine’s Day gift would 
probably have a higher reference price than if he/she went out to buy the product with no 
                                                            
1444  See the discussion in chapters 2 and 3. 
1445  See the discussion of the difficulties in para 4.3.3 above, as well as in the whole of para 4.3.4. 
1446  See the discussion in chapter 3. 
1447  Perreault et al Essentials of Marketing 453. 
1448  Perreault et al Essentials of Marketing 453. 
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special occasion or purpose in mind. Perreault comments that “[c]onsumers are [also] less price 
sensitive the greater the significance of the end benefit of the purchase.”1449 
All of the above considerations1450 raise many questions. For example, should the kind of store 
and/or the store philosophy and/or store practices, sales techniques and/or sales practices play 
a role and if so to what extent? Does the location of the store play a role? For example, should 
it matter whether the store is located in an upmarket or downmarket shopping precinct or 
whether it is located in a township, upmarket residential area, or industrial area? Should 
location play a role and if so to what extent? What if there is a mix of all the above? The 
likelihood of wide fluctuation in prices for the same commodity in a market presenting such a 
wide array of considerations is not inconceivable. Does it matter whether or not the 
contractant was aware, or ought to have been aware, or was unaware of these practices and/or 
philosophies? If it does matter, to what extent should it shape a court’s decision? 
 
(vii) Date for determination of a reasonable price or rental 
From the above discussion of the wide range of variables, it is evident that it is problematic to 
arrive at a gold standard against which the standard of reasonableness could be tested. On the 
assumption that a gold standard is determinable, the question arises whether the date of 
contract is to be used as the point at which reasonableness is to be judged or should it be the 
date at which empowered contractant decided on the price or is it to be decided at date of 
delivery. All three options are plagued with problems.1451 The value of the object may have 
either decreased or increased from the one date to the other. This may operate to the 
disadvantage of the contractant on the receiving end of the exercise of the discretionary power. 
The parole evidence rule as well as the “four corner’s” approach to interpretation of written 
                                                            
1449  Perreault et al Essentials of Marketing 450. 
1450  In para 4.3.4.2(A)&(B) and the parts of para 4.3.4.2(C) preceding this footnote reference. 
1451  See also the discussion of the problem in chapter 5 para 5.2.2.2(D)(i)(b), where it is indicated that in some 
international jurisdictions and instruments the date of contract is used whilst others use the date of delivery.      
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contracts1452 would place a potentially paralysing limitation on the court’s ability to resolve the 
dispute by curtailing the breadth of the evidentiary enquiry. Where does it leave the 
contractant who wishes to introduce evidence extrinsic to the written contract to support his or 
her position? 
 
(viii) Certainty regarding the test for reasonableness 
Standards that are beset by too many variables1453 present difficulties in administration that 
cast a cloud over any hope for effective policing.1454 Certainty regarding the test is paramount 
as is evident from Kerr’s criticism of three recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeal.1455 
The three decisions are Seven Eleven Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd v Cancun Trading No 150 CC 
Seven Eleven;1456 Transnet Ltd V Rubenstein;1457 and Consol Ltd t/a Consol Glass v Twee Jonge 
Gezellen (Pty) Ltd & another.1458 In respect of the test governing the reading of a tacit term into 
a contract, Kerr points out that the Supreme Court of Appeal contradicted itself as to the nature 
of the hypothetical bystander test. In the Consol case, the court held that a term would be 
inferred if the contractants confirm it in response to a question asked by the hypothetical 
bystander. In the other two cases,1459 the court adopted an “objective” approach that ignored 
the “actual but unexpressed” intention of the contractants. The distinction being that in the 
latter approach, a term is implied on the say-so of the hypothetical bystander, whereas in the 
Consol approach (the correct one according to precedent) a term would be implied only on a 
positive response by the contractants to a question by the hypothetical bystander. That the two 
                                                            
1452  The parole evidence rule precludes evidence of pre-contractual negotiations whilst the “four corner’s” 
approach excludes all extrinsic evidence. See the discussion in chapter 2 para 2.4.5. 
1453  The submission is that the standard of a reasonableness in relation to price and rental (that includes a 
unilaterally determined price since it regulated by the standard of the arbitrio boni viri) is one such standard. 
1454  Speidel (1970) 31 University of Pittsburgh LR 363. 
1455  Kerr (2006) 123 SALJ 195. The discussion that follows is based on this article.  
1456  2005 (5) SA 186 (SCA), hereafter Seven Eleven 2005 (5) SA 186 (SCA).  
1457  2006 (1) SA 591 (SCA), hereafter Transnet Ltd 2006 (1) SA 591 (SCA). 
1458  2005 (6) SA 1 SCA, hereafter Consol Ltd 2005 (6) SA 1 SCA. 
1459  Seven Eleven 2005 (5) SA 186 (SCA) and Transnet Ltd 2006 (1) SA 591 (SCA).  
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approaches may lead to different results is not to be disputed in light of the illustration by Du 
Bois et al.1460 A similar conflict in approach can only exacerbate the already uncertain paradigm 
in which the standard of reasonableness in relation to price and rental is located.  
Casting more shadows on the requirement of certainty is the warning that if the approach 
advocated in Seven Eleven and Transnet Ltd cases1461 that envisage a “new role for the 
hypothetical bystander”1462 were to be followed, the result would be that contractants “would 
no longer have the opportunity they now have to form their own contracts in their 
entirety.”1463 The approach suggests that a court could view contracts from a perspective very 
different from that of the contractants who, because of their knowledge, did not consider it 
necessary to put what they know into words. The consequence would be that courts would end 
up making contracts whilst disregarding the intention of the contractants, something which the 
court have consistently affirmed it would not do.1464 Such objectification of consent has 
prompted the stinging (but perhaps exaggerated) rebuke that the objective methodology of 
determining contractual content is the “greatest” of the legal fictions that expands “the scope 
of ‘consent’ far beyond what the parties ever had in mind.”1465 
Regardless of whether the rebuke is exaggerated or not, the objectification of consent with 
reference to price would be most unfortunate in that it would debase the principals of 
contractual autonomy and consensus by excluding a contractant from the participating in the 
                                                            
1460  Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 1100 referred to in para 4.3.4.2 above – the “toy-gun” incident. It will be 
recalled that Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 1100 argued that on an ex post facto approach the conduct of a 
defendant who shoots in self-defence when confronted with a “real-looking” toy gun may be deemed to be 
unreasonable and hence wrongful whilst an ex ante examination would result in the conduct being 
reasonable and hence not wrongful. The say-so of the hypothetical bystander can be equated to the ex post 
facto examination of the conduct whereas the positive-response-by-the-contractant approach approximates 
an ex ante examination. 
1461  Seven Eleven Corporation 2005 (5) SA 186 (SCA), Transnet 2006 (1) SA 591 (SCA). 
1462  Kerr (2006) 123 SALJ 196. 
1463  Kerr (2006) 123 SALJ 204. 
1464  Kerr (2006) 123 SALJ 195, 204.See further para 4.4 below. 
1465  Macneil ‘Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational 
Contract Law’ (1977-1978) 72 North Western University LR 854, 884. 
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determination of the essence of the contract, namely, the price,1466 thereby devaluing contract 
law as an obligation-creating mechanism. It would also seriously impair the dignity of the 
contractants bearing in mind the cardinal role played by the value of dignity in the 
constitutional and, hence, generally in the legal paradigm.1467 
 
4.3.4.3 The notion of a reasonable price or rental 
(A) The current position 
The decision in Adcorp Spares P.E. (Pty) Ltd v Hydromulch (Pty) Ltd1468 is illustrative of the 
common law rejection of an agreement to pay a reasonable price as a formula that complies 
with the requirement that the price must be objectively ascertainable ex facie the contract.1469 
The Court held that an agreement to pay a reasonable price does not constitute an objective 
standard on the basis of which a price may be ascertained. 
The Adcorp Spares P.E. (Pty) Ltd v Hydromulch (Pty) Ltd court reasoned1470 that an agreement at 
a reasonable price leads to uncertainty because the price cannot be determined with reference 
to “something which in itself is not certain.”1471 The Court concluded that an agreement to pay 
a fair and reasonable price is too uncertain to give rise to a valid contract of sale. The Court’s 
problem centred on the failure to find satisfactory answers to the questions as to what is the 
                                                            
1466  See the discussion generally in this chapter and, in particular, in para 4.3.3.3(D) above.   
1467  See para 4.2.4.2 above. 
1468  1972 (1) SA 663 (TPD) 668. See also, for example, Erasmus v Arcade Electric 1962 (3) SA 418 (T), hereafter 
Erasmus 1962 (3) SA 418 (T). 
1469  The notion of a reasonable price was unknown in Roman law. It also appears not to have found favour in 
Roman-Dutch law where the contract of sale played an important role in international trade. Development of 
the economy was highly valued in a mercantile society and the notion of a reasonable price was not accepted 
because of the problems that it might create in practice. It was simply seen as a negotiating tool in the 
process of arriving at an agreement. Van der Bergh TSAR 2012 (1) 61-63. 
1470  At 668. 
1471  See also Erasmus 1962 (3) SA 418 (T) 419G-420B. A valid formula would, for example, be a usual price. In this 
instance, the usual price refers to a factual position, namely the usual price of the seller. See further the 
discussion in chapter 1 para 1.4.2.2(C). 
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true meaning of a fair and reasonable price,1472 who must determine it1473 (the buyer, the seller 
or an undetermined third party or a court) and how is it to be calculated. The Court, 
furthermore, found it problematic that the answers depended on the opinion of some 
undetermined person or persons. These considerations led the Court to conclude that because 
a reasonable price does not provide a factual basis for the calculation of a price, it is too 
uncertain to give rise to a valid contract of sale. The Court was clearly concerned with the 
ambiguity inherent in the notion of a reasonable price and that that may lead to different 
interpretations, providing fertile ground for litigation.  
The difficulty of the Court may be illustrated with reference to a card game where two players 
are required to draw a card, the one half of which is black and the other half which is white. The 
one player may view the card from the perspective of the black half and the other from the 
perspective of the white half, both players being unaware that they are viewing the card from a 
different perspective.1474 The result is that they have different perceptions of the same 
thing.1475 Such a result could conceivably follow on the determination of a reasonable price 
where the buyer and seller view the reasonable price from two totally different perspectives. 
The requirement of certainty in relation to price seeks to avert such possibilities. The 
requirement of certainty constitutes one of the protective mechanisms devised and refined by 
our common law to prevent abuses and disputes regarding the counter-performance expected 
                                                            
1472  It is submitted that, generally, contractants have different ideas as to what constitutes a reasonable price, 
hence it cannot be said that they are in agreement about what a reasonable price is until they have specified 
the price or an objective method of determining it. Until they have done so by exercising their right to 
negotiate, an agreement to a reasonable price is indefinite and uncertain. 
1473  Perillo Corbin on Contracts Vol 1 Revised Edition (1993), hereafter Perillo Corbin on Contracts Vol 1, observes 
that reasonableness is a matter of opinion and that opinions differ even though the opinions may be equally 
honest and well informed (595). 
1474  Grant, Kline & Quiggin ‘Differential awareness, ambiguity and incomplete contracts: A model of contractual 
disputes’ (2012) Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization 1, 2-3 <http://ac.els-
cdn.com/S0167268112000443/1-s2.0-S0167268112000443-main.pdf?_tid=e7e54d5a-3ec2-11e2-a80b-
00000aab0f6b&acdnat=1354701941_e72fd5711c909a015f713802c4f15af2>. 
1475  Both see the same card but for the one it is black and for the other it is white. 
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of the buyer.1476 Hence, certainty regarding the essential aspects of a contract, including price, 
serves to protect the integrity of the obligation-creating function of contracts and protects the 
dignity of the contractants by ensuring that the contract reflects their wishes.1477 
 
(B) Criticism of the current position 
Zeffert is critical of the approach as represented in the Adcorp case, arguing that a fair and 
reasonable price is not void for vagueness because “...that which can be reduced to certainty is 
certain and an agreement to pay a reasonable price may be capable of being reduced to 
certainty if the court is able to determine what is reasonable and fair in the 
circumstances…”1478 Such an approach does not promote certainty of the law. Aside from being 
circuitous, the argument is based on a number of speculative imponderables. The law would 
serve very little purpose if the price cannot be reduced to certainty prior to the court’s 
intervention. If the court has to determine the price, a contractant may be prejudiced by a 
result which was not reasonably anticipated or contemplated at the date of contract.1479 
Also critical of the Adcorp court, was the Appellate Division,1480 which in an obiter dictum 
declared that it was difficult to comprehend on what principle a sale at a reasonable price or 
even a lease at a reasonable rental, should be regarded as invalid.1481 In expressing itself thus, 
the court found comfort in the position adopted in England and the United States of 
                                                            
1476  Zimmermann  Obligations (1990) 254-255; Kerr Sale and Lease 66. 
1477  Zimmermann Obligations (1990) 254. 
1478  ‘Sales at a Reasonable Price’ (1973) 90 SALJ 113.Emphasis added. 
1479  See the argument in para 4.3.4.3(C) below. See also para 4.3.3.3(A) above and para 4.4 below. 
1480  In Genac Properties 1992 1 SA 566 (AD). The case dealt with the terms of a contract of lease. 
1481  At 576I-578D. 
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America1482 and in contracts of service where an agreement for a reasonable remuneration is 
permissible.1483 
 
(C) Response to the criticism 
Zeffert,1484 in appealing for a less dogmatic approach, refers to Elite Electrical Contractors v The 
Covered wagon Restaurant1485 which concerned a contract of service. In the Elite case the court 
concluded that a fair and reasonable price for goods supplied and services rendered created 
sufficient certainty in the contract so as to make it unnecessary for the court to declare the 
contract void for vagueness. It must be noted, however, that there are significant differences 
between a contract of sale and a contract of service which makes it possible to conclude service 
contracts at a reasonable fee. Zeffert, with respect, correctly points out1486 that in the case of a 
contract of service there is: (a) a tangible result on the basis of which a just and reasonable 
remuneration may be calculated; (b) an industry standard against which a reasonable 
remuneration may be measured; (c) a social need for a reasonable remuneration for work done 
because it often happens that work is done in circumstances where no fixed payment can be 
stipulated in advance. These factors cannot be said to apply in the case of a contract of sale. It 
is, for example, the industry standard that furnishes the objective basis for the determination of 
a reasonable fee for services rendered. No such industry standard exists in the case of contracts 
for the sale of goods, more so where the goods are rare or unique.1487 There also does not 
                                                            
1482  At 578B-C. The court also echoed the view of Zeffert ‘Sales at a Reasonable Price’ (1973) 90(2) SALJ 113, 
hereafter Zeffert (1973) 90(2) SALJ 113. The position as it obtains in England, the United States of America 
and a few other jurisdictions is discussed in chapter 5. 
1483  In support of its view in connection with contracts of service, the Court, at 577G-578D cited the case of 
Chamotte (Pty) Ltd v Carl Coetzee (Pty) Ltd 1973 (1) SA 644 (A) 649C-D. The Chamotte court was of the view 
that authority exists for a reasonable remuneration.  
1484  (1973) 90 SALJ 113. 
1485  1973 (3) SA 418 (RA). 
1486  At 113 
1487  See chapter 1 para 1.4.2.2(C)(ii)(a). 
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appear to be a social need for the recognition of a sale at a reasonable price.1488 On the 
contrary, social need, as evidenced by recent consumer protection legislation, seems to favour 
a legal position that favours pre-contractual disclosure, clarity, and certainty.1489 In addition, 
the current common law1490provides sufficient elasticity to accommodate situations where the 
contractants do not expressly agree on a price or where they unwilling or unable to1491 settle a 
price themselves.1492 Consequently, it is submitted that a sale at a reasonable price is, not only, 
misleading,1493 but also, the need for such a sale is non-existent.1494 
Even if one were to accept that the standard of a reasonable price is capable of practical 
implementation, the question still remains whether as a matter of principle, a reasonable price 
constitutes a valid formula. Whilst it is conceded that issues relating to mode and time of 
performance may be settled by employing the standard of reasonableness,1495 the same cannot 
                                                            
1488  See para 4.3.4.3(E) below. 
1489  See, for example, the provisions of consumer protection legislation discussed in chapter 3 that characterised 
price transparency as one of the hallmarks of the legislation: information about price being regarded as an 
essential component of the prized notion of making an informed decision. Hence, price transparency 
contributes to contractual autonomy and consensus, the hallmarks of South African contract law: see chapter 
2 and in particular paras 2.2.4 and 2.4. Important in this context is the 1997 research paper of the Office of 
Fair Trading in England that found that in order to make informed choices, consumers require information 
about price, quality and terms of trade and concluded that an unregulated market may not always provide 
this: Cartwright P ‘Publicity, punishment and protection: the role(s) of adverse publicity in consumer policy’ 
Legal Studies (2011) 1,13 <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/.doi:10.1111/j.1748-121X.2011.00212.x>, hereafter 
Cartwright (2011) Legal Studies. “[I]mperfect information about prices” may also precipitate high prices: 
Armstrong ‘Economic Models of Consumer Protection Policies.’ Paper prepared for conference on “The pros 
and cons of consumer protection,” organised by the Swedish Competition Authority, held on 11 November 
2011, 2 and 7 <http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/34773/>.  
1490  See the explanation of objective ascertainability in chapter 1 paras 1.1 and 1.4.2. See further chapter 5 para 
5.3 regarding the elasticity of the common law requirement of objective ascertainability. 
1491  Whether for lack of knowledge and/or expertise and/or confidence in their ability to set a price. 
1492  For example, the possibility of nomination provides adequate relief where either or both the contractants 
does/do not possess the requisite knowledge and/or experience to settle the price.  
1493  See the discussion in para 4.3.4.3(E) below. 
1494  Such a development, it must be emphasised, is superfluous given the current formula that are regarded as 
valid, and would serve to create confusion instead of clarity in contracts of sale. See in this regard the 
discussion of the characteristics of the law, inter alia, clarity and transparency, in para 4.2.4 above. See also 
chapter 5 para 5.2.2.2(E)-(F).   
1495  The determination of what is reasonable in the context of time of delivery is fairly easily established with 
reference to factors such as the nature of the goods (e.g. perishables) or the purpose (e.g. wedding) thereof.   
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be said for more “crucial” aspects of performance, such as price or quantity.1496 A direct appeal 
to reasonableness, devoid of any objective qualifying standard(s), does not facilitate effective 
determination.1497 The determination of what is reasonable is largely “a matter of discretion 
and good sense and is therefore not capable of being subjected to hard and fast rules.”1498 The 
(reasonable) price or rental is not settled until a judge determines what is reasonable in the 
circumstances.1499 The litigant claiming a reasonable price comes to court without a complete 
cause of action.1500 “He is saying to the judge or jury: ‘Complete our contract for us, and then 
enforce it.’ It is the same as if the ‘contract’ had said: ‘for a price to be fixed by a judge or 
jury.’1501 Whilst it is patent that litigation is often inevitable and that courts should not shirk 
from its responsibility of resolving difficult problems, it is equally patent that courts should not 
expend their time, energy, and resources to create contractual rights and obligations in 
                                                            
1496  In relation to open terms as to quantity, and, after referring to a number of English and Australian cases, it 
has been concluded that, in Australia, “in all the cases there was an objective standard, contained in the 
contract, by which the quantity could be measured”: Howard ‘Open Terms as to Quantity in Contracts for the 
Sale of Goods’ (1977) 5(3) University of Tasmania LR 308, 309. The writer observes that whilst a court may be 
able to preserve other open terms in contracts with reference to the standard of reasonableness, this is not 
possible where the open term relates to quantity (308). It is submitted that the same considerations apply in 
respect of price. 
1497  Lücke (1977-1978) 6 Adel LR 14. The writer gives the example of a restraint of trade agreement that was held 
to be incapable of being given geographical limitation where the stipulation was that the restraint should 
operate for a “reasonable distance” from a certain point. See also Adcorp Spares P.E. (Pty) Ltd v Hydromulch 
(Pty) Ltd 1972 (1) SA 663 (TPD); Westinghouse 1986 (2) SA 555 (A). See also Menzies J in Hall v Busst (1960) 
104 C.L.R. 206, 235, hereafter Hall (1960) 104 C.L.R. 206.  
1498  Lücke (1977-1978) 6 Adel LR 1. A similar position prevails in Australia. The writer doubts that reasonableness 
is an “externally existing standard” arguing that “[o]ne does not have to be a legal realist to see that a point 
which is settled by reference only to ‘reasonableness’ is not really settled until a judge determines what was 
reasonable in the circumstances”: Lücke (1977-1978) 6 Adel LR 13. Perillo Corbin on Contracts Vol 1 agrees 
that the legal effect of a promise to pay a reasonable price is a promise to pay sum that a court or jury may 
determine in case of a dispute (595).  
1499  Perillo Corbin on Contracts Vol 1 595. Menzies J in Hall v Busst (1960) 104 C.L.R. 206 is of the view that where 
an object does not have market value, a reasonable price “would be no more than an agreement to pay what 
the court should fix as its value. I am inclined to think such a bargain [an agreement to sell at a reasonable 
price] would be no contract ...” (235). 
1500  Hall (1960) 104 C.L.R. 222. 
1501  Per Fullagar J Hall (1960) 104 C.L.R. Fullager J concludes that “...clearly a contract in those terms could not be 
enforced, for no breach antecedent to litigation could be assigned” (222). See also Perillo Corbin on Contracts 
Vol 1 595. A sentiment similar to that in the Hall case but this time in respect of the absence of certainty 
regarding rental was expressed in Joseph Martin 1981, 52 N.Y.2d 105. 
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essential aspects of contractual relations.1502 The latter is a right accorded to the contractants 
by contract law through the requirement of essentialia. Underscoring this is the fact that price-
determination by a court is the result of a litigious and adversarial process which the fixing of a 
price was never intended to be.1503  
The above argument may be slanted differently. When contractants agree on a reasonable 
price, their rights are no longer fixed by contract. The determination thereof is automatically 
shifted to an unknown entity, presumably the courts, to be determined in the light of uncertain 
criteria. The court is tasked with the responsibility of determining the scope of relevant 
evidence to establish the certainty that cannot be extracted from the contract. This, in effect, 
results in the court perfecting the contract for the contractants. In doing so, the court is not 
enforcing the contract as agreed upon by the contractants, neither is the court interpreting the 
contract, but rather it would be conceptualising its own idea of what the contract ought to have 
said. This does not contribute to certainty.1504 In contrast to this, when contractants appoint a 
nominee, they do so on the basis of their trust and confidence in the knowledge and expertise 
of the nominee whose knowledge and expertise in the particular field1505 would serve as the 
criteria in light whereof the price would be determined. 
It is submitted that an agreement to sell at a reasonable price is no more than an agreement to 
agree, the final price still to be determined by the parties either by express agreement or by 
way of nomination or by way of a formula.1506 Until that happens the contract remains 
incomplete. The price becomes ascertained or objectively ascertainable and the contract 
                                                            
1502  Walker 382 S.W.2d 198 (Ky. 1964). See further the discussion regarding the function of the courts in the 
determination of price in para 4.4 below.  
1503  Hurwitz and Others NNO v Table Bay Engineering (Pty) Ltd & Another 1994 (3) SA 449 (C) 454D, hereafter 
Hurwitz 1994 (3) SA 449 (C) 
1504  Brownsword Contract Law Themes for the Twenty-First Century (2000) para 9.11. 
1505  Dublin v Diner 1964 1 SA 799 (D) 804D, hereafter Dublin 1964 1 SA 799 (D).  
1506  See also Hall (1960) 104 C.L.R. where the court said that in the case of a sale at a reasonable price the actual 
price can only be arrived at either by further agreement between contractants or by a court. The latter notion 
was unacceptable to the court (222). See the discussion earlier in this sub-paragraph. 
 
 
 
 
 259 
  
becomes complete only when the parties determine what the purchase price is expressly (price 
ascertained), or by nomination, or by way of a formula (price objectively ascertainable). The 
constitutional, jurisprudential and policy imperatives underlying essentialia,1507 the duty of 
good faith that is inherent in essentialia,1508 and the very strong obiter dicta in the Everfresh 
Market Virginia v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd1509 favouring the recognition of a duty to conduct 
good faith negotiations, require that negotiations to reach express agreement, or agreement on 
a nominee or a formula, must be conducted and that such negotiations must be conducted in 
good faith1510 and in the spirit of ubuntu. Under such a construction, a contractual term for a 
reasonable price would not invite invalidity. Instead, it would be construed as a duty to 
negotiate in good faith, failing which a court may order a “recalcitrant” contractant (one who in 
bad faith does not want to negotiate the price) to negotiate in good faith. If, however, good 
faith negotiations fail to perfect the contract, then each contractant should be at liberty to 
withdraw from the negotiations.1511 Such an approach will ensure fidelity by the court to its 
function as an arbiter of fact and law1512 as well to ensure fidelity to contract law’s regard for 
the true intention of the contractants.1513 
In light of the above, it stands to reason that the standard of reasonableness cannot be applied 
in “the absence of any agreed basis of calculation.”1514 Since a court cannot enforce a contract 
                                                            
1507  Discussed in paras 4.2.4.2(B) and 4.2.4.3 above. 
1508  See para 4.2.4.4 above. 
1509  2012 (1) SA 256 (CC). 
1510  Perillo Corbin on Contracts Vol 1 579 argues that the minimum obligation created by an agreement to agree is 
a duty to negotiate in good faith. 
1511  Farnsworth ‘Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations’ (1987) 
87 Columbia LR 217, 240-241, hereafter Farnsworth (1987) 87 Columbia LR 217.  
1512  See the discussion in para 4.4 below. 
1513  Knapp ‘Enforcing the Contract to Bargain’ (1969) 44 New York University LR 673, 682-685 and 723. 
Farnsworth (1987) 87 Columbia LR observes that the act of negotiation contains an implicit undertaking of a 
“serious intent” to reach agreement with the other contractant (234).   
1514  Lücke (1977-1978) 6 Adel LR 15. It is submitted that the notion of reasonableness is satisfactory only (i) if the 
contract provides for an objective standard (e.g. an agreement to buy all the bricks to be used in the building 
of a specific house at R1 per brick) or (ii) if it provides for the necessary machinery (e.g. the auditor of the 
company); or (iii) there was a previous course of dealing between the contractants which could serve as an 
objective point of reference.      
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unless it can determine what it is,1515 the conclusion is that the standard of reasonableness is 
insufficient as a determinant of one of the essential obligations of the contractants. Uncertainty 
about an essential term precludes the creation of an enforceable contract.1516 
Given all the uncertainties associated with the standard of reasonableness, and weighed 
against the requirement that the purchase price must be certain, and the need for such 
certainty as explained above, the only logical conclusion is that the decision in the Adcorp case 
is the correct one: a stipulation that a sale at a reasonable price does not constitute a valid 
formula for the conclusion of a contract of sale. 
 
(D) Position in respect of lease agreements 
It is axiomatic that an ascertained or objectively ascertainable rental promotes stability in 
business transactions.1517 Rental is the price the lessee agrees to pay and the lessor agrees to 
accept in exchange for the use and occupation of premises. Nothing can be more vital in a lease 
agreement.1518 
                                                            
1515  The contractants must express their intention in a manner that is capable of being understood. The fact that 
they have actually agreed is of no consequence where a court cannot determine the terms of the contract 
with reference to the facts and circumstances of the case. Perillo Corbin on Contracts Vol 1 525. See also 
Walker 382 S.W.2d 198 (Ky. 1964) where the court said a contractant must have an enforceable contract 
before he/she can enforce it. See also the discussion in chapter 5 para 5.2.2.2(D)(i)(a). 
1516  Perillo Corbin on Contracts Vol 1 525. 
1517  Walker 382 S.W.2d 198 (Ky. 1964). The court had to decide on the validity of a rental renewal option that left 
the rental to be agreed upon between the lessor and lessee and the monthly rental to be fixed on “the 
comparative basis of rental values as of the date of renewal with the rental values at this time reflected by 
the comparative business conditions of the two periods.” The court held that this amounted to an agreement 
to agree which it could not enforce. Regarding the formula, the court held that it neither fixes the rent nor 
furnishes a positive key to its establishment. Echoing some of the concerns relating to the indeterminateness 
of the notion of a reasonable price raised in para 4.3.4 above, the court questioned whether the notion of 
“comparative business conditions” related to local business conditions, or national business conditions, or 
conditions that affected the lessee’s particular business. The court’s declaration that the degree of certainty 
is the controlling consideration echoes the approach in South African law. An example of a formula that 
contains a definite objective standard which introduces the requisite degree of certainty is in the case of 
Jackson v Pepper Gasoline Co. 280 Ky. 226, 133 S.W.2d 91 126 A.L.R. 1370 where contract stipulated that the 
rental would be “an amount equal to one cent per gallon of gasoline delivered to the said station.”   
1518  Knapp, Crystal & Prince Problems in Contract Law Cases and Materials (2003) 274. The axiom has equal 
validity in relation to the essentiale of price in contracts of sale. 
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In Lobo Properties (Pty) Ltd v Express Lift Co SA (Pty) Ltd,1519 the court held that the usual rental 
is the rent charged for that kind of property in the area where the leased property is situated. 
The notion of a usual rental gives expression to the objective ascertainability requirement as 
per the Westinghouse principle in that it may be determined with reference to the industry 
standard in the rental market.1520 In rental, the industry standard is determinable with 
reference to various factors including the location of the rental property and the average rental 
charged in such areas. Commercial and residential areas have a fairly general and distinct socio-
economic profile. It is this generality that could facilitate the determination of an industry 
standard that would serve as an objective criterion for the determination of a usual rental.1521 
Support for this proposition may be found in the following: (i) consumer mobility is limited by 
lease durations; (ii) the number of transactions, in general, are not as voluminous as in the sale 
sector - the same consumer typically concludes a single rental agreement at a time relative to 
multiple transactions that the consumer would enter into in the purchase and sale market; (iii) 
in the rental market, the category of supplier is fairly well-defined,1522  so also the type of rental 
property.1523 These considerations may militate against wide fluctuations in rental occurring 
within specific nodes, thereby contributing to market stability and the ability to arrive at an 
objective industry standard for the determination of a usual rental. Accordingly, there would be 
compliance with the Westinghouse principle which requires a formula, for example, an industry 
standard, that could be used by an outsider to settle the price without further reference to the 
contractants.1524 However, it is conceivable that an industry standard may not exist in certain 
                                                            
1519  1961 (1) SA 704(C) 708-710A. 
1520  The industry standard was one of the criteria used by Zeffertt (1973) 90(2) SALJ 113 to distinguish contracts of 
sale from service contracts where an agreement for reasonable remuneration for work done is permissible 
based on the existence of an industry standard. 
1521  As indicated before, it is the objective standard that makes possible a system of individualised justice as well 
a system of precedent for other contractants. 
1522  For example, private, corporate, estate agent. 
1523  For example, residential, commercial, industrial, private, holiday. 
1524  Westinghouse 1986 (2) SA 555 (A). See also Lücke (1977-1978) 6 Adel LR 14. 
 
 
 
 
 262 
  
instances.1525 It is submitted that in such cases contractants would usually agree on a fixed 
amount of rental as would be the case in a contract of sale of rare, precious or unique 
commodity.  
Agreement to a reasonable rental would mean that the decision is left to an undetermined 
third party or to a court of law which would bring into play the difficulties outlined earlier in this 
chapter.1526 Hence, the use of the term reasonable rental should be avoided because of the 
problem of definition as well as its misleading connotations.1527 
 
(E) Economic, social, and moral considerations 
It is generally accepted that there is often an unequal power relationship between seller and 
buyer.1528 Our recent economic history is testament to the fact that consumers hardly need 
encouragement to spend, 1529  the market-place being awash with consumers who 
enthusiastically purchase products which they can hardly afford and thereby consign 
themselves to the scrapheap of economic ruin as evidenced by the increase in sequestrations 
and liquidations.1530 Sequestrations and liquidations can have a devastating effect of lives of 
those affected. Cabinet ministers have in the past warned consumers to curb spending or run 
the risk of being stressed financially and emotionally.1531 
The recently enacted National Credit Act1532 is one of the measures designed, inter alia, to 
restrict access to credit and to reverse this trend. Despite this, the recently UNISA-Momentum 
                                                            
1525  This could be, for instance, where the rental property has unique properties. An example would be where the 
property is the only one in the country or the location boasting certain historical or architectural features. 
1526  See para 4.3.4 above. 
1527  See para 4.3.4.3(E) below. 
1528  See chapters 2 and 3. 
1529  Part of this may be ascribed to the fact, as confirmed by empirical evidence, that contractants, not only, 
underestimate, but also, choose to ignore low probability risks: Eisenberg ‘Why There is No Law of Relational 
Contracts’ (1999-2000) 94 Northwestern University LR 805, 812, hereafter Eisenberg (1999-2000) 94 
Northwestern University LR 805. 
1530  See the discussion in chapter 3. 
1531  Amukelani Chauke The Times Friday, 20 April 2012, 5. 
1532  34 of 2005. 
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research1533 paints a different picture.1534 It reveals that “[m]ore than half of the country’s 
households are living beyond their means and have taken on too much debt 
consequently...”1535 Bernadene de Clercq,1536 is reported as putting the blame for the unhealthy 
financial position of about 50.35% of South Africans on “irresponsible spending.”1537 BNP 
Paribas Cadiz Securities report that there are more people using credit in South African than 
there are people who have jobs.1538 Causing grave concern is the number of indebted 
consumers who are still managing “to source additional unsecured loans” suggesting that 
lenders are “finding loopholes to circumvent the National Credit Act.”1539 The number of 
unsecured borrowers is expected to grow exponentially with the entry of banks into the 
lucrative, but risky, unsecured lending market, that relies solely on the consumer’s promise to 
repay the loan, to offset weak corporate demand for credit.1540 
                                                            
1533  UNISA-Momentum Household Financial Wellness Index Results: 2011 released on 19 April 2012, available at 
<http://www.unisa.ac.za/contents/faculties/ems/docs/Financial_wellness_index_April2012.pdf> See also 
Amukelani Chauke The Times Friday, 20 April 2012, 5. 
1534  It reveals that in terms of financial wellness, 30% of households are in the “Anchored Unwell” category whilst 
a further 30% are in the “Drifting Unwell” category with a further 20% in the “Drifting Well” category. Only 
20% are in the “Anchored Well” category meaning that the household is firmly entrenched as being 
financially sound. The “Anchored Unwell” category means that the households are deeply rooted in this 
category with very little prospect of rising out of their predicament. The “Drifting Unwell” means the category 
is unstable and at risk of becoming “Anchored Unwell” due to negative influences such as higher taxes, 
interest rates or a sharp increase in prices. “Drifting Well” means that whilst the category is well, it is at risk of 
becoming “Drifting Unwell” due to the negative influences mentioned before. 
1535  Editorial in The Times Friday, 20 April 2012, 9. The same editorial suggests that the research findings correlate 
with research conducted by the National Credit Regulator in January 2012 that disclosed that, as at 
September 2011, 8.83 million of the country’s 19.1 million credit-active consumers had impaired credit 
records. The editorial goes on to suggest that an investigation into whether the act needs tightening up would 
not be inappropriate. See also the discussion in this regard in chapter 3 para 3.3.  
1536  Head of the personal finance research unit at UNISA. 
1537  Amukelani Chauke The Times Friday, 20 April 2012, 5. 
1538  Shevel Adele Sunday Times Business Times Supplement 06 May 2012, 3. 
1539  Editorial in The Times Friday, 20 April 2012, 9. 
1540  ABSA is reported as being prepared to pay R10.13 billion for the store credit card business of Edcon, South 
Africa’s largest clothing retailer. The deal will enable ABSA to extend credit and sell other financial products 
to about four million customers of Edcon. The Reserve Bank fears that the entry of banks into this sector may 
worsen the already dangerously high level household debt in relation to disposable income. The ratio 
currently stands at 70%: Reuters report 7 June 2012 The Times (Business Times) 9. The report by the National 
Credit Regulator to Portfolio Committee of Trade and Industries about the huge debt burden and the increase 
in the number of unsecured loans shocked the latter to undertake to place possible amendments to the 
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Against this background, the recognition of a reasonable price or unilateral discretionary power 
to settle the price may encourage further indiscriminate spending on the part of consumers and 
reverse the policy directions of recent consumer protection legislation.1541 How much more 
attractive would a “reasonable price,” or, for that matter, a price to be determined later, not 
sound to a buyer?1542 It blunts the reality of a known amount of money that could have acted as 
a disincentive to buy or that could have acted as an incentive for further reflection.1543 It may 
allow businesses and “frequent participants in the market-place” to exploit their superior legal 
and/or commercial sophistication1544 to entice people to buy products which they cannot afford 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
credit environment before parliament. SAKE 24 5 August 2012 
<http://wwwsake24.com/Ekonmie/Skuldwette-dalk-gewysig-20120805>. 
1541  It would exemplify the two-step-forward, one-step-backward proverb. For the two steps forward, see the 
discussion of the policy directions in chapter 3 above.  
1542  The temptation created may be equated to the “buy now pay later” marketing strategy that tempt buyers to 
over-extend themselves. The misplaced optimism in the “it-will-not-happen-to-me” syndrome is evident in 
the sub-conscious reasoning of contractants who delude themselves into over-extending themselves. In a 
study in the United States of America it was found that the respondents have an optimistic view of their own 
position. Though the respondents correctly estimated that over fifty percent of American couples would 
eventually divorce, all the correspondents rated their own chance of divorce as being nil: Eisenberg (1999-
2000) 94 Northwestern University LR 805, 811. A similar optimism, an optimism already evident in the 
increasing number of persons swelling the alarmingly large ranks of the over-indebted (see para 4.3.4.3(E) 
above and chapter 3 para 3.3) could lead to contractants embarking on contract-creation at a reasonable 
price or a unilaterally determined price in the optimistic belief about their ability to pay the eventual price 
(whether reasonable or not).    
1543  McKee et al identify a number of behavioural characteristics that lead to over-indebtedness in ‘Responsible 
Finance: Putting Principles to Work’ 2011 September Focus Note 73 Washington D.C. CGAP 9. The following 
may assist in understanding why contractants may be attracted to a reasonable price or one that is to be 
determined unilaterally: (i) consumers tend “to discount greatly the future for the present” - evidence 
thereof is that credit consumers are more focussed on “the allure of up-front cash than the interest and other 
costs that they have to pay over the life of the loan;” (ii) consumers tend to base decisions on erroneous 
conclusions or assumptions which are often based on simple calculations. To this may be added that these 
calculations are often also erroneous and/or based on an erroneous or wishful understanding of the true 
facts and/or the implications of such facts. See also Smith Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract 320. 
The correctness of these observations is borne out by South Africa’s debt “time bomb”: Trevor Manuel, 
Minister in the Presidency, The Times 4 November 2011 at 1. The Minister ascribed the persistently high 
levels of (over)indebtedness to either marketing that is so powerful that “we cannot help ourselves,” or to an 
attempt to “try and keep up with the Kunenes.” (The latter is a reference to a certain individual who hosted a 
function where sushi was served on semi-naked bodies of young ladies. The extent of the problem is evident 
from the Minister’s reference to a release by the Reserve Bank that indicated that household indebtedness is 
at 75.9% of disposable income and that if the ratio is disaggregated it would indicate that “the middle classes 
are way in above 100% - all of next year’s earnings are already spent.” 
1544  Feinman (1982-1983) 30 UCLA LR 829, 845. 
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or may not need. The result would be that the existing patterns of inequality in society would 
be exacerbated or, at best, be maintained. 
 
4.3.5 Conclusion 
The discussion of the indeterminateness of the standard of reasonableness in relation to 
price1545 highlights some of the problems that would result from the obiter dicta that call for 
the recognition of sales at a reasonable price or a unilaterally determined price. The discussion 
also illustrates that it would be burdensome for a court to conduct an elaborate enquiry to 
determine what price or rental the contractants would have decided on as being reasonable 
had they negotiated the price or rental themselves.1546 In Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs v 
Charlesworth, Pilling & Co.,1547 the court said that valuations are characterised by inferences 
and conjectures which are difficult to reduce to exact reasoning or to explain to others. Expert 
witnesses have their own set of conjectures according to their own experience and personal 
sagacity leaving “more than ordinary room for ... guesswork.”1548 Posner postulates that “no 
matter how elaborate the enquiry a substantial probability of error would remain and an 
erroneous interpretation undermines the utility of contracting as a method of organizing 
economic activity.”1549 
The conclusion is that the recognition of the obiter dicta would introduce an unacceptable 
element of uncertainty into the domain of the essence of the contract, namely, that of the 
determination of the price and rental. The uncertainty, if allowed to come to pass by the 
recognition of the a reasonable price and rental and that of a unilaterally determined price and 
                                                            
1545  Outlined earlier in this para. 
1546  The court would have to engage in an elaborate enquiry as indicated earlier in the text of this para. See also 
Speidel (1970) 31 University of Pittsburgh LR 363.  
1547  (1901) AC 373, 391. 
1548  See also Walker 382 S.W.2d 198 (Ky. 1964). 
1549  Posner ‘The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation’ unpublished paper, (2005) Paper 56 American 
Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 10. 
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rental would adversely affect the ability of people to plan their contractual obligations1550 with 
a corresponding reduction in the trust and respect for the notion of contract law as an 
obligation-creating mechanism. 
Mindful of the findings of the UNISA-Momentum report, the ease with which credit is still 
obtained despite the provisions of the National Credit Act, the ease with which consumers can 
delude themselves to become indebted,1551 and the effect that the over-indebtedness may 
have on individuals and those near on dear to them, it would unconscionable for the law to 
facilitate and thereby to perpetuate economic hardships by giving effect to the obiter dicta. The 
conclusion that contractants may, in circumstances where it is not prudent to do so, contract 
more readily because of the deceptive attractiveness of a reasonable price or one that is 
determined later, is not without merit. The conclusion is supported when viewed in the context 
of the blunt reality of a known price that may have given pause for further reflection or that 
could have dissuaded the contractant from concluding the contract.  
The imponderables1552 introduce an unacceptable element of uncertainty1553 into the domain of 
the essence of the contract, namely, that of the determination of the price that the notion of 
reasonableness is intended to regulate. The uncertainty introduced by the standard of 
reasonableness in the context of price determination and the possibility of misuse and abuse, 
especially in the context of the persistently high levels of (over)indebtedness militates against 
the recognition of the obiter dicta. 
                                                            
1550  Kennedy (1975-1976) 89 Harvard LR 1688-1689. 
1551  Bearing in mind also that consumers tend to underestimate or ignore risks. Eisenberg (1999-2000) 94 
Northwestern University LR 805, 812. 
1552  Outlined earlier in this para. 
1553  See also the remarks by Peckham J in United States v Trans-Missouri Freight Association 166 US 290 (1896), 
331-332, in deciding that the antitrust legislation in issue prohibited all restraints of trade and not only 
unreasonable restraints. After posing several questions relating to the difficulty of pinning down the notion of 
reasonableness, the learned judge concluded that to hold otherwise would be to leave the determination of 
reasonableness to the companies imposing the restraint. See also Speidel (1970) 31 University of Pittsburgh 
LR 363. 
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The conclusion is that the constitutional and policy imperatives underlying the essentiale of 
price militate against the recognition of a unilateral discretionary power to determine the price 
and rental and the recognition of contracts of sale and lease at a reasonable price and rental 
respectively.1554 
 
4.4 The role of the courts in the determination of the price and rental: dispute-settling or 
hortatory? 
4.4.1 Introduction 
The judicial process has two main functions, namely, a dispute-settlement function and a 
hortatory function.1555 In the case of the former, the emphasis is to dispense justice by deciding 
individual disputes in the light of all the circumstances relevant to that dispute. The latter 
function “emphasises that the law is part of a complex set of arrangements designed to provide 
incentives and disincentives for various types of behaviour.”1556 “The rule-orientated approach 
(to the essentialia of price and rental) accords with the hortatory function, whereas the 
construction technique or ad hoc approach (standards-based) accords with the dispute-
settlement function. A desire to do justice in an individual case is often likely to conflict with a 
desire to encourage or discourage particular types of behaviour in the future.”1557 An increase 
in the dispute-settling function makes predictability of decisions more difficult thereby 
adversely affecting the possibility of planning.1558 
The discussion that follows investigates the courts’ role as being either hortatory or dispute-
settling in relation to the determination of price and rental.  
 
                                                            
1554  As per the obiter dicta in NBS Boland Bank 1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA) and Genac Properties 1992 (1) SA 566 (AD) 
respectively. 
1555  This paragraph reflects the views of Atiyah as restated by Vorster (1988) 2 TSAR 183. 
1556  Vorster (1988) 2 TSAR 183. 
1557  Vorster (1988) 2 TSAR 183. 
1558  Vorster (1988) 2 TSAR 183. 
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4.4.2 The current position 
By way of introduction, it is necessary to repeat that it was concluded that individual autonomy 
coupled with the presumptive equality of the contractants serve as the rationale for the 
principles of freedom and sanctity of contract.1559 The principles find expression in the 
reluctance of the courts to engage the issue of determining contractual liability based on the 
substantive fairness of the contract.1560 Given the respect accorded to the autonomy and 
presumptive equality by our courts of law as evidenced in their insistence on the doctrine of 
pacta sunt servanda, it is not surprising that the courts do not view their role as being one also 
of making or remaking contracts.1561 The courts’ refusal to recognise the validity of a sale at a 
reasonable price or at a unilaterally determined price1562 could also be justified on the basis 
that such recognition would require of the courts to make or to remake contracts.1563 The 
following caution issued in the American case of Slayter v Pasley,1564 is apposite in this context:  
                                                            
1559  In chapter 2. See for example, the discussion in chapter 2 of Tjollo Ateljees 1949 (1) SA 856 (A); Bank of Lisbon 
1988 (3) SA 580 (A); Brisley 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA); Afrox Healthcare 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA); Napier v Barkhuizen 
2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA); Bredenkamp (appeal) 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA) and Potgieter 2012 (1) SA 637 (SCA). 
1560  Representative of this approach of the courts in this regard is the decision in Napier 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA). The 
court held “that intruding on apparently voluntarily concluded arrangements is a step that Judges should 
countenance with care, particularly when it requires them to impose their individual conceptions of fairness 
and justice on parties’ individual arrangements” (para [13]). In Bredenkamp (appeal) 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA) 
the Court, quoted with approval the dictum in Wells v South African Alumenite Company 1927 AD 69, 73,that 
in the absence of fraud, contractants must be held to a contract even if it contains harsh conditions (para 
[33]). In Natal Motor Industries Ltd v Crickmay 1962 (2) SA 93 (N), the Court said that coming to the rescue of 
such a contractant would be tantamount to changing the contract instead of interpreting it (98). See further 
the case law in chapters 1 and 2. 
1561  See also Lubbe & Murray Contract 21. Further evidence is the cautionary approach of the courts when it is 
faced with problem of keeping a contract alive by reading terms into it. See the discussion of tacit terms in 
para 4.3.4.2(C)(viii) above. See also Perillo Corbin on Contracts Vol 1 529. Smith traces the reluctance of the 
courts to the nineteenth century tendency of the judges to elevate contract law into the central place in the 
law of obligations. This resulted in a reluctance to impose obligations that had not been voluntarily assumed. 
Thus, a denial by judges that they had the power to make or remake contracts: Smith Atiyah’s Introduction to 
the Law of Contract 10. 
1562  See the discussion in paras 4.3.4.3(A) above. See chapter 1 paras 1.2 and 1.4.2. 
1563  See para 4.3.4.3(C) above. 
1564  199 Or. 616 (1953), 628. The case dealt with a rent renewal agreement that required the contractants to 
agree on the rental at date of renewal. In refusing to recognise the notion of a reasonable rental, the court 
endorsed the established approach that the rental must be specified with such a degree of certainty and 
definiteness that nothing is left for future determination (620). See also Joseph Martin 1981, 52 N.Y.2d 105 
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“We should be hesitant about completing an apparently legally incomplete agreement between 
persons sui juris enjoying freedom of contract and dealing at arms’ length by arbitrarily 
interpolating into it our concept of the parties’ intent merely to validate what would otherwise 
be an invalid agreement, lest we inadvertently commit them to an ostensible agreement which, 
in fact, is contrary to the deliberate design of all of them. It is a dangerous doctrine when 
examined in the light of reason ... [It] import[s] a quality of jural ego and superiority not 
consonant with long-accepted ideas of legalistic propriety under a democratic form of 
government ... [It] will open the door to repeated opportunities to that which, in principle, courts 
should not do and, in any event, are not adequately equipped to do.” 
Further evidence of the courts’ reluctance to make or remake contracts is to be discerned in the 
courts’ approach to objections raised by a contractant to the price set by a nominee. In such 
instances, the courts’ have declared themselves willing to come to the assistance of a plaintiff 
where the price set by the nominee is “so grossly excessive that it bears no reasonable 
relationship at all to the value of the shares at the relevant time, and is a manifestly unjust and 
unfair price ...”1565 Having decided to come to the assistance of the plaintiff, the question arises 
whether it falls within the power of the court to force on the contractants a price which it 
deems to be reasonable in light of the evidence it relied on in coming to its initial decision.1566 If 
answered in the affirmative, it would amount to making or remaking the contract.  
There is a dearth of case law on this point but what there is suggests that the courts do not 
consider it appropriate to enforce a price on the contractants. In both the Gillig1567 and the 
Dublin cases1568 the plaintiffs were dissatisfied with the price a nominee had placed on the sale 
of shares. In the Gillig case, the Court accommodated the plaintiff (the seller) on equitable 
principles1569 by not enforcing the price set by the nominee. The Court went on to say that 
because the plaintiff is accommodated on purely equitable principles, equity must also be done 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
which dealt with a term for mutually agreed upon rental in a lease renewal agreement. Both cases are also 
dealt with in chapter 5 paras 5.2.2.2(A)&(B)(i). 
1565  Dublin 1964 1 SA 799 (D) 805A. Courts have come to the assistance of aggrieved contractants where the 
nominee acted improperly in determining the price (for example, where there was fraud, collusion, caprice) 
or where the price arrived at is manifestly unfair in effect or substance. Van der Merwe et al Contract 230. 
1566  Or alternatively, the price which it used as a yardstick to come to its initial decision, viz., the decision that the 
price determined by the nominee is improper or that it is unreasonable. 
1567  1953 (4) SA 675 (TPD). 
1568   1964 (1) SA 799 (D). 
1569  It based its decision on the laesio enormis principle that was still recognised at the time. See the discussion in 
of the principle chapter 2 and in particular in para 2.3.2.1.   
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to the defendant (the buyer). On this basis, the Court found that it would only be fair to allow 
the defendant the choice to decline to continue with the contract or to continue with the 
contract “on the modified price found to be the true and fair value of the res vendita.”1570 The 
basis for granting the buyer a choice was the Court’s reluctance to enforce a “new contract” on 
him.1571 What the modified price (which the court refers to) is to be, is not clear. Is it, for 
example, to be determined by the court using the evidence it has before it, or must it be 
referred to another nominee? This is not clear from the decision or from the decision in the 
Dublin case. 
In Dublin v Diner,1572 the court held that where the price set is so grossly excessive that it bears 
no reasonable relationship at all to the value of the shares at the relevant time, and is a 
manifestly unjust and unfair price, the buyer would be legally justified in refusing to pay the 
price. It left open the question whether the other party (the seller in this case) has an election 
as suggested in Gillig v Sonnenberg.1573 In both cases, there was no attempt by the court to 
suggest what a reasonable price is or should be, let alone to enforce its view of what it 
considered to be a reasonable price. It left the future of the contract to the discretion of the 
contractants.1574 
                                                            
1570  At 683D-E. 
1571  At 683 E-G, the court explained itself by saying that the defendant was prepared to buy at a price to be fixed 
by the nominee. If the nominee’s determination is so defective as to entitle the plaintiff to refuse sell at that 
price, the buyer was entitled not to continue with the transaction and “to resist a new contract being forced 
upon him.” Emphasis added. 
1572  1964 (1) SA 799 (D). 
1573  At 805A-B. 
1574  In the Gillig case it would be the defendant who would have to decide whether to continue at a new price. If 
the defendant rejected that option, the contract would terminate. In effect, the contract would be voidable 
at the option of the defendant. In terms of the Dublin case, where the Court did not grant the defendant the 
same option, the contract would be voidable at the option of the plaintiff, who the Court said would be 
justified in not continuing with the contract at the price set by the nominee. The difference between the 
approaches of the two courts has significant implications for the contractants. A similar reluctance is to be 
discerned in H Merks & Co (Pty) Ltd v The B-M Group (Pty) Ltd 1996 (2) SA 225 (A). The agreement was that 
the price in an ongoing sales agreement may be increased by mutual agreement from time to time. The Court 
refused to perfect the agreement by providing a (reasonable) price (233I-234H and 235C-D). See also Hurwitz 
1994 (3) SA 449 (C) to similar effect (453I-455G). It is respectfully submitted that the approach of our courts 
in this regard is the correct one. 
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In NBS Boland Bank, the Court also does not express a view on the competency of the courts to 
settle the issue on behalf of the contractants where an empowered contractant had not 
exercised its discretion arbitrio boni viri.    
It is submitted that the fact that the Gillig and Dublin courts did not determine a modified price 
constitutes evidence of the court’s reluctance to become involved in the contract-creating 
process since the court was “not the functionary chosen by the parties in their contract to 
quantify the performance.”1575 Judicial determination of [price and] rental is “unattractive” 
because (i) it is the result of a litigious and adversarial process which is not what rent-fixing [or 
price-fixing] was meant to be; (ii) it involves “legal and other costs,” some of which is 
irrecoverable by even the successful party; and (iii) it involves the possibility of appeals which if 
they come to pass add further time delays as well as further layers of costs.1576 
 
4.4.3 Considerations against a price and rental determining role 
It is submitted that a court that does intervene would be imposing its own views rather than 
giving effect to what the contractants committed themselves to. Given the jurisprudential and 
policy considerations underlying the essentiale of price, 1577  any such imposition would 
constitute an infringement of the freedom of the contractant(s) to contract and hence impinge 
on the dignity of the contractant(s).1578 Additionally, the courts may become engaged in 
rewriting contracts that may fall outside of its expertise.1579 Hence, the current common law 
                                                            
1575  Hurwitz 1994 (3) SA 449 (C) 453F. See also Walker 382 S.W.2d 198 (Ky. 1964) where the court expressed 
similar concerns.  
1576  Hurwitz 1994 (3) SA 449 (C) 454D-F. 
1577  As discussed above in this chapter. 
1578  In Slayter v Pasley, 199 Or. 616 (1953) 264 P.2d 444, the Court warned against completing legally incomplete 
agreements for fear of committing the contractants to an ostensible agreement which is, in fact, contrary to 
their deliberate intention. Such “[j]udicial paternalism should be as obnoxious to courts as is legislation by 
judicial fiat.” The court reasoned that “[b]oth import a quality of jural ego and superiority not consonant with 
long accepted ideas of judicial propriety under a democratic form of government” (628-629).    
1579  Choi (2003) 103 Columbia LR 63. For example, in Bethlehem Steel Corp. V Litton Industries, Inc. 468A.2d 748, 
(Pa. Supr. Ct. 1983), the court declined to supply price escalation clauses for the building of ships because of 
the “complexity” of the industry terms. Due regard is had for the fact that expert evidence may be called in a 
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provisions are to be preferred to the obiter dicta1580 because contractants are in a better 
position to jointly determine performance appropriate to their personal needs and 
requirements, and they can also do so more cheaply.1581 
It has been suggested1582 that where a contract fails because the nominee’s nomination is 
unjust there should be no judicial substitution of the price where the contractants intended the 
determination to be made by the specified nominee only and by no-one else. It is further 
suggested that the price should be settled by a court as the appropriate bonus vir in those 
situations where the contractants simply identified the nominee as belonging to a particular 
class.1583 With respect, the distinction between an identified and an unidentified nominee is not 
helpful and amounts to splitting of hairs. The fact that the contractants referred to a nominee 
as a member of a particular class does not necessarily give rise to a presumption that the 
nominees did not intend to rely on him/her solely, or did not consider him/her on the basis of 
his/her particular qualities or skills. Neither does it mean that they trusted his/her judgment in 
that field any less than the judgment of person who was specifically named.1584 It is submitted 
that in most cases contractants appoint a nominee (whether by name or by membership of a 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
court of law. However, aside from the fact this may not always be possible because of resource issues, the 
task of determining the term may be beyond the scope and competency of the court because, as in the 
instant case, “the nature of the negotiations in the shipbuilding industry and the extreme complexity of the 
undertaking, an escalation clause requires careful negotiations between the parties and must be custom 
tailored to fit the project” (757-758).    
1580  The obiter dictum in NBS Boland Bank 1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA) suggests our law should recognise a price 
determined unilaterally subject to the arbitrio boni viri notion. The other obiter dictum in Genac Properties 
1992 1 SA 566 (AD) suggests that a contract of sale and lease at a reasonable price and rental, respectively, 
should be valid. 
1581  Gergen (1992) 92 Columbia LR 997, 1000; Walker 382 S.W.2d 198 (Ky. 1964). 
1582  Kerr Sale and Lease 50-55; Kerr & Glover (2000) 117 SALJ 206. 
1583  For example, “the auditor for the time being of the company” as was the case in Gillig v Sonnenberg 1953 4 
SA 675 (T). In other words, in those cases where the determination was made not on the basis of attributes of 
a particular person in whom they trusted or on whose skills and qualities they relied. Kerr Sale and Lease 50-
55; Kerr & Glover (2000) 117 SALJ 206. The writer asks the reader to infer that in the case where a nominee is 
specifically named, the contractants intended that nominee and no other to settle the price. The contract 
then fails if that nominee is unable or unwilling to settle the price or fixes a price that is considered to be 
excessive. However, where the nominee is referred to as belonging to a particular group of category of 
persons, the contract continues and a new value has to be set by a court where the initial nominee produces 
an unjust estimation.  
1584  See Hurwitz 1994 (3) SA 449 (C) 459E to similar effect. 
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particular trade or profession) either because they do not trust their own ability, knowledge or 
skill to settle on a price, or because of differences of opinion between them. In both cases, the 
nominee is appointed because of the nominee’s actual or presumed independence and 
integrity and/or ability and/or knowledge and/or skill.1585 Hence, it does not make any 
difference whether or not they identified the nominee by name. The intention of the 
contractants in both instances is not to get an arbitrary estimation “but a just estimation, 
tanquam boni viri.”1586 
 
4.4.4 Conclusion 
The recognition of the obiter dicta that call for the validity of a sale at a reasonable price or at a 
unilaterally determined price will lead to an increase in the dispute-settling function of the 
judiciary with a concomitant reduction in certainty and predictability.1587 If the courts, in 
addition, were to embark on a path of contract-making, it would create uncertainty regarding 
the sanctity of contractual arrangements. This would serve to diminish the values of dignity, 
equality, and freedom that are so important, not only, in the current constitutional regime1588 
but also, to the policy initiatives underlying consumer protection legislation.1589 The increase in 
consumer protection legislation with its hortatory orientation may be viewed as a corrective 
mechanism to restore the balance between the two functions of the judicial system. The 
discussion of the constitutional, jurisprudential and policy imperatives that inform the notion of 
                                                            
1585  In Dublin 1964 1 SA 799 (D) 804D, the court concluded that “both parties presumably relied upon the ability, 
competence and integrity of the third party nominated by them, much in the same way as they might rely on 
an arbitrator.” 
1586  Phrase borrowed from Machanick 1920 CPD 339. See also Van der Bergh (2012) 1 TSAR 61. 
1587  Vorster (1988) 2 TSAR reflects that Atiyah has similar concerns about the “dramatic” rise in England of the 
dispute-settling function at the expense of the hortatory function (183).  
1588  See the discussion of the values in para 4.2.4.2 above. 
1589  See chapter 3 in this regard and in particular paras 3.9 and 3.10. 
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essentialia,1590  is evidence that essentialia also have a hortatory orientation and could 
complement this purpose. 
Furthermore, the decisions in the Dublin and Gillig cases are in alignment with the general 
approach of the courts that it is not the function of a court to make or remake contracts.1591 A 
view that a court may determine a price that binds the contractants is nothing less than 
suggesting that a contract may be concluded at a price to be fixed by a court,1592 which would 
be to ascribe to the courts a function that is alien to its constitution, in that it is neither dispute-
settling nor hortatory in nature.1593 This observation supports the conclusion that validity 
should not be bestowed on contracts of sale and lease at a reasonable price and rental 
respectively, or at unilaterally determined price and rental.   
 
 
 
                                                            
1590  Paras 4.2.4.2(B), 4.2.4.3 and 4.2.4.4 above. 
1591  This is an inevitable consequence of a jurisprudence that places individual autonomy and responsibility at the 
vanguard of its approach to freedom and sanctity of contract. See the discussion in chapter 2 regarding the 
court’s reluctance to second-guess contracts freely entered into. In Alfred 1974 (3) SA 506 (A) the Court in 
dealing with the implication of tacit terms into a contract said that courts “cannot make contracts for people; 
nor can it supplement the agreement of the parties merely because it might be reasonable to do so” (532). 
See also Clements v Simpson 1971 (3) SA 1 (A) 7; Techni-Pak Sales (Pty) Ltd v Hall 1968 (3) SA 231 (W) 236; 
Lubbe & Murray Contract 21, 414-417 and 424. A similar situation prevails in England. Beaton Anson’s Law of 
Contract (2002) writes that the law “will not re-write a contract for the parties or imply additional provisions 
merely because it would be reasonable to do so” (7). See also Beale Chitty On Contract Vol 1 para [1-
061].Section 9 of the English Sale of Goods Act 1979 (also discussed in chapter 5 para 5.2.3) in providing for 
the dissolution of the contract where the nominee is unable or unwilling to settle the price, also disqualifies 
the court from setting the price.  
1592  See in support the dicta in para 4.3.3 above from Hall (1960) 104 C.L.R. 222.  
1593  The gap-filling role that would be imposed on courts by the standard of reasonableness (that includes the 
arbitrio boni viri notion) would impair the ability of contractants to legislate contracts for themselves and 
would amount to a delegation of legislative authority to the courts, an act that would result in a gross 
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Danzig (1974-1975) 27 Stanford LR argues that the Article 2 
provisions of the UCC, including the one referring to  the notion of a reasonable price, amount to a delegation 
of legislative decisions to courts. Apposite in this context, is his dismissal of the legislative function ascribed to 
courts as being based on a “triad of dubious assumptions that self-evident ideal resolutions of situational 
problems exist, that they can be discovered by careful scrutiny of actual situations, and that once articulated 
they will be widely accepted.” He concludes that the UCC is “phrased as a piece of legislation that, save for its 
comprehensiveness, reads very much like a judicial opinion” (634-635).   
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4.5 Conclusion 
The possibility of disputes clogging up the judicial machinery at the expense of those who can 
ill-afford the judicial processes cannot be discounted. The uncertainty, the impaired ability to 
plan and the challenges associated with accessing the courts raise serious policy concerns.1594 
The review of the constitutional, jurisprudential and policy imperatives of essentialia in relation 
to price-determination and of the role of the courts in this connection reveals that the creation 
of contractual obligations is as much the result of the intention of the contractants at work as it 
is of legal policy. The exigencies of modern commercial practice, 1595  reinforced by the 
complexities of modern commercial practices,1596 necessitate a measure of control for the 
promotion of a fair and level playing field.1597 The objective of such control would be to create 
the best possible opportunity for each contractant to maximize his/her autonomy without 
derogating from that of the other, thereby fulfilling the constitutional imperatives of dignity, 
equality, and freedom. This objective is fulfilled by conceptualizing the essentiale of price as a 
rule that consists of a duty-imposing as well as a power-conferring component. 
Insulating agreement on price and rental from the will of the contractants is justified on the 
basis that agreement on price and rental constitutes the essence of the contract and has policy 
relevance 1598  and hence the right that flows from the power-conferring component of 
                                                            
1594  The challenges of accessing the courts were highlighted in chapter 3. The policy concerns support the duty-
imposing and power-conferring interpretation of the nature of essentialia as discussed and explained in para 
4.2.4.2(B) above. 
1595  Bargaining power is an important consideration in this context. The extent to which the notion of individual 
autonomy holds true depends on “the degree to which [the contractant] has the wherewithal to individualize 
the phases of the bargain to his desires–or, as the case may be, to sub-divide a single situation into a variety 
of specialized bargains to meet his needs”: Llewellyn (1931) 40 Yale LJ 716. Hence bargaining power, to a 
significant extent, also depends on the flexibility of the bargain in question: Llewellyn (1931) 40 Yale LJ717. 
See also Tjollo Ateljees 1949 (1) SA 856 (A) (discussed in chapter 2) where, in rejecting the doctrine of laesio 
enormis, the court questioned the pertinence of the doctrine in a modern commercial setting with its “highly 
complicated commercial organisation and its ingenious selling devices ...” 
1596  See the discussion in para 4.3.4.2 above. 
1597  See also in this context the discussion of marketing practices in chapter 4 para 4.3.4.2(C)(v). 
1598  Despite the risk of repetition, the context of the discussion makes it incumbent to refer to the findings in the 
1997 research paper of the Office of Fair Trading in England. It concluded that to make informed choices, 
consumers require information about price, quality and terms of trade and that an unregulated market may 
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essentialia is,1599 on constitutional and policy grounds, incapable of being alienated. Within this 
paradigm of control, one may say that its role exemplifies the practical operation of the 
doctrine of paternalism that serves to regulate contractual relations in a manner that is 
conducive of justice and equity.1600 The constitutionality of such paternalistic intervention was 
acknowledged by the Constitutional Court when it recognised that the Rental Housing Act 
superimposed its unfair practice regime on the obligations that contractants negotiate for 
themselves.1601 Viewed in this light, the essentiale of price represents “the democratic impulse 
to treat all persons as equals and to recognise the capacity of [contractants] for self-
actualisation and self-government.”1602 
The public policy considerations1603 also support the paternalism evident in the proposition for 
a rule-based approach to the essentiale of price that prefers certainty in relation to price over 
the individualism of freedom of contract that is evident in the call for the acceptance of the 
standard of reasonableness as a price-setting mechanism. A rule-based approach requires 
information and disclosure which, as evidenced in the discussion of the consumer protection 
legislation in chapter 3, promotes the making of informed choices, hence, giving concrete 
expression to the consensual aspect of contract law. The result is that a rule-based approach 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
not always provide this: Cartwright (2011) Legal Studies 13. It has also been suggested that imperfect 
information about prices may also precipitate high prices: Armstrong “Economic Models of Consumer 
Protection Policies.” Paper prepared for conference on “The pros and cons of consumer protection,” 
organised by the Swedish Competition Authority, held on 11 November 2011, 2 and 7. The information 
contained in these two pieces of research support the argument against the recognition of a reasonable price 
or a unilaterally determined price. The uncertainty that results from the indefiniteness of such prices may be 
equated to the uncertainty that may result from unregulated markets. Equally important for the question 
posed by the obiter dicta is the possibility that the indefiniteness may result in a spike in prices. Such 
consequences may lead to an exacerbation of the problem of (over) indebtedness and negate the policy 
objectives of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 and the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008. 
1599  See para 4.2.4.2(B) above. 
1600  The principle of paternalism is also evident, for example, in the consumer protection legislation discussed in 
chapter 3 as well as in the remedies prescribed for breach of contract in the absence of agreement regulating 
the consequences of a breach.    
1601  Ntombizodwa Yvonne Maphango & Others v Aengus Lifestyle Properties CCT 57/11 [2012] ZACC 2 para [51]. 
1602  Woolman (2007) 18 Stell LR 522. 
1603  Also evident in the consumer protection legislation discussed in chapter 3 and in Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 
(CC) and Hoffmann 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) discussed in chapter 1 para 1.3.3. 
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would, as in the case of the consumer protection legislation,1604 operate in harmony with the 
principles of contract law, even in a modern commercial setting. Hence, a rule-based approach 
that requires a contractual term from which the price and rental are objectively ascertainable 
without further reference to the contractants is, like consumer protection legislation, in 
consonance with equity-based jurisprudence and public policy and is similarly committed to the 
constitutional values of dignity, equality and freedom. 
Justification for the exclusion of rental from being determined by the standard of 
reasonableness, including unilateral determination of rental, is supported by the provisions of 
section 26 of the Constitution and the provisions of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and 
Unlawful Occupation of Land Act.1605 Viewed against the recognition of the right of access to 
adequate housing as a constitutionally protected right and a basic human need, an approach to 
the determination of the essence of the contract, namely rental, 1606  based on the 
indeterminate standard of reasonableness or based on the unilateral exercise of discretion 
would not be justifiable. Both these approaches do not provide the requisite degree of 
certainty in an area of contract law that affects the fundamental right of human beings to 
access to housing. This is exacerbated by the potential for abuse of discretionary power in a 
society where there is a shortage of adequate housing.1607 The fact that the disadvantaged 
contractant, who it is submitted will be the tenant because of shortage of housing, may have a 
(free) right of recourse to courts is of little comfort: such contractant would be saddled, not 
only, with the burden of proof, but also, with the transaction costs of litigation.1608 
 
 
                                                            
1604  See chapter 3 para 3.9.  
1605  19 of 1998. See the discussion of the two acts in para 4.2.4.2(A)(i) above and in chapter 3.  
1606  See para 4.3.3.3(D) above. 
1607  See Badenhorst et al Property 254-255. 
1608  These include the risks involved with litigation, the time, energy and other such resources required to 
conduct litigation.   
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The conclusion is that a development that recognises sales at a reasonable price or one that is 
unilaterally determined would: 
(i) run counter to the constitutional imperatives that inform essentialia.1609 
(ii) run counter to the constitutional imperative to foster socio-economic reforms and 
to strive to create a just and egalitarian society.1610 
(iii) run counter to the policy considerations underlying recent legislation,1611 and court 
decisions1612  that recognise contractual autonomy but that require that it be 
exercised with restraint to promote a constitutional and/or a social and/or an 
economic objective. 
(iv) be economically, socially, morally, and legally indefensible.1613 
(v) not promote certainty and consensus.1614  
Accordingly, validity should not be bestowed on contracts of sale at a reasonable price or at 
unilaterally determined price. 
 
 
                                                            
1609  See para 4.2.4 above. 
1610  See the discussion in para 4.2.4.2 above. The goals are also in evidence in the consumer protection legislation 
discussed in chapter 3.  
1611  See the legislation discussed in chapter 3. See also the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 0f 1997 
(regulating, inter alia, wages and working hours, the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 
2003 (regulating the granting government tenders), the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998. The purpose of the Act is to prohibit the eviction of unlawful occupiers 
that does not comply with the prescripts of the Act. The definition of unlawful occupiers was extended by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal to include those cases where the occupation was initially lawful (for example, in 
terms of a lease agreement or mortgage) but subsequently became unlawful on termination of, for example, 
the lease agreement, or the mortgage. As a result, the ambit of the Act was been extended so that the 
common law right of a lessor to summarily evict a tenant and any contractual provision regarding the eviction 
of a tenant, are now subject to the provisions of the Act. See Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker v Jika 2003 (1) SA 113 
(SCA).  
1612  Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC); Breedenkamp (interim interdict) 2009 (5) SA 304 (GSJ) and in Hoffmann v 
South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC). The cases are discussed in chapter 1 para 1.3.3 and in chapter 2. 
1613  See para 4.3.4.3(E) read with the provisions of the consumer protection legislation discussed in chapter 3. 
1614  See the discussion throughout this chapter. See also the discussion in chapter 2 paras 2.2.2 (consensus), 2.6 
(certainty). 
 
 
 
 
279 
 
Chapter 5 
Discretionary powers in respect of price and rental in international and comparative 
perspective 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In the chapter 2 the legal position as it obtains in international instruments, both at a 
national and international level, was briefly explored by way of comparison to the South 
African position regarding the principles of consensus, freedom, sanctity and certainty of 
contract. Similarly, chapter 3 concerned a comparison of the legal position in respect of 
consumer protection legislation and the impact of the policy considerations underlining 
consumer protection legislation on contract law principles. Chapter 4 explored the content, 
role and function of the essentialia of price and rental in the contract law and how 
reasonableness as a standard for determining price and rental relates to this.  
The discussion in this chapter will be confined to an examination of the position in the 
United States of America, England, Scotland, Germany and the Netherlands1615 regarding 
contracts of sale and lease at a reasonable price and rental respectively, or at a unilaterally 
determined price or rental. The position as it obtains in international instruments such as 
the United Nations Conventions on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,1616 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts,1617 and the Principles of 
European Contract Law1618  will also be examined.  
The objective in this chapter is to compare the position in those jurisdictions with the 
current legal position in South Africa and to ascertain what lessons, if any, may be learnt 
from the international experience in respect of the question of law under investigation in 
                                                            
1615  These countries were referred to by the Supreme Court of Appeal in NBS Boland Bank v One Berg River 
Drive 1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA) in support of its call for the recognition of contracts of sale and lease at a 
reasonable price or rental, as well as for the recognition of the proposition that the price or rental may be 
unilaterally determined by one of the contractants. 
1616  The convention concluded in 1980 is hereafter referred to as the CISG. 
1617  The principles, settled in 2004, are hereafter referred to as the UNIDROIT Principles (2004). 
1618  The principles, settled in 2003, are hereafter referred to the PECL. 
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this thesis, namely, whether South African contract law should recognise the validity of (i) 
contracts of sale and lease at a reasonable price or rental respectively1619 and (ii) at a 
unilaterally determined price or rental.1620 
 
5.2 Comparative law 
5.2.1 Introduction 
In the discussion below of the position in the five national jurisdictions,1621 and the three 
international law instruments,1622 it becomes apparent that with the exception of one,1623 
they recognise the standard of reasonableness, in principle, as providing the relevant degree 
of certainty required by the Westinghouse principle for the validity of contracts of sale and 
lease respectively.1624 The discussion will therefore focus on the standard of reasonableness 
and the mechanisms for determining a reasonable price or rental in the various jurisdictions 
with a view to determining the desirability and benefit of importing the notion of 
reasonableness as a standard for determining the essentialia of price and rental in contracts 
of sale and lease respectively. 
The discussion will commence with an examination of the position in the United States of 
America and thereafter of the position in each of the other four national jurisdictions. 
Thereafter, the position in the each of the three international instruments will be examined.  
 
 
                                                            
1619  As suggested in an obiter dictum in Genac Properties v NBC Administrators 1992 (1) SA 566 (AD). 
1620  As suggested in an obiter dictum in NBS Boland Bank v One Berg River 1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA). It will be 
recalled that in a footnote in chapter 1 para 1.2 it was explained that there is a marked similarity between 
contracts of sale and contracts of lease: Cooper Landlord and Tenant (1994) 6-7. Hence, the practice of 
referring mainly to the law relating to the price in contracts of sale followed in the previous chapters will 
be continued in the interest of brevity and avoiding repetition. Differences between the two will be 
highlighted. 
1621  The United States of America, England, Scotland, Germany and the Netherlands. 
1622  The CISG, UNIDROIT Principles (2004), and the PECL. 
1623  Namely, the CISG. 
1624  The Westinghouse principle requires that the price must be certain in that it is either ascertained or 
objectively ascertainable with reference to something which in itself is certain. For example, a formula 
such as the usual price or a price list that could be used by an outsider to settle the price without further 
reference to the contractants. See further chapter 1 paras 1.2, 1.4.2.2(C) and chapter 4 para 4.2.4.2(B)(ii). 
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5.2.2 The United States of America 
5.2.2.1 Background 
Prior to the introduction of the Uniform Commercial Code,1625 the law was similar to that in 
South Africa in that the validity of a contract, in respect of its essentialia, was dependant on 
whether an objective standard of determination, independent of the contractants, was 
available.1626 Certainty as to the material aspects, especially in relation to price and rental, 
was deemed to be of the essence in contract law. The methodology for the determination of 
the rental (and price) had to be contained within the “four corners” of contract.1627 
 
5.2.2.2 The position under the Uniform Commercial Code 
(A) Background 
The common law position in relation to price in contracts of sale underwent a radical 
transformation by UCC 2-305.1628 Article 2, which applies only to the contracts for the sale of 
goods,1629 was introduced to promote uniformity in the various legal jurisdictions in the 
United States of America1630 and to facilitate commercial transactions.1631 Thus, the position 
in respect of the essential of rental in contracts of lease is still regulated by the common law 
                                                            
1625  Hereafter referred to as the UCC. All references to the UCC and the texts of the UCC relied on in this 
chapter comes from the various volumes of Lawrence Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code. 
1626  Choi ‘Contracts with Open or Missing Terms under the Uniform Commercial Code and the Common Law: 
A Proposal for Unification’ (2003) 103 Columbia LR 50, 56-61, hereafter Choi (2003) 103 Columbia LR 50.  
1627  For example, in Davis v Cleve March Hunt Club 405 S.E.2d 839 (Va. 991) an agreement for a “mutually 
agreed rent” was rejected on the basis that it was not objectively ascertainable. It was deemed to be too 
indefinite because it did not have a “specified method or guideline for fixing rent” (842). In Joseph Martin 
Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. V Schumacher Court of Appeals New York 1981, 52 N.Y.2d 105, 436 N.Y.S2d 247, 417 
N.E.2d, hereafter Joseph Martin 1981, 52 N.Y.2d 105 the Court, in rejecting the renewal of a lease 
agreement “at annual rentals to be agreed upon,” reasoned that “before the power of the law can be 
invoked to enforce a promise, it must be sufficiently certain and specific so that what was promised can 
be ascertained” (541). See also Slayter v Pasley, 199 Or. 616 (1953), 264 P.2d 444 to the same effect. See 
also Choi (2003) 103 Columbia LR 53-54;  
1628  The provisions of Article 2 have resulted in a moderation in the insistence by some courts that an 
agreement must have a price or a price perfecting mechanism: Perillo Corbin on Contracts Volume 1 
Revised Edition (1993) 579, hereafter Perillo Corbin on Contracts Vol 1. See also Lawrence Anderson on 
the Uniform Commercial Code Vol. 2A (2008) 424 & 428, hereafter Lawrence Anderson Vol. 2A (2008).   
1629   This means that all other contracts are regulated by the law applicable in each state. 
1630  UCC 1-201(2)(c). 
1631  See para 5.2.2.2(B)(iii) chapter below.  
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which requires that it must be ascertained or objectively ascertainable.1632 Hence, it is not 
inapposite to conclude that the approach in respect of the essentiale of rental accords with 
the current state of law in South Africa.1633 
 
(B) UCC 2-305 
(i) Introduction 
UCC 2-305 reads: 
“U.C.C. 2-305 Open Price Term 
(1) The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract for sale even though the price is not settled. 
In such a case the price is a reasonable price at the time for delivery  if 
(a) nothing is said as to price; or 
(b) the price is left to be agreed by the parties and they fail to agree; or 
(c) the price is to be fixed in terms of some agreed market or other standard as set or 
recorded by a third person or agency and it is not so set or recorded 
(2) A price to be fixed by the seller or by the buyer means a price for him to fix in good faith. 
(3) When a price is left to be fixed otherwise than by agreement of the parties fails to be fixed 
through the fault of one party the other may at his option treat the contract as cancelled or himself 
fix a reasonable price. 
(4) Where, however, the parties intend not to be bound unless the price be fixed or agreed and it is 
not fixed or agreed there is no contract. In such a case the buyer must return any goods already 
received or if unable so to do must pay their reasonable value at the time of delivery and the seller 
must return any portion of the price paid on account.”1634 
The purpose of UCC 2-305 is to give effect to the agreement made1635 and, in doing so, it 
changes the common law in that it does not provide for the invalidity of a contract of sale 
simply because the price term has been left open. The validity of such contracts are, in 
                                                            
1632  See, for example, Davis v Cleve March Hunt Club, 405 S.E.2d 839 (991) at 842 Joseph Martin 1981, 52 
N.Y.2d 105. Both cases are discussed in a footnote in para 5.2.1 above. It has been suggested that 
Comment (e) to Section 33 of the Restatement (Second), Contract appears to endorse the application of 
UCC 2-305 to other “open price” contracts that would include lease agreements but it must be noted that 
that the Restatement (Second) has persuasive value only: Knapp, Crystal & Prince Problems in Contract 
Law Cases and Materials (2003) 7-8 and 277-278, hereafter Knapp et al Problems in Contract Law. See 
also Farnsworth Contracts (2004) para 1.8; Choi (2003) 103 Columbia LR 72. Section 204 of the 
Restatement (Second) also appears to support a wider application that would include lease agreements. 
It has been observed that the Code has been influential in cases not governed by it and that some 
jurisdictions have begun to apply the UCC approach to open terms in service contracts as well: Perillo 
Corbin on Contracts Vol 1 541-542 and 580-581; Choi (2003) 103 Columbia LR 50, 52-53 & 73. Open terms 
in service contracts are also recognised in South African. See Elite Electrical Contractors v The Covered 
wagon Restaurant 1973 (3) SA 418 (RA), and chapter 4, para 4.3.4.3(C). Though there appears to be views 
expressed in favour of wider application of UCC 2-305, it does not support a conclusion that UCC 2-305 
applies to rental agreements as well. See the cases of Davis and Joseph Martin Jr discussed earlier. 
1633  See chapter 1 para 1.2. 
1634  From Lawrence Anderson Vol. 2A (2008) 418-419.  
1635  UCC 2-305 serves to accommodate the possibility that contractants may enter into transactions “without 
having specific knowledge of all the factors involved or into transactions in which the factors are variable 
or fluctuating”: Lawrence Anderson Vol. 2A (2008) 422 & 424.  
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terms of UCC 2-204(3),1636 dependent on two considerations, viz., whether the contractants 
intended to make a contract and whether there is a reasonably certain basis for granting an 
appropriate remedy. If these two considerations (intention and remedy) are present, the 
contract is prima facie valid and enforceable.1637 
Hence, under the general interpretation of UCC 2-204(3), the intention of the contractants 
coupled with the possibility of a remedy, acquire a dominant place in the determination of 
the validity of a contract of sale. The intention as a predominant requirement is reinforced 
by UCC 2-305(1) that provides that contractants, if they so intend, may conclude a contract 
despite a price not being agreed upon1638 and in UCC 2-305(4) that provides that there is no 
contract if the contractants did not intend to be bound unless the price is fixed or agreed 
upon.1639 The contract stands or falls on these two enquiries (intention and possibility of a 
remedy) which are the touchstones of the UCC provisions on indefinite contracts.1640 Under 
the aforementioned construction,1641 agreement on price becomes a secondary 
consideration.  
                                                            
1636  UCC 2-204(3) reads: 
“Even though one or more terms are left open a contract of sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the 
parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate 
remedy.” 
1637  The term indefiniteness relates to contracts where one or more terms have been left undetermined. For 
example, a contract of sale which does not specify the price of the product. See UCC 2-204(3). 
Indefiniteness will result in invalidity only if the “construction becomes futile”: Perillo Corbin on Contracts 
Vol 1 577 and 580. See also Murphy, Speidel & Ayres Studies in Contract Law (2003) 421-422, hereafter 
Murphy et al Studies in Contract Law; Lawrence Anderson Vol. 2A (2008) 431. The position in respect of 
absence of intention accords with the South African approach where an intention to contract is one of 
the essentialia of a valid contract of sale. However, unlike the position in the United States of America, 
South African law does not engage on an enquiry about the possibility of a remedy until and unless all the 
essentialia inclusive of price are present and a breach of contract has been proven.  
1638  See also UCC 2-305(4) to the same effect. 
1639  In Bethlehem Steel Corp. V Litton Industries, Inc. 468A.2d 748 at 757-758 (Pa. Supr. Ct. 1983), hereafter 
Bethlehem Steel 468A.2d 748 the Court, relying on UCC 2-304(3) commented that a court could not 
create a contract by employing the various rules of interpretation and construction if the contractants did 
not intend for a contract to come into existence. A court could proceed to determine the terms of the 
contract only if such mutual intention was present. In the absence of such intention, the court’s enquiry 
must terminate.   
1640  Perillo Corbin on Contracts Vol 1 580 n34. 
1641  In UCC 2-305 read with UCC 2-204(3). 
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Hereafter follows a brief exposition of the UCC 2-305 Open Price Term1642 that regulates the 
law relating to the notion of a reasonable price and the notion of a unilaterally determined 
price.  
 
(ii) Content of UCC 2-305 
In general, UCC 2-305 provides that a contract does not come into existence where the 
contractants intended to be bound only if the price is fixed or agreed upon and the price is 
not so fixed or agreed upon.1643 
Of importance is that UCC 2-305 further provides that contractants may conclude a contract 
of sale even though the price is not settled. UCC 2-305 presumes all such contracts to be 
valid with the aim of preserving them and filling in any gaps provided that contractants 
intended to make a contract and provided that there is a reasonably certain basis for 
granting an appropriate remedy.1644 
Where the contractants have the intention to contract but leave the price to be agreed 
upon and they fail to agree, then in terms of UCC 2-305(1)(b) the “price is a reasonable price 
at the time of delivery.”1645 The same applies where nothing is said about the price (UCC 2-
305(1)(a))1646 or where the price is to be fixed in terms of an agreed market or other 
                                                            
1642  Though the UCC provision does not expressly mention missing terms, the courts generally interpret the 
term “open” to include both terms left to be negotiated and missing terms. Choi (2003) 103 Columbia LR 
55. 
1643  UCC 2-305(4). See also Murphy et al Studies in Contract Law 422.  
1644  UCC 2-304(3). Choi (2003) 103 Columbia LR 64. 
1645  See also Murphy et al Studies in Contract Law 422. In stark contrast to this, there is a reluctance to fill the 
gap relating to quantity by trying to ascertain what would have been a reasonable quantity: Murphy et al 
Studies in Contract Law 425. The problems associated with determining what constitutes a reasonable 
quantity are said to be “virtually insuperable.” Thus, despite an intention to contract, a contract sans an 
agreement on quantity should fail for “indefiniteness”: Murphy et al Studies in Contract Law 421-422. It is 
submitted that similar problems bedevil gap-filling as far as price is concerned. See also the discussion of 
the problems associated with the “hypothetical contracting” approach and the “majoritarian” approach 
in American law in the text following this footnote reference. See also the discussion and the conclusions 
reached in chapter 4 above generally, and in particular in para 4.3.4.2 thereof regarding the problems 
associated with the notion of a reasonable price.  
1646  In terms of South African common law, the price would be the usual price of the seller which provides a 
much simpler and less contentious method of calculation and one that promotes greater certainty. See 
chapter 1 para 1.4.2.2(C)(ii)(a).  
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standard as set or recorded by a third person or agency and it is not so set or recorded (UCC 
2-305(1)(c)).  
The effect of UCC 2-305(1) is that agreements to agree are enforceable and it also rejects 
the unenforceability of such contracts on the basis of “indefiniteness.”1647 In such contracts, 
the contractants are obligated by UCC 1-304[Rev]1648 to negotiate in good faith to arrive at a 
price. Failure to do so exposes the particular contractant to liability for breach of 
contract.1649 
Where the price is left to be fixed other than by agreement between the contractants and 
the price-fixing is frustrated through the fault of one of them, then the “innocent” 
contractant has an option to treat the contract as cancelled or he/she may fix a reasonable 
price (UCC 2-305(3)). An open price contract would only fail where there is no reasonable 
basis for determining a substitute price.1650 
Section 204 of the Restatement (Second), which has persuasive value only,1651 is of the 
similar import to UCC 2-305.1652 However, unlike UCC 2-305, the Restatement (Second) 
                                                            
1647  Lawrence Anderson Vol. 2A (2008) 21. 
1648  UCC 1-304[Rev] provides that all contracts are subject to the duty of good faith in their performance and 
enforcement. The UCC has been undergoing a process of revision since 1991 hence the qualification [Rev] 
which indicates the UCC as revised: Van Zelst The Politics of European Sales Law: A Legal-Political Inquiry 
Into the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code, Vienna Sales Convention, the Dutch Civil Code and the 
European Consumer SA (2008) 46, hereafter Van Zelst The Politics of European Sales Law. 
1649  Milex Products, Inc. v Alra Laboratories, Inc., 237 Ill. App.3d 177, 177 Ill. Dec. 852, 603 N.E. 2d 1226 (2d 
Dist. 1992) concerned the manufacture of pharmaceutical products at a price to be negotiated. The Court 
concluded that a valid contract had been concluded that imposed on the contractants a duty to negotiate 
in good faith. In general, the duty to negotiate in good faith is one that prevents a contractant from 
renouncing the agreement or abandoning the negotiations or insisting on conditions that do not form 
part of the preliminary negotiations (1234). In South Africa, an agreement to agree or an agreement to 
negotiate in good faith is regarded as invalid. See, for example, Southernport Developments (Pty) Ltd v 
Transnet Limited 2005 (2) SA 202 (SCA) and Everfresh Market Virginia v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 
(1) SA 256 (CC). Both cases are discussed in chapter 4 para 4.2.4.4. Good faith is also not recognised as a 
general regulatory norm in South Africa. See chapter 2 para 2.8. The approach in England (para 5.2.3.2(A) 
below) is similar to the South African one.  
1650  Perillo Corbin on Contracts Vol 1 577; Murphy et al Studies in Contract Law 422. 
1651  Knapp et al Problems in Contract Law 7-8. 
1652  Section 204 provides that where a “bargain is sufficiently defined to be a contract” and the contractants 
have not agreed “with respect to a term which is essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a 
term which is reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the court.” UCC 2-204(3) is to the same 
effect: Murphy et al Studies in Contract Law 422-423. 
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provisions are not limited to contracts for the sale of goods and are intended to cover all 
exchange transactions.1653 Hence, lease agreements are covered as well. 
 
(iii) Rationale for the notion of a reasonable price 
The courts in the United States of America derive their justification for gap-filling from the 
Uniform Commercial Code, the provisions whereof are based on an acknowledgment that 
contractants form part of a market and that it is their understanding that they act in concert 
with market forces even if the price is left to be settled later by agreement or by a 
mechanism that proves unsuccessful.1654 
 
(iv) Approaches to the application of UCC 2-305 
In applying the default rules of the UCC 2-305,1655 the approach is to give to the contractants 
what they would have contracted for had they expressly contracted.1656 This approach 
which seeks to uncover the intention of the contractants, is known as the “hypothetical 
contracting” approach1657 which resembles the hypothetical bystander test used in South 
African law to read tacit terms into a contract.1658 However, the “hypothetical contracting” 
approach is said to be beset with difficulties1659 that have often resulted in the courts 
inferring what the majority of contractants in a particular setting would have done.1660 This 
                                                            
1653  Murphy et al Studies in Contract Law 422. 
1654  Perillo Corbin on Contracts Vol 1 579. For example, where a formula for the calculation of the price fails 
because the state (or other organisation) no longer issues the price index that forms part of the formula.  
1655  As set out above in para 5.2.2.2(B) above. 
1656  DiMatteo Law of International Contracting (2009) 20, hereafter DiMatteo Law of International 
Contracting; Choi (2003) 103 Columbia LR 64. 
1657  Murphy et al Studies in Contract Law 425-426.  
1658  See chapter 4 para 4.3.4.2(C)(viii).  
1659  See also the discussion in chapter 4 para 4.3.4.2(C)(viii) where it was shown that inconsistencies about 
the nature and content of the hypothetical bystander test may lead to problems that may include 
imposing terms into contracts which were not within the contemplation of the contractants.  
1660  Murphy et al Studies in Contract Law 425-426.  
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approach, known as the “majoritarian” approach,1661 signals a departure from the 
hypothetical contracting standard1662 and appears to enjoy judicial preference.1663 
 
(v) Factors considered in determining a reasonable price 
The UCC does not specify a list of factors or guidelines for giving content to the notion of a 
reasonable price.1664 The following is a summary of some of the factors which may play a 
role in the determination of a reasonable price. The description of the factors is followed by 
an analysis thereof.1665 
 
(a) Market price 
UCC 2-305(1)(c) expressly authorises an open-price term that may be resolved with 
reference to the markets.1666 A court may have regard for the fair market value at the time 
and place of delivery or it may choose the prevailing price in the market where the seller 
contracted to sell.1667 However, a reasonable price is not necessarily the quoted or list price 
neither is it necessarily the actual selling price,1668 nor the market price.1669It has also been 
                                                            
1661  The problems and the policy and jurisprudential considerations relating to the determination of what the 
contractants would have wanted were outlined in chapter 4 para 4.3.4.2. 
1662  Murphy et al Studies in Contract Law 425-426. 
1663  DiMatteo Law of International Contracting 20. The following comment accompanying Section 204 of the 
Restatement (Second) expressly disclaims reliance on the hypothetical approach. 
“Sometimes it is said that the search is for the term the parties would have agreed to if the question had 
been brought to their attention. Both the meaning of the words used and the probability that a particular 
term would have been used if the question had been raised may be factors in determining what term is 
reasonable in the circumstances. But where there is in fact no agreement, the court should supply a term 
which comports with community standards of fairness and policy rather than analyze a hypothetical 
model of the bargaining process.”  
See Murphy et al Studies in Contract Law 425. 
1664  Lawrence Anderson Vol. 2A (2008) 440. 
1665  See para 5.2.2.2(D) below. 
1666  Lawrence Anderson Vol. 2A (2008) 442. 
1667  Lawrence Anderson Vol. 2A (2008) 432-433 & 442. 
1668  In Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Of Elizabethtown, Inc. V Coca-Cola Co., 988 F2d. 386 (3d Cir. 1993), hereafter 
Coca-Cola Bottling988 F2d. 386 (3d Cir. 1993), one of the issues before the court concerned the market 
price of sugar used to calculate the price of the sugar-based Coca-Cola syrup supplied to the bottling 
companies. The Court had to decide whether it related to the (lower) actual selling price as claimed by 
the bottling companies or to the (higher) “quoted” or “’list” price as claimed by Coca-Cola. The formula 
proposed by the Court suggests that a market price is the price made known to users upon inquiry prior 
to sale less any discounts, allowances or rebates which are available to users or which are made known 
upon inquiry prior to sale (paras [52], [66],[138], [140], [141] and [147]). In South African law, market 
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suggested that a reasonable price is one which is “normally going to be cashed out as closely 
related to the market price.”1670 
 
(b) Course of performance, course of dealing and usage of trade 
As a guide to an understanding of the notion of reasonableness, recourse may be had to 
UCC 1-303 [Rev]1671 which provides that the “course of performance,”1672 “course of 
dealing”1673 and “usage of trade”1674 may be used to assist in the interpretation of 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
does not necessarily refer to an organised entity like a municipal produce market. Katzenellenbogen Ltd v 
Mullin 1997 (4) SA 855 (A) 878E-F. It may refer “to any source to which the purchaser might reasonably 
have gone, in the circumstances, in order to replace the goods which ought to have been delivered to 
him.” Desmond Isaacs Agencies (Pty) Ltd v Contemporary Displays 1971 (3) SA 286 (T) 288. Market price 
would, therefore, be the price charged at such a source. See chapter 1 para 1.4.2.2(C)(ii)(b). 
1669  In Perdue v Crocker International Bank, 702 P. 2d 503 – Cal: Supreme Court 1985 919, 927, hereafter 
Perdue 702 P. 2d 503, the Court did not support the defendant’s contention that a price equal to a 
market price cannot be held unconscionable, saying that the courts do not only consider market value 
but also the cost of the goods or services to the seller, the inconvenience imposed on the seller and the 
true value of the product or services. 
1670  Murphy et al Studies in Contract Law 425.  
1671  See specifically UCC 1-303(d)[Rev]. See also UCC 1-201(b)(3) that defines an agreement as “the bargain of 
the parties in fact, as found in their language or inferred from other circumstances, including course of 
performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade as provided in Section 1-303.” The use of course of 
dealing and/or trade usage as touchstones for the determination of a reasonable price are also to be 
found in the other jurisdictions under discussion in this chapter.  
1672  UCC 1-303[Rev](a). This refers to a sequence of conduct between the contractants under the contract in 
question subsequent to its formation. There is no indication as to the number of acts that would be 
required to constitute a course of performance: Lawrence Anderson Vol. 2A (2008) 442; Lawrence 
Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code Vol. 1A (2004), 1008-1009, 1017-1019 and 1055, hereafter 
Lawrence Anderson Vol. 1A (2004). The notion of a course of performance is recognised in South African 
law although not in relation to price. In Comwezi Security Services (Pty) Ltd and Mohammed Shafie 
Mowzer NO v Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd (759/11) [2012] ZASCA 126 (21 September 2012) the Court 
said that where there is a perceived ambiguity in a contract, the subsequent conduct between the 
contractants in implementing the agreement could be taken into account in preferring one interpretation 
to the other (para [15]).  
1673  UCC 1-303(b)[Rev]. This refers to a sequence of previous transactions between the contractants. Here 
also there is no guidance as to the number of transactions that would be required to constitute a course 
of dealing: Lawrence Anderson  Vol. 1A (2004), 1009, 1054-1055 and 1058-1060. 
1674  UCC 1-303(c)[Rev]. This refers to any practice or method of dealing which has been regularly observed in 
a place, vocation, or trade so as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the 
transaction in question. In Frigaliment Importing v BNS International 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), 
hereafter Frigaliment 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), the court said that the usage must be of such a 
long duration and so well established and universal that a “violent” presumption arises that the 
contractants contracted with reference to it and made it part of the agreement. However, it does not 
have to be ancient or certain as required at common law to establish a custom. See also Comment 8 to 
UCC 1-303[Rev]. In terms of UCC 1-303(d)[Rev] the contractants must be engaged in the particular trade 
or vocation or must be aware or should have been aware of such usage of trade: Lawrence Anderson Vol. 
1A (2004) 1009 and 1034. See also DiMatteo Law of International Contracting 20-21.  
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contractual terms.1675 Evidence of these factors would give rise to a presumption of 
reasonableness.1676 In the event of a conflict between the aforementioned three factors or 
between these factors and an express term then the express term would take precedence 
over the three factors. In the absence of an express term a course of performance would 
take precedence over a course of dealing and a usage of trade. A course of dealing, in turn, 
would take precedence over a usage of trade.1677 
 
(c) Seller’s usual selling price, “posted” price, price in effect, formulae 
It has been submitted that the price gap in contracts of sale and service can also “be more 
readily and justly filled by recourse to the ‘market’ for the goods or services,1678 or to the 
parties’ own ‘course of dealing,’1679 or to a multitude of factors called ‘reasonableness.’”1680 
Where reference to the “market” is not possible because the goods may not be frequently 
traded in the marketplace, the reasonable price may be the seller’s usual selling price,1681 a 
‘posted price,’1682 or a written document may incorporate other documents or formula such 
as the cost of production plus a reasonable profit.1683 
                                                            
1675  The case of Frigaliment 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) may be used to illustrate these notions. In issue 
in the case was whether the use of the word “chicken” in a contract referred to young chickens as per 
trade usage as alleged by the plaintiff, or whether it was a generic term referring to all chickens 
regardless of age. The express terms of the contract providing no clue, the court then considered the fact 
a second consignment bearing the same qualities as the first one was sent despite plaintiff’s protests. The 
court also considered that there was no course of previous dealing between the contractants. Lastly, the 
court considered conflicting evidence of trade usage. The court finding no guidance from any of these 
factors gave judgment against the plaintiff because it had not discharged the onus of proving that the 
word “chicken” referred to young chickens only.  
1676  The presumption would be rebutted by proof of unconscionable conduct in the establishment of the 
course of performance, course of dealing or usage of trade: Lawrence Anderson Vol. 1A (2004) 1016. 
1677  UCC 1-303(e)[Rev]. 
1678  The use of a market as a factor for determining a reasonable price has already been dealt with in para 
5.2.2.2(B)(v)(a) above. In respect of service contracts, the position advocated does not appear to differ 
from that in South African law as commented on by Zeffert (1973) 90 SALJ 113. See chapter 4, para 
4.3.4.3(C). 
1679  This appears to be similar to a “course of dealing” under UCC 1-303 (b) [Rev] discussed in sub-para (b) 
above:  Lawrence’s Anderson Vol. 2A (2008) 451. 
1680  Perillo Corbin on Contracts Vol 1 574-575 and 581-583. 
1681  This is similar to the notion of an implied or usual price in South African Law. See chapter 1 para 
1.4.2.2(C)(ii)(a) and (c). 
1682  A posted price is a written statement of (crude oil) prices circulated publicly among sellers and buyers of 
crude oil: North Central Airlines, Inc. v Continental Oil Co., 574 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1978), para [22]. In 
Havird Oil Co., Inc. v Marathon Oil Co., Inc. 149 F.3d 283, 1998-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 72212, 41 Fed. R. Serv. 
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(d) Price at the time and place of delivery, incorporation by reference  
A reasonable price has also been determined with reference to the price at the time1684 and 
place of delivery. The price recorded by a state organ or any official organisation may be 
used as evidence of a reasonable price.1685 The method used in calculating the price in the 
past between the contractants may also serve as an indication that that method is to be 
used in the instant case.1686 
Where a reasonable price cannot be determined because of insufficient evidence, the 
contract fails for indefiniteness.1687 This could probably relate to a sale of rare, unique or 
precious goods. Such and similar goods, because of their rarity and or unique qualities, do 
not attract a usual price or market value and, hence, a contract could be void if it does not 
specify the price or an objective method of computing it.1688 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
3d 86, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 63 (4th Cir. 1998), hereafter Havird Oil 149 F.3d 283, 1998-2, the price of 
petrol was set at the “posted Wholesale Reseller Price”, also known as the “rack price” in the industry, at 
the terminal where delivery is made (para [1]). A “posted price” is similar to a “price in effect.” The 
former is the price in “jobber” contracts (bulk buyers intermediaries who do not sell directly to 
consumers but who distribute to other dealers or to municipalities, police and fire departments etc.) 
whereas the latter is the price charged to franchisees. A posted price is usually less than a price in effect: 
Mathis v Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2002), para [I], hereafter Mathis 302 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2002). 
See also Neugent v Beroth Oil Co., 149 N.C. App. 38, 560 S.E.2d. 829, 47 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 102 (2002), 
para [I], hereafter Neugent 149 N.C. App. 38. Both a posted price and a price in effect are similar in notion 
and effect to a “price list” price that was accepted in Shell SA (Pty) Ltd v Corbitt and Another 1984 4 SA 
523 (CPD) as complying with the requirement of objective ascertainability. See the discussion in chapter 1 
para 1.4.2.2(C)(ii)(d).  
1683  Neugent 149 N.C. App. 38. The contract provided that the sale would be at the “dealer buying price” 
which is a formula price term that allows the supplier to make price adjustments in response to 
commercial dynamics in the market (para [I]). The term referred to the price effective at date of delivery 
in the supplier’s pricing area where the motor fuel sales facility was located (para [III](C)). The court held 
that the agreement was binding and that the pricing structure could not be departed from without the 
consent of the dealer (para [III](D)). See also Perillo Corbin on Contracts Vol 1 543-544 and 580. This is 
similar to the use of a formula in South African law that meets the standard of objective ascertainability. 
See chapter 1 para 1.4.2.2(C)(ii). 
1684  The time of delivery is in terms of UCC 2-305(1). 
1685  In Lamberta v Smiling Jum Potato Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 981 (Dep’t Agric. 1966), which concerned the 
sale of potatoes, the federal-state market news report for the city on the day after delivery was used as 
evidence of such reasonable price: Lawrence Anderson Vol. 2A (2008) 440.  
1686  Lawrence Anderson Vol. 2A (2008) 451. The course of dealing in UCC 1-303(b)[Rev] discussed in sub-para 
(b) above is to the same effect. 
1687  Coca-Cola Bottling 988 F2d. 386 (3d Cir. 1993) para [104]. See also Lawrence Anderson Vol. 2A (2008) 
450.  
1688  This is the position in South African law in relation to rare and precious goods. Note, however, that in the 
Netherlands the possibility of a reasonable price is recognised even in respect of rare or unique items. 
See para 5.2.6.2(B) below.  
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(vi) Unilateral discretionary power to determine price 
By way of introduction, it must be re-iterated that UCC 1-304[Rev] imposes a non-variable 
duty1689 of good faith in the performance and enforcement of contracts.1690 In relation to 
the unilateral determination of a price, UCC 2-305(2) imposes, over and above the duty in 
UCC 1-304[Rev], a duty of good faith where a price is to be fixed by either the buyer or the 
seller.1691 Good faith is a question of fact and means honesty in fact and the observance of 
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.1692 The duty is interpreted as having both 
subjective and objective features1693 in that it requires honesty in fact (subjective honesty) 
and the observance of reasonable standards of fair dealing (objective reasonableness).1694 
The duty requires the courts to interpret contracts within the commercial context in which 
they were created, performed and enforced. Failure to comply with the duty constitutes 
breach of contract.1695 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1689  The duty may not be excluded. However, the contractants may agree on the standards by which good 
faith may be measured subject to the core requirement that the standard(s) agreed upon must not be 
unreasonable: UCC 1-302(b)[Rev]. The duty of good faith in America is the most well-developed of the 
common law jurisdictions. See chapter 2 para 2.8.  
1690  The duty, however, does not extend to pre-contract negotiations. This is unlike the position in Dutch law. 
See para 5.2.6.2(C)(ii) below.  
1691  The duty of good faith does not apply where the contract contains a fixed price: Lawrence Anderson Vol. 
2A (2008) 430. Thus the position resembles the approach in South Africa where price agreed upon is not, 
in the absence of improperly obtained consensus, subject to judicial scrutiny.  
1692  UCC 1-201(b)20 [Rev].  
1693  In Mathis 302 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2002) a group of franchisees challenged, on the grounds of breach of the 
duty of good faith, the price Exxon had set for the sale of gasoline pursuant to a clause expressly granting 
Exxon the power to set the price. The price was found to be objectively reasonable in that it compared 
favourably with the price charged by Exxon’s competitors. On a subjective analysis, however, the Court 
found that Exxon had breached its duty to exercise good faith when setting the price. The Court reasoned 
that Exxon had set the prices so as to force the franchisees out of business to be replaced by Exxon-
owned businesses. In Havird Oil 149 F.3d 283, 1998-2 the Court found that there was compliance with 
the reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in trade in that the price for the petrol was set in the 
“middle of the pack” of all the wholesalers in the area. 
1694  Drahozal ‘Usages and Implied Terms in the United States’ September 2012 12, hereafter Drahozal ‘Usages 
and Implied Terms in the United States’; Knapp et al Problems in Contract Law 442 and 804. 
1695  Comment 1 to UCC 1-304[Rev] in Lawrence Anderson Vol. 1A (2004) 761. See the Milex case discussed in 
a footnote in sub-para (B)(ii) above; Drahozal ‘Usages and Implied Terms in the United States’ 13.  
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(C) Arguments in favour of the open contract provisions of UCC 2-305 
It has been said that the litigation that results from open-term contracts, establishes 
precedents which have social and economic utility.1696 
However, the opposite argument is equally, if not more valid. The standards-based 
approach requires the law to be found in each situation.1697 Such casuistic investigation and 
determination of the law will result in a greater number of decisions being set on a greater 
range of issues. Since the decisions are generally fact-specific (the law must be found in 
each situation) it may have very little precedent value. Hence, the indeterminacy and the 
casuistic nature of the enquiry inherent in the standard of reasonableness renders it 
inarticulate as a mechanism that provides the “overarching account of contractual 
obligation that contract theory requires.”1698 One of the major problems of the standard of 
reasonableness in the context of the discussion at hand, is the difficulty in identifying and 
defending the appropriate standard to be used to distinguish enforceable commitments 
from non-enforceable ones.1699 
The increase in the number, range and diversity of precedents and the reduction in the 
precedent value thereof may contribute to uncertainty of the law. Uncertainty makes it 
more difficult and confusing to navigate the contract law arena which may result in distrust 
of contract law as an obligation-creating mechanism. In effect, the multiplicity of precedents 
that construe the legal standard of a reasonable price might just have the effect of justifying 
the imposition of an immutable rule.1700 Such an eventuality would bring the approach 
based on open-price terms full circle back to a rule-based one based on the requirement of 
                                                            
1696  Choi (2003) 103 Columbia LR 65. 
1697  Llewellyn’s theory was that an “immanent” law is to be found in any situation and that the role of the 
court was to discover this ‘immanent” law. See the discussion in para 5.2.2.2(D)(i)(c) below.  
1698  Murphy et al Studies in Contract Law 29. 
1699  Murphy et al Studies in Contract Law 29; Kennedy (1976) 89 Harvard LR 1690, concludes that case law 
will give rise to rules that are so closely bound to the facts of the particular case as to serve very little or 
no precedential value.” See also the discussion chapter 4 para 4.3. 
1700  Ayres & Gertner ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules’ (1989-1990) 
99 Yale LJ 87, 89 n13, hereafter Ayres & Gertner (1989-1990) 99 Yale LJ 87.   
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objective ascertainability.1701 The rule-based approach has greater precedent value in that it 
reduces to a minimum the occasions for judicial lawmaking. The generality of the rule 
ensures that decisions have far reaching effects, presenting fewer occasions for judges, 
litigants and prospective contractants to be confronted with conflicting lines of 
authority.1702 The overall result is increased certainty of the law and a corresponding 
increase in trust to use contract as an obligation-creating mechanism.1703 The result gives 
effect to the important principles of freedom and certainty of contract.1704 
 
(D) Arguments against the open contract provisions of UCC 2-305 
The rationality of the provisions of UCC 2-305 may be challenged on both jurisprudential 
and policy grounds. The jurisprudential concerns are dealt with first and thereafter the 
policy issues will be considered.  
 
(i) Jurisprudential concerns 
(a) Rationality of UCC 2-204(3) 
The provisions of UCC 2-204(3)1705 may be criticised on the basis that it is impractical to 
determine whether a breach has occurred and what the appropriate remedy is when the 
terms of the contract itself is unclear.1706 In England, Section 8 of the Sale of Goods Act1707 is 
                                                            
1701  See chapter 1 paras 1.1 and 1.2. 
1702  Kennedy (1976) 89 Harvard LR 1690. See further para 5.2.2.2(D)(i)(c) below regarding rules and 
standards. See also chapter 4 para 4.2.4.3. 
1703  Certainty promotes predictability which, it is submitted, facilitates the process of conducting business 
and, hence, is beneficial for economic development.  
1704  Chapter 2 paras 2.2 and 2.6. 
1705  The predication of the existence of a valid contract of sale on the existence of an intention to contract 
coupled with the existence of a remedy. In para 5.2.2.2(B)(i) above, it was explained that the open term 
provisions of UCC 2-305 apply only if the requirements of UCC 2-204(3) have been met. 
1706  In Cobble Hill Nursing Home, In. V Henry & Warren Corp., 548 N.E. 2d 203, 206 (N.Y. 1989), the court said 
that a court cannot determine whether a contract has been breached and what an appropriate remedy 
would be until and unless it has established what the agreement is. In the same vein, the court in Ross-
Simons of Warwick, Inc. v Baccarat, Inc., 182 F.R.D. 386, 395 (D.R.I. 1998) declared that certainty is an 
“important characteristic” of a contract because a court can  enforce an agreement only if it can specify 
the obligations undertaken by the parties. In Bethlehem 468 A.2d 748 at 757-758 (Pa. Supr. Ct. 1983) the 
court based its finding of an absence of an intention to contract on the existence of the very gap it was 
asked to fill, namely, the furnishing of a price escalation clause. The court said “the absence of the terms 
necessary to calculate the price to be allowed for inflation and to apportion that escalation over time,” 
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similarly criticized for presupposing that the contractants had concluded a valid contract 
and then suggesting methods by which the price may be ascertained. It is pointed out that 
the first point to be considered in an action on sale is to find out whether a contract was 
concluded and the absence of an agreement on the price may provide good evidence that 
the parties had not yet reached a concluded contract.1708 The UCC approach is similarly 
counterintuitive and does not promote certainty.1709 
Furthermore, UCC 2-204(3)’s other touchstone, namely, that of intention, raises evidentiary 
issues concerning the determination of contractual intent. There are several approaches to 
determining intention including examining the four corners of the document, or looking at 
the conduct and language of the contractants or examining the surrounding circumstances. 
The issue of which method to use is further complicated by rules of interpretation such as 
the parole evidence rule and the caveat subscriptor rule. To what extent should reliance be 
placed on, not only, what the contractants wrote or said, but also, on what they did not 
write or say? A court, in determining contractual intent, is required to choose amongst at 
least three interpretive strategies.1710 Camero describes the jurisprudence as demonstrative 
of the “chaos” in determining intent.1711 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
pointed to the absence of an intention to contract. Similar criticism is levelled at Section 8(2) of the 
English Sale of Goods Act 1979. See para 5.2.2.2(D)(i)(a) below.  
1707  The touchstone in England is the existence of an intention to buy and sell. See para 5.2.3.2(A) of this 
chapter below. 
1708  Atiyah, Adams and MacQueen The Sale of Goods (2005) 30. UCC 2-305 is similarly criticised by the New 
Formalists. See para 5.2.2.2(D)(i)(c) below.  
1709  The requirement of certainty in contract creation ensures, inter alia, that the judiciary has sufficient 
information to determine that a contract has or has not been concluded and that the terms of the 
contract are sufficient to determine that a breach of contract has occurred and whether an appropriate 
remedy exists: Van der Merwe, van Huyssteen, Reinecke and Lubbe Contract: General Principles (2012) 
192 et seq, hereafter Van der Merwe et al Contract; Hutchison, Pretorius, Du Plessis, Eiselen, Floyd, 
Hawthorne, Kuschke, Maxwell, Naudé and De Stadler The Law of Contract in South Africa (2012) 210-216, 
hereafter Hutchison et al Contract.. 
1710  Scott ‘The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract’ (2000) 94 Northwestern University LR 847, 849. 
1711  Camero ‘Level Up: Employing the Commerce Clause to Federalize the Sale of Goods’ 1, 13 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2027482>. Accepted for publication. Publication 
details as follows: Jennifer Camero, Level Up: Employing the Commerce Clause to Federalize the Sale of 
Goods, 50 San Diego Law Review (2013), hereafter Camero ‘Level Up.’ See also Hunter Taylor ‘Uniformity 
of Commercial Law and State-by-State Enactment: A Confluence of Contradictions’ (1978-1979) 30 
Hastings LJ 337, 346-348. The generality of Camero’s conclusion aside, it does provide support for the 
conclusions drawn in chapter 4 para 4.3 regarding the problems of determining contractual intent in 
relation to price.  
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Thus, the reliance on contractual intention, at the expense of the essentiale of price, for the 
determination of contractual validity is a problem that may result in uncertainty.1712 The 
uncertainty does not promote legal and commercial efficiency in that contractants may have 
difficulty in planning and in allocating risks and they could be presented with outcomes that 
they had neither anticipated nor contemplated. 
 
(b) Date of determination of the reasonable price 
The rule that the reasonable price must be determined at date of delivery is also to be 
found in English1713 and German law.1714 In the Netherlands,1715 the CISG1716 and the 
UNIDROIT Principles (2004)1717 the applicable date is the date of contract. 
Pre-determining a date for computation of a reasonable price is problematic because the 
date makes a huge difference in that market conditions or circumstances, generally, may 
have undergone a radical change from one date to the other.1718 There appears to be no 
reason to justify a general presumption that contractants would have preferred either one 
of the two dates in the ordinary course. In general, a buyer who wishes to escape the risk of 
price fluctuations would want to place the risk on the seller by opting to contract for the 
price at date of contract. The converse is equally true: a seller who wishes to allocate the 
risk of price fluctuations to the buyer, would, in general, contract for a cost-based price 
calculated at date of delivery.1719 
                                                            
1712  The possibility of different outcomes regarding the issue of contractual validity may be illustrated with 
reference to the English case of May & Butcher v The King [1934] 2 KB 17, also discussed in para 
5.2.3.2(A) below. The price, inter alia, was to be determined from time to time by the buyer and the 
seller as the quantities of the stock became available. The court found that the clause revealed an 
intention not to be bound until and unless agreement on the price had been reached. The court a quo 
had found that the contractants had meant to be bound: Beale et al Ius Commune Casebooks for the 
Common Law of Europe Cases, Materials and Text on Contract Law (2010) 322, hereafter Beale et al Ius 
Commune Casebooks.  
1713  See para 5.2.3.2(B)(iii) below.  
1714  See para 5.2.5.3(C) below. 
1715  See para 5.2.6.1 below. 
1716  See para 5.2.7.2(B) below. 
1717  See para 5.2.7.3(B) below. 
1718  This could be due to, for example, war, natural disasters, need or even artificial manipulation by one of 
the contractants: Bridge Benjamin’s Sale para [13-079], hereafter Bridge Benjamin’s Sale.  
1719  Ayres & Gertner (1989-1990) 99 Yale LJ 96 n44. 
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Neither of the two approaches1720 accords with the generally accepted view that default 
clauses such as the open price terms under discussion, should, in order to reflect some 
vestige of the consensual aspects of contract law, reflect the position that the contractants 
would have contracted for had they expressly agreed on the issue at hand.1721 
 
(c) Rules versus standards 
The jurisprudential basis for determining price terms with reference to standards rather 
than rules is subject to criticism and, hence it is necessary to examine the debate. 
The introduction of the open term provisions in the UCC was justified on the basis that the 
law exists in “patterns of conduct and relationships and, when discovered, provides a more 
reliable source of certainty than does the rigid, external system of classical contract law.”1722 
In this context, it is worth noting that the UCC was inspired by the Legal Realist Movement 
of which Llewellyn was one of the main proponents.1723 
The Realists advocated a move to a system of “standardized, flexible, group related and 
‘reasonable’ contracts.”1724 Hence, the UCC’s “open texturedness and focus on flexible rules 
which were dependent on fact-specific determinations.”1725 Llewellyn argued that “an 
immanent law” was to be found in any situation and that the role of the ‘law authority’” was 
to discover this ‘immanent law.’”1726 Thus, he believed that legal rules must relate to the 
facts “and must fit the realities of the transactions they govern.”1727 Llewellyn’s focus on 
                                                            
1720  The price determined at date of contract or at date of delivery. 
1721  Ayres & Gertner (1989-1990) 99 Yale LJ 96. 
1722  Speidel  (1981-82) 67 Cornell LR 791.  
1723  Van Zelst The Politics of European Sales Law 40; Wiseman ‘The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the 
Merchant Rules’ (1986-1987) 100(2) Harvard LR 465, hereafter Wiseman (1986-1987) 100(2) Harvard LR 
Wiseman provides an insightful analysis of Llewellyn’s contribution to the creation of the UCC (465 et 
seq). The Realists believed that the chaos that resulted from the depression in the 1930s could be 
managed only by replacing the traditional views of ordering the market with a realistic approach based 
on the facts of everyday life. The final UCC product is reflective of the regulatory ideals of the New Deal 
era of politics and is a consequence of the political reality of the 1940s and early 1950s: Van Zelst The 
Politics of European Sales Law 40-42; Danzig ‘A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform 
Commercial Code’ (1974-1975) 27 Stanford LR 621, hereafter Danzig (1974-1975) 27 Stanford LR 621.   
1724  Van Zelst The Politics of European Sales Law 41. 
1725  Van Zelst The Politics of European Sales Law 41. 
1726  Van Zelst The Politics of European Sales Law 41. 
1727  Wiseman (1986-1987) 100(2) Harvard LR 470. 
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mercantile commercial transactions invited the criticism that it “resulted in less protection 
to consumers than they needed.”1728 
The UCC approach which is based on the notion that the law exists in “patterns of conduct 
and relationships and, when discovered, provides a more reliable source of certainty than 
does the rigid, external system of classical contract law,” prompted the declaration that “[a] 
more complete triumph of standards over rules is hard to imagine.”1729 
However “[t]he problem with standards is that they may lead the court to water without 
explaining how to drink.”1730 Standards such as reasonableness are difficult concepts to 
define and lead to “dramatically” different opinions on the same provision.1731 The method 
is criticised for promoting decision-making according to the facts of a particular situation 
and not according to the logic of a statute or a juristic concept.1732 It requires consideration 
of the commercial context “without clarifying how the diverse data were to be assembled 
and used.”1733 This has prompted the “new formalists” to argue that the gap-filling role of 
the courts in open term contracts is fraught with difficulty because they must consider “all 
of the relational and contextual factors” in order to arrive at the correct result. Courts are 
faced with almost insurmountable difficulties “when filling in the gaps on the basis of 
‘information that is either unobservable to one or both of the parties or unverifiable to the 
                                                            
1728  Wiseman (1986-1987) 100(2) Harvard LR 519. Camero comments that the UCC seems to be preferred by 
the business community because the Commissioners who drafted the code “always favor the needs of 
business over that of the consumer:” Camero  ‘Level Up’ 10. Drahozal ‘Usages and Implied Terms in the 
United States’ 1-5. 
1729  Speidel  (1981-82) 67 Cornell LR 791.  
1730  Speidel  (1981-82) 67 Cornell LR 791.  
1731  Camero  ‘Level Up’ 13. See also the discussion in chapter 4 paras 4.3 and 4.3.4.3(A).  
1732  Danzig (1974-1975) 27 Stanford LR 621-632. See also the discussion in chapter 4 para 4.2.4.3 regarding 
rules and standards viewed in a constitutional context. 
1733  Speidel (1982) 67 Cornell LR 792. Reference is made to the notion of commercial reasonableness 
throughout the UCC without the notion being defined. The definition by the courts, namely, that it 
includes commonly accepted commercial practices of responsible businesses which afford all parties fair 
treatment does not take the matter further: Drahozal ‘Usages and Implied Terms in the United States’ 11-
12. See also the discussion in chapter 4 para 4.2.4.3 above regarding rules and standards as well as the 
discussion in para 4.3.4.2 regarding the elusiveness of securing a definition of the standard of 
reasonableness in relation to price and rental.  
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courts.’”1734 Hence, the “new formalists” argue for a diminished role for the courts in gap-
filling. 
Whilst UCC 1-303[Rev]1735 provides some tools for giving content to the notion of 
reasonableness, it does so within a commercial context, effectively rejecting lay-
interpretations and dictionary meanings thereof.1736 The conclusion is reinforced by UCC 1-
201(b)(20)[Rev] that defines good faith with reference to the observance of “reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing.”1737 In addition, trade usages normally arise in smaller 
communities such as professional groups, trade unions and business associations.1738 The 
problem is that usages of trade often involve esoteric knowledge which is seldom known 
outside of the particular community.1739 The highly complex, technical and specialised 
nature of the evidence to prove such a trade usage coupled with the reality that a court is 
often faced with a bank of expert witnesses for both sides adds to the difficulty of proving or 
disproving a standard of reasonableness1740 especially in relation to a highly subjective 
issue1741 such as price and rental which go to the essence of the contract.1742 
 
(d) Conclusion 
It is submitted that the fact that the standard of reasonableness is not necessarily 
concretrised with reference to objective considerations introduces an element of 
                                                            
1734  Choi (2003) 103 Columbia LR 63. See also the discussion in chapter 4 para 4.3. 
1735  Discussed in para 5.2.2.2B(v)(b) above. 
1736  Lawrence Anderson Vol. 1A (2004) 1015. 
1737  Emphasis added. 
1738  DiMatteo Law of International Contracting 21 n29. It is submitted, it is easier for customs and usages to 
arise and to be recognised in such smaller communities as opposed to larger communities characterised 
mobility and by a diversity of transactions and participants. 
1739  DiMatteo Law of International Contracting 24. 
1740  DiMatteo Law of International Contracting 25. In Folk v Central Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 567 N.E. 2d 1(ILL. 
App. 1990) the Court, in deciding on the quality of asphalt work at a race-track, was faced with a raft of 
witnesses on both sides (4-7). These included a consulting engineer, a specialist in asphalt installation, 
race car drivers, a professional engineer, officials of the national racers association and an engineer 
testing company. Though the case did not concern the standard of reasonableness, the range of expert 
witnesses, the technical issues and the complexity thereof offer a glimpse of the challenges that may be 
faced in determining what is reasonable in a particular factual scenario. See further para 5.2.2.2(D)(i)(b) 
above in regard to trade usages.    
1741  See chapter 4 para 4.3.4.2(C). 
1742  See chapter 4 para 4.3.3.3(D). 
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uncertainty1743 that is exacerbated by the unquantifiable number of variables that may 
impact the standard as well as by the infinite number of possibilities that could arise from a 
consideration of these variables.1744 It is suggested that the uncertain paradigm of the 
notion of reasonableness in the context of the essence of the contract of sale and lease, 
namely, price and rental determination, does not  promote the accepted view that freedom 
of contract is not an end in itself but that it is a vehicle for self-determination.1745 
 
(ii) Public policy concerns 
(a) Gap-filling function of UCC 2-305 
The presumption underlying the UCC 2-305 provisions is that if the gap fillers are 
reasonable, then the contractants would have consented to them.1746 Aside from the fact 
that the presumption is not supported by the majoritarian approach favoured by the 
courts,1747 the UCC does not indicate what factors should play a role in determining a 
reasonable price.1748 Case law also suggests that the success in the determination of a 
reasonable price is not always guaranteed.1749 
The justification for gap-filling, namely the reasoning that contractants act in concert with 
market forces,1750 presupposes the existence of a market and that the market has some 
semblance of organisation. In doing so, the UCC appears to ignore the interests of ordinary 
contractants as opposed to the business community.1751 This view of contract law, intent as 
it is on serving the interests of the markets, transforms contract law into a “body of devices” 
                                                            
1743  See also para 5.2.2.2(D)(ii) below and chapter 4 para 4.2.4.3. 
1744  See chapter 4 para 4.3.4.2. 
1745  Zimmermann The New German Law of Obligations: Historical and Comparative Perspectives (2005) 205, 
hereafter Zimmermann The New German Law of Obligations. The discussion of the Consumer Protection 
Act (CPA) in chapter 3 above serves to illustrate that the CPA does not so much limit freedom of contract 
as to give expression to the principle of self-determination of contractual content. In doing so, it has 
incorporated the constitutional values of dignity, equality and freedom into the law of contract.    
1746  Choi (2003) 103 Columbia LR 64. 
1747  See para 5.2.2.2(B)(iv) above.  
1748  Lawrence Anderson Vol. 2A (2008) 440. 
1749  Murphy et al Studies in Contract Law 422. 
1750  See para 5.2.2.2(B)(iii) above. 
1751  Knapp et al Problems in Contract Law 6. 
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serving the business community and their interests “instead of as a body of means geared 
towards obtaining general social ends.”1752 
 
(b) Reliance on market price 
Whilst market price is useful as an indicator, it is submitted that the approximation of a 
reasonable price to that of a market price (“closely related”)1753 muddies rather than 
clarifies the standard of reasonableness. It may give rise to conflicting interpretations as to 
the extent to which a price must track the market price in order for it to meet the 
requirement of reasonableness. Phrased differently, how close to the market price must the 
judicially determined price be in order for it to satisfy the requirement of reasonableness? 
Other questions that may arise concern the considerations to be used to determine whether 
the price is to be one set at above or below the market value? Is the determination to be 
made from the perspective of the buyer who, it can be assumed, would expect the price to 
be set below the market value or from the perspective of the seller in which event he/she 
would expect a price higher than the market value? What considerations determine what 
should be the maximum allowable margin above or below the market value? Lastly, why 
must the reasonable price be one that tracks the market value - why can it just not be the 
market price? As concluded in chapter 4 above, configurations such as these do not 
contribute to the notion of certainty.1754 
Furthermore, the notion of a market price which is supposed to give content to the notion 
of a reasonable price is itself not subject to definition. It may or may not be a quoted price, 
                                                            
1752  Pound ‘The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence’ (1931) 44 Harvard LR 697, 708, hereafter Pound (1931) 44 
Harvard LR 697, in an essay critical of the then emerging New Realist movement. A development that 
serves principally the interests of the markets would, in South Africa, run counter to the constitutional 
imperative to effect socio-economic reforms for the creation of a just and egalitarian society based on 
the values of dignity, equality and freedom. The implementation of this imperative has already been 
commenced in South Africa. See for example the consumer protection legislation discussed in chapter 3. 
It is also evident in other public interest legislation as well as in Constitutional Court decisions discussed 
at various points throughout the thesis. See for example, the reference to some of these in chapter 4 
paras 4.2.4.2(A) and 4.5.      
1753  See para 5.2.2.2(B)(v)(a) above. 
1754  Para 4.3. 
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or a list price or the actual selling price.1755 The uncertainty inherent in the tentativeness of 
the definition is unsatisfactory from a policy perspective in that it does not provide guidance 
to the market or to individuals for planning purposes. 
 
(c) Reliance on course of performance, prior dealings and trade usages 
Though the rationale for the open term provisions are to attain uniformity in trade and to 
facilitate commercial transactions, it appears that some sectors of the commercial world 
have developed their own system in which the UCC provisions do not play a dominant 
role.1756 In an empirical study, it was found that the concepts of “usages of trade” and 
“commercial standards” as used in the UCC may not exist,1757 or may be far more general in 
scope and conditional in form than is commonly assumed.1758 
In respect of commercial transactions, the fact that most traders use trade terms (that 
operate across borders) drafted by their trade organisations calls into question the need 
                                                            
1755  See para 5.2.2.2(B)(v)(a) above. 
1756  The National Grain and Feed Association (NGFA) is an organisation that also serves to resolve contract 
disputes amongst its members. In doing so, the arbitrators follow a hierarchy of authority that first 
considers the terms of contract. If these are insufficient, reliance is placed on the NGFA Trade Rules and 
thereafter on trade practice. The UCC is considered only if the first three sources are insufficient. This 
happens very rarely in practice. The duty of good faith also does not play a major role in deliberations of 
the NGFA: Bernstein ‘Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Codes Search for Imminent 
Business Norms’ (1995-1996) 144 U. of Penn. LR 1765, 1776-1777, hereafter Bernstein (1995-1996) 144 
U. of Penn. LR 1765. One of the reasons for the NGFA approach is the transaction costs, including time, 
money, expertise, effort and delays, of litigation: Bernstein 1790. Another reason is the higher risk of 
adjudicative error brought about when courts resort to extralegal provisions by going outside of the 
contract: Bernstein 1795. This supports the argument made in chapter 4 para 4.3.4.2(C)(i) that the court’s 
perception of the reasonable person may lead to the imposition of a price that was neither anticipated or 
contemplated at date of contract. Bernstein ‘Usage in Courts: The Flawed Evidentiary Basis of Article 2’s 
Incorporation Strategy’ (21 Dec, 2011) (draft paper) 1, 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1882596> observes that “[m]any merchant 
industries that have opted out of the legal system and the Code and that have replaced it with privately 
run legal systems, have rejected incorporation [of gap-filling] in favour of a relatively plain meaning 
textualist approach to interpretation” (35-36).  
1757  Not even in relatively close-knit merchant communities. 
1758  Bernstein‘The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy...’Chicago University 
Working Paper No 74 (2d Series) 1, 8 <http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Publications/Working/index.html> . 
The difficulty experienced by trade associations to codify their own usages and practices is indicative of 
the difficulty of proving commercial trade usages and practices. See chapter 4 para 4.3.4.2(D) for a 
discussion of the difficulty experienced by the National Hay Association in defining a reasonable time in 
relation to payment.   
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and value of uniform codes1759 founded on open term provisions.1760 The preference for 
arbitration for commercial dispute resolution further dilutes the rationale for open term 
provisions.1761 
Decisions to the effect that a reasonable price may or may not be a market price1762 do not 
engender certainty about the meaning and application of the notion of market price as a 
determinant of reasonableness. Contractants who agree to a reasonable price or who leave 
the price term open on the assumption that a market price constitutes a reasonable price 
would be in for a rude surprise because the notion of a market price being reasonable is in 
itself open to scrutiny on a host of factors such as the cost of the goods or services to the 
seller, the inconvenience imposed on the seller and the true value of the product or 
services.1763 
In addition, the reliance on course of performance, prior dealings and trade usages as 
interpretative tools or as gap-fillers has the potential of transforming informal business 
practices into legally enforceable contractual terms.1764 This may cause contractants to stick 
                                                            
1759  This would include the open term provisions of the other jurisdictions under discussion.   
1760  Ortiz & Viscasillas ‘The scope of the Common European Sales Law: B2B, goods, digital content and 
services’ (2012) 11(3) Journal of International Trade Law and Policy 241, hereafter Ortiz & Viscasillas 
(2012) 11(3) Journal of International Trade Law and Policy 241.  
1761  Ortiz & Viscasillas (2012) 11(3) Journal of International Trade Law and Policy 242. Arbitrators drawn from 
the trade or industry would make use of the trade terms recognised in the trade or industry. 
1762  In Au Rustproofing Center, Inc. V Gulf Oil Corp., 755 F.2D 1231 (6TH Cir. 1985), hereafter Au Rustproofing 
Center 755 F.2D 1231 (6TH Cir. 1985) the Appellant’s contention that the Respondent’s prices for gasoline 
were unreasonable because Appellant’s competitors sold gasoline for less than what it buy could from 
the Respondent, was rejected as being “insufficient to establish that prices set by Gulf contravened 
reasonable commercial standards in the gasoline market or otherwise constituted bad faith or 
commercially unreasonable behaviour” (para [23]). See also TCP Industries, Inc. v Uniroyal, Inc. 661 F2. 
542, 9 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 742, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 369 (6th Cir. 1981), hereafter TCP Industries 661 F2. 
542, 9 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 742 where the court used the example of a prior course of dealing price which is 
higher or lower than market price. Such higher or lower price, according to the court, could be found to 
be a reasonable price. See also Perdue 702 P. 2d 503, 927, discussed in a footnote in para 5.2.2.2(B)(v)(b). 
1763  See Perdue 702 P. 2d 503 discussed in a footnote in para 5.2.2.2(B)(v)(a) above. 
1764  Bernstein (1995-1996) 144 U. of Penn. LR 1796-1797. For example, a contractant who has accepted late 
delivery or late payment in an ongoing contract may find that the indulgences become recognised as a 
course of performance having the effect of preventing the contractant from putting an end to late 
delivery or late payment in the future. 
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to the letter of the contract and constrain them from making temporary accommodations 
that would benefit the other contractant(s).1765 
 
(d) Reliance on a “multitude of factors called reasonableness” 
The statement that gap-filling in relation to price can be achieved with reference to a 
“multitude of factors called reasonableness”1766 is devoid of any meaning and content and 
hence, provides no guidance for prudent planning.1767 It compromises certainty especially 
when viewed through the prism of the concerns regarding the difficulty of defining 
reasonableness in relation to price.1768 The approach leaves the door open for judicial 
contract-creation and the imposition of a contractual obligation which may not have been 
anticipated or contemplated by either, or both, of the contractants at date of conclusion of 
the contract.1769 
 
(e) “Trapping” of contractants 
Gap-filling also runs counter to public policy that resists the “trapping” of contractants by 
unintended contractual duties and ones that they had no intention of being bound by.1770 It 
also detracts from the principle of, not only, freedom of contract, but also, freedom FROM 
contract. Open term provisions based on standards such a reasonableness that allow courts 
to impose terms into contracts that contractants may not have contemplated or anticipated 
may discourage contractants from experimenting with new forms of agreements because of 
the uncertainty that results from the possibility that courts may impose terms that were 
                                                            
1765  The latter scenario would run counter to the spirit of the law evident in the debt restructuring provisions 
of the National Credit Act1765 designed to ease the burden of over-indebtedness. See chapter 3 para 
3.7.2.1. 
1766  Perillo Corbin on Contracts Vol 1 574-575 and 581-583. 
1767  In the absence of a qualifying attribute as to the nature of the factors, for example, a reference to 
objective factors, contractants who rely on the open price provision have to wait to see which side the 
dice will fall on. 
1768  See chapter 4 para 4.3. 
1769  See chapter 4 for the implications of this for contractual autonomy, consensus, certainty and the public 
policy objectives and constitutional imperative. See also the contents of this para. (5.2.2.2(D)). 
1770  Choi (2003) 103 Columbia LR 62-63. See also chapter 4 paras 4.3.4.2(C) and 4.4 in this regard. 
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neither contemplated not anticipated.1771 Thus, it may diminish the value of three cardinal 
principles of contract law, namely, (i) the liberty to contract, (ii) the consensual principle, 
and (iii) certainty. It is submitted that such consequences must be avoided when it concerns 
fundamental issues such as price and rental determination that go to the root of the 
contract.1772 The principle of certainty, evident in all branches of the law,1773 ensures that 
contractants are not bound by unintended or unanticipated contractual obligations. 
 
(f) Reasonable price not capable of determination 
It may happen that the contract is rendered invalid because of the evidentiary issues 
relating to the determination of contractual intention or simply because the court is unable 
to determine a reasonable price.1774 Such a result could have serious consequences for one 
or both of the contractants who relied on the provisions of UCC 2-305 to come to their 
assistance.1775 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1771  Choi (2003) 103 Columbia LR 62-63. 
1772  See further the discussion in chapter and in particular in para 4.3.4.3(D). 
1773  It is worth repeating the Constitutional Court’s caveat that “[a] person should be able to know the law, 
and be able to conform his or her conduct to the law”: President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Another v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC), para [102]. Uncertainty about consequences may generate disputes 
that might otherwise have been avoided and it may also discourage “beneficial reliance”: Barnett 
‘Contract is Not a Promise; Contract is Consent’ 1, 13 
<http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/615>. The eventual result could be an erosion of the law 
as an institution for the creation of a just, egalitarian society based on the values of dignity, equality and 
freedom: such a result being against the constitutional imperative in South Africa. See further chapter 4 
and in particular para 4.2.2. 
1774  This result could prevail despite a finding of an intention to contract and a reasonably certain basis for 
granting an appropriate remedy as required by UCC 2-304(3): Coca-Cola Bottling 988 F2d. 386 (3d Cir. 
1993) para [104]. See also Lawrence Anderson Vol. 2A (2008) 450; Murphy et al Studies in Contract Law 
42; Perillo Corbin on Contracts  Vol. 1 577. 
1775  The price may have been left open because one or both of the contractants may, at date of contract, 
have felt that they lacked the necessary foresight to determine the price. The price could also have been 
left open due to incomplete bargaining or excessive initial optimism about performance of contract. The 
contractants, may, in all three instances, have relied on the provisions of UCC 2-305 to fill in the gap. 
Knapp et al Problems in Contract Law 359. 
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(g) Approaches to the application of UCC 2-305 
The conflicting approaches to the application of UCC 2-3051776 provide further grist to the 
mill of the argument against the standard of reasonableness as a determinant of the 
essentialia of price and rental. The choice between a hypothetical versus majoritarian 
approach, underscores Kerr’s warning regarding the importance of having a clear vision 
about the nature and content of the test to be applied in determining the existence of a 
tacit term.1777 
On the majoritarian approach, the price is implied by the “fabrication of the objective 
reasonable person.”1778 The notion of objective reasonableness is beset with problems of 
definition and application.1779 In addition, the preference for the majoritarian approach in 
the context of price would result in the courts legislating contractual terms that go to the 
essence of the contract.1780 The courts would be imposing terms that may not have been 
anticipated or contemplated by the contractants, resulting in the courts playing a contract-
creating role, a result that Lücke warned against.1781 Aside from implications for the 
principle of certainty, the result would be a devaluation of the notion of contractual 
autonomy by denying contractants input in determining the essence of their contractual 
relations. Such a consequence would, not only, negate the policy gains made by consumer 
protection legislation aimed at empowering contractants to play a more proactive and 
informed role in the formulation of their contractual obligations,1782 but also, serve to strip 
them of their contractual dignity.1783 
 
 
 
                                                            
1776  The hypothetical and majoritarian approaches. See para 5.2.2.2(B)(iv) above. 
1777  See chapter 4 para 4.3.4.2(C)(viii). 
1778  DiMatteo Law of International Contracting 20. See also chapter 4 para 4.2.4.2(C)(i). 
1779  See chapter 4 para 4.3.4.2. 
1780  Price and rental as the essence of a contract of sale are discussed in para 4.3.3.3(D). 
1781  See chapter 4 paras 4.3.4.2(C)(viii), 4.3.4.3 and 4.4. 
1782  See chapter 3. See also Zimmermann The New German Law of Obligations 205. 
1783  See chapter 4 para 4.3.4.3(C). 
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(h) The duty of good faith 
Though the general understanding is that good faith serves to exclude any surprises1784 and 
to give effect to the intention of the contractants, or to honour their reasonable 
expectations, the possibility of an unfettered discretion has received judicial recognition by 
a Chief Justice, albeit in a minority judgment.1785 The decision, if it gains traction, would not 
only render the duty redundant, but would also devalue the requirement of consensus. 
In complying with the good faith requirement, the empowered contractant is only required 
to set a price that is reasonable pursuant to reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing 
in the trade.1786 Thus, a reasonable price does not necessarily mean that the price must be a 
market price or a competitive price.1787 It is submitted that this proposition affirms the 
conclusion1788 that the introduction of the standard of reasonableness in the determination 
of the price would introduce uncertainty and should not receive recognition as a matter of 
law, policy and economics.  
                                                            
1784  Lawrence Anderson Vol. 2A (2008) 445. 
1785  In Amoco Oil Co. V Ervin, 908 P.2d 493 (Colo. 1996), hereafter Amoco 908 P.2d 493 (Colo. 1996), a lease 
agreement empowered Amoco to modify the rental paid by its franchisees subject to a duty to give 
adequate notice. Amoco was found to have breached the duty of good faith by double-charging for an 
asset when it modified the rental. In a dissenting judgment, the Chief Justice held that it is possible to 
draft an agreement granting an unfettered discretion. According to the Chief justice, this was the position 
in the instant case where the only duty on Amoco was to give adequate notice of the revised rental. The 
judge reasoned that to hold otherwise would be to allow the franchisees to “use the jury as a tool to 
renegotiate the lease agreement after their legal formation.” The franchisees had the option of accepting 
or rejecting the initial lease agreement containing the rental modification clause. In accepting the initial 
agreement, they had consented to Amoco’s absolute discretion.  
1786  UCC 1-201(b)(20)[Rev]; TCP Industries 661 F2. 542, 9 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 742. 
1787  In Au Rustproofing Center755 F.2D 1231 (6TH Cir. 1985), discussed an earlier footnote in para 
5.2.2.2(D)(ii)(d), the Appellant’s contention that the Respondent’s prices for gasoline were unreasonable 
because Appellant’s competitors sold gasoline for less than what it buy could from the Respondent, was 
rejected as being “insufficient to establish that prices set by Gulf contravened reasonable commercial 
standards in the gasoline market or otherwise constituted bad faith or commercially unreasonable 
behaviour” (para [23]). See also TCP Industries 661 F2. 542, 9 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 742 where the court used 
the example of a prior course of dealing price which is higher or lower than market price. Such higher or 
lower price, according to the court, could be found to be a reasonable price. See also Harvey v Fearless 
Farris Wholesale, Inc. 589 F.2d 451 (1979) 461 to similar effect. 
1788  See chapter 4, and, in particular, para  4.3.4.3(E). 
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As a norm, factors such as a “‘posted price’ or a future seller’s or buyer’s ‘given price,’ ‘price 
in effect,’ ‘market price,’ or the like satisfies the good faith requirement.”1789 The apparent 
purpose of this provision is to relieve suppliers in industries where such price terms are used 
from the burden of proving the price charged to be a reasonable one.1790 In regard to these 
considerations, it is important to note that the presumption of reasonableness that arises 
places the burden of rebuttal on the buyer who may not be able to carry the transaction 
costs thereof.1791 Proving subjective dishonesty may also be extremely challenging from an 
evidentiary perspective.  The evidentiary problems of proving non-compliance with the duty 
are compounded by the fact that the full potential of the duty has not been realized due to 
the “spirited” disagreement about the meaning and application of the duty1792 coupled with 
a tendency by the courts to resist making a finding of bad faith.1793 
 
(E) Observations  
In essence, the discussion of the meanings given to a reasonable price1794 leads to the 
following observations: 
(i) The approaches as to what constitutes a reasonable price are not free of 
difficulties.1795 
(ii) The meanings ascribed to a reasonable price do not provide useful criteria that 
could facilitate planning or that assist in resolving the problems of the 
indeterminateness of the standard of reasonableness in relation to price.1796 
                                                            
1789  Comment 3 to UCC 2-305 in Lawrence Anderson Vol. 2A (2008) 422; Perillo Corbin on Contracts Vol 1 580. 
See also Mathis 302 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2002), for a discussion of the legislative history of UCC 2-305 and 
Comment 3 (para [III]). 
1790  Neugent 149 N.C. App. 38 para [III](D).However, absence of honesty in fact (subjective good faith) takes 
such prices outside of the norm, resulting in non-compliance with the good faith requirement of UCC 2-
305(2): Mathis 302 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2002), at para [III], discussed in a footnote in para 5.2.2.2(B)(vi) 
above. 
1791  For example, time and resources. The issue relating to transaction costs was discussed in chapters 3 and 4 
above. 
1792  Furmston & Tolhurst Contract Formation: Law and Practice (2010) para [11.70]. 
1793  Murphy et al Studies in Contract Law 668. 
1794  In paras 5.2.2.2(B)(iv)-(vi) above. 
1795  The majoritarian approach and the hypothetical contracting standard discussed in paras 5.2.2.2(B)(iv) and 
5.2.2.2(D)(ii)(g) above. See also chapter 4 para 4.3.4. 
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(iii) In some instances, the notion of a reasonable price is sought to be determined 
with reference to an objective criterion that is, in itself, certain. 
In respect of the third observation, it is self-evident that the examples of a reasonable price, 
if transplanted into the South African context, could be accommodated under requirement 
that the price must be objectively ascertainable without further reference to the 
contractants.1797 Other interpretations of a reasonable price do no more than subsume 
under the generic term of reasonableness those rubrics which the South African common 
law has used as mechanisms for determining whether the price is objectively 
ascertainable.1798 The conclusion is that the South African requirement of objective 
ascertainability is fluid enough to meet the needs of modern commercial enterprise whilst 
at the same time adhering, not only, to the principle of certainty, but also, the consensual 
imperative of contract law and, in doing so, sustaining the constitutional values of the 
dignity, equality and freedom.1799 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
1796  The meanings confirm that the standard lends itself to interpretation which does not contribute to 
certainty. See for example, the decision in Au Rustproofing Center755 F.2D 1231 (6TH Cir. 1985) (discussed 
in a footnote in para 5.2.2.2(D)(ii)(c) above) where the Court concluded that a reasonable price is not 
necessarily one that is market related or even competitive. See further para 5.2.2.2(D)(ii)(b)-(h). Regard 
must also be had for the fact that the use of the majoritarian approach may lead to the imposition of a 
price (para 5.2.2.2(D) above) that is the result of the court’s formulation of the objective reasonable 
person (chapter 4 para 4.3.4.2(C)). See also chapter 4 para 4.3 for a discussion of the uncertainty created 
by the standard of reasonableness. 
1797  For example, the “course of performance” or “usage of trade” may be accommodated under the rubric of 
an implied price. The notion of a course of performance is known in South African law although not in 
relation to price. As indicated earlier, the Court in Comwezi Security Services (Pty) Ltd and Mohammed 
Shafie Mowzer NO v Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd (759/11) [2012] ZASCA 126 (21 September 2012) said 
that where there is a perceived ambiguity in a contract, the subsequent conduct between the 
contractants in implementing the agreement could be taken into account in preferring one interpretation 
to the other (para [15]). 
1798  For example, the seller’s usual price or a formula or a course of dealing in para 5.2.2.2(B)(v)(c) above. A 
posted price or the price according to the seller’s price list from time to time or a price as contained in 
the federal or state market news report are all similar to a price list which is recognised in South African 
law. See Shell SA (Pty) Ltd v Corbitt and Another 1984 4 SA 523 (CPD). See further chapter 1 para 
1.4.2.2(C). The acceptance of a reasonable fee in contracts of service was succinctly explained and 
distinguished from sale by Zeffert (1973) 90 SALJ 113. See chapter 4 para  4.3.4.3(D). 
1799  See the discussion in chapter 4. 
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(F) Conclusion 
The experience in the United States of America confirms the concerns raised in chapter 4 
regarding the indeterminateness of the standard of a reasonable price and the uncertainty it 
generates. The cases discussed do not provide meaningful criteria for planning purposes in 
that the meanings ascribed to a reasonable price are not anchored in objective 
considerations that could have precedent value.1800 In addition, it may happen that the 
contract is rendered invalid because of evidentiary issues relating to the determination of 
contractual intention or simply because the court is unable to determine a reasonable 
price.1801 Such a result could have serious implication for one or both of the contractants 
who relied on the provisions of UCC 2-305 to come to their assistance.1802 
The duty of good faith, like the cases discussed, is also inarticulate in providing criteria that 
could have precedent value. Of concern is the judicial recognition given to the possibility of 
an unfettered discretion,1803 a possibility that would render the duty of good faith nugatory. 
The line of reasoning, albeit in an obiter dictum, has enormous implications for consensus, 
especially in the context of discretionary powers in standard form contracts1804 and the 
attendant possibility of abuse.   
Thus, the American experience of the duty of good faith as a check on discretionary power, 
serves to support the submission that the recognition of a unilateral power to settle a price 
is a matter to be determined in the light of principle and policy rather than on the basis of 
the method of its implementation or the mechanisms to be used to curtail its unfair 
                                                            
1800  See paras 5.2.2.2(D)(ii)(b)-(h) above. 
1801  This result could prevail despite a finding of an intention to contract and a reasonably certain basis for 
granting an appropriate remedy as required by UCC 2-304(3): Coca-Cola Bottling 988 F2d. 386 (3d Cir. 
1993) para [104]. See also Lawrence Anderson Vol. 2A (2008) 450; Murphy et al Studies in Contract Law 
42; Perillo Corbin on Contracts Vol 1 577. 
1802  The price may have been left open because one or both of the contractants may, at date of contract, 
have felt that they lacked the necessary foresight to determine the price. The price could also have been 
left open due to incomplete bargaining or excessive initial optimism about performance of contract. The 
contractants, may, in all three instances, have relied on the provisions of UCC 2-305 to fill in the gap. 
Knapp et al Problems in Contract Law 359. 
1803  See the discussion of Amoco908 P.2d 493 (Colo. 1996) in a footnote in para 5.2.2.2(D)(ii)(h). 
1804  It has been estimated that 95% of all transactions are using standard form contract. Hutchison et al 
Contract 25. See further chapter 2 para 2.4.2. 
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exploitation.1805 The propositions advanced earlier against the recognition of such power 
has its roots in the constitutionally entrenched notions of dignity, equality and freedom,1806 
policy considerations1807 as well as in the common law principles of freedom of contract, 
consensus and certainty which has been granted constitutional legitimacy by the Barkhuizen 
court.1808   
Furthermore, the criticism directed at using contract law as an instrument to promote the 
interests of the business community rather than as an avenue for attaining “general social 
ends”1809 reinforces the conclusions reached in chapter 41810 of the positive influence of 
macro socio-economic considerations as informed by the Constitution on law and legal 
policy.1811 It also supports the conclusion1812 that the constitutional and policy imperatives 
aimed at fostering socio-economic reforms for the transformation of South African society 
into a just and egalitarian one militate against the recognition of a reasonable price or one 
that is unilaterally determined. 
Hence, as concluded in chapter 4, the notion of a reasonable price or one that is unilaterally 
determined is unacceptable as a matter of principle and policy.1813 The American experience 
may be said to support the retention of the Westinghouse principle that the price must be 
objectively ascertainable rather than to justify the adoption of the standard of 
reasonableness. 
The conclusions reached in regard to the American experience find resonance, as will be 
seen, in the discussion of the other jurisdictions in this chapter. 
                                                            
1805  See chapter 4 para 4.2.4.4 and chapter 6 paras 6.5-6.6. 
1806  See chapter 4 para 4.2.4.2. 
1807  See, for example, the discussion in chapter 3. 
1808  The judgment was discussed in chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4.  
1809   Pound (1931) 44 Harvard LR 708 in an essay critical of the then emerging New Realist movement. See 
para 5.2.2.2(D)(ii)(a) above. 
1810  Para 4.2. 
1811  The UCC emphasis on the market also runs counter to the human rights components and social 
transformation goals evident in recent consumer protection legislation in South Africa, and in the 
jurisprudence emerging in cases such as Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) and 
Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC), discussed in chapters 1 para. 13.3. 
1812  Chapter 4 para 4.5. 
1813  The submission is that the notion of reasonableness as a gap-filling mechanism is meaningless and 
potentially misleading to naive or gullible buyers. See chapter 4 para 4.3.4.3(E). 
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The next jurisdiction considered is England. 
 
5.2.3 England 
5.2.3.1 Introduction 
The position relating to a reasonable price is regulated by Section 8 of the Sale of Goods Act 
1979.1814 The general principles of contract apply where the provisions of Section 8 of the 
Sale of Goods Act do not find application, as in the case of lease agreements.1815 The general 
rule of contract law is that a contract is not enforceable where the contractants leave a vital 
part of their contract undetermined, subject to further negotiation or where the ambiguity 
in the contractual language cannot be resolved by recourse to the parol evidence rule. A 
court will not add what it considers to be a reasonable or usual term because it is a basic 
principle of contract law that the contractants must make their own contract and must 
settle its terms themselves.1816 
 
5.2.3.2 The Sale of Goods Act 1979 
Section 8 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 reads: 
“8(1) The price in a contract of sale may be fixed by the contract, or may be left to be fixed in a manner 
agreed by the contract, or may be determined by the course of dealing between the parties.  
8(2) Where the price is not determined as mentioned in sub-section (1) above the buyer must pay a 
reasonable price. 
8(3) What is a reasonable price is a question of fact dependent on the circumstances of each particular 
case.” 
 
(A) Content of statutory provisions relating to reasonable price 
Despite a lack of detail, a contract of sale is valid as soon as an agreement to buy and sell is 
reached provided that the remaining details, inclusive of the determination of the price, can 
                                                            
1814  The history of sales at a reasonable price in England goes back to the Sale of Goods Act of 1893: Beale, 
Bishop & Furmston Contract Cases & Materials (2008) 412, hereafter Beale et al  Contract Cases & 
Materials. See also Schmitthoff The Sale of Goods (1966). The provisions of the current Section 8 are 
substantially the same as the provisions of Section 8 of the Sale of Goods, 1893.  
1815  In terms of section 1(1) and 2(1), the Sale of Goods Act 1979 applies only to contracts of sale. 
1816  Bridge Benjamin’s Sale para [2-016].The position is similar to that in South African law. See the discussion 
in chapter 4 para 4.4. 
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be determined by the standard of reasonableness.1817 Section 8(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 
1979 provides that a reasonable price must be paid where the contract does not in terms of 
section 8(1) specify a price or a manner of fixing a price or where there is no course of 
dealing between the contractants.1818 
Where the contractants intended the price to be fixed by a further agreement, the statutory 
provision does not apply and the contract would fail. In May &Butcher Ltd v The King1819 the 
court refused to uphold the validity of the contract because the contract was not silent on 
the price. Under the 1893 Sale of Goods Act, as in the case of the 1979 Act, the default 
reasonable price provision would apply only if the contract was silent on the price. The 
Court held that there was no silence on the price because a term in the contract provided 
that the contractants were to agree on the price. There being a failure to agree on the price, 
the contract was, accordingly, not valid. An agreement to agree or to negotiate in good faith 
is also invalid and is not rescued by the provisions of Section 8(2).1820 However, the same 
does not apply where the contractants agreed on particular method of ascertaining the 
                                                            
1817  Beale Chitty On Contract Volume 1 (2008) paras [2-113], hereafter Beale Chitty on Contract Volume 1; 
Peel  Treitel on The Law of Contract (2011) para [2-085], hereafter Peel Treitel on The Law of Contract. 
1818  Section 8(2) resembles the position under UCC 2-305(1)(a). One important difference is that it does not 
make gap-filling by the court dependent on a determination of whether there is a reasonably certain 
basis for an appropriate remedy as required by UCC 2-204(3). The English approach appears to be much 
narrower than the approach in the United States of America in that a reasonable price will be read into 
the contract only if the contract made no reference to a price at all or where the method for determining 
the price is ineffective or meaningless. In United States of America, an agreement to agree also may also 
precipitate the application of the open price provisions whereas this is not the case in England. The 
English approach is criticised, as is the American approach (para 5.2.2.2(D)(i)(a) above), for presuming the 
existence of a contract in the absence of a price term when its very absence may constitute proof that 
there is no contract: Peel Treitel on The Law of Contract para [2-085]. In the event of a nominee entrusted 
with the task of determining the price being unable or unwilling to fix the price, the contract falls away. 
Section 9(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979; Bridge Benjamin’s Sale para [2-049].  
1819  [1934] 2 KB 17, 20.The case concerned the sale of the total stock of old tentage. The price, inter alia, was 
to be determined from time to time by the buyer and the seller as the quantities of the stock became 
available.  
1820  In Courtney and Fairburn Ltd v Tolaini Brothers (Hotels) Ltd [1975] 1 All ER 716, the Court of Appeal held 
that an agreement “to negotiate fair and reasonable sums” did not satisfy the requirement of certainty in 
that it did not contain a price or a method of calculating it. The clause amounted to an agreement to 
agree. The decision confirms that an agreement to agree is invalid and does not invite the application of a 
reasonable price: Peel Treitel on The Law of Contract para [2-092]. Note that agreements to agree would 
not fail under UCC 2-305(1)(b)). In the American case of Milex which is factually similar to the Courtney 
case the court held the contract to be valid. See the discussion in a footnote in para 5.2.2.2(B)(ii) above. 
The South African approach is the same as the English approach. See chapter 4 para 4.2.4.4. 
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price, but that method proves to be ineffective.1821 Where one contractant refuses to 
nominate a nominee to settle the price, the validity of the contract will depend on whether 
or not the appointment of the nominee is essential.1822 
 
(B) Factors considered in determining a reasonable price 
(i) Introduction 
The Sale of Goods Act 1979 does not provide guidance for understanding the standard of 
reasonableness other than to provide that a reasonable price is a question of fact to be 
determined in light of the circumstances of each case.1823 Hence, the Act does not provide 
any guidance in relation to the challenges of determining a reasonable price.1824 In addition, 
the duty of good faith does not apply because English law does not recognise a general duty 
                                                            
1821  In Nicolene Ltd V Simmonds [1953] 1 All ER 822, the court was faced with a clause (a sale of steel bars was 
made subject to the usual conditions of acceptance) which was meaningless because such conditions of 
acceptance did not exist. The Court of Appeal drew a distinction between a clause yet to be agreed on 
and a clause which is meaningless. In the case of the former, there was no contract for lack of certainty, 
but, in the case of the latter, the meaningless clause did not affect the validity of the contract.  
1822  In Sudbrook Trading Ltd v Eggleton [1982] 3 All ER 1 an option to buy in a lease agreement provided for 
the appointment of valuers by the lessor and lessee respectively. On the option being exercised, the 
lessor refused to appoint a valuer. The House of Lords construed the method of calculating the price 
(valuation) as an agreement to sell at a fair and reasonable price and held that it constituted mere 
machinery for the calculation of the price and did not constitute an essential element of the contract. 
Hence, the sale could proceed at a reasonable price. The Sudbrook decision does not promote certainty in 
that it leaves to door open for another court to hold that the price-fixing mechanism is essential. This 
happened in Gillat v Sky Television Ltd [2000] 1 All ER (Comm) 461 where a clause that provided for the 
valuation of shares to be referred to “an independent chartered accountant” was held to not constitute 
mere machinery. The court reasoned that the contractants had entrusted to the judgment of the 
unnamed independent chartered accountant the decision as to which of various approaches (an 
earnings-based approach, assets-based approach or a discounted-cash-flow-basis approach) should be 
used to determine the price. Accordingly, the court held that it was not entitled to substitute its own 
opinion. See also Beale Chitty On Contract Volume 1 para [2-113]; Bridge Benjamin’s Sale paras [2-017] 
and [2-046]-[2-052]. Note that UCC 2-305(1)(c) also provides for a reasonable price where the method of 
calculation proves to be ineffective. However, UCC 2-305(1)(c) does not make the application of a 
reasonable price dependent on whether the method of calculation is essential or non-essential. The 
criticism in chapter 4 para 4.4.3 in respect of the named and unnamed nominee also applies in respect of 
the essential - non-essential approach. See also chapter 4 para 4.3.3.3(D) for a discussion of price as the 
essence of the contract. 
1823  Section 8(3) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
1824  See chapter 4 para 4.3. 
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to act in good faith.1825 Hereafter follows a discussion and evaluation of the factors 
considered by courts when completing open price term contracts. 
 
(ii) Prior course of dealing, trade usage 
It has been held that in striving to uphold contracts, it is the duty of courts, especially in 
commercial contracts in a trade with which both contractants are familiar, “to construe such 
documents fairly and broadly, without being too astute or subtle in finding defects...”1826 In 
the process, courts may take into account terms from trade custom or may have regard to 
the terms from a previous course of dealing between the contractants.1827 In addition, any 
uncertainty may be resolved by reference to some machinery or formula (e.g. an arbitration 
clause) where such device, if “liberally construed, was wide enough to provide a method 
alternative to agreement...”1828 
 
                                                            
1825  Unlike the United States of America (para 5.2.2.2(D)(ii)(h) above), Germany (para 5.2.5.3(B) below) and 
the Netherlands 5.2.6.2(B) below). See also Furmston Cheshire, Firfoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract 
(2007) 32; Smith & Atiyah Atiyah’s An Introduction to the Law of Contract (2005). The English courts have 
expressed their reluctance to apply a good faith standard in terms similar to those expressed by the 
South African courts, namely, business considerations, contractual certainty, conferring an undefined 
judicial discretion: Beale Chitty On Contract  Volume 1 para [1-023]. Bingham LJ comments that English 
law, unlike many civil law systems, does not recognize an overriding principle that contracts should be 
made and carried out in good faith. Instead, the law “has developed piecemeal solutions to in response 
to demonstrated problems of unfairness:” Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd 
[1989] 1 QB 433, 439. The case concerned the failure of a lending library to disclose to the borrower the 
existence of a clause in the contract imposing a fee for late return. The borrower was relieved of the 
penalty fee on the ground that the lender had failed in its duty to reasonably and fairly bring the clause to 
that borrower’s attention. 
1826  Hillas & Co Ltd v Arcos Ltd (1932) 147 L.T. 503, 514, hereafter Hillas (1932) 147 L.T. 503.  
1827  Bridge Benjamin’s Sale para [2-017]. In Hillas (1932) 147 L.T. 514 an option to buy timber (specifications 
whereof not determined) for a price to be calculated by reference to the official price list was alleged to 
be expressed in vague and uncertain terms. The House of Lords held that the option was enforceable 
because the uncertainty could be resolved by having recourse to the principal contract of which it was 
part, as well as to the previous dealings between the contractants and the practice in their trade. In Foley 
v Classique Coaches Ltd [1934] 2 K.B. 1 an agreement to agree was held to constitute an agreement at a 
reasonable price presumably on the basis that it contained an arbitration clause in the event of a failure 
to agree on the price and because it formed part of a larger contract. It would appear as if the inclusion of 
criteria for the determination of the price (price list in Hillas and arbitration in Foley) facilitated the 
decisions to uphold the validity of the contracts: Beale Chitty On Contract Volume 1 paras [2-130] and 
[43-040]; Atiyah An Introduction to the Law of Contract 116. In South Africa, a reference to a price list is 
recognized as valid. So also is reference of a matter to arbitration as deadlock breaking mechanism. This 
is similar to the Southernport case discussed chapter 4 para 4.2.4.4. See further para 5.2.2.2(D)(ii) above 
for criticism of course of dealing and trade usage factors. 
1828  Bridge Benjamin’s Sale para [2-017]. 
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(iii) Market price 
In computing a reasonable price, reference may be had to the current market price1829 at 
the time and place of delivery1830 or to “some other figure (e.g. the cost of production).”1831 
When using the market price, care must be taken that such price may be affected by 
accidental circumstances that may prevail at the appointed time and place. Thus, the 
market price may or may not be conclusive evidence of a reasonable price.1832 This does not 
contribute to certainty and impacts adversely on the ability to plan. 
The reference to “some other figure” is also troublesome in its vagueness. The vague 
promise that the price may be settled by some other figure such as the cost of production 
would be unsettling to contractants who may wish to rely on the provisions of Section 8(2). 
There is no clarity as to what the other figure is or could be and how such figure is to be 
used in computing the price.  
 
(C) Unilateral discretionary power to determine price 
The Sale of Goods Act 1979 is silent on the issue of unilateral price determination. 
The concept of unilateral price determination does not appear to be recognised at common 
law despite a dictum in May & Butcher Ltd v The King1833 that a price may be left to the 
unilateral determination of one of the contractants. Furthermore, nothing is said in that 
case about a controlling mechanism such as that the determination must be reasonable.1834 
                                                            
1829  Beatson Anson’s Law of Contract 62. 
1830  The date of delivery is also used in America. UCC 2-305. See para 5.2.2.2(D)(i)(b) above for criticism of 
specifying a date.   
1831  Bridge Benjamin’s Sale para [2-047]. 
1832  Bridge Benjamin’s Sale para [2-047] explain that the market price may be affected by a host of factors, 
not least of which may be that the seller deliberately held back delivery to take advantage of changing 
market conditions or to create a demand or an outbreak of unrest may create a temporary shortage in 
supply leading to a spike in the price. In these instances the market price would then be highly 
unreasonable.  
1833  [1934] 2 KB 17 at 21. 
1834  Von Bar & Clive Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of 
Reference (DCFR) Volume I (2009) 600, hereafter Von Bar & Clive Principles. On the same page, it is said 
that the same applies in Scottish and Irish law. See also Lando & Beale Principles of European Contract 
Law Parts 1 and 2 (2000) 311, hereafter Lando & Beale Principles of European Contract Law. A contrary 
view is that an agreement to a unilateral determination of the price is valid provided that the empowered 
contractant acts bona fide: Bridge Benjamin’s Sale of Goods (2010) para [2-045]. However, it is submitted 
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5.2.3.3 Conclusion 
The explanations of the standard of reasonableness in relation to price, as in the USA 
experience, display an approach that nods in the direction of the objective ascertainability 
criterion of the Westinghouse principle which it has already been suggested lends itself to 
interpretation to accommodate concepts such as trade usages and past practices.1835 
The English approach also leaves considerable leeway for uncertainty in that, for example, 
the application of the default reasonable price term is left to the unpredictability of a 
determination of whether a price-fixing mechanism is deemed to be essential or not.1836 In 
addition, trade usage, prior dealings and market value are not definitive of a reasonable 
price but are factors that a court may take into account with others in determining a 
reasonable price. Reference to trade usage and prior dealings also do not serve to illuminate 
the standard of reasonableness where one or both of the contractants are not engaged in 
the particular trade or in any trade whatsoever or where there is no trade usage or prior 
dealings between the contractants.1837 
As has already been pointed out,1838 the presumption that a valid contract exists is 
problematic in that the absence of an agreement on price may provide good evidence that a 
contract had not been concluded. 
The absence of a general duty of good faith1839 in the determination of a reasonable price 
does not appear to have had any influence on the meanings given to a reasonable price. 
These meanings are similar to those in America where the duty of good faith is entrenched 
in the law.1840 Hence, it is submitted that the inclusion or exclusion of the duty of good faith 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
that the absence of a general duty of good faith (para 5.2.3.2(B)(i)) does not support Bridge’s contention. 
The Sale of Goods Act 1979 differs from UCC 2-305(2) which expressly recognises unilateral price 
determination subject to the duty of good faith. See the discussion of UCC 2-305(2) in para 5.2.2.2(B)(vi) 
above. See also Beale et al Contract Cases & Materials 271.  
1835  See para 5.2.2.2(F) above. 
1836  See the discussion of the Nicolene and Gillat cases in a footnote in para 5.3.2.2(A) above. See also chapter 
4 para 4.4.3. 
1837  See the criticism in 5.2.2.2(D)(ii)(c) above. 
1838  See para 5.2.2.2(D)(i)(a) above. 
1839  See para 5.2.3.2(B)(i) above. 
1840  See para 5.2.2.2(D)(ii)(h) above. 
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does not seem to materially affect, alter or improve the position of the one contractant over 
the other. In any event,1841 the issue of the recognition of a reasonable price or a unilaterally 
determined price is one to be decided as a matter of principle and policy based on the 
constitutional values of dignity, equality and freedom.1842 
The difficulties associated with giving content to the concept of reasonableness as a 
criterion for the determination of a price causes an erosion of the principle of certainty, thus 
confirming the conclusion that the standard of reasonableness as a price-setting mechanism 
should not be countenanced in the South African context.1843 A development that 
recognises a reasonable price would run counter to the notion of contractual autonomy that 
forms the basis of the South African law of contract;1844 watering down the exercise of 
contractual autonomy in respect of the essence of the contract.1845 The principles of 
consensus and certainty would be further casualties. Such a consequence would, not only, 
run counter to the policy directions of consumer protection legislation that seek to grant 
contractants a greater role in determining their contractual destiny,1846 but would also 
undermine the constitutional values of dignity, equality and freedom.1847 This is not 
acceptable on constitutional as well as on public policy grounds.1848 
 
5.2.4 Scotland 
5.2.4.1 Introduction 
The Scottish approach to open terms is similar to that in America and England in that the 
object of contract law is to facilitate commercial transactions and not to create obstacles in 
                                                            
1841  See para 5.2.2.2(F) above. 
1842  See chapter 4 para 4.2.4.4 and chapter 6 paras 6.5-6.6. 
1843  See chapter 2 para 2.9, chapter 3 para 3.10 and chapter 4 para 4.5. 
1844  See the discussion in chapter 2 para 2.2.2. 
1845  See the discussion in relation to the essence of the contract in chapter 4 para 4.3.3.3(D). 
1846  See the discussion in chapter 3 above. 
1847  See the discussion generally in chapter 4 above and, in particular, para 4.2.4.2. 
1848  See the discussion of the constitutional and public policy considerations that runs throughout chapter 4. 
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the way of solving practical problems.1849 The touchstone for the implication of terms is 
whether it is possible to enforce the contract.1850 Thus, it is not the function of the courts to 
imply terms which were not agreed upon in order to create a contract.1851 
 
5.2.4.2 The notion of a reasonable price 
Section 8(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 also applies in Scotland and the same 
considerations to apply in respect of open price terms as in England.1852 It would appear as if 
Scottish law also allows the determination of a reasonable rental where a rental is not 
stipulated in the lease agreement.1853 
 
5.2.4.3 Unilateral discretionary power to determine price 
As in the case of English law, there does not appear to be a rule permitting unilateral 
determination of a price.1854 
 
5.2.4.4 Conclusion 
The conclusions reached in respect of the legal position in England apply equally here. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1849  McBryde The Law of Contract in Scotland (2007) para [5-12], hereafter McBryde The Law of Contract in 
Scotland.  
1850  McBryde The Law of Contract in Scotland para [5-14].  
1851  For example, if a lease does not specify the terms thereof, there is no enforceable agreement: McBryde 
The Law of Contract in Scotland para [5-14]. See also Walker The Law of Contract and related obligations 
in Scotland (1985) para [8.6], hereafter Walker The Law of Contract. 
1852  Woolman & Lake Contract (2001) 32; R & J Dempster v Motherwell Bridge and Engineering Co Ltd [1964] 
ScotCS CSIH 1 (03 July 1964) also cited as 1964SLT 353, 1964 SLT (Notes) 82, 1964 SC 308 308, [1964] 
ScotCS CSIH_1, 2 BLR 104 available at <http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1964_SC_308.html>. 
McBryde The Law of Contract in Scotland paras [5-13] to [5-15] and [5-22]; Walker The Law of Contract 
para [8.3]. 
1853  McBryde The Law of Contract in Scotland paras [5-13] to [5-15].  
1854  Von Bar & Clive Principles 311. 
 
 
 
 
319 
 
5.2.5 Germany 
5.2.5.1 Introduction 
The following provisions of the Bürgerliches Gezetzbuch (BGB) are pertinent to the 
discussion of open price terms: 
BGB 154: 
“If parties have not agreed on all points on which agreement is required according to the declaration 
even of only one party, the contract is, in case of doubt, not entered into. An agreement on individual 
points is not binding even if recorded.” 
BGB 315: 
 “Specification of performance by one party 
(1) Where performance is to be specified by one of the parties to the contract, then in case of doubt 
it is to be assumed that the specification is to be made at the reasonably exercised discretion of 
the party making it. 
(2) The specification is made by declaration to the other party. 
(3) Where specification is to be made at the reasonably exercised discretion of a party, the 
specification made is binding on the other party only if it is equitable. If it is not equitable, the 
specification is made by judicial decision; the same applies if the specification is delayed.”   
BGB 316: 
 “Specification of consideration 
If the extent of the consideration promised for an act of performance is not specified, then in case of 
doubt the party that is owed the consideration is entitled to make the specification.” 
BGB 317: 
 “Specification of performance by a third party 
(1) Where the specification of performance is left to a third party, then in case of doubt it is to be 
assumed that the specification is to be made at the reasonably exercised discretion of the third 
party.” 
BGB 319: 
 “Ineffectiveness of specification; substitution 
(1) If the third party is to specify performance at its reasonably exercised discretion, the specification 
made is not binding on the parties to the contract if it is evidently inequitable. The specification is 
made in this case by judicial decision; the same applies if the party cannot or does not want to 
make the specification or if it delays it. 
(2) If the third party is to make the specification at its free discretion, the contract is ineffective if the 
third party cannot or does not want to make the specification or if it delays it.”  
With reference to BGB 154, it may be said that, in general, in Germany, as in the United 
States of America and England, a contract is not valid where the contractants have not 
agreed on all the terms on which they intended agreement to be reached. Hence, in order 
for the courts to play a gap-filling role, there must be no indication that the contractants 
intended that agreement must be reached on that issue.  
Though the BGB does not specifically provide for the imposition of a reasonable price and 
rental in the event of contractual silence on price and rental, such imposition may be 
implied from an analysis of BGB 154, BGB 315 and BGB 316, the latter two articles dealing 
with unilateral price determination.  
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The two articles dealing with unilateral price and rental determination, namely, BGB 315 
and BGB 316,1855 form the basis of the discussion and conclusions reached in respect of a 
reasonable price and rental.  The two concepts - reasonable price and rental and unilaterally 
determined price and rental - are therefore discussed simultaneously below.  
 
5.2.5.2 Reasonable price and rental, and unilateral determination of price and rental  
BGB 315 permits unilateral determination of the contract price and rental. An examination 
of BGB 315(1) reveals that the article contemplates two scenarios where a contractant is 
empowered to settle the price and rental unilaterally. The first is where the empowered 
contractant’s discretion must be exercised in an equitable manner whilst in the second 
instance the empowered” contractant has a free discretion. BGB 315(1) provides that when 
doubt exists about the nature of the discretion in the event of unilateral price and rental 
determination, the assumption is that the exercise of discretion is regulated by the standard 
of reasonableness.1856 Hence, the provision creates a presumption of reasonableness1857 
which would be rebuttable on proof that the contractants had agreed that the empowered 
contractant has a free discretion. 
Where the empowered contractant is bound by the standard of reasonableness, the court 
has the power of substitution if the determination is inequitable (BGB 315(3)).1858 Where 
the empowered contractant is not bound by the standard of reasonableness,1859 it seems 
that the contract would be avoided if the price or rental were found to be unreasonable, the 
                                                            
1855  The provisions are not specific to contracts of sale and hence apply to contracts of lease as well. 
1856  BGB 315(1): “Where performance is to be specified by one of the parties, then in case of doubt it is to be 
assumed that the specification is to be made at the reasonably exercised discretion of the party making 
it.” Emphasis added.  
1857  Zimmermann Obligations 255. 
1858  Judicial gap-filling is also permissible where the “empowered” contractant delays in making the 
determination: BGB 315(3). 
1859  That is, where there is no doubt that the empowered contractant has a free discretion: BGB 315 (1). 
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court having no power of substitution. This conclusion is founded on the silence on the issue 
in BGB 315(3) and is sustained by analogy with the provisions of BGB 319(2).1860 
Where the contract is silent on the extent of the counter-performance (for example, the 
price), BGB316 allows the creditor-contractant to determine the performance in which 
event, and, in the absence of any indications to the contrary, the provisions of BGB 315, as 
outlined above, would presumably apply.1861 
 
5.2.5.3 Approaches to the determination of a reasonable price and rental 
(A) Logical or normative implications 
German law, on a conceptual level,1862 follows an approach to contractual interpretation 
where there is a gap in the contract that corresponds to the “hypothetical bystander” 
approach of South African law. 
When filling in gaps in a contract, the court has to ascertain “the logical or normative 
implications” of the contract.1863 A contract is deemed to be incomplete only if the term is 
necessary to ensure the purpose of the contract.1864 The approach limits the discretion of 
the courts to impose terms or to interfere with the terms of the contract, the function of the 
court being limited to completing the contract.1865 Hence, a term is read into the contract 
                                                            
1860  BGB 319 operates in conjunction with BGB 317. BGB 317(1) provides that where a third party has been 
appointed to settle the price, then in the case of doubt, it is assumed that the third party must exercise 
his/her discretion in a reasonable manner. Hence BGB 317(1) is strikingly similar to BGB 315(1) in that it 
also creates a presumption of reasonableness. See also Lando & Beale Principles of European Contract 
Law 312. BGB 319(1) provides for judicial substitution where the third party should have exercised 
his/her discretion in an equitable manner but fails to do so or cannot or does not want to do so. 
However, in terms of BGB 319(2), no judicial substitution occurs where the third party had a “free 
discretion” and cannot or does not want to make a determination or delays in doing so. The contract 
would simply be rendered “ineffective.” See also Hawthorne ‘The contractual requirement of certainty of 
price’ (1992) 55 THRHR638, 647, hereafter Hawthorne (1992) 55 THRHR 638; Von Bar & Clive Principles 
603. Presumably the same would apply where the third party had a free discretion but the price is 
objectionable. 
1861  Kröll, Mistelis & Viscasillas The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods (CISG) (2011) hereafter Kröll et al The United Nations  Convention suggests that the empowered 
contractant would be bound by the standard of reasonableness (816).  
1862  Markesinis, Unberath H & Johnston The German Law of Contract: A Comparative Treatise (2006) 140, 
hereafter Markesinis et al The German Law of Contract. 
1863  Markesinis et al The German Law of Contract 141. 
1864  Markesinis et al The German Law of Contract 141. 
1865  Markesinis et al The German Law of Contract 141. 
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only if it is one to which the contractants would have agreed to had they actually considered 
the unforeseen situation (the so-called hypothetical intention of the contractants.)1866 In 
one case, the court refused to enforce a contract on the basis that the contract did not 
include any precise or determinable factors to help the expert make his/her decision.1867 
 
(B) Good faith 
However, the strict approach of the hypothetical intention test is somewhat diluted when 
good faith is taken into account in determining contractual intent.1868The requirement of 
good faith which also applies to the negotiation stage,1869 invalidates a clause which 
unreasonably disadvantages one of the contractants.1870 In the performance of a contract, 
customary practices may be taken into account in determining whether there is compliance 
with the duty of good faith.1871 Thus, the standard of good faith, which is the standard used 
to determine contractual intent in interpretation,1872 enables the court to give expression to 
the objective meanings of the terms of the contract1873 and to imply contractual terms more 
readily than English courts by going beyond the four corners of the contract.1874 The open-
endedness of the notion of good faith has caused German academics to caution that the 
                                                            
1866  Markesinis et al The German Law of Contract 141. The approach is then similar to the hypothetical 
approach in the United States of America (see para 5.2.2.2(B)(iv) above) and to the “hypothetical 
bystander” test in South Africa (see chapter 4, para 4.3.4.2(C)(viii)).The officious bystander test of English 
law also operates on the same principle: Markesinis et al The German Law of Contract 140.  
1867  The contractants had agreed that in the event of their failure to decide on the terms, inclusive of the 
rental, of a lease renewal contract, the outstanding terms would be determined by an expert nominated 
by the chamber of commerce: Kötz & Flessner European Contract Law Volume 1: Formation, Validity, and 
Content of Contracts; Contract and Third Parties (1997) 47-48. The name of the case is not provided in 
the source. 
1868  Markesinis et al The German Law of Contract 141.  
1869  BGB 311. 
1870  BGB 307. 
1871  BGB 242. 
1872  BGB 157: Markesinis et al The German Law of Contract 134. 
1873  Markesinis et al The German Law of Contract 134. This approach resembles the majoritarian approach of 
American law. See para 5.2.2.2(B)(iv) above. See chapter 4 para 4.3.4 for a discussion of a reasonable 
price and the problems related thereto. 
1874  Markesinis et al The German Law of Contract 138-139.  
 
 
 
 
323 
 
requirement of good faith does not give the courts a ‘free mandate’ to assign contractual 
terms on the basis that they reflect the reasonable intentions of the contractants.1875 
 
(C) Dealer or manufacturer’s price list  
The reasonableness of a unilaterally determined price is generally determined in light of the 
dealer or manufacturer’s price list at date of delivery.1876 The courts have upheld 
unconditional discretionary power only if the contract allowed the “disempowered” 
contractant to withdraw from a contract where between date of contract and date of 
delivery, the price rises by much more than the cost of living. The right to withdraw does not 
apply in contracts between business persons because they can undertake the heavy burden 
of establishing that the price set by the empowered contractant is not in accordance with 
fair valuation.1877 
 
5.2.5.4 Conclusion 
The distinction drawn between those situations where a free discretion is allowed and those 
where the free exercise of discretion is curbed by the requirement of reasonableness makes 
uncertain the role of reasonableness in the context of price determination. Surely the 
standard of reasonableness should act as an equitable restraint on all exercises of unilateral 
discretionary power otherwise it serves little purpose except in those cases where it is clear 
that the contractants intended the discretionary power to be exercised within the bounds of 
reasonableness or where such intention is presumed.1878 The alternative increases the 
possibility of abuse of power.  
                                                            
1875  Markesinis et al The German Law of Contract 141. Markesinis et al observe that the importance of BGB 
242 lies in its “blandness” that has “allowed it to become the peg on which numerous value judgments of 
German courts could be hung” (120). 
1876  The date of delivery is also utilised in the United States of America, England, Scotland. The date of 
contract is used in the Netherlands and in the CISG. See para 5.2.2.2(D)(i)(b) above for criticism of 
prescribing a date for the determination of a reasonable price. 
1877  Kötz & Flessner European Contract Law Volume 1 49-50 
1878  The presumption arises if there is doubt about whether the discretion is limited or unlimited. See BGB 
315(1). 
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As in the case of the jurisdictions discussed before, the provisions in the BGB are similarly 
inarticulate about the meaning and content of a reasonable price and rental.1879 
Accordingly, the provisions invite the same criticism, viz., that they, not only, produce 
uncertainty, but also, the possibility of judicial determination of a price and rental which 
may not be what the contractant(s) had anticipated or contemplated at date of contract. 
Hence the open term provisions insofar as they relate to price and rental would, in the 
South African context, be unacceptable on constitutional and policy grounds.1880 
 
5.2.6 The Netherlands 
5.2.6.1 Introduction 
Prior to the advent of the Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek,1881 the law in the Netherlands 
required, as does the law in South Africa, that the price must be ascertained or 
ascertainable. In the absence thereof, the contract would be void.1882 NBW 7.4 changed this, 
making it possible for the Dutch courts to play a gap-filling role.1883 
 
5.2.6.2 The Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek 
(A) Introduction 
NBW 7.4 that deals with open price terms reads as follows:  
“Where a sale has been entered into without a determination of the price, the buyer owes a 
reasonable price; in determining that price, one takes account of the prices usually stipulated by the 
seller at the time of entering into the contract.”1884 
Article 7.4 does not establish a general principle and, hence, does not regulate the position 
in the case of lease agreements in this regard. It has been contended that provisions similar 
                                                            
1879  The discretion inherent in the duty of good faith (para 5.2.5.3(B) above) makes for unpredictability 
making it difficult for contractants to plan their contractual obligations. 
1880  See the discussion in chapter 4 above. 
1881  Hereafter referred to as the NBW. The NBW came into effect on 1 January 1992: Hawthorne (1992) 55 
THRHR 647. 
1882  Asser-Hijma Serie Bijzondere Overeenkomsten (Koop en Ruil) Vol 5.1 215, hereafter Asser-Hijma Serie 
Bijzondere.  
1883  The NBW, unlike the BGB, makes specific provision for the judicial gap-filling where the contractants have 
not agreed on a price.  
1884  The English translations in this chapter are from texts in Busch The Principles of European Contract Law 
and Dutch Law: A Commentary (2002), hereafter, Busch The Principles. 
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to those in Article 7.4 that apply in the case of mandates,1885 deposit1886 and construction1887 
lay the foundation for a general rule.1888 
 
(B) Content of Article 7.4 
Article 7.4 provides for the payment of a reasonable price where the contract is silent on the 
price to be paid or where there is insufficient information from which to determine the 
price. As in all the other jurisdictions under discussion, Article 7.4 does not apply where the 
contractants considered agreement on the price to be essential for the creation of the 
contract.1889 Article 7.4 also does not apply where the contractants negotiated about the 
price but failed to reach consensus.1890 
Where the sale is a once-off sale or where the subject matter of the sale is rare or unique so 
that there is no usual or market price, it has been suggested that the sale is not void.1891 In 
such instances, recourse must be had to Article7.4 and the buyer would have to pay a 
reasonable price which would be determined with reference to the price of other goods sold 
by the seller or with reference to the opinion of experts.1892 
Also influencing Article 7.4 is the duty of good faith,1893 used synonymously with the 
standard of reasonableness and fairness, which permeates all branches of the Dutch law of 
obligations.1894 The duty, which is said to exist where a contractant knew or ought to have 
                                                            
1885  Article 7:405. 
1886  Article 7:601. 
1887  Article 7.12.3. Busch The Principles 268. See also Asser-Hijma Serie Bijzondere 222.  
1888  Busch The Principles 268. See also Asser-Hijma Serie Bijzondere 222. However, it is submitted that the fact 
that the legislature made specific provision for only sales contracts, mandates, deposits and construction 
and the fact that there appears to be no constraint on the legislature to include lease agreements, 
constitute proof that lease agreements were not intended to be governed under the rubric of open price 
terms. 
1889  Busch The Principles 269. 
1890  HR 10 December 1999, 5 (Peters v Peters) referred to in Busch The Principles 269. This is similar to the 
position in England law (para 5.2.3.2(A) above) but unlike that in America (para 5.2.2.2(B)(ii) above). 
1891  This is unlike the case in South African law (para 1.4.2.2(C)(ii)(a) of chapter 1 above). 
1892  Asser-Hijma Serie Bijzondere 177. 
1893  Article 3.11. 
1894  Hartkamp et al Contract Law in the Netherlands 49. See also Wessels ‘Civil Code Revision in the 
Netherlands: System, Contents and Future’ (1994) 41(2) Netherlands International LR 163, 181, hereafter 
Wessels (1994) 41(2) Netherlands International LR 163.   
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known of the facts or the law, is central to the code and regulates all stages of the contract 
including the negotiation stage.1895 
 
(C) Factors considered in determining a reasonable price 
(i) Usual price of seller 
The price usually stipulated by the seller at date of contract1896 is taken into account in 
determining a reasonable price.1897 Article 7.4 does not create a presumption that the 
contractants intended the price to be the normal price1898 and a court which does not peg 
the price at seller’s usual price, may adduce expert evidence to find a solution.1899 An 
indication of the unreasonableness of the seller’s usual selling price is where the price is so 
extreme that the seller is obliged to mention it to buyers before concluding a sale.1900 The 
notion of “so extreme” is subject to interpretation and seems to predict a finding of 
unreasonableness only in exceptional circumstances. 
 
(ii) Law, usage, reasonableness and equity 
Article 7.4 is supplemented by Article 6:248(1)1901 that provides for judicial gap-filling on the 
basis of the law, usage or the requirements of reasonableness and equity. The validity of any 
rule binding the contractants that emanates from a law, usage or juridical act is subject to 
the requirement of reasonableness and fairness. In addition, Article 6.2(1) imposes an 
                                                            
1895  Mak Performance-Orientated Remedies in European Sale of Goods 106. 
1896  Reasonableness is determined at date of contract. The same applies under CISG. However, in the United 
States of America, England and Scotland the operative date is the date of delivery.  
1897  Article 7.4. See also Asser-Hijma Serie Bijzondere 176; Busch The Principles 268.  
1898  This unlike Article 6:104 of the PECL discussed in para 5.2.7.4(C)(i) of this chapter below. Busch The 
Principles 269.  
1899  Busch The Principles 269. 
1900  Asser-Hijma Serie Bijzondere 176. 
1901  Busch The Principles 269. Article 6:248 reads: 
(1) “A contract has not only the juridical effects agreed to by the parties, but also those which, according 
to the nature of the contract, result from law, usage or the requirements of reasonableness and 
equity. 
(2) A rule binding upon the parties as a result of the contract does not apply to the extent that, in given 
circumstances, this would be unacceptable according to the standards of reasonableness and 
equity.” 
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obligation to act in accordance with the requirements of reasonableness and fairness or 
good faith. The test for reasonableness and fairness is an objective one that requires, not 
only, that the contractant did not know, but also, that he ought not to have known about 
it.1902 
The references to reasonableness and fairness refer to the contractants’ duty to observe 
reasonable commercial standards and fair dealing.1903 The standard of reasonableness is 
used to determine the existence and content of the legal relationship between the 
contractants by explaining, supplementing and correcting their contract.1904 The 
requirement of reasonableness expects of contractants to act as reasonable persons and to 
have regard for one another’s reasonable interests. The standards that must, in terms of 
Article3:12,1905 be taken into account when determining reasonableness are (i) generally 
accepted principles of law, (ii) current juridical views in the Netherlands and (iii) the 
particular societal and private interests involved.1906 The judgment of an objective person 
and the general usage in the trade or industry will normally fall under the notion of juridical 
views.1907 Taken together Articles 3:12, and 6:248 define the notion of reasonableness in 
very broad terms, possibly because the notion pervades the whole of the NBW and because 
it applies to all stages of the contract, including the pre-contractual stage.1908 Thus, even an 
express term may be set aside if its enforcement would be grossly unjust in the 
circumstances. This would probably only happen in exceptional situations.1909 
The courts are obliged to indicate in its judgment which interests and which principles it 
took into account. Ultimately, the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the nature 
                                                            
1902  Article 3.11. Hence, it requires both the objective and subjective reasonableness as in the case with the 
duty of good faith in the United States of America. See para 5.2.2.2(B)(vi) above. 
1903  Hartkamp et al Contract Law in the Netherlands 49; Busch The Principles 49. 
1904  Busch The Principles 63. 
1905  Article3:12 reads: 
“In determining what reasonableness and equity require, reference must be made to generally accepted 
principles of law, to current juridical views in the Netherlands, and to the particular societal and private 
interests involved.” 
1906  Article 3:12. 
1907  Busch The Principles 64. 
1908  Busch The Principles 63. 
1909  Hartkamp et al Contract Law in the Netherlands 50. 
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and purpose of the contract will prove conclusive as to the particular interests that will 
prevail.1910 
 
(D) Unilateral discretionary power to determine price 
Whilst the NBW does not make provision for unilateral price determination, express 
provision was made for it in Article 1501.2 of the BW. The fact that the provision was not 
repealed by the NBW means that the possibility of a unilaterally determined price has been 
left open. This, coupled with the recognition of freedom of contract, leads to the conclusion 
that it is possible for a price to be determined unilaterally.1911 
Any unilateral price determination would, however, be subject to the provisions of articles 
such as Article3:40(1)1912 that provides for the nullity of contractual terms that are contrary 
to good morals or public order.1913 The exercise of a unilateral discretionary power would 
also have to be exercised with due regard for the non-derogable provisions of Article 
6:248.1914 Article 6:248(1) requires the empowered contractant, when exercising such 
power, to take into account “the legitimate interests of the other party1915 and, more 
specifically, to determine the content of the term in a reasonable way.”1916 A finding of 
unreasonableness would render the term non-binding1917 and constitute a breach of 
                                                            
1910  Busch The Principles 63-64. 
1911   The principle of freedom of contract is implicit in Article 6:248(1) that provides that a contract has the 
juridical effect agreed by the contractants subject to qualifications relating to law, usage and the 
requirements of reasonableness and fairness. See Busch The Principles 33 and 270; Asser-Hijma Seire 
Bijzondere 216-217; Lando & Beale Principles of European Contract Law 311. 
1912  Article3:40(1) reads 
“A juridical act which by its content or necessary implication is contrary to good morals or public order is 
null.” 
1913  Thus the validity of the contractual term granting unilateral discretionary power may be attacked on this 
basis. Busch The Principles 33, 197 and 270.  
1914  Busch The Principles 271; Asser-Hijma Serie Bijzondere 216-217. The problem is that the burden of proof  
and the transaction costs of litigation would probably fall on the contractant with the weaker bargaining 
power since it would not be illogical to assume that the discretionary power would, in most instances, lie 
in the hands of the contractant with the stronger bargaining power. 
1915  A conundrum posed by this requirement relates to the extent to which the “empowered” contractant is 
obliged to endeavour to ascertain what the legitimate interests of the other contractant may be. See 
further chapter 4 para 4.3 for a discussion of the possible permutations that could bedevil best efforts of 
a court in this regard. 
1916  Busch The Principles 270. 
1917  Article 6:248(2). See also Busch The Principles 270-271; Von Bar & Clive Principles 600. 
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contract, enabling a court to play a gap-filling role by supplying a reasonable price in terms 
Article 7.4.1918 
 
(E) Problems of generality and contradictions arising from reasonableness 
Whilst Article 3:12 of the NBW provides a conceptual framework for the standard of 
reasonableness, it is not without problems. The first element (generally accepted principles 
of law) is problematic in that the different principles of law may be contradictory. The 
second one (current juridical views in the Netherlands) does not necessarily reflect general 
views or patterns of behaviour in that it involves an investigation of the views of specific 
groups of persons, e.g., insurers, to which the contractants may belong. Hence, it does not 
necessarily concern general patterns of behaviour.1919 The last element (the particular 
societal and private interests involved) is equally problematic in that the interests may 
contradict each other1920 or the other two elements. In the light hereof, the conclusion that 
reasonableness is determined by very general and sometimes contradictory principles of 
law is justified.1921 
The broad formulation of the test for reasonableness1922 that provides courts with more 
latitude when deciding on the reasonableness of conduct1923 is not conducive of certainty in 
that it reduces the value of precedent. Its economic and/or social utility is compromised in 
that it may not provide the requisite guidance to contractants during the various stages of 
contract-creation, or to contractants who have to decide on a course of conduct when 
facing possible breach of contract or possible litigation. The formulation also does not 
exhibit any overt sensitivity for the wishes of the contractants, thereby demonstrating an 
apparent lack of regard for the consensual requirement in this vital area of contract law, 
namely, the determination of the price. 
                                                            
1918  Asser-Hijma Serie Bijzondere 216; Busch The Principles 270-271; Von Bar & Clive Principles 600. 
1919  Busch The Principles 63. 
1920  The three elements are set out in Busch The Principles 63. 
1921  Busch The Principles 64. 
1922  In Article 3:12. 
1923  Busch The Principles 64.  
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5.2.6.3 Conclusion 
Article 7.4 does not introduce the measure of certainty that it seems to do at first blush 
because it does no more than place a reasonable price in the context of an objective 
standard, viz., the usual price of the seller. Certainty is further eroded by Article 6:248(1) 
that provides for judicial gap-filling on the basis of the law, usage or the requirements of 
reasonableness and equity, read with Article 3:12 that sets out the standards for 
determining reasonableness.1924 
None of the provisions contained in the conceptual framework serve to address the 
problems associated with the standard of reasonableness in relation to the determination of 
price and rental.1925 Indeed, the broad and general provisions as well as the contradictory 
aspects of Article 3:121926 confirm the difficulties associated with the notion of a reasonable 
price.1927 It is difficult to resist the temptation to note here that at the time of its 
introduction some commentators were critical of the NWB, saying that the use of open 
norms will result in increased litigation and an increase in uncertainty.1928 It is submitted 
that the criticism could have been written specifically with the open-endedness of Article 
7.4 read with the other articles discussed above, in mind. 
The view has also been expressed that Article 6:248(2)’s requirement that the term, given 
the circumstances, must be “unacceptable” according to the criteria of reasonableness and 
equity means that a court “may intervene only by way of exception.”1929 Be that as it may, 
the provisions of Article 6:248 add additional layers to an already complex enquiry, 
multiplying the already substantial risks and uncertainties associated with the standard of 
reasonableness in relation to price.1930 
                                                            
1924  See paras 5.2.6.2(C)(ii) and 5.2.6.2(E) above. 
1925  See chapter 4 para 4.3. 
1926  Busch The Principles 63-64. See the discussion in paras 5.2.6.2(C)(ii) 5.2.6.2(E) above. 
1927  See chapter 4 para 4.3. 
1928  Wessels (1994) 41(2) Netherlands International LR 166. In para 5.2.2.2(C) above, the observation was 
made that the increase in litigation could result in a reduction in the legal, economic and social value of 
the decisions made. 
1929  Hartkamp et al Contract Law in the Netherlands 50; Busch The Principles 271. 
1930  See the discussion in chapter 4 above. 
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It is submitted that the broadly framed provisions are representative of the philosophy of 
keeping the contract alive, even if it operates at the cost of the actual intention of the 
contractants. Hence, they do not alleviate the concerns expressed in chapter 4 regarding the 
indefiniteness of the standard of reasonableness in relation to price and rental 
determination and its implication for consensus and certainty. The Dutch approach would 
be hard to justify in the context of policy, and the values underpinning the constitution.1931 
 
5.2.7 International Instruments 
5.2.7.1 Introduction 
The international instruments discussed below are all inspired by the desire to attain 
uniformity in trade1932 and to facilitate commercial transactions.1933 The discussion of these 
instruments will focus on the provisions relating to open price terms and aspects incidental 
thereto. Most of the instruments resolve the problems posed by open term contracts in 
relation to price with reference to the standard of reasonableness.  
 
5.2.7.2 The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(1980) 
The discussion that follows will commence with a brief introduction setting out some of the 
more salient aspects of the CISG provision. Thereafter, it engages in a discussion of the 
relevant provisions that regulate the CISG approach to open terms in relation to price 
determination. 
 
 
 
                                                            
1931  See the discussion in chapters 3 and 4 above. See also the discussion in paras 5.2.2.2(E)&(F) above. 
1932  Honnold ‘Symposium–Ten Years of the United Nations Sales Convention’ (1997-1998) 17 Journal of Law 
and Commerce 181, 182 (commenting on the UCC and the CISG), hereafter Honnold (1997-1998) 17 
Journal of Law and Commerce.   
1933  As also is the case in the other jurisdictions discussed in this chapter.  
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(A) Introduction 
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980) 
(CISG)1934 was inspired by “the need to free international commerce from the Babel of 
diverse domestic legal systems.”1935 It is aimed at attaining uniformity in international 
trade1936 rather than at devising new, improved, or reformed provisions of sales law.1937 
The CISG applies to contracts of sale1938 and the provisions thereof do not extend to other 
types of contracts, inclusive of lease agreements. It regulates the legal relationship between 
contractants whose places of business are in different Contracting States where the 
contractants have agreed to its application or where the rules of Private International Law in 
the State in which litigation takes place so dictate.1939 The CISG does not apply to non-
commercial sales (consumer sales) and hence it leaves domestic consumer sales contract 
                                                            
1934  Text available at <http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/V1056997-CISG-e-book.pdf.> The 
origins of the CISG may be traced to before the Second World War when attempts were made, under the 
auspices of the League of Nations, at creating uniformity in the international sale of goods: Amato ‘U.N. 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods – The Open Price Term and Uniform 
Application: An Early Interpretation by the Hungarian Courts’ (1993) 13 Journal of Law and Commerce 1, 
2, hereafter Amato (1993) 13 Journal of Law and Commerce. See also Farnsworth ‘Formation of Contract’ 
in Galston & Smit International Sales: The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods (1984) 3-1, 3-2, available at 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/farnsworth1.html#304> hereafter Farnsworth ‘Formation of 
Contract’.   
1935  Honnold J Documentary History of the Uniform Law for International Sales 1 (1989) as quoted in Flechtner 
‘The Several Texts of the CISG in a Decentralized System: Observations on Translations, Reservations and 
other Challenges to the Uniformity Principle in Article 7(1)’ (1997-1998) 17 Journal of Law and Commerce 
187, hereafter Flechtner (1997-1998) 17 Journal of Law and Commerce 187. 
1936  The importance of uniformity flows, not only, from the Preamble to the CISG, but also, from Article 7(1) 
which provides that uniformity in application is one of the basic interpretive principles of the CISG. Of the 
five national jurisdictions discussed above, only Germany (signed 1981, ratified 1989 and in force 1990); 
Netherlands (signed 1981, accepted 1990 and in force 1992); United States of America (signed 1981, 
ratified 1986 and in force 1988) have adopted the CISG: Kröll et al The United Nations Convention LVII-
LVIII. 
1937  Flechtner (1997-1998) 17 Journal of Law and Commerce 187. Though uniformity is the aim, the CISG does 
make provision for declarations and reservations in terms whereof Contracting States may opt out of 
certain parts of the CISG (Article 92). States may contract out of, inter alia, Articles 14(1) and 55: Kröll et 
al The United Nations Convention. The two articles are discussed in para 5.2.7.2(B) below. 
1938  Article 4.  
1939  Article 1 of the CISG.  See also Kröll et al The United Nations Convention 21; Boele-Woelki ‘Principles and 
Private International Law. The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the 
Principles of European Contract Law: How to Apply Them to International Contracts’ (1996) 1 Uniform LR 
652, 669, hereafter Boele-Woelki (1996) 1 Uniform LR; Bridge Benjamin’s Sale para [1-024].  
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provisions intact.1940 Where it applies, the CISG is mandatory, superseding the domestic 
sales law.1941 
 
(B) Regulation of open price terms 
(i) Article 55 of the CISG 
Article 551942 which fulfils a gap-filling role for an omitted price reads as follows: 
“Where a contract has been validly concluded but does not expressly or impliedly fix or make 
provision for determining the price, the parties are considered, in the absence of any indication to the 
contrary, to have impliedly made reference to the price generally charged at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract for such goods sold under comparable circumstances in the trade 
concerned.” 
Article 55 applies where a contract is silent on the price provided that the contract is valid in 
all other respects, and that there is nothing to the contrary, either expressly or impliedly, in 
such contract. The gap-filling role of Article 55 of the CISG comes into play only if there is no 
express or implied price1943 stipulation in the contract or if the contract does not otherwise 
provide for the determination of the price.1944 It will also not apply where the contractants 
agreed to fix the price at a later point in time.1945Article 55 comes into  operation only “in 
the absence of any indication to the contrary.” It, therefore, operates as a last resort where 
the interpretation of the contract does not lend itself to the determination of a price.1946 
                                                            
1940  Article 2. 
1941  Boele-Woelki (1996) 1 Uniform LR 669; Schultz ‘Rolling Contract Formation Under the UN Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods’(2001-2002) 35 Cornell International LJ 263, 266. 
1942  Article 55 is located in Part III (Sale of Goods) of the CISG. Parts II (Formation of the Contract) and III form 
the “substantive core” of the CISG: Lookofsky Understanding the CISG: A Compact Guide to the 1980 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for International Sale of Goods (2008) 47, hereafter Lookofsky 
Understanding the CISG. 
1943  A price would be implied through the inclusion of a price list of which the buyer was aware, or ought to 
have been aware or through trade usages and practices. Kröll et al The United Nations Convention 812. 
See also UNCITRAL Digest of Case Law on the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of 
Goods United Nations (2008) 178, hereafter UNCITRAL Digest of Case Law, available at < 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/clout/MAL-digest-2012-e.pdf> These variations of an implied price 
can be accommodated in the South African context under the current rubric of a usual/current price or 
the rubric of an implied price. See chapter para 1.4.2.2(C)(ii)(a)&(c).  
1944  Kröll et al The United Nations Convention 812. 
1945  UNCITRAL Digest of Case Law 59. In this regard, it differs from UCC 2-305(1)(b) which provides for a 
reasonable price where the contractants agreed to agree on a price but fail to do so. 
1946  Kröll et al The United Nations Convention 811. Article 55 is, for example, not applicable where the 
contractants had implicitly indicated the need to reach agreement on the price in the future: Case Law on 
UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT) Case No 139 [Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration at the Russian 
Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 3 March 1995] quoted in Gabriel ‘The Buyer’s 
Performance under the CISG: Arts 53-60 Trends in the Decisions’ (2005-2006) 25 Journal of Law and 
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Where a contract is silent on the price, the applicable price is not the reasonable price but 
the price “generally charged1947 at the time of the conclusion of the contract for such goods 
sold under comparable circumstances in the trade concerned.”  
The price which is determined at date of contract, any fluctuations thereafter being 
irrelevant,1948 is based on three objective criteria, namely, the price which is (a) paid for the 
same goods; (b) in the particular line of business or common market; and (c) in comparable 
circumstances.1949 Controversy reigns about the approach to be adopted where such 
objective features are lacking.1950 One of the views, and one that accords with the CISG’s 
philosophy to maintain the continued existence of the contract, is that the applicable 
domestic law should be used to fill the gap and that the contract should be deemed to be 
invalid only if domestic law provides no solution.1951 
 
(ii) Article 14(1) of the CISG 
Article 41(1) forms part of Part II Formation of Contracts. Article 92 allows states to contract 
out of Part II. 
Article 14(1)  
“A proposal for concluding a contract addressed to one or more specific persons constitutes an offer if it 
is sufficiently definite and indicates the intention of the offeror to be bound in case of acceptance. A 
proposal is sufficiently definite if it indicates the goods and expressly or implicitly fixes or makes 
provision for determining the quantity and the price.” 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Commerce 273, 275, hereafter Gabriel (2005-2006) 25 Journal of Law and Commerce 273. In this regard, 
the provisions of Article 55 resemble the provisions of Section 8(2) of the English Sale of Goods Act. See 
the discussion thereof in para 5.2.3.2(A) above.They differ from the UCC 2-305 in that they do not apply 
where (i) the contractants leave the price for future agreement and then fail to agree thereon (UCC 2-
305(1)(b)); and (ii) where the method agreed upon fails (UCC 2-305(1)(c) and UCC 2-305(3)). 
1947  Note that all the other jurisdictions link the price to the standard of reasonableness. Under the UNIDROIT 
Principles, reasonableness comes into play only if a trade price is not available which is peculiar because 
the standard of reasonableness encompasses a trade price as is evident from the discussion of the 
position in, for example, United States of America. 
1948  Kröll et al The United Nations Convention 814. 
1949  Kröll et al The United Nations Convention 814. 
1950  An example would be where there is no market in the goods which are produced solely for the buyer: 
Kröll et al The United Nations Convention 815. The rules of Private International Law would probably have 
to come into play to determine the applicable domestic law or the Malev approach would probably 
prevail in such an instance. The Malev court held that there is no market in aeroplane engines and hence 
Article 55 did not apply.  The Malev case is discussed hereafter. 
1951  Kröll et al The United Nations Convention 815. 
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The provisions of Article 55 are thrown into disarray by Article 14(1) which provides that a 
valid offer only arises if the offer expressly or implicitly fixes the price or provides for the 
determination thereof.1952 Article 14(1) operates as a compromise offered to those nations 
that preferred closed-term price provisions. It is reflective of the legal position countries 
such as South Africa which are less receptive to the notion of open price terms. Socialist 
countries as well as some civil law systems were against the notion of open term contracts 
preferring certainty and foreseeability over flexibility.1953 An objection that informed the 
opposition to Article 55 was that unilateral price determination could work to the 
disadvantage of the weaker contractant contracts. Another factor was that in Socialist 
countries contractants may be required to conform to a predetermined macroeconomic 
government plan.1954 
Article 14(1) is clearly aimed at some form of specificity and definiteness because without 
these qualities a court cannot determine whether enforceable obligations have been 
created.1955  The implication is that there is no offer and, hence, no intention to contract, 
where the proposal does not fix the price or does not make provision for determining the 
price1956 or where the contract does fix the price (and the goods and quantity), but the offer 
cannot be understood by “a reasonable person of the same kind [as the offeree] ... in the 
same circumstances [as the offeree].”1957 This conclusion which is supported by case law,1958 
                                                            
1952  Article 14(1) provides that a requirement for a valid offer is that the proposal must, inter alia, be 
“sufficiently definite.” Article 14(1) further provides that a proposal is sufficiently definite if it “indicates 
the goods and expressly or implicitly fixes or makes provision for determining the quantity and the price.” 
This is referred to as the “absolute validity requirement.” Accordingly, a contract is concluded when 
agreement is reached on “the essential minimum content,” namely, agreement on goods, quantity and 
price: Kröll et al The United Nations Convention 224 and 812. 
1953  Though the aim of the CISG was to attain uniformity of approach, the discussions surrounding the 
introduction of Article 55 created controversy which probably led to the incorporation of Section 14(1) as 
a compromise: Kröll et al The United Nations Convention 811. See also Garro ‘Reconciliation of Legal 
Traditions in the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods’ (1989) 23 The 
International Lawyer 443, 463-465, hereafter Garro (1989) 23 The International Lawyer 443; Mistelis 
‘Article 55: The Unknown Factor’ (2005-2006) 25 Journal of Law and Commerce 285, 287, hereafter 
Mistelis (2005-2006) 25 Journal of Law and Commerce285; Farnsworth ‘Formation of Contract’ 3-1, 3-7. 
1954  Cvetkovic ‘The Characteristics of an Offer in CISG and PECL’ (2002) 14 Pace International LR 121, 126 n16. 
1955  Lookofsky Understanding the CISG 48-49. 
1956  Lookofsky Understanding the CISG 50.  
1957  Article 8(2). 
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suggests that the Article 14(1) requirement is complied with on the application of criteria 
that approximate the objectively ascertainable requirement of South African law.  
In Pratt & Whitney v Malev Hungarian Airlines, the Supreme court of Hungary determined 
that an offer that did not specify the price of all the engines was not sufficiently definite in 
terms of Article 14(1) and was, hence, not binding.1959 The Court ruled that in order for a 
contract to be sufficiently definite it had to expressly or impliedly fix the price or make 
provision for its determination. 1960 
A contrary point of view that rejects the compromise premise is that Article 55 provides a 
default-rule position, with the courts playing a gap-filling role. This would negate any 
suggestion that an absence of a price term was necessarily fatal under Article 14(1).1961 
Another view is that the contradiction between Articles 14(1) and 55 leaves Article 55 
redundant.1962 Various other solutions have been offered.1963 However, the differences in 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
1958  Lookofsky Understanding the CISG, gives the example of a Hungarian case where “a seemingly nebulous” 
oral communication was held by the court to be sufficiently definite in that the course of prior dealings 
between the contractants impliedly determined, inter alia, the price of the goods. The decision is based in 
Article 9 (1) that provides that contractants are bound by any practices that they have established 
between themselves served as a basis for the court’s conclusion (49 and 96). Lookofsky does not give the 
name of the case.  
1959  Lookofsky Understanding the CISG 50-51.The court, apparently, did not reflect on the relationship 
between Article 14(1) and Article 55: Lookofsky Understanding the CISG 50-51 and 96. Apparently, the 
court also did not apply Article 55 because the court held that there was no market price for aircraft 
engines: Kröll et al The United Nations Convention 812 n6. See also Flechtner (1997-1998) 17 Journal of 
Law and Commerce 213; Gabriel (2005-2006) 25 Journal of Law and Commerce 275-276. 
1960  Flechtner (1997-1998) 17 Journal of Law and Commerce 212. See also Mistelis (2005-2006) 25 Journal of 
Law and Commerce 294. The Malev decision may be viewed as being illustrative of an interpretation 
filtered by the prism of national law and serves as a practical illustration of some of the criticisms levelled 
at the CISG: Amato (1993) 13 Journal of Law and Commerce 18-20. For the criticisms see para 5.2.7.2(E) 
below.  Given the clear provisions of the UCC 2-305 on the matter of open price terms, the decision 
would probably have gone the other way had the case been decided in a court in the United States of 
America or in Germany: Amato (1993) 13 Journal of Law and Commerce 18-20. It may be mentioned that 
the law in France mirrors the law in South Africa in so far as it requires that the price must be objectively 
ascertainable without further reference to the contractants: Amato (1993) 13 Journal of Law and 
Commerce 19. See further the discussion of the South African position in chapter 1 paras 1.1, 1.2 and 1.4. 
1961  Lookofsky Understanding the CISG 50. Lookosksy cites the Austrian Supreme Court as adopting a more 
liberal approach (51). See also Kröll et al The United Nations Convention report Honnold Uniform Law 
(1999) at para [325.3] as suggesting that Article 55 allows for open contracts (812-813 fn 8).  
1962  Farnsworth ‘Formation of Contract’ 3-8. Amato (1993) 13 Journal of Law and Commerce concludes that 
the decision in the Malev case does not help in reconciling controversy surrounding the relationship 
between Articles 14(1) and 55 (4-18). Amato also concludes that conflicting academic interpretations 
(Honnold v Farnsworth) of this relationship also do not assist in reaching an understanding of the Malev 
court’s decision. The disjunct between Articles 14(1) and 55 was also recognised but not resolved by 
those who participated in the drafting of the CISG: Amato (1993) 13 Journal of Law and Commerce 9-11. 
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approach to the conflicting provisions of Articles 14(1) and 55 in academic and judicial 
circles and the inability to arrive at a solution is reflective of the debate that gave rise to the 
“compromise” provisions and do not inspire confidence in the strive towards uniformity in 
the international arena.1964 
(C) Factors considered in determining the price “generally charged” 
(i) Market price 
Reference to a market price is permitted by Article 55 of the CISG.1965 Where a uniform 
market or stock-exchange exists, the prevailing price at such market or stock-exchange will 
be determinative.1966 For the purpose of realising the provisions of Article 55, it is sufficient 
if a price range is identifiable from which a median price may be deduced.1967The particular 
line of business or market is deemed to be the market to which both contractants 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Hence, the legislative history of the two articles is not of much use in resolving the controversy 
surrounding the two articles: Felemegas An International Approach to the Interpretation of the United 
Nations Convention for the International Sale of Goods (1980) as Uniform Sales Law (2007) 193. 
1963  Lookosky Understanding the CISG suggests a solution that resembles the position under UCC 2-305 read 
with UCC 2-204(3). (The UCC provisions are discussed in para 5.2.2.2(B) above). The proposal is that if the 
true intention of the contractants (determined in light of the provisions of Article 8) reveals an intention 
to be bound without a fixed or ascertainable price, then the default (gap-filling) provisions of Article 55 
should apply (51 and 96-97). The implication of this is that the provisions of Article 14 would then apply 
only in that category of cases where the contract provides for a method of determining the price.  
Kröll et al The United Nations Convention proposes that price be a “sufficient” but not a “necessary” 
condition for the validity of a contract (813). 
It is submitted that another solution could be found in the fact that in terms of Article 4(a) of the CISG, 
the CISG does not regulate the validity of contracts. The result of this exclusion is that the validity of 
contracts must be determined by the national law of the contractants identified by the rules of Private 
International Law as being the applicable law. The solution suggested is that Article 14(1) should be 
applied in those instances where the national law identified by Private International Law for the 
determination of the validity of the contract does not, for the sake of certainty, recognise open term 
contracts. Accordingly, Article 55 would apply only where the national law, identified by the rules of 
Private International Law as the applicable law for the determination of the validity of the contract, does 
not regard certainty as being paramount, and hence is not averse to the notion of open term contracts. It 
is admitted that such an interpretation would give rise to two strands of precedents – one, based in 
Article 55, that operates in countries that favour open terms and another one, based in Article 14(1), that 
operates in countries that do not favour open terms. However, the proposed solution would resolve the 
conflict that has dogged the relationship between the two articles up to now. Furthermore, it would 
prevent conflicting precedents being established regarding the relationship between Articles 14(1) and 55 
which have the effect of nullifying the Article 7(1) attempt at obtaining uniformity. 
 
1965  Mistelis (2005-2006) 25 Journal of Law and Commerce reports that a French court concluded that Article 
55 referred to a market price (292). 
1966  Kröll et al The United Nations Convention 815. 
1967  Kröll et al The United Nations Convention 815. 
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belong.1968 The position where no market exists appears to have been settled by the 
Hungarian Supreme Court in the Malev case. The court held that Article 55 of the CISG was 
not applicable because there was no market (for aeroplane engines).1969 
 
(ii) Usual price list 
In giving effect to Article 55 of the CISG, it has been said that the method relies on 
“objective or objectifiable facts and circumstances, such as the common list price for the 
goods.”1970 In a case decided in Germany, the contractants did not specifically discuss the 
price of the goods but had exchanged a seller’s “purchase list” which contained a price list. 
The Appellate Court concluded that the ‘usual list price can be taken as the price agreed 
upon.’1971 A Swiss court determined an omitted price based upon the usual invoice price of 
the seller.1972  
 
(iii) Usage and practice 
Article 55 of the CISG must also be read with Article 9(1) of the CISG which provides that 
contractants are bound by any usage to which they have agreed or by any practice which 
they have established for themselves.1973 In terms of Article 9(2) of the CISG contractants, 
unless otherwise agreed, are bound by a usage of which they “knew or ought to have 
known” and which in international trade is widely known to, and regularly observed by, 
parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade concerned.”  
                                                            
1968  Kröll et al The United Nations Convention 814. 
1969  Hence the decision based on Article 14(1) that a valid contract had not been concluded.  Mistelis (2005-
2006) 25 Journal of Law and Commerce 294.  
1970  Mistelis (2005-2006) 25 Journal of Law and Commerce 296. 
1971  Mistelis (2005-2006) 25 Journal of Law and Commerce 291. The article does not provide the citation of 
the case. 
1972  Mistelis (2005-2006) 25 Journal of Law and Commerce 294. The article does not provide the citation of 
the case. See also UNCITRAL Digest of Case Law 59. The usual price list or an invoice price would comply 
with the objective ascertainability requirement of South African law of sale. 
1973  This would include both what is referred to in the USA (para 5.2.2.2(B)(v)(b) above) as a course of 
performance and a course of dealings. 
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Thus, though the provisions of Article 55 of the CISG seem to indicate an open-ended 
approach (“the price generally charged” under “comparable circumstances”), the 
interpretations discussed above1974 are anchored in objectively ascertainable considerations 
and enjoy recognition in South African law.1975 
 
(D) Unilateral price determination 
The CISG does not provide for unilateral determination of the contract price. It is submitted 
that the probable reason for this may be located in the same reasons that countries 
objected to the enactment of the Article 55 open term provision, as well as the possibility of 
exploitation of poorer nations.1976 
 
(E) Arguments against the open price term provision 
(i) Burden of proof 
Article 55 is not clear about who has the burden of proving what the “trade” price is. Kröll et 
al cite some commentators as being of the view that the price has to be determined ex 
officio with the co-operation of the contractants, whilst others hold the view that the onus 
is on the contractant alleging the price.1977 The lack of clarity gives rise to uncertainty and 
the possibility exists that decisions may reflect the bias of contracting states to interpret the 
provisions along national lines.1978 
 
 
 
                                                            
1974  Namely market price, usual price list and usage and practice. 
1975  The notion of a market price is recognized whilst practices and usages may resort under the rubric of 
“implied terms.” See chapter 1 para 1.4.2.2(C)(ii). The price as per the seller’s price list is recognised - 
Shell SA (Pty) Ltd v Corbitt and Another 1984 (4) SA 523 (CPD)). Furthermore, where a contract is silent on 
the price it is accepted that the price is the usual price of the seller. See chapter 1 para 1.4.2.2(C)(a)&(c). 
1976  See further paras 5.2.7.2(E)(iii)&(iv) below. 
1977  Kröll et al The United Nations Convention 815-816. Kröll et al cite Magnus, in Stuadinger Kommentar 
(2005) as being in favour of the ex officio approach, whilst Benicke, in MünchKommHGB (2007) is cited as 
being in favour onus being on the contractant alleging the price. 
1978  See further para 5.2.7.2(E)(iii) below. 
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(ii) Interpretative differences 
Factors such as differences in meaning in national languages,1979 and differences in 
academic training and thinking and in professional training and practice may mean that the 
use of uniform international words does not necessarily translate into uniform application 
or interpretation of those words.1980 Even the notion that the wording is uniform is not 
accurate because of differences in, not only, the official CISG language versions of the 
document but also in the translations thereof into the various national languages.1981 It has 
also been said that the great anomaly of legal language is the “inability to define its crucial 
words in terms of ordinary factual counterparts.”1982 Finally, declarations and reservations 
also contribute to non-uniformity.1983 
                                                            
1979  Honnold ‘The Sales Convention in Action–Uniform International Words: Uniform Application?’ (1988) 8 
Journal of Law and Commerce207, 207-208, hereafter Honnold (1988) 8 Journal of Law and Commerce 
207. Honnold explains by quoting the realists as warning that “[e]ven if you get uniform laws you won’t 
get uniform results.” He ascribes the truth in this adage to the fact the lawyers work with “blunt, 
unreliable tools” called words. “Words” are “mushy, ambiguous things even for ordinary 
communications.” Honnold quotes Edna St. Vincent Millay as writing that translating the simple phrase 
“Home Sweet Home” into French “would drive a Frenchman to Gallic gesticulation.”   
1980  Honnold (1997-1998) 17 Journal of Law and Commerce 185. Cultural contexts may also contribute to 
different interpretations. Hence, language cannot perfectly represent the world. It has also been 
suggested that the same word may not have the same meaning twice, not even when used by the same 
person. Curran ‘Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in U.S. Comparative Law’ (1998) 46(1) 
American Journal of Comparative Law 43, 49, hereafter Curran (1998) 46(1) American Journal of 
Comparative Law 43. 
1981  The six CISG official translations are: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Spanish and Russian. Flechtner 
(1997-1998) 17 Journal of Law and Commerce 189. An attempt to deal with such language problems may 
be detected in the fact that there were only two official working languages used in the drafting of the 
Principles of European Contract Law (2003) (PECL), namely, English and French. During the drafting of the 
PECL, English increasingly became the language of choice but where a term could not be translated into 
French, serious consideration was given to dropping such term. Significant also was the fact that attempts 
were made to find “new, neutral terms wherever possible” in order to overcome “[t]he disadvantage of 
adopting the English terms’ common law history”: Busch The Principles 17. 
1982  Hart LA Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence (1919), 7-8, quoted in Curran (1998) 46(1) American 
Journal of Comparative Law 49 n12 and 50. 
1983  Flechtner (1997-1998) 17 Journal of Law and Commerce 193-197. In the USA, UCC 2 dealing with Sales 
has also not been uniformly adopted in the States that adopted it: Camero J ‘Repair the Roof When the 
Sun is Shining: Enacting a Federal Sales Act to Supplant Uniform Commercial Code Article 2’ 4-6. 
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Another important factor contributing to non-uniformity is the national lens through which 
tribunals tend to view international rules.1984 Instructive in this respect, are the varying 
interpretations given to Article 8(3) of the CISG that provides that “due consideration is to 
be given to all relevant circumstances of the case, including the negotiations, any practices 
which the parties have established between themselves, usages and any subsequent 
conduct of the parties” when ascertaining the intention of the contractants. Some 
commentators have interpreted this provision as renouncing the parol evidence rule whilst 
others take the view that it does not.1985 Courts in jurisdictions that regard contracts as 
being the product of an adversarial relationship would opt for the former interpretation 
whilst in a jurisdiction that views contracts as cooperative ventures,1986 the courts would opt 
for the latter interpretation.1987 That South African contract law falls into the former 
category is apparent from its alignment with the classical approach to contract law.1988 
Courts are also said to adopt interpretations that favour developed countries. Article 39 of 
the CISG requires a buyer to notify a seller of non-conformity within a reasonable period of 
time.1989 The adoption of a strict interpretation of the requirement by the courts is said to 
operate in favour mainly of developed countries.1990 
                                                            
1984  Amato (1993) 13 Journal of Law and Commerce 3. See also Mistelis (2005-2006) 25 Journal of Law and 
Commerce 292-293; Murray ‘The Neglect of the CISG: A Workable Solution’ (1997-1998) 17 Journal of 
Law and Commerce 365, 366, quotes Honnold J as emphasising “the lack of a common heritage of judicial 
technique and substantive law among Contracting States” as problematic to the attainment of uniformity 
in the interpretation of the provisions of the CISG; Honnold (1988) 8 Journal of Law and Commerce 208. 
1985  Flechtner (1997-1998) 17 Journal of Law and Commerce 200-201. 
1986  In an adversarial paradigm, each contractant would seek to exact the best possible deal without giving up 
too much with a resultant diminution in the level of trust that each has for the other. Where contracts 
are deemed to be a cooperative venture, contractants are perceived as being engaged in a mutually 
beneficial relationship based on trust and joint action: Flechtner (1997-1998) 17 Journal of Law and 
Commerce 202.   
1987  Flechtner (1997-1998) 17 Journal of Law and Commerce 200-204. Flechtner illustrates this point with 
reference to an American judgment where it was held that the CISG had no impact on the application of 
the Texas parole evidence rule. On the other hand, a German court recognised the principle that an oral 
agreement can contradict a written one.  
1988    This alignment is outlined in chapter 2. 
1989  A buyer who wishes to claim for defective goods must notify the seller within a reasonable period of time 
(Articles 38, 39 and 44).  Aside from the fact that not all domestic legal systems have such a rule, 
Germany has been identified as being too strict in its interpretation of what constitutes a reasonable 
period of time: Honnold (1997-1998) 17 Journal of Law and Commerce 185. 
1990  Alaoudh (2012) 26(4) Arab Law Quarterly 481. 
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Though principle of uniformity may be well-founded in theory, the reality dictates 
otherwise. As indicated1991 factors may exist that impact on the attainment of uniformity. 
The conclusion is that uniformity may be not always be the most viable option and that 
choices may be dictated by socio, economic, political, or constitutional considerations which 
may be equally, if not more, central to the development of a nation. 
 
(iii) National interest 
Some sales-related issues are not subject to the jurisdiction of the CISG. One of the most 
important concerns the validity of contracts, an issue which was pertinently placed outside 
the scope of the CISG.1992 The purpose of the exclusion is to preserve national rules that 
embody important public policies and social values that cannot be waived by agreement.1993 
Thus, there is a recognition that national and international policies are not, and need not, 
always be in alignment. The conclusion is strengthened by the fact of the inclusion of the 
both the closed term provisions of Article 14(1) and the open term provisions of Article 
551994 as well as by the fact that states may contract out of either or both.1995 
Given the above, and the vastly different legal, economic, social and political contexts in 
which transactions occur, it is inevitable that differences in approach, application and 
results would occur, leading to the realisation that global uniformity in respect of the 
essentialia of price and rental is probably unattainable. It also proves that uniformity may 
not necessarily be desirable given macro socio-economic, political, policy and constitutional 
considerations that may predominate in countries.  
 
(iv) Policy issues 
                                                            
1991  In this sub-paragraph as well as in the discussion of declarations and reservation and the compromise 
provisions of Articles 14(1) and 55. 
1992  Article 4(a). Kröll et al The United Nations Convention 62. 
1993  Flechtner (1997-1998) 17 Journal of Law and Commerce 198-199.  
1994  See para 5.2.7.2(B)(i) in this regard. 
1995  Article 92 allows states to contract out of Part II of the CISG (Article 14(1) falls into Part II) and out of Part 
III of which Article 55 forms part.  
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It is questionable whether global uniformity should be the goal given the different social, 
legal, economic, political and developmental imperatives that prevail in the different 
countries in the world. The CISG does, indeed, accommodate such imperatives by providing 
for declarations and reservations and by omitting some sale-related issues from its 
jurisdiction. The underlying purpose of the declarations and reservations is the preservation 
of national laws that embody important public policies and social values.1996 The recognition 
of provisions that allow States to opt out of certain provisions also serves to underscore the 
idea that uniformity should not be an inviolable principle of law.1997 
The issue of uniformity aside, open terms do not serve the interests of developing 
countries1998 especially when viewed through the prism of unfavourable terms of trade for 
raw materials (to the detriment of poorer countries) in relation to the ever-increasing price 
of manufactured goods (benefitting richer countries).1999 Courts located in developed 
countries where goods are manufactured and priced would probably impose (unreasonably) 
high prices for manufactured goods.2000 In addition, greater price transparency prevails for 
raw materials produced by poorer countries but not for manufactured and industrial goods 
imported by these economies.2001 Similar considerations apply in a national context and 
even if legislation such as the South African Consumer Protection Act were to provide the 
disempowered contractant with comprehensive and effective protection, the latter would 
                                                            
1996  Flechtner (1997-1998) 17 Journal of Law and Commerce 200-204. 
1997  Uniformity should, at best, serve as a consideration in interpreting the CISG rather than an inviolable 
principle. This is the underlying theme in Flechtner (1997-1998) 17 Journal of Law and Commerce 187. 
1998  In this regard, it has been said that determining the trade price should not be difficult where it concerns 
raw materials or semi-completed products. However, a different picture emerges when the subject 
matter of the sale is a manufactured product: UNCITRAL Digest of Case Law 178. The observation lends 
support for the reservations developing countries have of open term contracts. 
1999  Garro (1989) 23 The International Lawyer 443-483.  
2000  Eörsi ‘A Propos the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods’ (1983) 
32(2) The American Journal of Comparative Law 333, 463 n88, hereafter Eörsi (1983) 32(2)The American 
Journal of Comparative Law 333.  
2001  Schlechtriem ‘Uniform Sales Law – The UN-Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods’1, 
50, published by Manz, Vienna: 1986 and reproduced with their permission 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schlechtriem.html> 
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still be burdened, not only, with discharging the onus of proving unconscionable conduct , 
but also, with the transaction costs associated therewith.2002 
The foregoing observations underscore the conclusion in chapter 4 that the standard of 
reasonableness should not, on constitutional and policy grounds, be countenanced in the 
crucial aspect of contractual relations concerning price. 
(F) Observations 
The inclusion of Article 55 is described as an “uneasy compromise” between conflicting 
approaches (open price terms and closed price terms).2003 Very insightful for the purpose of 
this thesis is the comment that it does not make any sense to regard the one approach as 
better than the other (open terms v closed terms) because rules of law are determined by 
the economic model that lies behind them.2004 To this one may add that socio-economic and 
political considerations as well as constitutional values also play a role.2005 Also insightful is 
that the CISG, despite its stated purpose of creating uniformity in international sales,2006 is 
reflective of Western legal tradition (both common law and civil law) and ignored Asian 
values and Islamic law in its codification.2007 
The CISG provisions that constitute recognition that differences in national policies, as 
influenced by macro socio-economic considerations, exist and that these differences should 
be recognised offer support for the argument2008 that policy and constitutional imperatives 
in the South African context do not support the Supreme Court of Appeal’s call for 
uniformity with the position in England, Scotland, Germany, the Netherlands and the United 
                                                            
2002  See the discussion in chapter 3 above. 
2003  Garro (1989) 23 The International Lawyer 463-464. See also Mistelis (2005-2006) 25 Journal of Law and 
Commerce 287; Eörsi (1983) 32(2) The American Journal of Comparative Law 341-343. 
2004  Eörsi (1983) 32(2) The American Journal of Comparative Law 343. 
2005  See the discussion in chapter 4 above. 
2006  See the Preamble as well as Article 7(1) of the CISG. 
2007  Bell ‘New Challenges for the Uniformisation of Laws: How the CISG is Challenged by ‘Asian Values’ and 
Islamic Law’ (2011) 11, 15-16, hereafter Bell New Challenges. Bell explains that in Islamic law which has 
experienced a great resurgence, a price must be certain and determined. It cannot be aleatory and a 
market price at a future date or even a price to be determined by a third party would be regarded as 
speculative: Bell New Challenges 13. So also would the notion of a reasonable price to be determined by 
a judge: Bell New Challenges 23 and 26. Hence, both Articles 14 and 55 would be repugnant in the 
context of Islamic law. 
2008  The argument runs throughout chapter 4. 
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States of America by recognising sales and leases at a reasonable price and rental 
respectively, or a unilaterally determined price or rental.2009 
Non-conformity created by language, translations, idiom, interpretations that reflect 
national polices or bias all feed into the debate whether to adopt open price provisions in 
conformity with international practice. The discussion of the CISG provisions that illustrate 
some of the causes of non-conformity are indicative that conformity is not always desirable 
and that the development of the law and legal policy is dictated by national norms and 
policies, and macro socio-economic policies all of which may be informed by constitutional 
imperatives. This raises the rhetorical question whether on a constitutional and 
jurisprudential level the law should serve the national or the international interests. The 
recognition that uniformity is not an inviolable principle of law2010 is instructive in relation to 
the recommendation of the South African Supreme Court of Appeal2011 that South African 
law in relation to the essentialia of price and rental should be brought in line with the law in 
England, Scotland, Germany, the Netherlands and the United States of America.2012 
 
(G) Conclusion 
Inasmuch as the CISG supports the validity of contracts in the absence of an agreement on 
price, the factors used, pursuant to Article 55, in filling in price gaps are not supportive of 
the use of the standard of reasonableness in determining the price. Some of the factors, 
namely, market price, usual price list, and usages and practices2013 have their roots in 
objective considerations and are reflective of the South African requirement of objective 
ascertainability rather than the standard of reasonableness. 
                                                            
2009  in NBS Boland Bank v One Berg RiverPara [16]. 
2010  Flechtner (1997-1998) 17 Journal of Law and Commerce 187. See the discussion in para 5.2.7.2(E)(iv) 
above.  
2011  NBS Boland Bank v One Berg River Drive 1999 (4) SA 928 (A). 
2012  A similar inference may be drawn in relation to the obiter dicta of the then Appellate Division in Genac 
Properties  v NBC Administrators 1992 (1) SA 566 (AD). 
2013  Discussed in para 5.2.7.2(C)). 
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Article 55 of the CISG also does not dispel any of the uncertainties and problems that 
surround the standard of reasonableness.2014 Instead, the uncertainties are 
compounded.2015 The uncertainty regarding the question of onus compounds these 
uncertainties. Furthermore, in settling on a median price or a price that approximates the 
median, it overlooks the fact that buyers and sellers, in general, have different approaches 
to contracting,2016 
Since the CISG was intended to represent a compromise between existing legal 
traditions,2017 the fact that Article 14(1) with its restrictive view was retained despite 
consistent opposition from, amongst others, the United States of America,2018 is indicative 
that the restrictive view is well supported in national legal regimes.2019 More importantly, 
the retention of Article 14(1) is also indicativethat the restrictive view is not viewed as being 
unsound in the context of the legal and economic order of the modern world.  
In addition, there is a recognition and acceptance that the laws of countries may differ 
because of differences in national and economic policy considerations. Hence, the 
acceptance of the constitutional and policy considerations for the retention in South Africa 
of the objective ascertainable requirement in relation to price determination2020 finds 
support in the CISG acknowledgement.  
The concerns expressed at an international level by developing countries in relation to both 
the open terms provision and the possibility of interpretations of CISG provisions favouring 
developed countries suggest that similar concerns, at a national level (in South Africa) in 
                                                            
2014  See the discussion in chapter 4. 
2015  The reference to a market price to fill price gaps creates lacunae in that that it ignores that a market may 
not exist or that contractants may operate in different markets or that there may be no uniformity in the 
market. For example, there may be different approaches in the countries of the respective contractants 
or there may be divergent practices in different countries. 
2016  Furthermore, in setting a price that approximates the median, the question arises whether it is going to 
be set above or below the median and by how much will or should it deviate from the median. 
2017  Amato (1993) 13 Journal of Law and Commerce 2. See also MacQueen & Zimmermann Edinburgh Studies 
in Law Volume 2 European Contract Law Scots and South African Perspectives (2006) 21-22.  
2018  Farnsworth ‘Formation of Contract’ 3.7. 
2019  Objections to the notion of open-term contracts were raised by Socialist countries as well as by some 
countries with a civil law system. Mistelis (2005-2006) 25 Journal of Law and Commerce 287.  
2020  See the discussion in chapter 4. 
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relation to the recognition of a reasonable price and rental and a unilaterally determined 
price and rental, are not without merit. The context of the skewed socio-economic reality in 
South Africa lends further weight to these concerns. 
The absence of a general duty of good faith2021 suggests that the drafters did not consider 
good faith as playing a significant role in the context of the open-price provision. The 
assumption is borne out by the fact that the Malev Airlines court evidently did not consider 
the notion of good faith to constitute sufficient grounds for invoking the provisions of Article 
55 of the CISG. Hence, the recognition of the duty of good faith does not, in itself, justify the 
adoption of the standard of a reasonable as suggested by the obiter dicta. 
The conclusion is that the provisions of the CISG do not support the reception into South 
African of the contracts of sale at a reasonable price or at a unilaterally determined price.  
 
5.2.7.3 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (2004)  
(A) Introduction 
The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (2004), (UNIDROIT 
Principles),2022 which have global application and which are intended to promote 
uniformity,2023 only apply to business to business transactions,2024 and may, in general, only 
be used where the contractants have agreed to its application.2025 Its application is not 
                                                            
2021  Bell New Challenges 27. Article 7(1) simply provides that in interpreting the convention, regard must be 
had to “the need to promote...the observance of good faith in international trade.” Lookofsky explains 
that the rule of interpretation was formulated as a substitute for a “substantive good-faith provision as 
some drafters of the CISG feared that a rule that required “good faith conduct might lead to 
“uncertainty”: Lookofsky Understanding the CISG 37 n187.It must be noted, however, that since the CISG 
does not generally deal with questions of validity, most questions which fall under the heading of validity 
such as fraud, duress, mistake or unreasonableness or unconscionability of contract terms fall to be 
resolved according to domestic or non-CISG (1980) rules:  Lookofsky Understanding the CISG 22. 
2022    Text available at 
<http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralversionprinciples2004-
e.pdf> 
2023  Article 1.6 of the UNIDROIT Principles. See also Bonell & Peleggi ‘UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts and Principles of European Contract Law: A Synoptical Table’ (2004) 9 Uniform LR 
315, 334, hereafter Bonell & Peleggi (2004) 9 Uniform LR 315.  
2024  Busch The Principles 15 and 16. 
2025  It may also be applied where the contractants have not specified a specific contractual regime that will be 
applicable. Preamble of the UNIDROIT Principles. 
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limited to contracts of sale as in the case of the CISG.2026 Hence it covers lease agreements 
as well. 
 
(B) Reasonable price and rental 
The following provisions have a bearing on the position relating open price terms: 
Article 5.1.7 
(1) “Where contract does not fix or make provision for determining the price, the parties are considered, 
in the absence of any indication to the contrary, to have made reference to the price generally 
charged at the time of the conclusion of the contract for such performance in comparable 
circumstances in the trade concerned or, if no such price is available, to a reasonable price.  
Article 2.1.13 
“Where in the course of negotiations one of the parties insists that the contract is not concluded until 
there is agreement on specific matters or in a particular form, no contract is concluded before 
agreement is reached on those matters or in that form.” 
The open price provisions do not apply where the contract contains a contractual provision 
for the determination of a price2027 or where a contractant insisted on agreement on the 
price as a precondition for the validity of the contract and no such agreement is reached.2028 
Hence, an agreement to agree does not invalidate the contract.2029 In the absence of such 
contractual provision or precondition, the presumption is that price is the price generally 
charged at the time of the conclusion of the contract2030 in the particular trade for a similar 
transaction under similar circumstances. The presumption may be rebutted by proving that 
it does not satisfy the test of reasonableness which forms part of Article 5.1.7.  Where a 
trade price does not exist, a reasonable price will be implied.2031 Hence, the UNIDROIT 
Principles adopt a two-stage approach2032 in that a reasonable price is implied only if there is 
no trade price. 
                                                            
2026  Kröll et al The United Nations Convention 236. 
2027  Article 5.1.7(1). 
2028  Article 2.1.13. A similar position prevails in the other jurisdictions under discussion in this chapter. See 
also Beale et al Ius Commune Casebooks 327. 
2029  Article 2.1.14 provides that the contract remains valid where the contractants agree to agree on a term 
(price) and do not subsequently reach such agreement. The provisions of Article 5.1.7(1) would then 
come into operation. 
2030  See para 5.2.2.2(D)(i)(b) above.  
2031  Article 5.17(1). See also Gabriel Contracts for the Sale of Goods: A Comparison of US and International 
Law (2009) 189-190. 
2032  This is unlike Article 55 of the CISG which was discussed in para 5.2.7.2(B)(i) above, and Article 6:104 of 
the PECL which is discussed in para 5.2.7.4(C)(i) below. 
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The problems created by Article 14(1) of the CISG2033 are not replicated in the UNIDROIT 
Principles where Article 2.1.2 simply requires (i) that the offer must be sufficiently definite 
to permit conclusion of the contract by mere acceptance by the offeree, and (ii) that it must 
indicate the offeror’s intention of being bound in the event of acceptance by the offeree.2034 
Thus, it leaves out reference to price (and quantity) as determinants of definiteness,2035 
obviating the contradiction that characterises Articles 14(1) and 55 of the CISG.2036 
Article 5.1.7(1) is supplemented by the provisions of Article 4.8 that provides that in 
supplying an omitted term that is appropriate in the circumstances, the court shall have 
regard for the intention of the contractants, the nature and purpose of the contract, good 
faith and fair dealing as well as reasonableness. However, the UNIDROIT Principles does not 
contain a definition of reasonableness unlike the PECL (Article 1:302).2037 
 
(C) Past practice and usage as factors in determining a reasonable price and rental 
In determining a reasonable price, the contractants are bound by any practice they 
established between themselves,2038 or by a usage that is “widely known and regularly 
observed2039 in international trade by parties in the particular trade concerned except 
where the application thereof would be unreasonable.”2040 The exception provides the 
court with considerable leeway in not enforcing a trade usage where one is proven.  
The discretionary aspect coupled with the absence of guidelines for the interpretation of the 
notion of reasonableness in the context of price, confirms the aspects of uncertainty and 
                                                            
2033  Discussed in 5.2.7.2(B)(ii) above. 
2034  Kröll et al The United Nations Convention 236. 
2035  The probable explanation for this is that the provisions of Article 2.1.2 are not confined to contracts of 
sale: Kröll et al The United Nations Convention 236. 
2036  Article 2:201(1) of the PECL, discussed below, is phrased in terms similar to that of Article 2.1.2 of the 
UNIDROIT Principles. The PECL is also not limited to contracts of sale - Article 1:101(1). 
2037  Discussed in para 5.2.7.4(C)(ii) below. See also Bonell & Peleggi (2004) 9 Uniform LR 336. 
2038  Article 1.9(1). 
2039  Article 1.9(2). Article 1:105(2) of the PECL is less restrictive in its interpretation in that it simply requires a 
usage that is “considered generally applicable in the same situation as the parties.” See para 5.2.7.4(C)(ii) 
below. 
2040  Article 1.9(2). 
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indeterminateness associated with the standard of reasonableness as discussed in chapter 4 
above. 
It would appear from the foregoing that the contract would be invalid where the subject-
matter of the sale is rare or unique so that an application of the above considerations 
proves futile in the establishment of a price.2041 Such a result accords with the position in 
South Africa.2042 
 
(D) Unilateral discretionary power to determine price and rental 
Article 5.1.7(2) provides that where the price that was unilaterally determined is found to be 
manifestly unreasonable, a reasonable price shall be substituted notwithstanding anything 
to the contrary in the contract. Thus the discretion is not unfettered. The reasonableness of 
unilaterally determined price would be subject to scrutiny in terms of Article 1.7 which 
places a non-derogable duty of good faith and fair dealing in international trade on 
contractants. However, applying the duty to conditions in international trade is problematic 
in that standards may vary from one business sector to another. There may also be a 
variance within one sector depending on the socio-economic and political environment 
within which the trade sector operates and also on the differences in size and technical skills 
that occur within different components that make up the trade sector.2043 
 
(E) Conclusion 
As in the case of the jurisdictions discussed earlier, some of the mechanisms used to 
determine a reasonable price and rental have their basis in the South African requirement 
of objective ascertainability.2044 The mechanisms for determining a reasonable price and 
rental simply serve as guidelines, as in the case of the other jurisdictions, and courts may 
deviate from these. The guidelines, such as there are, provided for the determination of a 
                                                            
2041  Asse-Hijmar Serie Bijzondere 218.  
2042    See the discussion in chapter 1 para 1.4.2.2(C)(ii)(a) and in chapter 4 paras 4.3.4.3(C)and (D). 
2043  UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES 17-21. 
2044  For example, reference to trade usage or earlier practices between the contractants. 
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reasonable price and rental, do not dispel any of the reservations expressed in chapter 4 in 
relation to a reasonable price and rental. 
 
 
5.2.7.4 Principles of European Contract Law (2003) 
(A) Introduction 
The genesis2045 of the Principles of European Contract Law (2003) may be traced to a dinner 
held after a symposium on the harmonisation of private international law in 1974 in 
Copenhagen when Professor Ole Lando2046 had a “brainwave: to harmonise the substantive 
of Europe in order to integrate the common market. This led to the formation of the 
Commission on European Contract Law that commenced its activities in the early 1980’s. 
The result of their deliberations is the Principles of European Contract Law (2003).2047 
The provisions of the PECL are intended to be applied as general rules of contract law in the 
European Union.2048 The PECL, which is localised to Western Europe, applies to all 
transactions: business to business; consumer transactions and private contracts.2049 Hence, 
it covers contracts of lease as well and, like the CISG and UNIDROIT Principles (2004), it is 
intended to promote uniformity.2050 The application of the PECL (2003) is not peremptory 
and will apply only between contractants who have agreed to its application.2051 
 
(B) Reasonable price and rental 
The provisions dealing with that deals with open price contracts reads: 
                                                            
2045  The history is drawn from Busch The Principles.  
2046  Professor of Private International Law at the Copenhagen Business School. 
2047    Hereafter referred to as the PECL. Text available at 
<http://frontpage.cbs.dk/law/commission_on_european_contract_law/PECL%20engelsk/engelsk_partI_o
g_II.htm> 
2048  Article 1:101(1) and all text references to the PECL are from Bonell & Peleggi (2004) 9 Uniform LR 358. 
2049  Busch The Principles 15 and 16; Boele-Woelki (1996) 1 Uniform LR 656. 
2050  Article 1:106. See also Bonell & Peleggi (2004) 9 Uniform LR 334. 
2051  Article 1:101(2). It may also apply where the contractants have not agreed to a specific system of 
(national or international) law (Article 1:101(3)) or where the chosen system of law does not provide a 
solution (Article 1:101(4)). It serves as a source of law within the European Union. Busch The Principles 
29. 
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Article 6:104 
“Where the contract does not fix the price or the method of determining it, the parties are to be treated 
as having agreed on a reasonable price.” 
Article 6:105 
“Where the price or any other contractual term is to be determined by one party and that party’s 
determination is grossly unreasonable, then notwithstanding any provision to the contrary, a reasonable 
price or other term shall be substituted.” 
Article 1:302  
“Reasonableness 
Under the Principles reasonableness is to be judged by what persons acting in good faith and in the same 
situation as the parties would consider to be reasonable. In particular, in assessing what is reasonable 
the nature and purpose of the contracts, the circumstances of the case, and the usages and practices of 
the trades or professions involved should be taken into account.” 
In order to avoid the voidance of a contract for lack of certainty, a reasonable price is used 
where the contract does not contain a price or a method of determining the price.2052 The 
principle applies to all contracts where a price has to be paid for the counter-performance 
of the other contractant, inclusive of lease agreements.  
However, it does not apply where the price can be deduced directly or indirectly, explicitly 
or implicitly, from the contract itself, neither does it apply where the contractants 
negotiated the price but failed to reach agreement thereon.2053 It also does not apply where 
a contractant insisted on agreement on the price as a precondition for the validity of the 
contract.2054 
 
(C) Factors considered in determining a reasonable price and rental 
(i) Normal price 
Article 6:104 is said to create a presumption that the contractants in such a situation 
intended to be bound by the normal price.2055 However, there is no explanation of what 
constitutes a normal price. Is it, for example, the normal price of the seller or is it the normal 
price charged by traders in the particular type of goods? 
 
(ii) Good faith, usages and practices 
                                                            
2052  Article 6:104. This simple provision advances a less complicated approach to judicial power to maintain a 
contract which stands in contrast to Article 55 read with Article 14(1) of the CISG, and Article 5.1.7 of the 
UNIDROIT Principles See also Busch The Principles 268. 
2053  Busch The Principles 268.  
2054  Article 2:103(2). Similar provisions are contained in the other jurisdictions under discussion.  
2055  Busch The Principles 268, with reference to Comment B to Article 6:104. 
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Article 1:302 provides that the standard to be used in determining the reasonableness of 
the price is that which a person acting in good faith in the same situation as the 
contractants, would consider to be reasonable. In particular, the nature and purpose of the 
contract, the circumstances of the case, and the usages and practices of the trades or 
professions involved should be taken into account. The article is not peremptory insofar as it 
concerns usages and practices. A court is by no means limited to those factors as is evident 
from the fact that the Article requires the court to have regard for the nature and purpose 
of the contract and the circumstances of the case.2056 
A usage may be described as a course of dealing or a line of conduct which has gradually 
manifested itself in a trade or industry.2057 However, the usage does not apply where it 
would be unreasonable to do so.2058 This gives the court, as in the case of Article 1.9(2) of 
the UNIDROIT Principles (2004), a wide discretion to disregard established usages.  
A practice refers to a precedent established as a result of a sequence of previous conduct 
under a particular transaction between the contractants.2059 Contractants are bound by 
their practices as well as by any usages to which they have agreed.2060 The application of 
such practices and usages, unlike usages to which the contractants have not agreed, are not 
subject to disqualification on the basis of unreasonableness.2061 This is peculiar because 
practices may also be unreasonable. The fact that contractants had followed a particular 
practice in the past should not give rise to an irrebuttable presumption of reasonableness. 
The possibility that a practice could have arisen as a result of factors such as unequal 
                                                            
2056  See also Busch The Principles 62. 
2057  Comment A to Article 1:105 of the PECL in Busch The Principles 40. 
2058  Article 1:105(2). It will be considered to be unreasonable, for example, where the usage prevails only at 
the place of business of one of the contractants. Busch The Principles 41. Article 1:105 reads: 
 “Art. 1:105: Usages and Practices 
(1) The parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed and by any practice they have 
established between themselves. 
(2) The parties are bound by usage which would be considered generally applicable by persons in the 
same situation as the parties, except where the application of such usage would be 
unreasonable.” 
2059  Comment A to Article 1:105 of the PECL (2003) in Busch The Principles 40.  
2060  Article 1:105(1). 
2061  Article 1:105(1). 
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bargaining power which would render the practice unreasonable, cannot be discounted. A 
practice will take precedence over a usage (not specifically agreed upon between the 
contractants) in the event of a conflict between the two.2062 
(D) Unilateral discretionary power to determine the price and rental 
Article 6:105 permits unilateral discretionary power to settle the price or any contractual 
term subject to the peremptory proviso2063 that the determination must not be grossly 
unreasonable. In the event of gross unreasonableness, the court plays a gap-filling role by 
substituting the price with a reasonable price, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in 
the contract.2064 In deciding whether the determination is grossly unreasonable, a court is 
guided by the provisions of Article 1:302 of the PECL (2003) discussed above.2065 Though 
peremptory, the inescapable conclusion is that the proviso places the burden of proof and 
the transaction costs on the “disempowered” contractant who, as suggested in chapter 4 
above, in most cases would be the contractant with the weaker bargaining power.2066 
Furthermore, the high onus of “gross unreasonableness”2067 serves to caution that courts 
must apply the article with “great reserve.”2068 Hence, a finding of unreasonableness may 
occur only be way of exception. 
 
(E) Conclusion 
The contents of the notion of reasonableness in the PECL (2003) resemble, in the main, 
those of the jurisdictions and the international instruments discussed earlier. In the main, 
the PECL provisions on reasonableness and the interpretation thereof do not contribute to a 
better understanding of reasonableness in that they do not address the issue of the 
                                                            
2062  Busch The Principles 41. 
2063  The proviso may not be excluded by agreement between the contractants. Busch The Principles 270. 
2064  Busch The Principles 270. 
2065  See the discussion in para 5.2.7.4(C)(ii) above. 
2066  The adverse implications thereof were discussed in chapter 4 above. 
2067  Emphasis added. 
2068  Busch The Principles 270. 
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indeterminateness of the standard of reasonableness2069 in any meaningful manner. Hence, 
they do not give expression to the principle of certainty, with attendant adverse 
consequences for beneficial reliance on contract law as an obligation-creating mechanism. 
 
5.3 Conclusion: comparative and international law 
The presumption that a valid contract exists despite the absence of agreement on a price is 
jurisprudentially unsound in that the absence of agreement provides good evidence that 
contract has not been concluded. The presumption is also problematic in that it promotes 
uncertainty.2070 Contractants who have not expressly made their agreement conditional on 
agreement on a price may be surprised to find that they are contractually bound. Aside from 
the evidentiary problems that the presumption gives rise to,2071 a contractant who is thus 
surprised would have to bear the burden of proof and the costs of litigation to disprove the 
existence of the contract.  
The indeterminacy and the casuistic nature of the enquiry may generate such a large 
number, range, and diversity of precedents that it reduces the social and economic utility of 
the precedents.2072 The aforementioned could lead to a distrust of role of contract law as an 
obligation-creating mechanism and consequentially to an erosion of the function of the law 
as a regulatory institution. 
Some of the meanings accorded to the concept of reasonableness by the other jurisdictions 
and by the international instruments either already find expression in South African contract 
law2073 whilst some others may be accommodated under the umbrella requirement of 
objective ascertainability, which, as already explained, is sufficiently elastic to incorporate 
                                                            
2069  See chapter 4 para 4.3. 
2070  See paras 5.2.2.2(D)(i)(a) and 5.2.3.2(A) above.  
2071  See para 5.2.2.2(D)(i)(a) above. 
2072  See para 5.2.2.2(D)(i)(a) above. 
2073  For example, the seller’s usual price, or a formula, or a price list the price according to the seller’s price 
list from time to time in para 5.2.2.2(B)(v)(c) above.  
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considerations like usages and practices.2074 Where the concept of reasonableness is not 
anchored by objective factors such as price lists, practices and usages,2075 the international 
law and practice do not provide any succour to someone seeking to overcome the problems 
associated with the standard of reasonableness in relation to price and rental 
determination.2076 The developments in South Africa concerning the place of the 
constitutional values of dignity, equality and freedom in the wider body of law, and, in 
contract law in particular, render the indeterminateness of a reasonable price 
problematic.2077 The indeterminateness that may lead to the imposition of terms that were 
not anticipated or contemplated would result in the relegation of the uniqueness of the 
individual contractants and would fall foul of the values of dignity and ubuntu that infuse 
contractual law in the constitutional era.2078 The indeterminateness would also fall foul of 
the policies that have inspired constitutional legislation such as the Consumer Protection 
Act.2079   
The inclusion in the CISG of both open-price terms (Article 55) and closed-price terms 
(Article 14(1))2080 and the exclusion of the important issue of the validity of contracts from 
the jurisdiction of the CISG constitute acknowledgment that constitutional and/or macro 
socio-economic and/or political considerations determine the content of national law. They 
also constitute an admission that the one system is not better than the other. The 
compromise to include Article 14(1) suggests that the closed-price model has considerable 
support in the international community.2081 Thus, the argument, on constitutional and 
                                                            
2074  For example, the “course of performance” and the “course of dealing” may be accommodated under the 
rubric of an implied price. See further the conclusions reached in paras 5.2.2.2(E)&(F) above. 
2075  See para 5.2.2.2(D)(ii)(b)-(h) above. 
2076  See chapter 4 para 4.3 
2077  Similar developments are evident in the international arena. See the discussion of the national and 
international developments in this regard in chapter 4 para 4.2.4.2(A). 
2078  See the discussion in chapter 4 para 4.2.4.2(A)(iii). Dignity also plays a role in the international arena. See 
chapter 4 para 4.2.4.2(A)(ii). 
2079  See chapter 3. 
2080  See para 5.2.7.2(B) above. 
2081  See chapter 5 paras 5.2.7.2(F)&(G). The closed price model was included despite sustained pressure from 
America against its inclusion. 
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policy grounds, for the retention in South Africa of the objective ascertainability 
requirement in relation to price determination,2082 has support in international law. 
The discussion also reveals that the open term provisions in the United States of America, 
England, and under the CISG are limited to contracts of sale and do not apply to contracts of 
lease. The probable reason for this is that the purpose of the open term provisions in those 
jurisdictions is to serve the commercial markets.2083 It is submitted that another reason may 
be located in the public policy considerations underpinning the socio-economic rights to 
shelter and family life. These rights enjoy recognition in the South African Constitution2084 as 
well as in international instruments.2085 The exclusion of rental from the being determined 
by the standard of reasonableness on these policy bases would orientate contract law, using 
Pound’s idiom, from a body of devices that principally serve the interests of the markets to 
an instrument geared towards obtaining general social ends.2086 
Finally, and in light of the prominent role that good faith plays in most of the jurisdictions 
under discussion, it is necessary to comment on its role. The duty, grounded as it is in the 
facts of the particular case, does not, and indeed, it cannot,2087 provide much in the way of 
criteria that could have precedent value in the determination of a reasonable price. 
Furthermore, when viewed in the context of the meanings ascribed to a reasonable price in 
those jurisdictions that recognise a general duty of good faith and those that do not,2088 the 
absence of such duty neither resolves not exacerbates the indeterminateness of a 
                                                            
2082  See chapter 4. 
2083  As suggested by Pound (1931) 44 Harvard LR 708. 
2084  Sec 26 of the Constitution discussed in chapter 3 paras 3.3 and 3.8.1 and in chapter 4 paras 4.2.4.2(A)(i) 
4.5. 
2085  The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966. Part III thereof recognizes 
socio-economic rights such as the rights to family life, adequate food, clothing and housing. Section 2(1) 
obliges member states are to take measures for the progressive realization of the rights contained in the 
Covenant. South Africa signed the Covenant in 1994 but has not yet ratified it. 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=4&lang=en&mtdsg_no=IV-3&src=TREATY, 
accessed on 23 November 2012. 
2086  Pound (1931) 44 Harvard LR 708 in an essay critical of the then emerging New Realist movement.   
2087  From a jurisprudential perspective, it is not meant equipped to do so. See also Van der Merwe Contract 
196. 
2088  A general duty exist in the all the jurisdictions except for England (para 5.2.3.2(B)(i)), and the CISG 
(5.2.7.2(G)). 
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reasonable price. The discussion confirms that good faith does not address the issue of 
certainty. What it does is to serve as a standard against which conduct of the contractants 
may be judged.2089 Be that as it may, the contention is that the recognition of a reasonable 
price or a unilaterally determined price is one to be decided as a matter of principle and 
policy based on the constitutional values of dignity, equality and freedom. The duty of good 
faith is seen as supporting this conclusion.2090    
In summary, the legal provisions in the different jurisdictions referred to by the SCA in the 
obiter dicta2091 as well as in the international instruments examined, do not resolve or 
provide guidelines that would address the problems associated with the standard of 
reasonableness outlined above.2092 The legal provisions and international instruments also 
do not address the constitutional, jurisprudential and policy deficiencies of replacing the 
requirement of agreement on the essentialia of price and rental with the standard of 
reasonableness. In the absence of any meaningful contribution in this respect, it is 
submitted that the legislative instruments discussed in this chapter do not provide any 
incentive for the adoption in South African law of the standard of reasonableness as a 
mechanism for the determination of price and rental. Hence, the international experience 
does not justify a departure from the common law rule that requires certainty in that the 
price must be ascertained or objectively ascertainable ex facie the contract. 
 
                                                            
2089  Van der Merwe et al Contract 277-278; Hutchison et al Contract 28-32. 
2090  See the discussion in chapter 4, para 4.2.4.4 and chapter 6 paras 6.5-6.6.  
2091  NBS Boland Bank v One Berg River Drive and others 1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA) and Genac Properties JHB (Pty) 
Ltd v NBC Administrators CC 1992 1 SA 566 (AD) 
2092  See chapter 4 para 4.3. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion and recommendations 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The central theme of this thesis, which has its genesis in obiter dicta in NBS Boland Bank v One 
Berg River Drive and others Deeb and another v ABSA Bank Ltd Friedman v Standard Bank of 
South Africa Ltd2093 and in Genac Properties JHB (Pty) Ltd v NBC Administrators CC2094 concerns 
the question whether South African law should recognise the validity of contracts of sale and 
lease where the contractants had agreed on a reasonable price and rental respectively, or on a 
price or rental to be unilaterally determined by one of them.  
The thesis’s aims is to determine whether a development in our law that recognises the validity 
of a contract of sale and lease at a reasonable price and rental, respectively, or at a unilaterally 
determined price and rental would be contrary to public policy as informed by the 
constitutional values of dignity, equality and freedom and whether such a development would 
promote consensus and certainty of the law which are foundational principles of the South 
African law of contract. 
With the above in mind, this chapter outlines and justifies my conclusions with reference to the 
preceding chapters. It will also recommend whether or not the status quo should be retained 
and whether the current provisions in our law relating to price are sufficiently refined and 
developed to give expression, not only, to the needs of commercial reality, but more 
importantly, to the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom (including 
freedom of contract) that underpin the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996.2095 In 
arriving at a conclusion, it is necessary to review the findings in the preceding chapters. 
                                                            
2093  1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA), hereafter NBS Boland Bank 1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA). 
2094  1992 (1) SA 566 (A), hereafter Genac Properties 1992 (1) SA 566 (A). 
2095   Hereafter the Constitution. 
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 6.2 Background issues 
The first chapter served to introduce various aspects of legal principle and policy that influence 
the question of law under investigation, as well as to lay the groundwork for the issues to be 
discussed in the chapters that followed it. 
The chapter introduced the concepts of certainty and freedom of contract (that includes 
contractual discretionary powers), the inter-relationship between the two and their bearing on 
the question of law. The discussion also entailed an examination, as does the whole thesis, of 
the values underlying the Constitution and how these impact on the principles of freedom and 
certainty of contract and on the question of law. 
No conclusions were drawn regarding the question of law. The discussion established that 
freedom and certainty of contract have a very fundamental role in the determination of the 
question of law. It also established that the tension between the two (freedom and certainty of 
contract) insofar as they may give rise to different conclusions regarding the question of law, 
had to be resolved with reference to public policy as informed by the values espoused by the 
Constitution.  
 
6.3 The role of certainty and freedom in the South African law of contract 
Chapter 2 explored more extensively the current status and development in South African 
common law of the principles of certainty and freedom of contract with specific reference to 
contractual discretionary powers.  
The discussion revealed that the fundamental analytical framework of the South African law of 
contract is centred on the “voluntary choices of individuals or more specifically, the voluntary 
assumption of obligations” and that the function of contract law “is conceived as principally the 
facilitation of voluntary choices by giving them legal effect.”2096  
                                                            
2096  Pretorius ‘The basis of contractual liability (1) Ideologies and approaches’ (2005) 68 THRHR 253, 253 & 260.  
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Pre-constitutional jurisprudence evidenced an erosion of the values of fairness, equity and good 
faith coupled with a reversion to “a libertarian view of the world.”2097 Not only has this 
reversion received further impetus in the post-constitutional setting, but the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, has also not responded to the constitutional imperative to promote the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights when developing the law (of contract). The Court’s judgments 
display a “hostility, not only to constitutional values, but also to broader concerns of equity and 
fairness...”2098 
The South African approach to freedom and sanctity of contract is criticized on the basis that 
the practice of law should also involve a process of constructive interpretation that seeks to 
achieve procedural and substantive fairness, and that takes cognizance of prevailing socio-
economic circumstances. Should the law do so, the role of the constitutional values of dignity, 
equality and freedom in the determination of contractual obligations and the resolution of 
contractual disputes is enhanced and the attainment of justice is facilitated.  
It was concluded that the strong classical contract law influence, grounded as it is in the 
principles of freedom and sanctity of contract, on the South African law of contract militates 
against the reception into our law of the notion of contracts of sale and lease at a reasonable 
price and rental respectively, or at a unilaterally determined price and rental as proposed in the 
obiter dicta. The conclusion is informed by: (i) the presumptive consensual nature of South 
African contract law that binds contractants regardless of considerations of reasonableness and 
fairness and that ignores challenges to contractual validity that are not founded on the grounds 
of improperly obtained consensus; (ii) court decisions led by the Supreme Court of Appeal that 
                                                            
2097   Advtech Resourcing (Pty) Ltd t/a Communicate Personnel Group v Kuhn and another 2008 (2) SA 375 (C) para 
[30]. The doctrine expounded individual freedom and liberty and informed the classical contract law 
approach to freedom and sanctity of contract. See chapter 2 para 2.2.1.  
2098  Bhana and Pieterse ‘Towards a Reconciliation of Contract Law and Constitutional Values: Brisley and Afrox 
Revisited’ (2005) 122 South African Law Journal 865, 865.  
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have “virtually elevated into a constitutional value”2099 the idea that public policy requires the 
enforcement of contracts; (iii) an approach that ignores the “statutory erosion”2100 of classical 
contract law by public interest legislation;2101 (iv) court decisions that have ignored2102 the 
Constitutional Court’s redefinition of public policy2103 as being informed by ubuntu and the 
constitutional values of dignity, equality and freedom, and as incorporating the notions of 
fairness, justice and equity, and reasonableness and the need to do simple justice between 
individuals; (v) an approach that ignores unequal bargaining power and that, in the interest of 
certainty, pays scant regard for unconscionability as a determinant of contractual validity; (vi) 
the Supreme Court of Appeal’s aversion to the recognition of good faith as a general underlying 
principle of contractual interpretation; and (vii) its reluctance to utilise constitutional values in 
the evaluation of contractual validity.2104 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
2099  Naudé and Lubbe (2005) 122 SALJ 441, 443. 
2100  Lubbe and Murray Contract (1983), 26. 
2101  See, for example, the legislation discussed in chapter 3. 
2102  For example, Bredenkamp and Others v Standard Bank of SA Ltd (appeal) 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA). It will be 
recalled that in chapter 1 para 1.3.3 it was explained that there are three cases involving the Applicant and 
that the Applicant’s name was spelt differently in two of the three cases. The precautionary measures 
described in chapter 1 para 1.3.3 to avoid confusion between the cases are also followed in this chapter and 
are repeated here for the sake of clarity. The spellings of the Applicant’s name as per the case citations will be 
retained and to avoid any confusion between the cases, the cases will hereafter be referred to as follows: 
Breedenkamp (interim interdict) 2009 (5) SA 304 (GSJ); Breedenkamp (return date) 2009 (6) SA 277 (GSJ); and 
Bredenkamp (appeal) 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA). See also Potgieter and Another v Potgieter NO and Others 2012 
(1) SA 651. 
2103  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC), hereafter Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC). See also Breedenkamp 
(interim interdict) 2009 (5) SA 304 (GSJ) and Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC), hereafter 
Hoffmann 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC). The cases are discussed in chapter 1 para 1.3.3 and in chapters 2 and 4. See also 
Nyandeni Local Municipality v Hlazo 2010 (4) SA 261 (ECM) discussed in chapter 2 para 2.3.2.2(A). 
2104  See, for example, Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA). 
 
 
 
 
363 
 
6.4 The role and impact of consumer protection legislation on the principles of certainty and 
freedom of contract 
Chapter 3 dealt with the impact of three legislative enactments2105 on the principles of freedom 
and certainty of contract. The three pieces of legislation protect consumer rights by imposing 
limitations on freedom of contract. The aim was to determine the extent to what the 
acceptance of the obiter dicta2106 would run counter to the jurisprudential basis and the public 
policy objectives of the enactments. A related objective was to determine whether public policy 
considerations can operate in harmony with contract law principles such as freedom, sanctity 
and certainty of contract. 
The legislation was found to exemplify the constitutional imperative, evident in the post-
constitutional ethic,2107 to foster socio-economic reforms for the transformation of the South 
African society into a just and egalitarian one; one founded on the constitutional values of 
dignity, equality, and freedom. Whilst the legislation recognise contractual autonomy as the 
appropriate social and legal mechanism to regulate one’s own affairs, they require that 
autonomy be exercised with restraint to promote a constitutional and/or a social and/or an 
economic objective.2108 The latter involves the principle of paternalism in terms whereof there 
is interference by the state with the autonomy of another person. The policy basis for the 
interference is that it protects the person interfered with, or that it is in the public interest. The 
result is that practical content is given to the constitutional values of dignity, equality, and 
freedom. The foregoing is founded on the view that the creation of contractual obligations is as 
                                                            
2105  The Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008; the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 and the Rental Housing Act 50 of 
1999. 
2106  The obiter dicta proposed the validity of contracts of sale and lease at a reasonable price and rental 
respectively or a unilaterally determined price and rental. 
2107  Examples of other legislation which display this ethic are the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 0f 1997 
and the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 which also address the inequality in 
bargaining power between suppliers and consumers. 
2108  The same recognition is evident in court decisions, for example, in Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC); 
Breedenkamp (interim interdict) 2009 (5) SA 304 (GSJ) and in Hoffmann 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC), discussed in 
chapter 1 para 1.3.3. 
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much a result of policy as it is of the intention of the contractants at work. The discussion found 
that public interest considerations which have clear policy imperatives can be utilised in 
harmony with existing principles of contract law and may even serve to strengthen these 
principles.2109 
In summary, the policy considerations underlying the legislative enactments that give 
expression to the contractual principles of consensus and certainty; that recognise the duty of 
good faith, and that concretises the constitutional values of dignity, equality and freedom, 
support the rejection of the proposals to confer validity on contracts of sale and lease at a 
reasonable and rental respectively, or at a unilaterally determined price and rental. Such 
contracts would give effect to the classical theory of contract law based on an adversarial 
system in terms of whereof a contractant is free to bind himself/herself even if it were to 
his/her detriment. This consequence would be contrary to the communitarian orientation of 
the legislation which is in line with the constitutional imperative to effect socio-economic 
reform for the creation of a just and egalitarian society based on constitutional values, including 
those of dignity, equality and freedom. Thus the legislation support the retention of the regime 
that imposes a duty to agree on an ascertained or objectively ascertainable price as a 
paternalistic restraint favouring extra-consensual normative control over party autonomy and 
the classical contract law orientation that characterises South African contract law. 
 
6.5 Constitutional, jurisprudential and policy imperatives informing the role and function of 
the essentialia of price and rental  
Chapter 4 concerned the question whether a reasonable price or rental, or a unilaterally 
determined price or rental can be said (i) to be the result of a voluntary choice; (ii) to promote 
                                                            
2109  See chapter 3 paras 3.6.10, 3.9 and 3.10. 
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certainty; and (iii) to be reflective of the constitutional, jurisprudential and policy imperatives 
that inform the essentialia of price and rental. 
The review of the constitutional, jurisprudential and policy imperatives of essentialia in relation 
to price and rental determination, and of the role of the courts in this connection, revealed that 
the creation of legally enforceable obligations must be informed by the constitutional values of 
dignity, equality and freedom. The communitarian orientation of the essentialia2110 that 
promotes consensus and certainty and that prevents disputes and counteracts possible abuses, 
transforms the essentialia from being sterile validity requirements into repositories of the 
constitutional values of dignity, equality and freedom, thus making them perfect vehicles for 
the implementation of these constitutional values in practice. These values act as a 
constitutional restraint on individualism and render agreements for a contract of sale and lease 
at a reasonable price and rental respectively, or at a unilaterally determined price or rental 
invalid as being contrary to public policy. Hence, such agreements fall foul of the 
communitarian function of essentialia. In addition, unilateral determination of price and rental 
would impinge on the non-arbitrary and non-capricious requirement of the law by slanting the 
apportionment of risk and contractual power in favour of the contractant who commands the 
discretionary power. 
In light of the proposition that price and rental can shape or cripple the future of an 
organisation or individual, the uncertainty regarding the eventual price or rental, engendered 
by the indeterminateness of the standard of reasonableness, could stifle effective and 
comprehensive planning which may negate the purpose of legislation aimed at reducing the 
levels of indebtedness. The result could be an insidious deterioration in the trust in, and respect 
for, contract law as an obligation-creating mechanism. This may be exacerbated by the 
                                                            
2110  In chapter 4 para 4.2.5 where it was explained that communitarianism, as does ubuntu, stresses the value of 
connection: members of society are viewed as being interdependent on one another and who place their 
needs and cares on par with those of others. 
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transaction costs of conducting litigation and by what could be a burdensome process for the 
courts to conduct elaborate enquiries to determine the reasonableness of the price and 
rental.2111  
The uncertainty, the inability to plan, the adverse impact on the levels of indebtedness, the 
challenges of accessing the courts and the skewed apportionment of risk raise serious policy 
concerns which go to the root of the constitutional values of dignity, equality and freedom. 
Thus, the principles informing the constitutional, jurisprudential and policy imperatives demand 
a rule-based approach to the essential of price. Within a rule-based paradigm, the essential of 
price contains both duty-imposing as well as power-conferring functions. Both functions 
confirm the theory that agreement on price and rental goes to the root (essence) of the 
contract and has policy relevance2112 and that, accordingly, the right connected thereto, is 
inalienable. The duty-imposing function places an absolute duty on contractants to negotiate 
and reach agreement on the price and rental and promotes certainty in that price and rental 
has to be either ascertained or objectively ascertainable. In requiring both contractants to be 
engaged in the creation of a contractual obligation which speaks to the essence of their 
contract, the duty-imposing function promotes certainty and at the same time gives expression 
to the contract law requirements of free choice and consensus. In thus giving effect to the 
constitutional imperative to infuse constitutional principles and values (such as dignity, equality 
and freedom) in contract law, it is in alignment with public interest legislation2113 as well as 
                                                            
2111  The time, energy, costs, effort, and risks associated with litigation limit access to courts. Contractants may 
also feel intimidated by the seller, especially if it is a large corporation or by the court process itself or by 
his/her lack of knowledge of the legal process. 
2112  Agreement promotes predictability, allowing the public to tailor their (the public’s) conduct accordingly. The 
resultant certainty inspires confidence in contract as an obligation-creating mechanism. Certainty allows for 
planning and increases the likelihood that private activity will follow a desired pattern. 
2113  For example, the consumer protection legislation discussed in chapter 3. Other examples are: Family Law: the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998, the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006; Labour Law: Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997; Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998; Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000; Property Law: the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and 
Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998. 
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Constitutional Court decisions.2114 The power-conferring function allows the contractants the 
freedom to negotiate a price and rental within the parameters of objective ascertainability. The 
exercise of the power would be subject to scrutiny by the standards of reasonableness, fairness 
and good faith which would serve as controlling mechanisms to prevent unconscionable or 
exploitative conduct. The duality2115 in the nature of the essentialia of price and rental 
promotes, not only, informed choice, consensus and certainty, but also, both procedural as well 
as substantive fairness.   
The recognition of a duty to negotiate in good faith as per the obiter dicta in the Everfresh 
Market Virginia v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd2116 is in line with the conclusion that both 
contractants should determine the price and rental: the duty informs and underpins the duty-
imposing component of the essentialia of price and rental. The duty would be incumbent on 
both contractants which is nothing more and nothing less than the conclusion in this thesis, 
namely, that the determination of the price and rental should not be left to the discretion of 
one of the contractants, neither should it be left to the imaginary reasonable person. The 
imposition of a duty to negotiate in good faith on both contractants promotes the contract law 
requirements of consensus (that incorporates informed choice) and certainty.  
In summary, a rule-based approach that requires an agreement from which the price and rental 
is objectively ascertainable without further reference to the contractants gives effect to equity 
based jurisprudence in that it advances the constitutional principles of dignity, equality and 
freedom, inclusive of ubuntu as defined by both Mokgoro J2117 and Ackerman J,2118 which 
principles are incorporated in the control mechanism of public policy as redefined by the 
Constitutional Court in the Barkhuizen case. 
                                                            
2114  See chapter 4 para 4.2.4.2. 
2115  Referring to the duty-imposing and power-conferring components. 
2116   2012 (1) SA 256 (CC), hereafter, Everfresh 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC).  
2117  S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), para [308]. See chapter 4 para 4.2.4.2(A)(ii) 
2118  Ferreira v Levin 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC). See chapter 4 para 4.2.4.2(A)(ii) 
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6.6 The notions of a reasonable price or rental and one determined unilaterally in 
comparative and international perspective  
The recognition of open price terms in the international jurisdictions2119 is based on an 
assumption that a valid contract exists despite the absence of agreement on a price. The 
assumption is criticised for being jurisprudentially unsound and for creating uncertainty. In 
addition, the standard of reasonableness which requires an examination of the facts of each 
case could result in a large number of precedents with a corresponding reduction in certainty 
and the social and economic utility thereof.2120 The combined effect of the foregoing could be a 
reduction in the utility and value of contracts as an obligation-creating mechanism.   
The review of the international jurisdictions also revealed that some of the interpretations of 
reasonableness are located in the requirement of objective ascertainability. However, where 
this is not the case, the international experience does not solve the problems associated with 
the indeterminateness of the standard of reasonableness as a controlling mechanism in relation 
to price and rental. Instead, the international experience confirms the conclusion reached in 
chapter 4 that the indeterminateness creates uncertainty and undermines the consensual 
aspect of contract law. The erosion of the principles of consensus and certainty at the expense 
of one of the contractants would diminish that contractant’s right to dignity, equality and 
freedom, rights that infuse contract law and the wider body of law in the constitutional era.2121  
The duty of good faith which features prominently in the international contract law landscape 
by its very nature does not address the issue of certainty. It serves, at best, as a standard 
against which conduct is measured2122 and hence it does not resolve the problems associated 
                                                            
2119  United States of America, England, Scotland, Germany and the Netherlands as well as in international 
instruments, namely, the United Nations Conventions on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (2004), and the Principles of European Contract 
Law. 
2120  See chapter 5 paras 5.2.2.2(D)(i)(a), 5.2.3 and 5.4. 
2121  Dignity also plays a defining role in the international arena. See chapter 4 para 4.2.4.2(A).  
2122  Van der Merwe et al Contract (2012) 169. 
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with the indeterminateness of a reasonable price. This is borne out by the fact that the 
meanings ascribed to a reasonable price do not materially differ in those jurisdictions that 
recognise a general duty of good faith and those that do not.2123 The duty also does not 
mitigate the fact that the standard of reasonableness in relation to price and rental does not 
place the contractants in a position of formal, procedural and substantive equality insofar as 
both risk and recourse is concerned. The exercise of good faith lies within the discretion and 
control of the empowered contractant. In the event of a dispute, the disempowered 
contractant would be saddled with the burden of proof and the transaction costs of challenging 
the price so determined.2124 Thus, the duty of good faith would not save the constitutional 
values of dignity, fairness and equality as core elements of the essentialia of price and rental, 
from being emasculated by the standard of reasonableness. 
The international experience also does not address the constitutional, jurisprudential and policy 
deficiencies of coupling the requirement of agreement on the essentialia of price and rental 
with the standard of reasonableness. In the absence of any meaningful contribution in these 
respects, it is submitted that the international experience cannot serve as authority for the 
implementation of the notion of a reasonable price and rental in the South African law of 
contract.  
Further support for the retention of the current position in South Africa may be found in the 
international compromise that led to the inclusion in the CISG of both Article 55 (open-price 
term) and Article 14(1) (closed-price term). The compromise constitutes an acknowledgment 
that conformity is not an inviolable principle and that rules of law are determined by 
constitutional and/or macro socio-economic and/or political considerations in each jurisdiction, 
and that the one (open-price term) is not necessarily better than the other (closed-price term). 
                                                            
2123  A general duty exist in the all the jurisdictions except for England (chapter 5, para 5.2.3.2(B)(i)) and the CISG 
(5.2.7.2(G)). 
2124  The disempowered contractant will probably be the one having the weaker bargaining power and may not be 
able to carry the transaction costs.  
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The compromise also proves that the closed-price term model is well supported in many 
countries. Furthermore, the acknowledgement2125 that an open-price provision may contradict 
national policy directions such as those that underpin macroeconomic government plans2126 
supports the conclusion that the recognition of the standard of reasonableness in relation to 
price and rental would run counter to the constitutional imperatives for socio-economic reform 
and the policy considerations in consumer protection legislation designed to give effect to 
these imperatives.2127 The recognition of a contract of sale and lease at a reasonable price and 
rental respectively, or at a unilaterally determined price or rental may be perceived as impeding 
such reform. 
Hence, the retention of the status quo does not mean that South Africa would be “out of step 
with modern legal systems”2128 because the retention of the status quo is defensible on the 
basis of international law and practice2129 and on the grounds of existing contract law 
principles2130 and on constitutional grounds and is reflective of the policy considerations 
underpinning public interest legislation.2131 
 
6.7 Overall conclusion 
“Sherlock Holmes and Dr Watson go on a camping trip. They set up their tent, have a modest 
repast, and go to sleep. In the middle of the night, Holmes wakes Watson up and asks him, 
                                                            
2125  That led to the compromise to include both Articles 14(1) and 55 in the CISG. See chapter 5 para 5.2.7.2(B).  
2126  See chapter 5 paras 5.2.7.2(B)(ii) and 5.2.7.2(B)-(F).  
2127  Another example relating to the law of property are the imperatives in section 25 of the Constitution which 
are intended to simultaneously protect existing property rights whilst at the same time permitting legislative 
reforms with the aim of correcting historical imbalances of property and wealth. The Prevention of Illegal 
Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Ac Act 19 of 1998 is an example of legislation aimed at 
promoting security of tenure. Other examples are The Extension of Security and Tenure Act (ESTA) 62 of 1997, 
the Interim Protection of Informal Rights Act 31 of 1996 and The Communal Properties Association Act 28 of 
1996. 
2128  As suggested in NBS Boland Bank 1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA) para [16].  
2129  See the inclusion in the CISG of Article 14(2) regarding closed price terms (chapter 5 para 5.2.7.2(B)(ii)), and of 
Article 4(a) which places the requirements for the validity of a contract outside of the scope of the CISG 
(chapter 5 para 5.2.7.2(E)(iii)) to accommodate national interests.  
2130  For example, freedom of contract, consensus and certainty. 
2131  See the discussion in chapter 3. 
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‘What do you see?’ Watson looks up and sees the night sky and tells Holmes so. ‘What does it 
mean?’ Holmes asks. Pondering this deep question, Watson answers, ‘It means the universe is 
vast and mysterious and our knowledge limited. It means that we can only understand what we 
can observe and that - Holmes interrupts him. ‘No, you idiot,’ he says. ‘It means someone has 
stolen our tent.’2132  
The story illustrates that the truth in the obvious is often overlooked; likewise in contract law. 
Freedom is often equated with non-regulation of conduct.2133 The truth that is often 
overlooked is that freedom, including freedom of contract, functions best in a robust regulatory 
environment backed up by the rule of law.2134 John Locke observed that ‘where there is no Law, 
there is no Freedom.’2135 In other words, freedom is enabled by law and without law, one 
cannot have freedom.2136 Hence, the imperative is to regulate contractual relationships to 
ensure that human relationships, on all levels,2137 comport with minimum standards that are 
compatible with the norms and expectations of a free and democratic society.2138  
In contract law, the rules of contract, inter alia, the essentialia of price and rental set the 
minimum standards for a regulatory framework that best promotes the values of a free and 
democratic society based on dignity, equality and freedom. They represent the distillate and 
wisdom of legal choices that have evolved over the centuries about the protections that 
civilians have a right to expect when entering the contractual domain and the risks associated 
therewith. In doing so, they promote individual choice within the framework of the law.2139 
                                                            
2132  Singer ‘Subprime: Why a Free and Democratic Society Needs Law’ (2012) 47 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties 
Law Review 141, 141-142, hereafter Singer (2012) 47 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties LR 141. 
2133  See chapter 2 paras 2.2.1 and 2.2.2. 
2134  See chapter 3 paras 3.9 and 3.10.    
2135  Singer (2012) 47 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties LR 144. 
2136  See chapter 4 paras 4.2.1-4.2.3. 
2137  Be it personal, social, economic, business, or legal.  
2138  Singer (2012) 47 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties LR 143-144. The consumer protection legislation discussed 
in chapter 3 are illustrative of this imperative. See also chapter 4 paras 4.2.1-4.2.3. 
2139  Singer (2012) 47 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties LR 149. 
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The exceptio doli generalis and the doctrine of laessio enormis no longer form part of our law. 
However, their philosophical underpinnings as tools of equity cannot be overstated and a 
revival thereof is to be discerned in the consumer protection legislation.2140 The redefinition of 
public policy in Barkhuizen2141 is confirmation that the fundamental rights and the values of the 
Constitution find expression in the concept of public policy. Thus, in the words of Van 
Huyssteen,2142 “matters of policy and socio-economic factors can no longer be ignored and 
passed over as being the exclusive domain of the legislature [when courts are engaged] in the 
process of finding a fair balance between the interests of the parties...”  
In respect of the duty of good faith the submission is that good faith serves as a justification for 
the duty-imposing aspect of the essentialia of price and rental that requires both contractants 
to jointly participate in the determination of an ascertained or objectively ascertainable price or 
rental. Thus, the duty to participate gives expression to the constitutional values of dignity, 
equality and freedom. The role of these values in the contract law arena was recognised by the 
Constitutional Court when it cautioned that the notion of sanctity of contract must be 
tempered by considerations of morality and public policy as discerned from the values 
embodied in the Constitution, and especially the Bill of Rights.2143 A contract that provides for a 
reasonable price or rental or for a unilaterally determined price or rental deprives the 
disempowered contractant from participation in the good faith negotiations2144 to arrive at a 
price or rental; this runs counter to the imperatives of public policy as redefined and as 
reflected in public interest legislation examined earlier. The recognition of a general duty of 
                                                            
2140  See chapter 3. 
2141  2007 (5) SA 323 (CC).  
2142  Van Huyssteen et al Contract Law in South Africa (2012) para [26]. 
2143  Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC), para [30] discussed in chapter 1, para 1.3.3 and in chapters 2 and 4 above. 
2144  One of the values of negotiation is that they serve to reveal otherwise unobtainable information about 
personal preferences and economic opportunities that may be valuable in the process of allocation and 
acceptance of contractual obligations and the associated risks, and, in the process, they promote economic or 
allocative efficiency. Murphy et al Studies in Contract Law (2003), 27-28. 
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good faith that seems imminent in light of the obiter dicta in the Everfresh case supports this 
conclusion. 
In evaluating the discussion and conclusions reached in the preceding chapters, it is submitted 
that a development that recognizes a reasonable price or rental or one that is determined 
unilaterally, is neither reflective of current socio-economic policies as represented by the 
consumer protection legislation and case law,2145 nor is it conducive to bringing justice any 
closer to the people. Equity may require modification of a rule where such rule causes 
hardship,2146 but the discussion has shown that no hardship is caused by the adherence to the 
generality of the rule that the price must be ascertained or objectively ascertainable. On the 
contrary, hardship is more likely in the event of a unilateral discretionary power to settle a price 
or rental or an agreement to a reasonable price or rental. It is, therefore, submitted that equity 
is not advanced by discarding the characterisation of the requirement that the price or rental 
must be ascertained or objectively ascertainable as a rule, and replacing it with the standard of 
reasonableness. Instead, equity is advanced by the certainty, clarity, transparency that results 
from the classification of the requirement as a rule. 
The totality of arguments presented above lead to the conclusion that the obiter dicta in the 
NBS Boland Bank and in the Genac Properties cases2147 which advocate the recognition of 
contracts of sales and leases at a reasonable price and rental respectively, and at a unilaterally 
determined price or rental, are indefensible in law and undesirable as a matter of policy and 
practice. 
 
                                                            
2145  Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) (chapter 1 para 1.3.3); Hoffman v South African Airways 2000 (11) BCLR 1211 
(CC) (chapter 1 para 1.3.3); Affordable Medicines Trust and others v Minister of Health and Others 2006 (3) SA 
247 (CC), (chapter 2 para 2.3.2.2(C)); Advtech Resourcing (Pty) Ltd t/a Communicate Personnel Group v Kuhn 
2008 (2) SA 375 (C) (chapter 2 para 2.3.2.2(C)); Mozart Ice Cream Franchises (Pty) Ltd v Davidoff 2009 (3) SA 
78 (C) (chapter 2 para 2.3.2.2(C)); Nyandeni Local Municipality v Hlazo 2010 (4) 261 (ECM) (chapter 2 para 
2.3.2.2). 
2146  Allen Law in the Making (1964) 385.  
2147  1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA) and 1992 (1) SA 566 (AD). 
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It is indefensible in law in that  
(i) it would be constitutionally unsound, as being against the notion of public policy 
as redefined by the Constitutional Court.2148 
(ii) it would contradict the trend towards the equitable considerations of good faith, 
fairness and reasonableness playing a more prominent role in decisions on the 
validity of contractual terms.2149 
(iii) it would not promote the principle of consensus in its broad, general sense,2150  
between the contractants as required by the authorities.2151 
(iv) it would result in the surrender of the freedom to contract at the most basic 
level in that it would disempower the disempowered contractant from 
participating in the formulation the price and rental which constitute the 
essence of the contract.2152    
(v) the indeterminateness of the standard of reasonableness in relation to price and 
rental could complicate the development of a body of precedent, resulting in a 
reduction in certainty and the ability of contractants to plan their contractual 
relations.2153 This could lead to a decline in the confidence in contract as an 
obligation-creating mechanism and consequently in the respect for, and, 
confidence in the regulatory function of the law itself.  
 
                                                            
2148  See Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) discussed in chapter 1 para 1.3.3. 
2149  This trend has emerged under the influence of the Constitution in cases such as Barkhuizen 2007 (5) SA 323 
(CC) (chapter 1 para 1.3.3); Hoffman 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) (chapter 1 para 1.3.3); Affordable Medicines Trust and 
others v Minister of Health and Others 2006 (3) SA 247 (CC), (chapter 2 para 2.3.2.2(C)); Advtech Resourcing 
(Pty) Ltd t/a Communicate Personnel Group v Kuhn 2008 (2) SA 375 (C) (chapter 2 para 2.3.2.2(C)); Mozart Ice 
Cream Franchises (Pty) Ltd v Davidoff 2009 (3) SA 78 (C) (chapter 2 para 2.3.2.2(C)); Nyandeni Local 
Municipality v Hlazo 2010 (4) 261 (ECM) (chapter 2 para 2.3.2.2). 
2150  See chapter 2 para 2.2.2.  
2151  See Kerr Sale and Lease (2004) 3–5; Hosten Introduction (1995) 702–713; Hackwil MacKeurten’s The Law of 
Sale of Goods in South Africa (1984) 4-5. 
2152  See chapter 4 para 4.3.3.3(D).  
2153  See chapter 4 para 4.3.4. 
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(vi) it would, generally speaking, be detrimental to the interests of the buyer and 
would run counter to: 
(a) common law protections, such as the implied warranties, that have 
historically developed to protect the buyer.2154 
(b)  legislative interventions such as the consumer protection legislation 
discussed in chapter 3 which, as a matter of law and policy, seek to 
benefit and protect the consumer.2155 
From a policy perspective, it is undesirable in that: 
(i) it would run counter to the constitutional imperative to promote socio-economic 
reforms for the attainment of a just and egalitarian society based on the 
constitutional values of dignity, equality and freedom as evidenced by public 
interest legislation.2156 In this context, and taking into account the UNISA-
Momentum report on the persistently high levels of indebtedness despite the 
provisions of the National Credit Act, it could cause a further spike in the levels 
of indebtedness and over-indebtedness. 
(ii) it could lead to unnecessary litigation. The proposition is that litigation would be 
avoided if, at the outset, the contractants manifest their respective positions 
                                                            
2154  See chapter 1 para 1.3.1.2(D). 
2155  Despite these and other legislative efforts, Sachs J at para [184] in the Barkhuizen case is of the opinion that 
South Africa lags behind “other parts of the industrialized world” insofar as consumer protection is 
concerned.    
2156  For example, the consumer protection legislation discussed in chapter 3 above. Other examples are, the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act 75 0f 1997 relating, inter alia, to wages and working hours and the Broad-
Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 relating to government tenders. Another example, is the 
Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998, the ambit whereof has 
been extended by the courts so that the common law right of a lessor to summarily evict a tenant and any 
contractual provision regarding the eviction of a tenant, are subjugated to the provisions of the Act. See 
Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker v Jika [2002] 4 All SA 384 (SCA). Such legislation, whilst recognising contractual 
autonomy, require that it be exercised with restraint to promote a political or social objective. Contractual 
autonomy becomes the backdrop against which political or social principles of justice have to operate. The 
latter involves the principle of paternalism in terms whereof interference by the state with the autonomy of 
another is justified by a claim that the interference is for the protection of the person interfered with or is in 
the public interest.  
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regarding the price that should be paid, thereby giving each an opportunity to 
walk away from the deal if the proposed price is unacceptable as being either 
too high or too low as the case may be. 
(iii) it could burden the weaker contractant with the burden of proof and the 
transaction costs of litigation.   
(iv) it could raise questions about the role and function of a court where it 
determines that a discretion has not been reasonably exercised. The wisdom of a 
court participating in the contract-creating process is questionable.2157 According 
to Lubbe, “judges are, in general, not entitled to supply terms and make 
contracts where the parties have not indicated their intention clearly.”2158 
It is undesirable in practice because: 
(i) of the uncertainty surrounding the method of calculating the price and rental. 
(ii) recognition thereof may exacerbate the current unequal bargaining power2159 
that exists between many buyers and sellers and between lessors and 
tenants.2160 The possibility exists that clauses to the effect advocated in the two 
obiter dicta may be included in standard form contracts thereby further 
compromising the buyer and the tenant’s ability to bargain and in the process 
inhibiting the buyer and the tenant’s freedom to contract. This would negate the 
policy gains made by the consumer protection legislation discussed in chapter 3.  
(iii) a seller or lessor2161 may abuse his/her discretionary power and fix a price or 
rental that exceeds the real value of the commodity secure in the knowledge 
                                                            
2157  See the discussion in chapter 4 para 4.4; 
2158  Lubbe & Murray (1983) Contract 307. 
2159  The Barkhuizen case para [59] confirmed the principle recognised in Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) 
SA 21 (SCA) that unequal bargaining power is indeed one of the factors that play a role in the consideration of 
public policy. 
2160  See chapter 2 para 2.4.4.  
2161  Sellers are usually in the better bargaining position. 
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that the buyer or tenant may not have the means to engage in costly and/or 
lengthy litigation.2162  
In the Barkhuizen case, Sachs J expressed a concern that underscores the points 
made in (ii) and (iii) above. The learned judge’s discomfort with standard form 
contracts and its potential for abuse is evident when he leaves for future 
consideration the question whether onerous and unilaterally imposed standard-
form contracts of adhesion should in general be regarded as offensive to public 
policy in our new constitutional dispensation.2163 In the Breedenkamp case, the 
court summarised Sachs J’s comments as expressing a concern with “the manner 
in which large powerful organizations wield oppressive contractual power in a 
way that allows them to impose onerous and unfair contractual terms on 
subordinate contractual parties.”2164 
The current provisions in our law relating to the price and the rental are sufficiently refined and 
developed to give expression, not only, to the needs of commercial reality, but more 
importantly, to the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom (including 
freedom of contract) that underpin the Constitution.2165 
In summary, the discussion in this thesis supports the theory that the Westinghouse principle 
that the price must be ascertained or objectively ascertainable is based on a policy judgment 
that contract law should be certain. The soundness of this judgment is borne out by the 
constitutional imperative to effect socio-economic reform for the creation of a just and 
egalitarian society based on the constitutional values of dignity, equality and freedom and the 
broader legislative policies as evidenced in recent consumer protection legislation.  
                                                            
2162  Kerr The Law of Sale and Lease (2004) 72. 
2163  Paras [184] and [185]. 
2164  Breedenkamp (interim interdict) 2009 (5) SA 304 (GSJ), para [56]. See also comments in similar vein in paras 
[60] and [68]. 
2165  Sections 10, 9 and 7(1) respectively of the Constitution. 
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Furthermore, it is founded on the fundamental principle that contracts are discrete transactions 
where contractants reach agreement on all material terms at date of contract. Finally, it is 
based on an aversion to the difficulties in supplying a term on which the contractants had not 
agreed upon. In this regard, the approach of the courts is reflective of the sensitivities of the 
delicate interstitial role played by courts. 
================================================= 
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